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This thesis explores the cultural politics of nature conservation in the UK in the 1990s.
Working with the insights provided by social constructivist approaches to nature and to
knowledge and extending the insights of Michel Foucault to the natural world, the thesis
examines the social and cultural processes that underpin the contemporary practices of
conserving nature. Calling upon ethnographic work on nature reserves, semi-structured
interviews with site managers and policy-makers and the analysis of texts, it examines
two examples of conservation practice: the broad shift in policy at the national scale
marked by the institutionalisation of the concept of 'biodiversity' and the changes in
management at Abernethy Forest in the Cairngorms, Scotland. These examples are
examined to investigate the processes and practices through which appropriate
conservation action is achieved and renegotiated.
The institutionalisation of 'biodiversity' is examined in two ways. First, the
establishment of the 'biodiversity process' around a business model of target-led species
and habitat action planning is investigated through the practices that give it shape. The
classification of habitats, the prioritisation of species and writing of plans are examined.
It is argued that this new regime of practice, through which new 'objects' of
conservation and new forms of knowledge are constructed, should be understood in the
broader social and political context of fights over nature and over the achievement of
powerful social positions. Secondly, the institutionalisation of biodiversity is examined
through the ways that people talk and argue about it. Calling upon the concepts of
discourse theory, the thesis focuses on the repertoires and rhetorical strategies used by
individuals to argue for particular understandings of nature. The development of
'biodiversity conservation' is revealed as negotiated through complex social and political
power relations and as involving the introduction of new sets of practices, the
development of new forms of knowledge and fights over the meaning of nature and
naturalness.
This analysis is extended by examining the process of policy change in one
detailed example of practice. By focusing on the changing construction of pine
woodlands and the changing management of Abernethy Forest Reserve, the thesis draws
out the complex relations between ideas of nature, ecological knowledge and
conservation action. It illustrates how the initial policy of minimal intervention was an
achievement that required multiple constructions of the forest to be balanced. But it also
illustrates how, as that policy began to have negative effects, the ideas of nature, the
ecological knowledge and appropriate practice were reworked and argued over. The very
idea of what constitutes a natural pinewood is shown to be revised and the management
changed with moves towards greater levels of intervention.
The purpose of adopting a broadly constructivist orientation to nature
conservation is to provide an analysis that allows insight into how conservation works
and how it has arrived at the present situation, a situation where the natural world seems
to be controlled and managed in increasingly sophisticated ways. The thesis therefore
has a critical intent. It seeks to argue for, and contribute to, greater reflection on where
present developments might be taking us and on the sorts of knowledge and practices
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PREFACE
On the 21st of May 2002, the Natural Environment Research Council held a debate in
Edinburgh entitled 'Land Use or ABUSE - a debate on managing the Scottish uplands'. The
great and the good of Scottish land management were there. There were eminent research
scientists, prominent figures in wildlife conservation and representatives from NGOs, land¬
owning interests and government. They were treated to brief talks on the role of the
researcher in environmental issues, research on over-grazing by sheep and deer, attempts to
find a resolution to conflicts over raptors on grouse moors and a plea that policy should be
changed to reward good management rather than productivity. The purpose of the meeting
was to discuss the place of natural science in land management.
After the talks, the debate was opened to the floor. Speakers rose to their feet to
challenge points made by the panel or to argue that a good way of managing the uplands
would be to create zones where different land uses could be catered for. The issues that were
raised were complex ones about how to find the best way forward and what constituted good
land management. These were questions that science could not address and after many
speakers had spoken and after the land-owners had locked horns with the RSPB, one
researcher - despite the moral and social issues evident in the very title - queried the debate:
'surely these are social issues, but we are here to discuss the role of science'.
In questioning the way this debate on natural science had veered towards social
issues, this researcher raised some crucial questions. What is the place of science in
environmental issues? How do we decide on the appropriate way to tackle these problems?
There were two responses to this query. The first was to agree that social issues and science
are separate and say, as John Lawton the Chief Executive of NERC did at the end of the
debate, that 'we need to decide what sort of countryside we want, but this is not a scientific
question, it is a social one. Science can help us achieve that vision, but first of all it is a
question for society'. The second response was raised in suggestions that, if these complex
issues of land management were to be adequately addressed, the social sciences had to be
brought in. You cannot, one speaker said, divorce natural and social science: you need the
social scientists to address the social or economic impacts of certain management scenarios
or to investigate why interest groups understand the issues in the ways that they do or how
they might react to specific policy initiatives.
This thesis takes issue with these responses to questions of how to deal with
environmental problems. It approaches environmental issues from the social sciences, but it
vii
does not accept the role that is usually prescribed for them as a bolt-on addition to a natural
science project, and it does not assume that science is simply applied to technical problems
after social decisions have been made. Rather, the thesis seeks to illustrate that the social
sciences have more to contribute to resolving these issues than assessing socio-economic
impact or responses to policy.
While the social sciences are currently involved in understanding environmental
issues - within an implicit division of labour where the natural sciences study 'the
environment' and the social sciences study 'the people' - the people that the social sciences
are meant to study are invariably other people. But if we think about the way that academics,
policy-makers and managers argue over what the problems are, how to proceed and possible
solutions, we have to recognise that the whole field of environmental policy-making is itself
a social arena. Environmental policy-making is not simply an instrumental response to
environmental problems; it is a social phenomenon. It is not simply a neutral and objective
process, as is often assumed by many involved. It is a power-laden, moral activity that has
significant implications for how we relate to others and to the world around us. As such, it is
possible to approach the social practice of conservation itself, with tools provided by the
social sciences and, through its study, contribute towards critical reflection on where
conservation might be heading.
This is important because as more and more technical solutions are proposed for
environmental problems, and as environmental management driven by the natural sciences
becomes increasingly sophisticated, many commentators question whether we are simply
addressing the symptoms rather than the actual problems. One of the problems is, I suggest,
the very way that we conceptualise environmental issues. And one manifestation of that
conceptualisation is evident in the lines that are drawn between the natural and social
sciences and the division of labour that this implies. If we are to tackle environmental issues
in meaningful ways, I believe that we need to rethink the relationship between the natural
and the social sciences and the roles that they have conventionally been understood to
perform in relation to those issues. Social and natural scientists need to enter a dialogue and
find new ways of thinking about environmental problems and nature more generally. This
thesis is intended as a contribution to that dialogue and an illustration of the sorts of insights
that constructivist social science can contribute to the process of rethinking nature.
1
Introduction
Exploring the Cultures of Nature Conservation
Writing in 1980, thirty-one years after the institutionalisation of the Nature Conservancy (for
a glossary see appendix I), Mabey assessed how far nature conservation had come and made
suggestions about how it might go forward. While he noted the successes that had been
achieved in terms of the development of a system of reserves, he closed his assessment by
saying that 'all this economic and administrative activity will be pointless - and quite likely
fruitless - if it does not have the support and active involvement of the whole community'
(Mabey 1980: 248). He argued that if conservation was to succeed in protecting nature and
in getting a concern for the natural world to pervade society, it would have to break out of its
specialised 'niche' and enthuse others outside the field of conservation.
Sixteen years later, Adams (1996a) made broadly the same claims. Despite its
apparent success - with a growing list of designations and a steadily increasing number of
people becoming members of conservation organisations - nature conservation had not made
significant headway. Setting out principles for future conservation, Adams echoed Mabey
and suggested that 'nature is everywhere, and nature conservation is therefore something that
must be pursued everywhere and must be built into the weave of human life ... we should
build connections between people and nature. Conservation must be woven into everyday
life...We need to re-establish the links between people and nature' (Adams 1996a: 171-172).
Again, after nearly fifty years of nature conservation activity, it was suggested that if it was
to succeed, conservation had to broaden its scope.
Today there are many encouraging developments. Agricultural policy is shifting
towards rewarding responsible management rather than productivity, forestry organisations
are becoming evermore sympathetic towards the needs of wildlife, conservation is being
taken into urban areas with the development of community woodlands and wildflower
meadows and, in Scotland, a duty to consider the impact of any governmental policy on
biodiversity is being written into legislation. Nevertheless, Marren (2002: 306) suggests that
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'nature conservation remains a rather inclusive activity with an off-putting bureaucratic
language'. By 'inclusive', Marren means that conservation is still a 'sectarian activity' and
that, despite these encouraging developments, it has not managed to break out of its 'sector'
to develop a 'universal ethic' throughout society.
The most common response to the recognition that conservation is not making
significant progress is to understand the issue to be one of communication. In one conference
after another I have heard speaker after speaker bemoan how conservation is somehow not
getting its message across. The implicit belief is that if only we could impart our knowledge,
people would change their ways and conservation would be more firmly embedded in
society. Thus, in major initiatives such as the current development of a Scottish Biodiversity
Strategy, an 'education and communication' working group has the job of identifying the
way that conservation 'messages' can more effectively be communicated.
In this thesis, I aim to enhance our understanding of why there has been a lack of
significant progress by raising a different sort of question. Might it be that nature
conservation's halting progress derives not simply from inadequate communication, but from
the way that nature conservation understands and approaches 'nature'?
To answer this question what is needed is critical reflection upon nature
conservation's underpinning assumptions, its ways of working and upon what
conservationists mean by 'nature'. I aim to contribute to this sort of critical reflection. More
specifically, I attempt to render conservation practice 'strange' and to ask why we conserve
nature in the ways that we do? Why do we uproot or chop down some species and leave
others to flourish? Why do we write action plans and set targets? What are the assumptions
about 'nature' that underpin different forms of action? When we look at the changing way
that we have conserved nature, why do certain forms of conservation seem appropriate at one
moment but inappropriate at another? In short, I examine the processes through which
appropriate conservation policy is developed in order to explore the ways that
conservationists themselves understand conservation problems and seek solutions.
To analyse these processes of problem construction and policy development, I draw
upon theoretical and methodological resources from post-structuralism and discourse
analysis. I argue that conservation policies depend upon the social construction of problems
and of nature more generally. Appropriate conservation policies are not instrumentally
related to problems as if one necessarily implies the other because the very ability to see
certain events, issues or processes as a problem depends upon the development of a socially
embedded 'way of seeing'. I do not, therefore, seek to examine specific conservation policies
with the intent of commenting on their utility or appropriateness. Rather, I want to approach
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those policies as social phenomena that can provide insight into the culture of nature
conservation.
Through the analysis of documents, twenty semi-structured in-depth interviews with
policy-makers and site managers, and through periods spent as a volunteer on nature
reserves, special attention is paid to two examples. The first is the development of new
mechanisms through which nature conservation practice is organised at a national scale: the
development of biodiversity action plans and a continuing 'biodiversity process'. The second
is changing management practice on one site: Abernethy Forest in the Cairngorms, Scotland.
Through these examples I investigate problem construction, the underlying assumptions that
shape action and the connections between science, conservation institutions and the policy
process. With reference to biodiversity action planning, I examine the practices through
which the biodiversity process works and the ways that different people argue over whether
or not the approach taken is appropriate. With reference to Abemethy, I explore the gradual
change in management and how this involves the reconstruction of what is 'natural'. Both
examples illustrate that what is understood to be appropriate conservation policy, and indeed
what is understood by 'nature' or 'biodiversity', is a culturally negotiated achievement in the
context of complex social and political power relations. Broad policies and specific
management strategies are continually being renegotiated as the context, ecological
knowledge and ideas of nature and naturalness, change.
This sort of analysis engages with the work of others that have sought to understand
why we conserve nature in the ways that we do. In particular, it engages with Adams' (1997;
see also Hajer 1995) analysis of the relationship of conservation to processes of
rationalisation or modernisation in western society. While conservation and the
establishment of nature reserves can be understood to be a reaction against these processes,
Adams claims that, in the UK at least, it is also very much part of rationalisation because of
its technocratic approach to controlling and manipulating nature. This thesis engages with
these ideas through the work of Michel Foucault and uses a broadly constructivist analysis to
examine empirically the institutional and discursive processes through which conservation
appears to be increasingly becoming part of rationalisation. The analysis is intended as a
means of bringing these processes to the fore - processes that can often be taken for granted
or obscured - so that we can more readily debate what such developments mean for the
practice of nature conservation and whether we are heading in the right direction. The thesis
is presented, therefore, as a contribution to the process of developing new approaches to
nature conservation.
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Structure of the thesis
In chapter two, I set the scene for the analysis that follows. In the first section, I detail,
through reference to secondary literature, something of the history of nature conservation
and of recent changes in the field. The intention is to draw the reader's attention to the
changes that I am interested in and to contextualise them. It is here that I introduce the
development of the concept of biodiversity and the interventionist nature of conservation
itself. This interventionism or managerialism is then related to Adams' (1997) claim that
while conservation can be understood as a reaction to the development of modern industrial
society, it is, with its tendency to intervene in ecological systems in a technocratic way, also
part of the process of rationalisation. Whilst I find these claims persuasive, I argue that we
need analytical tools that can be employed to understand how rationalisation works in
conservation. Chapter two therefore moves on to consider recent theoretical developments
that, I suggest, should be acknowledged by those, like myself, attempting to understand and
tell the story of recent change. In particular, I review the social constructivist approaches to
nature and to knowledge and turn to the work of Michel Foucault. Whilst his focus was on
the 'rationalisation of the body' and the 'rationalisation of populations' by new combinations
of power/knowledge, I hope to add to the voices of others (Hajer 1995; Darier 1999) in
suggesting that his work has relevance for understanding the rationalisation of nature. I close
the chapter by addressing the question of whether this approach represents either a
productive or destructive move. While some suggest that the constructivist approach ushers
in a relativism that removes the authority of conservationists to speak on nature's behalf and
that it undermines conservation, I suggest that it provides useful and important insights.
In chapter three, I detail my methodology in a way that engages with the
implications of a constructivist approach. An important issue here is reflexivity. It would be
contradictory to adopt a constructivist stance and emphasise the situated and 'messy' nature
of the knowledge claims of others, only to then implicitly suggest that I have direct reference
to some external reality irrespective of my own situation. For this reason, chapter three does
not simply recount what methods were used and why they were chosen and thought to be
most appropriate. Rather, it critically reflects upon the construction of my own knowledge
claims. In particular, this chapter engages with the problem of how to represent the research
process. This is important because while the acknowledgement of the need for reflexivity
encourages researchers to see their own practice as situated and messy, it is common for the
research to be reported in ways that suggest that it adhered to a neat ideal of design,
collection and analysis. I have tried to represent my own research in a way that does not
misrepresent it and make it fit an ideal that was not apparent in the doing, by providing a
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'thick description' (Geertz 1973) of the research process using the materials that I generated
at the time. Just as I use texts and interviews to tell the story of conservation, I use the texts
that I produced for supervisors or letters written to interviewees and 'gatekeepers' to tell the
story of my own research.
Chapter three concludes by considering three issues in detail. The first is the ethics
ofmy research. In particular, I focus on the negotiation of access as a continuous process and
on the issue of uninformed consent. I suggest that it is impossible to provide enough
information for informed consent to be given, precisely because the researcher is not
normally sure where the research is going. Consequently, I question rigid ethical procedures
and align myself with those that subscribe to a situated ethics. The second issue is the
practice of discourse analysis. I explain my intention to perform a discourse analysis similar
to that of Fairclough (1992), but detail what I actually did and how it differed. The third
issue is the move I made from examining the biodiversity process to examining the changes
in management at one site.
In chapter four, I begin my substantive engagement with conservation by examining
the development of the biodiversity process as discourse. With Foucault's analyses of
disciplinary society and sexuality in mind, I pay attention to the way that the natural world is
classified and thus to the way that new conservation objects are created and rendered
manageable. I explore the development of new mechanisms for prioritising species and the
development of new practices based around action planning and I suggest that these practices
connect to a more rigorous system of site management planning. Thus, I argue that with the
development of the biodiversity process, what we begin to see is the establishment of a more
coherent nature conservation. Site management, which used to be relatively diverse, comes
to be co-ordinated by scientists in a new regime of practice. It is a regime that should be
understood as inherently political, because with the establishment of the biodiversity process
we see both the re-negotiation of the place of science within conservation and the negotiation
of the place of conservation within wider society. In the biodiversity process, then, I suggest
we see the introduction of a new conservation discourse, a new way of understanding and
doing conservation.
In chapter five, I extend my analysis of biodiversity as discourse to examine
biodiversity in discourse. Calling upon more linguistically-oriented discourse analysis, I
supplement Foucault's emphasis on institutional practice by paying attention to how people
argue over, and speak about, that practice. I focus on the way that different interviewees
articulated different sorts of arguments in support of their respective positions in order to
draw out how the development of the biodiversity process was actually negotiated. In
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particular, I identify two rhetorical strategies for dealing with the apparent dilemma of
whether conservation should be species or habitat based (species and habitat action planning
lies at the heart of the biodiversity process). This approach extends the analysis of the last
chapter because what is emphasised is negotiation and argument. People are not simply
subject to the development of a bureaucratic process: they argue over it and fight to see their
position achieve ascendancy. In order to draw out how this negotiation is worked out in
practice, I focus on one example: Insh Marshes Nature Reserve on the River Spey in the
Highlands of Scotland. By looking at the different forms of management and the arguments
that are made to support those practices, it is possible to see how different and even
contradictory constructions of nature and rhetorical positions can be accommodated.
In chapter six, I move from my engagement with biodiversity to the first of two
chapters on the changing management at Abernethy in the Cairngorms. In this chapter, I
focus on the management regime in the early years of RSPB ownership (1988-1995). The
early policy was essentially one of minimal intervention in the pinewoods. I examine what
minimal intervention means and how it was arrived at as the appropriate form of practice. In
particular, 1 emphasise the dual construction of the pinewoods as 'natural' and 'unnatural', as
remnants of past naturalness and as drastically altered over time. I argue that this dual
construction sits at the heart of the policy of minimal intervention, which allows drastic
management intervention in some areas and not in others. I emphasise that the practices that
are undertaken rest firmly on the way that the forest has been constructed as an idea. Large
plantations can be felled or restructured precisely because they are constructed as being
relatively unnatural, while 'ancient semi-natural' areas must be left alone precisely because
of their apparent naturalness. In the process, I illustrate the way that new sorts of forest -
such as the 'ancient' or 'semi-natural' woodland - were invented. In the end, I suggest that
the policy of minimal intervention was an achievement that involved balancing different
constructions of the pinewoods and pinewood species.
Chapter seven moves on to illustrate how that balance was renegotiated. As the
policy of minimal intervention started to have what were understood as negative effects, the
practices that had been undertaken, and the constructions of the pinewoods that underpinned
those practices, were questioned. Calling upon interview material with site managers, reserve
ecologists and researchers, I explore how the idea of the natural pinewood was reconstructed.
By re-emphasising the site's human history, by calling upon developments in ecology and by
referring to forests elsewhere, this reconstructed natural forest is understood to be in a
continual state of upheaval rather than stability (the idea of stability underpinned the notion
of minimal intervention). Thus reconstructed, new forms of conservation practice based
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around the idea of mimicking natural disturbance processes, are suggested. Management
practice at Abernethy goes through a shift towards greater intervention and thus represents
an opportunity to examine the process by which that technocratic, rationalising tendency
gains the ascendancy.
In the final chapter, I suggest that what these analyses emphasise is that nature
conservation is, much more than is usually recognised, an arena of cultural politics. Nature
conservation practice is not only culturally negotiated, it is based upon culturally constructed
ideas and knowledge of 'nature'. I argue that the implications of this for conservation are
profound. I suggest that once this cultural politics has been recognised, much more attention
has to be paid to how nature is being represented in conservation and questions have to be
asked about who is doing the representing and what interests such representation serves. In
particular, I suggest that recognising that nature is a product of culture forces us to also
recognise that there are strongly entrenched habits of meaning making that separate nature
from culture and channel our relation to 'nature' through the prism of science. Bringing these
habits to the fore allows us to assess whether they provide the means for allowing
conservation to achieve its aims of broadening its scope and enthusing wider society about
nature. The conclusion that I reach through undertaking this research, is that they do not and
that we need to re-imagine nature. I argue that we need to reconstruct nature so that it is not
pushed into the distance, separate from culture, and that we need to develop a much less
idealistic view of science. I close by calling for conservationists to recognise and value other
ways of knowing nature, to find space for art and emotion and to reclaim wonder. It is only, I
believe, through recognising the importance of the culture of nature conservation itself, that
we will be able to critically reflect upon why conservation remains a specialised sector of
society and ultimately work towards the development of new cultures of nature.
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Nature Conservation and Social Theory
New answers to old questions
A question central to nature conservation is 'what is the best way to protect nature'?
Answers to this question have varied. Sheail (1976), for example, noted that the preservation
movement in the early twentieth century sought to prevent cruelty to animals and their
extinction due to over-collecting through legislation and education. Of the then three
established ways of preserving wildlife - legislation, education and nature reserves - nature
reserves were rejected as ineffective and costly: 'they were at best stop-gap measures when
the other two methods had failed' (Sheail 1976: 22). Legislation was thought to be more
effective because it would have a wider and more immediate effect. Yet, by the late 1990s,
Adams (1997: 279) was able to suggest that 'nature conservation strategies have involved
primarily the creation of places for nature, in National Nature Reserves (NNRs), Sites of
Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs) and reserves of NGOs such as the RSPB and the wildlife
trusts'. As conservation developed from a preservation movement into a state responsibility
interwoven with the science of ecology, the answer to the question - how best to protect
nature - had changed. In recent years, answers to this question have, I suggest, changed
again.
In this thesis, I examine this re-negotiation of appropriate conservation practice in
order to ask why and how nature conservation does what it does. I want to examine the
history of recent change in conservation in order to appreciate how nature is being
understood and how those understandings connect with certain forms of practice. This
chapter sets the scene for the analysis that follows. In the first section, I briefly sketch out
some of the history of nature conservation in order to contextualise recent changes such as
the accommodation of the concept of biodiversity and the development of what came to be
called the 'biodiversity process'. In the second section, I move on to examine one broad way
of conceptualising contemporary nature conservation that situates it with respect to processes
of 'modernisation' or 'rationalisation'. Viewed with reference to the development of western
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society, nature conservation can be interpreted as being both a reaction to and part of the
development of a societal model based on progress and the control of nature. Such
interpretations are compelling and potentially provide resources for understanding the
changing relations between knowledge, ideas of nature and the institutional practice of
present day conservation.
In the third section, I review recent theoretical developments - that emphasise the
social construction of nature and of knowledge - which, I suggest, should be taken in to
account by anyone attempting to tell the story of nature conservation. In distinction to much
historical work on conservation, I engage with this literature because it provides a useful
means of reflecting upon conservation and its development. With constructivist arguments in
mind, I suggest that 'rationalisation' should be understood less as an explanatory category
and more as requiring an empirical explanation itself. In the fourth section, therefore, I turn
to the work of Michel Foucault. This work provided the basis for, and is thus compatible
with, much of the constructivist approach to nature and knowledge and, I suggest, provides
useful resources for understanding the importance of biodiversity and target-led approaches
in contemporary nature conservation and changes in reserve management. Finally, I address
criticisms that could be levelled at a broadly constructivist orientation to nature.
A new era in nature conservation?
Nature conservation has a long history, arguably taking in the changing attitudes towards the
natural world that pre-date the establishment of its institutional home, but I start this brief
history at the point where the nature reserve became important. I do so because recent
developments take conservation based on reserves as a point of departure. The reserve can be
traced back to the protection of game in Royal Forests (Hinde 1985; Adams 1993), but areas
only became reserved for 'nature' in the late nineteenth century as concern developed over
changes in the English countryside. By 1912 the National Trust had acquired thirteen sites
that could be classed as reserves and the Society for the Promotion of Nature Reserves
(SPNR) had been formed (Sheail 1976). These events were significant, but both the SPNR
and the idea of reserves were peripheral to the preservationist movement before the late
1930s. In part due to the preferred importance of legislation, this was also due to the
continuing debates over the relative merits of national parks and nature reserves and the
ability of national parks to protect nature given their other role of providing an organised
arena for outdoor and rural recreation. It was not until the Second World War that nature
reserves came to occupy a more prominent position (Sheail 1976, 1998; Bocking 1993; also
see Adams 1986, 1993; Lowe 1983).
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Ecologists had been seeking the advancement of their science, but gradually became
convinced that this was impossible without the creation of a new institution dedicated to
ecology. Whilst they had, prior to this point, kept preservationists' calls for nature reserves at
a distance, in seeking this new institutional home they saw potential in the reserve
movement. Recasting its objectives to be consistent with the theory and practice of
ecological research, the ecologists assumed leadership of the nature reserves movement and
argued that nature conservation (as opposed to preservation) was itself the responsibility of
government (Bocking 1993). Both conservation and the ecologists benefited from this move.
In the context of the public respect for science generated in the Second World War, nature
conservation as applied science, and nature reserves as outdoor laboratories, could be recast
as potentially contributing to the national good. Conservation became useful.
In this early transition from preservation to conservation there was a change in the
conception of the nature reserve. For the preservationist, the function of the reserve was the
protection of valued places from all human interference except quiet contemplation. Charles
Rothschild, probably the single most important advocate for nature reserves in the early
twentieth century and founder of the SPNR, defined a reserve as 'an area, perhaps small,
perhaps large, possibly only a single tree, which is specifically kept in its wild state' (cited in
Lowe 1983: 341). For ecologists, however, the reserve came to have a different function.
Ecologists were interested in the relations between species or communities and habitats and
understood the need for reserves to provide habitats in order to protect species. Further they
realised that those habitats could, and should, be manipulated to maintain particular species.
The research of Godwin and Tansley at Wicken Fen, for example, suggested that leaving the
Fen 'in its natural state' had resulted in the development of scrub and was the quickest way
to lose the species that the site was there to conserve (Cameron 1999). Britain's countryside
needed to be managed (Tansley 1946). In a review of Britain's Nature Reserves, Nicholson
noted that
recently it has been appreciated that this task of preserving natural conditions is
not simply one of putting a ring fence round certain wilderness areas and hoping
for the best, but is dependent on knowledge and therefore on research. The
emphasis has swung over to scientific investigation (and where necessary
management) of nature reserves, particularly in order to understand how to
preserve interesting relics, conditions, habitats and species which would
otherwise tend to disappear (Nicholson 1957: 20).
Reserves should be managed and that management should be scientifically informed.
Consequently, as ecologists established themselves institutionally in the Nature Conservancy
(NC) and as reserves and Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs) became part of
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mainstream conservation practice, the idea of a more manipulative conservation gained
ascendancy. Norman Moore illustrated this when, reflecting on the management of National
Nature Reserves thirty years after Nicholson, he said that 'moderate physical disturbance of
habitats in British nature reserves is nearly always beneficial' (Moore 1987: 73). Ecologists
presented themselves as 'the ideal scientific 'managers' of environment, the engineers of
nature' (Livingstone 1995a: 368). Conservation became characterised by the control of
nature. Indeed, it was precisely this 'enthusiasm for environmental intervention and
manipulation' that Henderson (1992: 397) identified as the distinguishing feature of British
nature conservation when compared with North America (Sheail et. al. 1997).
The institutional links between ecology and conservation were reinforced throughout
the 1940s with ecologists dominating the committees that shaped the National Parks and
Access to the Countryside Act of 1949 (Sheail 2001). This Act established the structure of
nature conservation (as distinct from landscape conservation) for the next 50 years, with a
governmental body in the form of the Nature Conservancy (later the Nature Conservancy
Council and then the country agencies such as Scottish Natural Heritage) and a focus on
National Nature Reserves (NNRs) and SSSIs (for a glossary see appendix I).
By 1950, then, the nature reserve was central to nature conservation and through the
1950s and 1960s the Nature Conservancy undertook the task of scheduling the sites
recommended by the Nature Reserves Investigation Committee in the early 1940s. This
centrality remained irrespective of the upheaval of 'the split' in 1973, when the management
and legislative side of the Conservancy was divorced from the scientific research side (which
resulted in the formation of the Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) and the Institute for
Terrestrial Ecology) (see Sheail 1998). Indeed the importance of the special site was
reinforced in 1977 when rigorous criteria by which reserves should be chosen, along with a
list of all those sites that should ideally be protected, were published in The Nature
Conservation Review (Ratcliffe 1977). With its attention to representativeness, typicalness,
size and naturalness, the Review was crucial in entrenching the approach to reserve choice
and management that sought to cover the country with representative examples of the UK's
habitats. By 1975, 140 NNRs and 3209 SSSIs had been notified (Sheail 1976: 217, 221).
The passage of the Wildlife and Countryside Act in 1981 (WCA), however, increased
the importance of the SSSI and the power of the Nature Conservancy Council to promote
their protection. The 1980s was a busy and controversial time (Adams 1986). Under the
1949 Act, the NC and later the NCC were only required to notify the local authority of any
scientific interest, but under the WCA of 1981 the NCC had to notify the owner and the
Secretary of State and to list the potentially damaging operations to that scientific interest. In
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turn, owners were required to consult the NCC before carrying out any of those operations
and subsequently the NCC and the owner were meant to enter into a voluntary management
agreement. Whilst the notification of SSSIs prior to the WCA was 'never lax', afterwards
'the NCC was in a different 'ball game'. A new exactitude had to be applied to the entire
operation administratively, technically and financially, and nothing short of the re-
notification of all SSSIs would do' (Boyd 1999: 204). It was with this huge administrative
task, which took most of the decade to complete, that the SSSI would become the central
pillar of nature conservation in the UK (Adams 1986, 1993). But the enhanced power of the
NCC with respect to SSSIs was also contentious. Not only did the ability of the NCC to
suggest appropriate management of privately-owned land lead to embittered social relations,
but the more high-profile clashes between 'conservation' and 'development' descended into
'a grim chess game of land designation and statutory control' (Adams 1996a: 79). The
proposed extension of ski development on Cairngorm in 1981, for example, resulted in a
protracted battle with the Cairngorm Chairlift Company, Highland Regional Council and
Highlands and Islands Development Board pitted against the NCC, prominent NGOs and
naturalists. This was only the first in a long list of conflicts in Scotland: there were disputes
over moorland reclamation in Orkney and Shetland; afforestation on peat bogs (Warren
2000, 2002); cutting peat on Duich Moss on Islay; and ski developments at the Lecht, Glas
Moal, Drumochter and Ben Wyvis (Boyd 1999). Lessons about how to go about designating
reserves or SSSIs and how to engage others were learned from these disputes. Thus as the
conservation agencies began to grapple with the next phase of designation ushered in by
European legislation in the form of the 'Birds' and then the 'Habitats' directives, the process
became more participatory, although no less special site centred (Dixon 1998; Marren 1993,
2002).
Although beneficial in safeguarding particular sites - indeed for Marren 'nature
reserves are the greatest achievement of fifty years of nature conservation in Britain' (2002:
107) - these developments created a nature conservation that became increasingly limited in
its scope. There were three key problems. First, conservation was reactionary. It was always
fighting a rear guard action, only able to object to proposals after they had been developed.
In constantly reacting to threats (a situation brought about by the nature of the planning
system) conservation became the social pariah of rural development. Secondly, it became
restricted to special sites since attention had - through the importance of designation and the
defence of sites - centred on SSSIs and nature reserves. As early as 1980, Richard Mabey
was voicing concerns that whilst the establishment of reserves was clearly necessary, there
were dangers in regarding reserves as the chief purpose of conservation because they
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potentially deflected attention away from the failure to maintain ecological standards outwith
reserves. In focusing on special sites, conservation was potentially ignoring the changes
being wrought in 'the wider countryside', which held over 90% of 'the natural resource of
nature' (NCC 1984: 87). The spatial strategy of creating reserves and special sites served to
create spaces of nature, thus implicitly constructing the land outside them as not nature and
not so special. In the process, conservation was effectively becoming a land use sector,
which meant that the sphere of influence of the nature conservationist became restricted to
the site or the reserve. Thirdly, it was increasingly argued that the simple designation of
reserves or SSSIs was not sufficient because whilst it looked like action was taking place and
conservation agencies could point to the designation of sites as proof of action, many argued
that sites were simply not 'delivering' on species and habitats. Even though a site was
designated, the species or the habitat it was designated for could be declining or degrading.
By the late 1980s, then, it was not only being recognised within nature conservation
that changes taking place outside reserves were influencing the reserves themselves, it was
also understood that reserves were not an adequate mechanism by which to meet
conservation objectives if the reserve itself or 'the wider countryside' was gradually being
degraded (Adams 1993). Thus reserves potentially represented a problem in conservation
and prompted the question of whether there were other, more effective, ways of protecting
nature. In this context, different sorts of approaches were sought and argued for from the late
1980s onwards.
Although it is important to stress that reserves and sites remained central because of
the way they are written into legislation and conservation remained reactionary because of
the adversarial planning system, a new conservation discourse emerged in the late 1980s and
gained ground throughout the 1990s. In particular, there were attempts to shift conservation
away from a 'reactionary', 'conservative' or 'fire-fighting' model - where conservationists
simply reacted to threats or proposed developments and where conservation more generally
was in danger of becoming caught within the bounds of the nature reserve or the special site
- to a more 'proactive' model where conservationists could set out their wishes in advance
and go beyond the reserve to speak about much broader issues and to other social actors.
This change of emphasis can be highlighted in two related developments. One
important attempt to move away from 'the jaded policies of conservation practice' towards a
more proactive and less special site-based conservation can be seen in the calls for 'creative
conservation' (Scott and Luscombe 1995: 13; Adams 1996a, 1996b; O'Connor 1983; Sheail
et. al. 1997). Whilst there had long been calls for the need for conservation to break out of
the confines of the reserve and for the need to make conservation more attractive and
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relevant (Mabey 1980), it was in the 1990s that conservation began to be transformed by the
rhetoric of restoration ecology. This was significant because it raised the possibility of
creating or recreating desired ecological conditions (Adams 1996b). While conservationists
had protected the best of what was left of nature in reserves, it was recognised that most sites
of conservation value were removed from the areas where there were greatest numbers of
people. In consequence, conservation as an activity was removed from the majority of
people's everyday lives. Therefore it was thought that if conservationists wanted to make
conservation more relevant to more people, it should seek to enhance the conservation value
of sites that currently had very little conservation value but which were closer to, and part of,
more people's lives. Creative conservation could complement the existing statutory
protection of sites and contribute to efforts to combat habitat loss whilst at the same time
making it more relevant throughout society.
The other significant development in the moves towards a proactive conservation can
be seen in the increasing importance of the concept of 'biodiversity' and the establishment of
the 'biodiversity process'. The term 'biodiversity', coined in 1986 as shorthand for
biological diversity, emerged at a time of heightened awareness of environmental issues
(Wilson 1988). Takacs (1996) suggests that the establishment of the concept of biodiversity
was a case of prominent conservation biologists actively reworking conservation by
refashioning the object of their concern. For these biologists the emphasis on species
conservation up to that point was insufficient. Conservation needed to be moved away from
its focus on charismatic species which invariably only came to the conservationists' attention
when they were nearly extinct, because such an approach meant that the vast majority of
species - including some of the most important, like the invertebrates - were ignored
(Einarsson 1993). But at the same time, the alternative 'ecosystem' conservation was too
amorphous and would run into difficulties because it lacked tangible focus comparable to
charismatic species. The conservationists' response was to find a way of achieving both.
They did this by reconstructing nature conservation as biodiversity conservation, which
included the variety of life at the sub-species, species and ecosystem levels.
Subsequently, 'biodiversity' was one of the organising concepts of the Rio Earth
Summit in 1992 and thus one of the central issues of scientific and political concern.
Signatories to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which included the UK, were
obliged to produce a report detailing how they would conserve their biological diversity and
had, therefore, to translate the concept into their regime of conservation practice. In the UK,
this obligation represented an opportunity for those that had been seeking new approaches to
conservation - notably the RSPB - to advocate different sorts of conservation practice.
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The RSPB had been exploring new ways of doing nature conservation since the late
1980s. As the organisation grew - in terms of membership, revenue, staff and acquisitions -
it needed to be able to direct its resources to where they were needed most, whilst, at the
same time, justifying that prioritisation. It therefore sought to establish mechanisms by
which the spatially disparate organisation would most efficiently work towards the same
ends and would most effectively, and without ambiguity, establish what those ends should
be. By way of more precisely defining its objectives the RSPB, together with the NCC,
produced Red Data Birds in Britain (Bibby et. al. 1989; Batten et. al. 1990). This list was
meant to establish which species warranted greatest conservation concern and thus grounds
for focusing resources, research and action. Once the list had been established, the next step,
in order to work out what could be done for those species, was to assess the threats to each.
In turn, identifying the threats paved the way for proposing measures that could be
undertaken to deal with those threats. Thus the RSPB, drawing upon experience from
elsewhere in the world (such as the inclusion of 'recovery plans' in the Endangered Species
Act 1973 in the USA), and no doubt the broader discourse of countryside planning (Gilg
1978, 1991), proposed to develop individual strategies for each species. Each 'species action
plan' (SAP) (the term 'action plan' being derived from the RSPB's centenary slogan 'Action
for Birds' (Lance 1990)) would detail the current status of the species, the threats to it and
the current action being undertaken, before targets - centred on the population and range of
the species and achievable within a realistic time-span - were proposed along with a
suggested work programme (Porter et. al. 1990). As such, the RSPB explored the possibility
of an 'objective-led' or 'target-led' approach to conservation. It wanted to specify which
species were important, what it wanted to achieve for that species and to detail what it would
do by when. Although the RSPB was told that while such a scheme might work for birds, it
certainly could not work for invertebrates or plants (Wynne et. al. 1995b), they pushed on
and in addition to species action plans developed habitat action plans (HAPs) in conjunction
with the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC) and English Nature (Housden et. al.
1991; Williams and Green 1993).
In the discussions prompted by the requirement to respond to the CBD, the RSPB
argued strongly that an objective-led approach should form one of the pillars upon which
that response to the Convention should be built. As part of the process of preparing a
national strategy, a seminar was held at the Royal Geographical Society (RGS)
predominantly involving representatives from conservation agencies, government
departments and academia but with representatives from farming interests, county councils
and the Game Conservancy. In a presentation to one of the workshops of the seminar,
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Graham Wynne (1993), then the RSPB's Director of Conservation, argued strongly for the
adoption of action planning along similar lines to that already developed within his
organisation:
There is no implied criticism in what follows of those who have worked so hard
to achieve what we have, but I suggest that the approach taken to date has
serious flaws which could be addressed. In essence, what is proposed is a more
clearly objective-led approach, with objectives based on the real world of
species and habitats, and much greater integration of planning and action. Easy
words and hardly original, but they represent a substantial shift from current
practice and one which I believe is eminently achievable (Wynne 1993: 45).
Going on to outline that objective-led approach, Wynne noted that the starting point for most
nature conservation policy had been 'the identification of special sites and areas' but asked:
why start here? Wouldn't a better first step be to decide what our objectives are
in species, species assemblage and habitat terms? Definition of clear objectives
must be a pre-requisite of deciding the most effective conservation action, and
whilst I am happy to accept that site safeguard is part of the objective as well as
the action, there is surely a prior or, at least, a parallel stage which focuses on
species (Wynne 1993: 45).
After the RGS seminar, where the government had been somewhat ambivalent as to the
extent to which the objective-led approach might work, several NGOs (Butterfly
Conservation, Friends of the Earth, Plantlife, RSPB, World Wide Fund for Nature and The
Wildlife Trusts) spear-headed by the RSPB, decided to develop the approach independently.
Intending to push the Government along by showing what was possible (and highlighting the
importance of influencing the content of these policy documents), they met several times in
the summer and autumn of 1993 to assess the applicability of the approach across many taxa
and each time fed their thinking into a Working Group on objectives and principles chaired
by Dr Derek Langslow (Anon. 1994; Wynne et. al. 1995b).
Ultimately, in late 1993, when it was too late to continue to influence that process,
the group of NGOs decided that they had done enough work with sufficient wider interest to
publish and released the first edition of Biodiversity Challenge (Wynne et. al. 1993), a
document which set out a suggested structure for the UK Biodiversity Action Plan and the
key elements of an objective-led approach with examples of targets and action plans. These
'biodiversity action plans' (BAPs) closely mirrored the format of actions plans for birds
created by the RSPB and were put forward as a challenge to government and to conservation
as a whole. In effect, the Challenge Group was arguing for the re-organisation of
conservation and the broader adoption of planning practice based around auditing, objective
setting, implementation and monitoring.
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Shortly after Biodiversity Challenge, the Government response to the Convention was
published as Biodiversity: The UK Action Plan (Anon. 1994). Whilst the Action Plan was in
significant ways a review of how good Britain was and how much work was already under
way, it included '59 steps' towards better biodiversity conservation. The significant 'steps'
that subsequently commanded greatest attention were those that stated the need for targets
and the production of action plans for species and habitats.
Drawing significantly on business management planning, a new language (of species
action plans and targets) and a new set of practices (of action planning and reporting)
emerged. For each species or habitat, action plan steering groups were established, action
plans written, targets set, appropriate action prescribed and timeframes for action set out.
New organisational structures and new forms of practice developed. These action plans and
targets represented something of a sea-change in conservation policy because where
conservation had hitherto been oriented towards selecting special sites as reserves or SSSIs
so that there was a representative coverage of habitats, this new action-planning approach
was based on threats, with money and effort directed towards those species and habitats that
were most threatened. Rather than spreading resources around and trying to ensure that
examples of all habitats are protected, this approach prioritised some habitats and species
over others and actively works towards achieving quantitative targets in a specific timescale.
For many commentators this approach was advantageous for four reasons. First, as the
focus of attention shifted towards specific targeted action for species or habitats, it shifted
away from special places. With the focus on the skylark, for example, the conservationist is
interested in any place where that species occurs or in any of the processes, such as
agricultural or climate change, which affect its numbers and location. Focusing on species
such as the skylark allows the conservationist to talk about the conservation interest of
farmland or the problems facing farmland birds more generally; it allows the conservationist
to break out of a concern for special places alone as if they can only deal with the bits of land
they own or manage and to potentially influence the wider countryside. Conservationists can
say to farmers that the skylark has declined by 50% in the last 25 years and connect that with
farming practices and, potentially, introduce conservation concerns into broader social
concerns. In these ways, the focus of action plans on species and habitats is an important
strategy to allow conservation to 'break out' of the reserve.
Secondly, instead of simply protecting endangered species and habitats in reserves and
managing those reserves to try and boost their numbers or extent, planning encouraged the
conservationist to think about what they would like the situation to be. In a spirit of optimism
and self-belief, the conservationist could, instead of simply protecting and accepting that X is
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rare, work towards a situation where X became less rare. Conservationists could set down
what was special, what they would like to achieve and how they thought they could achieve
it. The introduction of planning into conservation meant that conservation itself became
forward looking and proactive rather than reactionary. Conservation had hitherto appeared to
many social actors as working in an ad hoc way because it was forced to react to
developments as they came up and because it worked with reference to criteria and
legislation that were relatively obscure to the general public. The establishment of an open,
public governmental process that included representatives from business, fishing, farming,
tourism and landowners and which set out what was special and what the objectives were,
meant that conservation could proceed with reference to much more clearly defined criteria.
Thirdly, action planning was a means of co-ordinating conservation action.
Conservation had, arguably, become extremely diverse and although it coalesced around
issues such as Flow Country afforestation or funicular railways, the effect of disparate
organisations with different objectives and ways of working was the muddying of the waters
of social negotiation with other actors. The disparate nature of conservation laid it open to
challenge because of its apparent inconsistency. Planning for species and habitats brought
people together. Co-ordinated action was, however, about more than achieving a unified
conservation: it was also about efficiency. As conservation organisations grew in size they
encountered classic organisational problems of making sure that all the arms of the
organisation were working towards the same end and resources were being allotted to the
most pressing tasks so as to efficiently work towards their aims. The business-planning
model was useful in this regard because it provided a mechanism by which these
organisations could reorient themselves to their goals.
Finally, the practices of prioritisation that were involved in the biodiversity process
meant that conservation action could arguably be made more efficient. Where in the past
reserve acquisition policy, for example, had been based on the notion of representativeness
(Ratcliffe 1977), it could now be based on threat. Instead of attempting to create reserves
based on the best examples of all the habitats in the UK, attention could be focused more
specifically on those habitats that were in greatest danger or for which the greatest
conservation gain, through changes in management, could be made.
Yet for all its apparent attractiveness, this approach did not, and does not, go
uncontested. I will illustrate some of the discontent with reference to contributions to ECOS,
a journal that is amongst the principal public forums of debate in conservation. Marren
(2000), for example, questioned the sorts of practices encouraged by the biodiversity
process. Referring to the action plan for Flamingo Moss (UK Biodiversity Group 1998c:
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172) - a species found in old magnesium limestone quarries and which is considered
endangered because of the cessation of quarrying - Marren noted that whilst one might think
that the future of the Flamingo Moss would depend on there being a healthy market for
magnesium limestone, 'the anonymous author of the Plan is more interested in micro-
propagation than macro-economics, and has no hesitation in ordering spore banks, and "ex-
situ stocks" for translocation experiments, as well as "periodic ground disturbance at all
known sites'" (Marren 2000: 43). Even though Marren thinks that 'Fiddling about with
Flamingo Moss and the like is seductive, and, in individual cases, not particularly
controversial', he worries that as all the individual species and habitats are brought within
the same process, the processes' 'sheer scope threatens to bring about a kind of pattem-book
conservation where a plan stands in the way of thought and originality' (Marren 2000: 44).
Further, 'translocations and other intrusive techniques are practically mandatory, and never
mind whether they conflict with IUCN guidelines or outrage any idea of naturalness' (for
glossary see appendix I). One reason for this, he suggests, is that 'institutions like Kew
Gardens and universities are more concerned with cutting-edge science than routine
monitoring 'n' management' and he 'suspect[s] that another is to give the illusion of control'
(Marren 2000: 45). Finally, 'the bureaucratic imperative, this apeing of 'business methods'
that seemed so clever five years ago, drives the process along in a cloud of arbitrary targets
and technical make-believe' (Marren 2000: 45).
In a similar way, Green (2000) criticises the development of the biodiversity process
by arguing that all the emphasis on targets obscures the fact that they are actually arbitrary
and that the process appears to be oriented towards returning to a pre-war golden-age of
biodiversity. Supporting Marren, Green noted that
the BAP process is highly manipulative - it depends on long term, even
continual intervention in natural processes. We may not be passing on to future
generations a countryside richer in wildlife, but a countryside where Nature is
restricted to fragmented sites that need continual management to retain the
habitats in the chosen state to protect a particular species chosen as valuable by
this generation (Green 2000: 49).
Although these two criticisms were published well after the establishment of the biodiversity
process in 1995, they show that the development of the process has by no means been
understood as a self-evidently good thing. Yet by the time of writing (2003), there are 391
species action plans and 45 habitat action plans, a separate structure of local biodiversity
action plans and separate country biodiversity groups (i.e. the Scottish Biodiversity Forum)
which have begun to establish their own strategies. Biodiversity has become big business.
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The biodiversity process is significant because while the legislative element of
conservation remains the main mechanism by which the statutory agencies fulfil their
objectives, it has ushered in a whole new way of undertaking nature conservation: the
biodiversity process and action planning represent a new answer to that old question - 'what
is the best way to protect nature'? It is therefore one example of the changing relations
between ecological knowledge, ideas of nature and institutional practice and offers one
possible means by which I can examine why and how nature conservation does what it does.
Nature conservation and modernity
My interest, then, is in telling the story of recent change in nature conservation. As such,
there is no shortage of examples of how I might go about telling that story because the
history of conservation in the UK has been told in many different ways. There have been
general histories of its emergence and institutionalisation (Adams 1986, 1993, Evans 1992;
Lowe 1983; Sheail 1976, 1981, 1998); histories of the development of specific sites or areas
(Clifford and Forster 1997; Johnston and Balharry 2001; Ramsay 1997; Lambert 2000, 2001;
Matthew 2002; Rothschild and Marren 1997; Friday 1997; Whittington 1996; Mather 1993);
histories of organisations (Samstag 1988; Jenkins and James 1994; Johnston 2000; Lowe and
Goyder 1983; Mackay 1995; Dwyer and Hodge 1996); and of individual species (Lambert
1998, 2001, 2002); analyses of the relationship between ecology and conservation (Sheail
1987; Adams 1997, 2003a; Bocking 1993, 1997; Toogood 1995, 1996b, 1997, 2003); more
reflective work that has sought to ask what conservation exists for, why it has taken the form
it has and where it ought to go (Stamp 1969; Mabey 1980; Adams 1996a; Marren 2002); and
autobiographical accounts of events and institutional change (Moore 1987; Boyd 1999).
These studies are, in the main, straightforward narratives of the important events in the
development of legislation or organisations (exceptions being Adams 1996a; Toogood 1995,
1996b, 1997, 2003; Bocking 1997) and have been central to developing a detailed
understanding of how conservation took on the shape we see today. Here, though, I want to
focus on other work, which, calling upon analytical resources provided by social theory,
situates conservation within broad narratives of the development of western society.
Historical accounts of the development of attitudes to nature emphasise the role of
the Christian notion of dominion over nature, the importance of the development of scientific
rationality and industrialisation and detail the different understandings of these developments
as people worked with or challenged them (Glacken 1967; Nash 1973; Oelschleager 1991;
Thomas 1983; Smout 2000; Williams 1980). The trajectory of societal development revealed
in these histories involves continuous tensions between different understandings of and
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approaches to the natural world. Smout (2000), for example, draws a distinction between
those that approach the natural world in terms of 'use' and those that approach it in terms of
'delight'. For some, the Earth provides resources for our use: if we develop our scientific
knowledge and our technologies of management we should be able to further our use and
work towards a better society. For others, the natural world is not there simply to be used
instrumentally; it is a source of aesthetic delight and wonder. For them, the development of
science and technology in the pursuit of the extension of human control over nature only
serves, in the long run, to corrupt and diminish our humanity. These are familiar battle lines,
which re-appear in numerous environmental disputes - most recently in arguments over
biotechnology - and can be seen to be but the most recent manifestation of long traditions
embedded in the development of western society, albeit worked out in a contemporary
context.
Not surprisingly, these tensions between different approaches to the natural world
have been identified within environmentalism itself. O'Riordan (1976) and subsequently
Pepper (1984, 1996), for example, identified 'ecocentric' and 'technocentric' traditions.
Worster (1977) discerned 'arcadian' and 'imperialist' perspectives within ecology.
Oelschlaeger (1993) outlined opposing scientific and aesthetic-religious approaches and
Norton (1991) saw the 'moralists' and 'economic aggregators' as in opposition. Although
referring to the division with different terms, these analysts highlight two broad 'schools of
thought' within environmentalism. Although these categories should not be understood as
hard and fast, they are useful analytical devices. A descendent of Romanticism, the
ecocentric preaches 'the virtues of reverence, humility, responsibility and care; argues for
low impact technology; decries bigness and impersonality in all forms (but especially in the
city); and demands a code of behaviour that seeks permanence and stability based upon
ecological principles of diversity and homeostasis' (O'Riordan 1976: 1). They advocate
democracy among creatures to the extent that nature should be respected for its own sake,
above and beyond its usefulness to people (Pepper 1984). The technocentric, on the other
hand, can be identified by an 'undiluted rational, scientific approach...[and]...a belief in the
ability and efficiency of management in solving problems by the use of 'objective analysis'
and recourse to the laws of physical science' (Pepper 1984: 29). They are 'almost arrogant in
[the] assumption that man is supremely able to understand and control events to suit his
purposes' (O'Riordan 1976: 1).
Recognising these different positions means accepting that environmentalism is both
a reaction to and part of the development of modern society. Yet whilst there is recognition
of these different positions, contemporary interpretations stress that one - the technocratic -
21
comes to dominance. Hajer (1995), for example, examined the construction of, and various
responses to, the problem of acid rain in northern Europe, and suggested that contemporary
responses mark an 'age of ecological modernisation'. In the 1970s, as notions of
environmental crisis grew, there were different responses characterised by texts such as
Limits to Growth (Meadows et. al. 1972) and Small is Beautiful (Schumacher 1973). The
first typified a hierarchical and technocratic top-down approach. The second represented a
participatory bottom-up approach. Hajer analysed the discursive construction of appropriate
responses and the way that the first approach won out. Ecological modernisation 'can be
defined as the discourse that recognises the structural character of the environmental
problematique but none the less assumes that existing political, economic, and social
institutions can internalise the care of the environment' (Hajer 1995: 25). As such, the
problem of acid rain became a technical problem requiring a technical solution. The response
to the problem - which pointed to fundamental issues of resource use - was not to address
the fundamental issues but to develop new technologies to mitigate emissions of gases and
new means of social organisation; it was an attempt to modernise out of the problem:
ecological modernisation straightforwardly rejects the anti-modem sentiments
that were often found in the critical discourse of social movements. It is a policy
strategy that is based on the fundamental belief in progress and the problem-
solving capacity of modem techniques and skills of social engineering...There
is a renewed belief in the possibility of mastery and control, drawing on
modernist policy instruments such as expert systems and science (Hajer 1995:
33).
While environmentalism is portrayed as occupying an ambivalent position, being both
reaction to and part of processes of modernisation and thus containing within itself tensions
between different understandings of appropriate action, it is the modernising element that
dominates.
Similar tensions are evident within nature conservation. In studying the tension
between 'use' and 'delight', Smout (2000), for example, identifies some of the strands that
came together under the notion of 'delight' and which were important in the formation of
nature conservation. Two strands of what might be termed a proto-environmentalism are
evident with reference to two individuals: the archetypical romantic, William Wordsworth,
and Alfred Newton, Cambridge zoologist and 'father of bird protection' in the UK (Smout
2000: 25). For Wordsworth, nature, a living force that could uplift and ennoble the
individual, was corrupted by industry, science and progress (Macnaghten and Urry 1998).
For Newton, however, science could be put to use. He was alarmed by the apparent
extinction of the Great Auk in 1844 (see Lambert 1998) and suggested that once it had been
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re-found there could be a breeding program in London Zoo. Taking a strong stance against
egg collecting and shooting of seabirds, Newton suggested that modern science must
'transmit to posterity a less perishable inheritance' than the 'mere possession of a few skins
or eggs' (cited in Smout 2000: 28). For Wordsworth nature must be protected from industry
and science, but for Newton, the protection of nature involved the pursuit of science.
These two strands - the romantic and the rational scientific - co-exist within nature
conservation and re-appear in the form of preservationism and conservationism, but just as
for environmentalism more generally, one came to dominate (Sheail 1976, 1998; for the
North American story of this dominance see Hays 1959). Adams (1997) forcefully highlights
the dominance of the technocratic approach to conservation in his examination of the
connections between conservation and ecology through the analytical prism of
'rationalisation' (see also Murphy 1994a). Rationalisation - which Weber (1968) argued was
one of the major processes of the modern period - involves a complex of interwoven
developments. It involves the development of science and technology that can be used to
predict and control nature, the expansion of capitalism involving the ascendancy of the
rational mastery of the market, the extension of the formal hierarchical organisation of social
action, and the formation of legal systems that enable the management of social conflict. In
short, 'rationalisation describes the process by which nature, society and individual action
are increasingly mastered by an orientation to planning, technical procedure and rational
action' (Morrison 1995: 218). With regard to 'nature' its rationale is, effectively, one of
control. As such, the logic of rationalisation has been manifest in Britain in urbanisation, the
growth of manufacturing and the industrialisation of agriculture.
Adams uses the concept of rationalisation as a frame to discuss conservation and
environmentalism. For him, 'environmentalism represents a significant dimension of
opposition to rationalisation and its effects on nature and human survival' (Adams 1997:
278) because both conservation and environmentalism can be seen to have their roots in a
reaction to the effects of industrial expansion. Yet, 'not only has nature conservation formed
part of a wider reaction to rationalisation but it is also part of that rationalisation' (Adams
1997: 278). Since one strand of rationalisation is the development of science and technology,
within conservation, ecology has 'provided knowledge about nature that has served to
classify and objectify it, to predict environmental change and to provide a technocratic recipe
book for directing and controlling that change' (Adams 1997: 278). Moreover, as
conservation has sought to respond to the challenge of rationalisation in terms of its effects
on nature, it has itself developed complex organisational structures and legal institutions.
Throughout much of the twentieth century, 'nature conservation practice has formed part of
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a rationalising project engaged in controlling nature and in organising the relations between
humans and nature primarily (although not exclusively) within the specific bounds of nature
reserves' (Adams 1997:278). Further, Adams suggests that as ideas in ecology have changed,
with the notion of instability gradually challenging the centrality of stability, there has been a
re-intensification of the scientific endeavour and the development of evermore-sophisticated
technologies for predicting and controlling nature. He noted elsewhere that:
Conservation through the second half of the twentieth century increasingly
treated nature itself as an object. We have explained its diversity and form, its
location and its demise through our science. We classified it and located it,
defined it and tied it down as a set of objects, as species, as sites or habitats. In
order to protect nature from industrial rationality, we have increasingly used the
logics and methods of industrial rationality itself. With our science and our
planning we manage and control nature, organising ourselves in corporations
and calculating cost-effective ways of sustaining and reproducing species and
habitats. We seek to use industrialism's weapons on nature's behalf, but in the
process we substantially industrialise nature itself (Adams 2001: 24).
For Adams, then, nature conservation has come to be dominated by the technocratic and
industrial approach to the natural world. While conservation is both part of and reaction to
the development of modern rationality, it has, for Adams, become much more a part of
rationalisation than a reaction to it.
By situating conservation in a narrative of the rationalisation of modem society,
Adams and Hajer provide compelling interpretative resources for understanding recent
changes in policy and practice. Can biodiversity action planning - with its focus on species
and habitats that were identified by research, its organisational structure of steering groups,
and its attention to targets in order to achieve efficient, cost-effective action - be understood
as a manifestation within conservation of the process of rationalisation? Can reserve
management, with its implicit assumptions about the ability of conservationists to engineer
their way to a better future, be understood as a form of policy embedded in ecological
modernisation: a technical response to the problem of protecting species and habitats?
It would certainly be easy to understand these recent developments in terms of
rationalisation. It would be easy to look at the planning and research involved in the
biodiversity process or reserve management and say that the rationalistic control of nature is
evident. It would be easy to say that a significant element of rationalisation is the
development of science, conservation is intimately connected with the science of ecology,
ecology (in its managerialist guise) is interwoven in the modern project of controlling nature,
therefore, conservation is part of rationalisation. But I suggest, however, that there are
difficulties in simply accepting 'rationalisation' or 'modernisation' as explanatory concepts.
24
However much the concept of rationalisation appeals, simply applying it takes it for granted.
One would start with the concept and its implicit social history and slot conservation into the
narrative. As such, simply applying it would be to perpetuate a social theory without
empirical substantiation. I want to suggest, then, that the issue of whether conservation
represents a manifestation of rationalisation or modernisation is an empirical question. The
importance of the biodiversity process and its taking on an apparently rationalist approach,
for example, cannot be readily understood by referring to it as part of rationalisation because
this would ignore how and why the rationalist approach came about. What is needed is an
analysis that can address the accomplishment of rationalisation and ask how different
traditions such as the ecocentric and technocentric are negotiated.
How is this to be done? Hajer (1995) suggests one direction by his adoption of a
broadly constructivist approach to nature. It is this constructivist work and its utility that is
reviewed in the next section.
Constructivist accounts: re-telling the story of nature conservation
There has been much historical scholarship on the development of nature conservation
(Adams 1986, 1993, Evans 1992; Lowe 1983; Sheail 1976, 1981, 1998). This work has been
crucial in developing an understanding of why certain directions were taken and thus how
we have arrived at the present. But in recent years this work has been challenged by those
that have utilised a constructivist orientation to nature and nature conservation (Toogood
1995, 1996b, 1997, 2003; Bocking 1997). From this perspective there are two problems with
many extant analyses. First, they assume that the nature being conserved is an unproblematic
'thing'. Debates, for example, between people seeking the protection of seabirds in the early
days of the preservation movement and sportsmen wishing to shoot at seabird colonies, were
characterised in terms of competing interests and opinions about how nature should be used
or protected. Nature 'is self-evident and exists in a space outside politics; it is simply the
object over which politics happens' (Braun 2002: 2). Secondly, they tell conservation's story
as one of social interaction whilst effectively bracketing-off science as if it does not involve
social interaction. Such a focus implicitly suggests that changes in science that have an
impact on conservation are not sociological, but, rather, the result of improvements in
scientific understanding alone.
These criticisms are connected to two important themes that frame a constructivist
approach to nature conservation: the social construction of nature and the social construction
of knowledge. With regard to the former, it is now, in the social sciences at least, commonly
accepted that 'nature' is socially constructed. Following the developments in the linguistic
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turn in social science and post-structuralism more generally, it is accepted that rather than
simply speaking about nature as if it is a thing that is outside language, nature is brought into
existence through language and is therefore thoroughly embedded in a cultural context:
'Nature is part of culture' (Wilson 1992: 12). As Soper puts it 'the one thing that is not
'natural' is nature...itself (Soper 1995: 7). It is not simply outside or beneath culture as_if
the cultural takes place on the bedrock of the natural because it is in the ways we talk about it
and the ways that we represent it that we give it meaning: as particular signs are interpreted
in similar ways, so similar ideas, myths, or imaginative geographies of nature develop. Even
as we travel through landscapes that appear uncontaminated by humanity we cannot help but
experience them not just as natural landscapes but also as cultural icons. 'What we mean
when we use the word "nature" says as much about ourselves as about the things we label
with that word' (Cronon 1996: 25). Nature is, in this way, constructed in social interaction
(Evernden 1992; Eder 1996; Bird 1987; Cronon 1995a; Demeritt 1998, 2001a, 2002;
Hannigan 1995; Olwig 1984; Escobar 1996; Merchant 1981, 1996; Haraway 1992; Benton
and Short 1999; Duncan and Duncan 2001; Dizard 1993).
Crucially, if we accept that 'nature cannot pre-exist its construction' (Haraway 1992:
296), then the story of nature conservation as a form of social interaction cannot simply be a
story of the efforts made to conserve nature: it must also be a story of how nature itself
changes as new vocabularies and practices evolve. We must accept that the very notion of
conserving nature rests upon understandings of nature that have a long and complex history,
and that 'nature', or our idea of nature, changes over time. In this, the constructivist approach
does not, at first, appear to go much further than the 'classic histories' of the changing ideas
of nature (Glacken 1967; Williams 1973, 1976, 1980; Thomas 1983; Coates 1998;
Oelschlaeger 1991; Smout 2000; Nash 1973). The constructivist approach, however, does
begin to go further, or at least address slightly different things. A broadly constructivist
approach, influenced by post-structuralism, for example, recognises the importance of
representation in relations of power. New avenues of research have thus explored the ways in
which nature is represented in art (Short 1991), photography (Wilson 1992; Ryan 2000), film
(Mitman 1999), news media (Burgess 1993; Holloway 1998), new technologies (Light 1997)
and in zoos and wildlife parks (Anderson 1995; Mitman 1996). This work has sought to
examine how particular sorts of viewing subjects and particular sorts of nature-as-object are
constituted in the act of representation. Representation is crucial because as Braun and
Wainwright put it 'the 'forest' in conservation discourse is not something that existed
independently from the maps, tables, techniques, and practices that made it available to
forms of economic and political calculation. One must see the forest before one can
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rationalise it' (Braun and Wainwright 2001: 52; see also Tsouvalis-Gerber 1998).
Constructivist approaches suggest that rather than exploring the changing ideas about nature
(which leaves 'nature', as an ahistorical object, unproblematised), it is important to examine
'the emergence of 'nature' as a discrete and separate object of aesthetic reflection, scientific
enquiry, and economic and political calculation at particular sites and specific historical
moments' (Willems-Braun 1997: 5). Thus the 'emergence' of particular species and habitats
has been explored. In particular, attention has been paid to the spotted owl in the US (Proctor
1998c); to foxes, cows, deer and badgers in the UK (Woods 1997, 1998, 2000); and to
wetlands (Giblett 1996) and forests (Braun 2002; Schama 1995).
Due to the fact that there are different signifying practices and different languages
and therefore multiple myths and contested natures - different 'ways of seeing' - the
constructivist approach has also examined how such representations, serve to structure social
relations and are mobilised towards certain social, political and moral ends. As such, many
commentators have sought to examine the way that different constructions of nature, or of
particular species or habitats (because if one looks closely one must recognise that it is rarely
'nature' that is being constructed but more often a very specific part of what is commonly
understood by 'nature'), come into conflict over particular issues. Emphasis is placed on the
way that particular representations work in power relations between social actors and the
ways that particular groups seek to dominate others or resist dominance (Anderson and Gale
1992; Harrison and Burgess 1994; Burgess 1992; Harrison 1993; Cloke et. al. 1996; Braun
2002; Macnaghten and Urry 1998; Cronon 1995a; Larsen 1992, 1994; Livingstone 1995a;
Schama 1995; Willems-Braun 1997; Bunce 1994; Proctor 1998c, Anderson 1995; Woods
1998, 2000; Matless 2000). In distinction to the work that examines the development of
environmental policy in party political and governmental contexts (McCormick 1991; Young
1993; Garner 1996; Doyle and McEachern 1998), this work examines the cultural politics of
environmental issues.
One example of a constructivist approach to nature conservation, which is relevant
to this study's focus on Highland Scotland, is Toogood's (1995, 1996a, 2003; and see
MacDonald 1998 for a critical response) examination of the debates between
conservationists and hunting estates over Caledonian forest regeneration and deer numbers
(on the cultural politics of Highland Scotland more generally see Lorimer 1999, 2000;
Withers 1999; Hunter 1995; Mackenzie 1998; Gold and Gold 1995; Womack 1989). There is
conflict because conservationists claim that there are too many deer for tree regeneration
while estates maintain high deer numbers because of traditional estate practice. Toogood
suggests that the conflict cannot be adequately described in terms of 'insider versus outsider'
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or 'tradition versus post romanticism' as outlined by Smout (1993). Simply viewing
conservationists as outsiders is inadequate because 'the debate is more about the models, or
discourses, of nature and society that are implicit within the differing representations of
ecology, tradition and space in and between the social groups involved' (Toogood 1995,
103). Thus, Toogood views the conflict as being based in two groups coming to the issue
from different social worlds - with differing representations - where each group is competing
for 'the power to define what 'nature', tradition and indeed, the Highlands, are (1995, 103).
In this sort of analysis, nature, and the Highland landscape, is constructed through disputes
between actors. The different discourses are mapped onto different social groups because
each group develops its own culture of nature. It is an analysis, therefore, which emphasises
that 'nature' is thoroughly bound up in disputes, arguments and social interaction more
generally, rather than being external to those debates.
This sort of constructivist work has implications for those, like myself, seeking to
focus on the field of nature conservation and to explain its institutional change and current
managerial emphases. It implies that if conservation is one of the contexts within which
nature is constructed and within which a culture of nature develops, then recognising that
meanings are never fixed and that culture is continually being re-negotiated means accepting
that conservation is itself a contested cultural arena. Consequently, this constructivist work
suggests that it is difficult to speak in any simple way about 'nature conservation' as a
whole. Nature conservation must be understood as an arena of negotiation. If it achieves a
relatively coherent position, so that reference to 'nature conservation' as a unitary whole
makes sense, this must be understood as a discursive achievement. Further, the constructivist
approach to nature implies that conservation's policies and practices also represent a
discursive achievement. If nature is constructed within the context of nature conservation,
the policies that are adopted - whether they are legislative, the practice of creating reserves
or particular sorts of management - cannot be understood as relating in any simple way to an
external nature (as if loss of species instrumentally leads to their protection). Rather, as Hajer
(1995) illustrated in his study of the discursive construction of environmental policy in
relation to the issue of acid rain, and as Toogood (1996b) has shown with reference to the
history of the Nature Conservancy in the UK, both policies and constructions of nature are
achieved within power-laden social relationships. A constructivist approach to nature
suggests that the shape that conservation takes in terms of its legislation and its practices is
discursively constructed. Under this approach institutional change is about more than the
growth of certain organisations or the wielding of power by influential individuals (as is
commonly re-iterated in histories of conservation); it is also about the negotiation of cultural
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discourses within conservation itself. In the process, nature and nature conservation are co-
constructed; nature emerges in the political terrain of its own conservation.
The second theme of a constructivist approach to conservation emphasises the social
construction of knowledge. Whilst the idea that nature is socially constructed draws upon
philosophical ideas contrary to the predominantly realist and positivist nature conservation
world, many of those that I have spoken with in the course of this study have readily
accepted (as almost a truism) that different people have different ideas of nature. They have,
though, invariably bracketed off this area of cultural concern from the solid ground offered
by science. Nature conservation, entwined as it is with the science of ecology, is surely based
upon objective, rather than value-laden, understandings of nature. But if a constructivist
position is taken seriously, recourse to science in this way is difficult because the focus on
the constitutive nature of discourse has been extended to, and indeed took some of its
impetus from, analyses of how knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is itself
constructed. In short, scientific knowledge is socially produced. For Golinski, 'scientific
knowledge is a human creation, made with available material and cultural resources, rather
than simply the revelation of a natural order that is pre-given and independent of human
action' (Golinski 1998: 6). Work in the sociology of science has thus explored such social
contingencies as the 'interests' of practitioners (Mackenzie and Barnes 1979); the micro-
practices of scientists at work (Knorr-Cetina 1981; Latour and Woolgar 1986; Latour 1987,
1999b); the importance of the place of production to the sorts of knowledge that get
produced (Livingstone 1995b; Ophir and Shapin 1991; Outram 1996; Shapin 1998); and the
gendered nature of knowledge construction (Merchant 1981, 1996; Haraway 1989, 1991,
1992).
This sociological approach to science has influenced studies of the history of
ecology. Although he wanted to retain the solid ground and moral authority of 'nature',
Worster, for example, says that 'the ideas of science are open to much the same kind of
treatment as other ideas, such as theological or political thought. Like all of man's
intellectual life, scientific ideas grow out of specific cultural conditions and are validated by
personal as well as social needs. They are, in short, more closely interwoven with the general
fabric of thought than is commonly supposed' (Worster 1977: xiv-xv). Although Mcintosh
(1985) argued that his definition of ecology was very (too) loose, Worster highlighted the
connections between ecology and broader societal attitudes by suggesting a link between
various ecological theories and conceptualisations and the managerial values in society.
Similarly, in his book The Social Construction of Nature, Evemden (1992) noted how
ecology has become the contemporary authority on nature's laws, defining what sorts of
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action are appropriate or dangerous and, thus, extending knowledge of nature into the moral
world of human action. Yet he also noted that there have been, and still are, different
conceptualisations of nature within ecology. Nature can be understood, for example, as a
harmonious whole and all human action as detrimental; or nature can be an arena of
perpetual competition where human dominance is itself natural. For Evernden, these
different interpretations, which extend to determine appropriate human conduct and which
cannot be simply chosen between by reference to nature, mean that 'nature justifies nothing,
or anything. Ecology is today's official voice on natural matters, an institutional shaman that
can be induced to pronounce natural whatever we wish to espouse. Ecology is, in this sense,
simply being used as a blunt instrument to help implement particular life-styles or social
goals' (Evernden 1992:15).
Consequently, ecology is understood to be deeply embedded in wider social
negotiation and it is this recognition that has generated a considerable amount of research.
Working at the intersection of the history of science and studies of colonialism, Grove (1995
1997), for example, addressed how proto-conservationist ideas influenced, and were
influenced by, the colonial encounter. Examining the more recent development of the
discipline of ecology, Taylor (1988) interpreted the focus on energy flows in 1950s ecology
as intimately connected with a post Second World War technocratic optimism and belief in
the ability of people to control nature. Kwa (1987) noted the centrality given to specific sorts
of ecology when their co-ordinating metaphors coincided with those of policymakers.
Bramwell (1989) explored the roots of contemporary ecology in the organic movement and
fascism. Mitman (1992) examined how social and political concerns in early twentieth
century America influenced the research of biologists at the University of Chicago. Reacting
against individualism and competition, and in the context of two world wars, this research
emphasised co-operation. Bocking (1997, 1993) emphasised the importance of the
institutions within which ecologists worked in shaping the choices in research and the
discipline more generally and suggested that the very concept of the ecosystem 'was not only
a particular set of ideas about nature but also a strategy contributing to the formation of
national communities of ecologists, independent of their local contexts' (Bocking 1997:
184). Dunlap (1991) examined the gradual dominance of the scientist over the naturalist in
the shift towards the bureaucratisation of conservation with reference to the history of efforts
to save the whooping crane. Samuel (1996, 1998, 2000) investigated conservation science in
Highland Scotland and argued that ecology and conservation took shape in the Highlands
with direct reference the social structure of Highland society and the importance of
landowners. Dean (1979), Nicolson (1989) and Waterton (2002) focused on the construction
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of ecological classifications. Journet (1991) and O'Hara (1992) examined the role of
narrative in ecological writing. Myers (1990a, 1990b) looked more generally at texts and
images in making ecological arguments. Cameron (1999) explored the way that different
fields of knowledge could become connected, looking specifically at the way that Tansley's
interests in psychology and ecology informed each other. Yearley (1989, 1991, 1993)
explored the use of science by conservation organisations and the ambivalent position that
this sometimes put them in. Finally, with respect to the more recent development of the
concept of biodiversity, Takacs (1996) sought to examine the role of prominent biologists in
re-shaping both their science and conservation by advocating and developing the concept,
and Bowker (2000) explored the implications of bureaucratic convergence around
biodiversity for the sorts of knowledge that will be produced. He argues that as data sources
are brought together, the heterogeneity of data and knowledge production is lost and that this
is a potentially detrimental development because it means that avenues for new research are
closed off before they can develop.
All this suggests that the content of ecology is related to the ecologists' broader
negotiation of a position in academia and society and that the recourse by some to the solid
ground of science, in the face of a constructivist orientation to nature, is problematic.
Constructivist approaches have therefore challenged the classic understanding of science as
neutral and objective with the resultant knowledge being the mirror of nature. Science cannot
be so simply bracketed off as the authoritative ground external to cultural discourse upon
which conservation rests. The implication of this is that one of the common interpretative
tools in understanding conservation must be rejected. The development of conservation
policy cannot be simply understood as the result of progress in ecological science or a better
scientific comprehension of the problems of nature. Conservation science is, rather, another
element that gives shape to, and is given shape in, discursive change.
These two themes - the social construction of nature and the social construction of
knowledge - open up for investigation elements of nature conservation that are too
commonly taken for granted. These constructivist understandings suggest that whilst
conservation presents itself as scientific and the authoritative agent that can speak for nature,
and whilst histories of conservation have commonly reinforced (or, at least, not questioned)
this image, what lies behind this facade is a messy world in which science and the
management associated with it are bound up in moral, social and political issues about 'the
environment', industrial expansion, beauty, identity, the law and who has the right to speak
for nature (Macnaghten and Urry 1998). These constructivist understandings also suggest
that the analysis of this contested arena of cultural politics requires a certain amount of
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agnosticism and symmetry (on the concept of symmetry in constructivist analyses see Bloor
1976). The analyst should not start from a presupposition that nature as it is constructed at
present, is the 'best' or closest to a true understanding of the natural world and tell the story
of the inevitable rise of that understanding. They should, rather, examine the multiple
understandings that people have constructed and worked with, even the ones that are now
understood to be 'wrong'.
In this thesis, I work with these constructivist ideas to show how conservation is
continually being renegotiated and to seek to investigate the processes of negotiation. The
centrality of the concept of biodiversity and the new mechanisms of action planning or shifts
in reserve management are thus not understood as instrumental responses to the problems of
nature, but as discursively arrived at, socially negotiated accomplishments to be explained.
Further, 'science' is not taken for granted as that arena of knowledge formation that lies
outwith politics and power: it is understood as embedded in and as taking its shape from the
political world. In this way, I hope to show that ecology and conservation are embedded in,
and are the context for, a cultural politics of nature.
There have been, however, criticisms levelled at this sort of constructivist approach
to nature and knowledge. More specifically, it has been suggested that the emphasis on
construction leads to the conceptualisation of representations of nature as floating above the
social fray. Consequently, recent constructivist work has sought to engage much more
substantially with the ways that constructions of nature are embedded in social and
institutional practice (Macnaghten and Urry 1998; Braun 2000, 2002; Demeritt 2001b). The
work of Michel Foucault has been particularly influential in this regard. Even though his
work on biopolitics and governmentality does not address the category 'nature' or the natural
sciences, his historical explorations of the emergence of modern forms of institutional and
personal practice provide a broad conceptualisation of institutional change that has begun to
be extended to inform a reading of contemporary ecological issues. In the next section, I look
at his work and that of others that have utilised his ideas in relation to environmental issues. I
do so because, in the context of an interest in the position of nature conservation with respect
to processes of rationalisation, Foucault's ideas and approach are, I suggest, useful.
Foucault, governmentality and nature conservation
While Foucault's work resists easy systematisation, Turner suggests that the unifying theme
is the dual focus on 'the rationalisation of the body and the rationalisation ofpopulations by
new combinations of power and knowledge' (Turner 1984: 159; see also Matless 1992; Philo
1992; Hoy 1986; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982; Philp 1990). The rationalisation of the body is
32
addressed most explicitly in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1977), which is cast as a
genealogy of the ways in which the modem individual has been created as object in the
interstices of the penal system, wider societal disciplinary regimes and the developing human
sciences (on his understanding of genealogy see Foucault 1980a). For Foucault the
emergence of discipline represents the emergence of a new form of power based less on
direct violence and more on regulation and normalisation through observation and the
calculated correction of abnormal behaviour. Foucault exemplifies the workings of this new
form of power with reference to its manifestation in the penal institution but also by
examining a broader disciplinary regime in society as a whole. In prison, inmates were
subject to two forms of visibility: on the one hand, the prison authorities accumulated a
detailed knowledge of the physiology and behaviour of the inmates, whilst on the other, they
were housed in cells where they could be observed without knowing it. The constant threat
of visibility encouraged normal behaviour and the accumulation of new forms of knowledge
about the delinquent or the depraved contributed to the emergent human sciences of
medicine, psychology and so on, which, in turn, contributed to the construction of norms. As
such, Foucault sees bodies of knowledge as tied to systems of social control. Knowledge was
produced as an effect of power and power operated through knowledge (Foucault 1977: 27).
In society more generally, Foucault explored the ways that the body was made 'docile'
through the meticulous, minute techniques used to control it. The spaces of work, such as
factories, or of care, such as hospitals, were organised in ways that leant themselves to the
controlling and surveying of the body. And the organisation of life into work, leisure and
sleep, and so on, became structured and controlled with the institutionalisation of the
timetable and the development of an exhaustive work ethic. Thus Foucault concentrated on
understanding the development of the disciplinary regime through an analysis of the 'new
micro-physics of power' (Foucault 1977: 139); it was an analysis of the ability of
disciplinary power to penetrate the minute everyday practices of individuals and so render
their bodies docile. This is the rationalisation of the body (Turner 1984) because with the
emergent disciplinary regime the body is caught within the human sciences and rendered
knowable and thus controllable.
A criticism of this work, with its emphasis on the local relations of power, however,
was that it ignored the relations between institutions and the state (Rutherford 1999). But in
The History of Sexuality (1978), Foucault extended his analyses of the disciplinary regime
and its workings on the human body to an analysis of the regulation and normalisation of the
'social body' through expert discourses of sexuality. That is, he turns his attention to the
connection between the micro-level operation of power on the body and the problem of
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regulating entire populations by the state (rationalisation of populations). In particular,
Foucault identifies a new form of power that he characterises as 'biopower', which is
concerned with 'administering life' (Foucault 1978: 139). This 'power over life' evolved in
two forms. The first draws on his earlier work and focuses on the discipline or the 'anatamo-
politics of the human body' and the second focuses on the regulatory controls used to
supervise the health and longevity of the population: the manipulation of these controls is to
undertake 'a biopolitics of the population'. In as much as these two elements are connected,
to attempt to regulate sexual activity is to link the discipline of the body with the
management of the population. Thus Foucault argues that 'one of the great innovations in the
techniques of power in the eighteenth century was the emergence of "population" as an
economic and political problem' (Foucault 1978: 25). It was an emergence that Foucault
associated with changes taking place in early modern Europe that marked the transition from
'rule' to 'government' (Foucault 1991). In replacing the relatively coercive rule of the state
by a sovereign, this new form of thinking about and exercising power involved finding ways
in which subjects would internalise state control through self-regulation. 'In contrast to
sovereignty, government has as its purpose not the act of government itself, but the welfare
of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity,
health' (Foucault 1991: 100). The health and welfare of the population 'were no longer
conceived of as ends in themselves.. .they were now seen instrumentally and empirically, as
the means for the increase of the state's power' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1984: 139-140).
It is with this attention to the population that the art of government of the state
becomes a distinct activity requiring new forms of knowledge and new techniques and
practices of social control. 'Biopolitics is therefore inherently linked to the development and
elaboration of specific forms of expertise' (Rutherford 1999: 44). 'Experts', supported by
new forms of knowledge, have the task of 'administering life' and their expertise is
implicated in the way biopolitics becomes applied to the individual and collective body
through the disciplines of medicine, education, public health and social welfare. This
rationalisation of the population is, for Foucault, an essential element of the development of
modern society because the parallel development of the techniques of biopower (anatomo-
politics) and the institutions of state power (biopolitics) were also crucial in the emergence
of political economy (Dean 1999). 'Biopower was without question an indispensable
element in the development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without
the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the
phenomena of population to economic processes' (Foucault 1978: 140-141). Foucault (1991)
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dubbed the emergence of these new formations of knowledge and techniques of governing
populations 'governmentality', by which he meant:
[the] ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections,
the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit
complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle form
of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means
apparatuses of security.. .this type of power which may be termed government,
[results] on the one hand, in formations of a whole series of specific
governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of whole
complex of savoirs (knowledges) (Foucault 1991: 102-103).
With the simultaneous emergence of the population and biopower, then, Foucault identifies
what he takes to be an important element of modern society - the 'governmentalisation' of
the state. Formal bodies of knowledge become interlinked with administrative mechanisms
that act upon both the individual and the population through a variety of techniques. He
therefore offers an analysis of the emergence of modern government based on specific
configurations of power/knowledge; it is, as he says of his analysis of discipline, 'a history of
the modem soul...a genealogy of the present scientifico-legal complex' (Foucault 1977: 23).
In offering an historical explanation for the form of contemporary society and in
suggesting important elements in its emergence, Foucault offers resources for contemporary
analysis and for this study. Foucault's nominalistic approach provides the basis for, and is
thus compatible with, much of the constructivist approach to nature and knowledge. Foucault
argues that if one wants to understand the constitution of society one should listen to history.
If one listens to history, he argues that one finds not that there is a timeless and essential
secret behind things, 'but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was
fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms...from chance' (Foucault 1980a: 142). He
adopts a genealogical approach as 'a form of history which can account for the constitution
of knowledges, discourses and domains of objects etc., without having to make reference to a
subject that is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty
sameness throughout the course of history' (Foucault 1980b: 117). This nominalist position
means that history, our knowledge of the world and the way that that knowledge influences
the human subject, are all things of the world: they are contingent on relationships,
interactions and struggles (Philp 1990). This sort of understanding is evident in Foucault's
analysis of the emergence of the categories of 'madness', the 'body', 'discipline' and
'sexuality'. Foucault showed that there were certain sets of discursive practices that
governed what could be said about a particular topic at any particular time or place and
situated those discursive practices within the work of institutions such as prisons, hospitals
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or schools. As such, categories such as 'the body' only emerged through situated discursive
practices and only made sense within the discursive frame of reference that enabled those
categories.
In a similar way, 'nature' and 'biodiversity' could be conceived as emerging through
discursive practice within an institutional context of ecological science and its associated
conservation agencies; as formations of knowledge and practice which bring objects into
being and, in turn, perpetuate those fields of knowledge. An analysis of the emergence of
biodiversity, then, could consider, in a similar way to Foucault, the small practices involved
in the formation of new regimes of nature conservation. 'Biodiversity' and, more broadly,
'nature' can be understood as embedded within the emergence of new forms of
power/knowledge that are the result of continuing struggle and negotiation and which
constitute and underpin biodiversity conservation.
Pointers to how Foucault's ideas might be put to work in an analysis of nature
conservation can be found in work that has sought to utilise the concept of 'governmentality'
(Dean 1999; Rose and Miller 1992). The study of governmentality:
seeks to identify the emergence of that regime, examine the multiple sources of
the elements that constitute it, and follow the diverse processes and relations by
which these elements are assembled into relatively stable forms of organisation
and institutional practice. It examines how such a regime gives rise to and
depends upon particular forms of knowledge and.. .considers how this regime
has a technical or technological dimension and analyses the characteristic
techniques, instrumentalities and mechanisms through which such practices
operate (Dean 1999: 21).
Taken as such, a study of biodiversity conservation as a regime of practice and as an arena of
power/knowledge would address the emergence of the regime, the different elements that
constituted the whole, the forms of institutional practice, the dependence of these practices
upon specific sorts of knowledge and the techniques involved.
Does such an approach stretch Foucault's ideas beyond the bounds of their utility? In
his genealogical work (as opposed to his archaeological work: Foucault 1972, 1974)
Foucault was interested in the human sciences, the state and how people became caught up
in relations of power. There is, however, potential value in extending Foucault's explicit
concern with the biopolitics of the human population and the human sciences to the natural
world and the natural sciences. It is possible to argue that although Foucault's analysis of
power/knowledge was aimed at illustrating the relations between individuals and the
apparatus of the state, his insistence that knowledge was produced as an effect of power and
power operated through knowledge is compatible with contemporary analyses of science as
social practice (Rouse 1987, 1993). Ecological science, as the above review suggested, is not
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corrupted by power or social influence, it is thoroughly embedded in power and social
practice.
It is possible to note, too, that at the same time as the 'population' was interwoven
with the development of 'biopower', there developed new approaches to the natural world.
Rutherford, for example, suggests that 'it is clear from [Foucault's] discussions of the
biopolitical regulation of populations that this assumes not only the disciplining of
individuals and populations, but also, necessarily, a concern with the administration of 'all
the conditions of life' as represented by the environment' (Rutherford 1999: 45). The
definition and administration of the 'population' requires the simultaneous definition and
administration of the environment upon which the population depends since if the art of
government is to improve the condition of the population, a central concern must be the
proper balance between the population and resources. Consequently, the idea of the
environment as the sum of the physical resources upon which the population depends also
comes into existence and becomes a problem of government: the government of populations
also entails the government of nature. In line with this argument, Demeritt (2001c: 437)
claims that the 'efforts to enumerate and conserve the nation's natural resources were a
distinct extension of an emergent discourse of 'biopower". Similarly, Rutherford suggests
that whilst Foucault identified an expanding series of discourses on population in the
eighteenth and nineteenth century, if we look to historical scholarship, we can see evidence
of other discourses which take the environment or nature as their object. Glacken, for
example, points to George Perkins Marsh's treatise on Man and Nature, and which explicitly
addressed the population-resources issue, as marking the arrival of an entirely different
approach to the natural world 'influenced by the theory of evolution, specialisation in the
attainment of knowledge, (and) acceleration in the transformation of nature' (cited in
Rutherford 1999: 51). Just as biopower was characterised by the emergence of new forms of
power/knowledge in the human sciences and associated institutions, within which the
population materialised as an object, so there also developed new forms of power/knowledge
and institutions concerned with the environment.
Following this sort of logic, environmental governance can, arguably, be understood
as an extension of biopower. In this vein, governmentality as a concept has been extended to
provide a context for analyses of the regimes of practices - the configurations of
power/knowledge - through which nature, natural resources and the environment have
become known and controlled. Murdoch and Ward (1997), for example, have examined the
role of statistics in the UK, most especially around the time of the Second World War, in
creating a new object - national agriculture - that subsequently came into the compass of
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government. Hannah (2000), with a focus on Francis Walker, director of the 1870 and 1880
US censuses, and Kirsch (2002) with a focus on John Wesley Powell and the mapping of the
Colorado Plateau in the nineteenth century, both examine the mechanisms by which data
travelled and was invested with authority and through which the nation and the blank spaces
on the map became known to the policy makers. It was through such mechanisms that 'the
west' became known and bound up with the westward geographical expansion of specific
systems of value and signification. Braun (2000) has focused on the processes of geological
mapping on the west coast of Canada in the late nineteenth century and the co-construction
of national resources and competent geological observers that allowed the surveillance of the
west and the transferral of geological information back to the centres of population and
calculation in the east. Demeritt (2001c) has examined the statistical and diagrammatic
enframing of the forest resources of the Progressive-era United States and highlights how
once transformed into a calculable quantity they became available to new disciplinary forms
of state power. Thus whilst Foucault focused on the emergence of a new object of a
governmental rationality - the population - others have sought to extend this usage to look at
the formation of different objects, such as the national farm, or the national forest, and thus
their incorporation within the rationality of government and their ultimate control and use
directed from a distant centre of calculation.
The power/knowledge configurations that constitute and control 'the environment'
and the population with regard to the environment, and which are interwoven with the rise of
ecological science, have thus been recast as 'ecological governmentality' (Rutherford 1999:
51), 'environmental governmentality' (Darier 1996) or 'environmentality' (Luke 1999).
Rutherford suggests that 'ecology and environmental management can also be regarded as
expressions of biopolitics, as these originate in, and operate on, the same basic concerns for
managing the 'continuous and multiple relations' between the population, its resources and
the environment' (Rutherford 1999: 45). Nature conservation could, therefore, at its simplest,
be understood as a part of a problem of environmental governance. Conserving the natural
world is part of governing the population by regulating the actions of people through
legislation to protect species or by designating reserves in the face of an expanding influence
on rural areas. This is governing the population for the benefit of nature, but perhaps more
importantly, for the population itself. The changing practices of conserving nature that
accompany the increasing importance of biodiversity represent a renegotiation of
environmental governance and will be, just as renegotiations of government were for
Foucault, bound up in the development of new forms of knowledge, new institutional
contexts and new practices.
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Just as Foucault utilised a genealogical approach in order to offer a history of the
present scientifico-legal complex, so extending biopower to the natural sciences potentially
renders them open to analysis. Furthermore, just as Foucault's attention was arguably
focused on the rationalisation of the body and the rationalisation of the population, if we
extend biopolitics to ecopolitics and biopower to ecopower we can examine the
rationalisation ofnature but with the analytical resources provided by Foucault.
Governmentality is close to rationalisation as an understanding of the processes
taking place in modern society. As Dreyfus and Rabinow point out, Foucault inherits from
Weber 'a concern with rationalisation and objectification as the essential trend of our culture
and the most important problem of our time' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 166). But he
examines rationalisation in a different way. Rather than chart the progressive development of
particular forms of rationality involved in the process of rationalisation, Foucault examines
'how forms of rationality inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices, and what
role they play within them' (Foucault 1981: 8). Instead of simply adopting the concept of
rationalisation, with its implicit historical narrative of development, Foucault examines the
way that particular forms of rationality work. He therefore avoids adopting a concept that is
relatively closed to the rapid mutation of events and processes of change and is able to
examine precisely how knowledge and practices become interwoven with particular effects
(Dean 1994). Thus by drawing upon Foucault we can analyse the developments in nature
conservation in new ways. From a Foucauldian perspective, explanation for the shape of
conservation should not be sought in any grand narrative of the gradual triumph of
rationality over nature, but the small 'forgotten' practices - in the micro-physics of power -
that underpin conservation itself. We can thus offer a genealogy of contemporary
rationalistic nature conservation.
Dangerous or productive ground?
While it would be inaccurate to label Foucault a constructivist, his approach to
understanding knowledge, power, objects and subjects as produced within discourse has an
affinity with constructivism and, as such, could be interpreted as venturing into dangerous
territory. In recent years the constructivist approach to environmental issues has been heavily
criticised from what could be characterised as a 'realist' perspective for 'oversocialising
nature' (Benton 1994; Dunlap and Catton 1994; Murphy 1994b, Dickens 1996; Gandy
1996). Indeed, Soule and Lease (1995: xvi) suggest that 'contemporary forms of intellectual
and social relativism can be just as destructive to nature as bulldozers and chain-saws'.
Constructivism is criticised for two reasons. First, it is argued that a constructivist approach
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does not acknowledge the independent existence of nature, the environment or
environmental problems; this approach, arguably, denies 'that there are features of the world
which exist independent of discourse and social construction' (Dickens 1996: 74). Secondly,
a constructivist approach is criticised because it means that no form of knowledge can be
understood to be privileged over any other. The constructivist approach to environmental
issues is thus thought to be, at best, an interesting intellectual activity, but, at worst,
downright harmful to the environmental cause. It is thought to be harmful because if
conservation, and environmentalism more generally, speak for nature, they do so through
scientific argument. Suggesting that scientific knowledge is socially constructed, in the eyes
of critics, only serves to undermine the cause of conservation because conservation's
authority to speak for nature is reduced to just another claim. For them, asserting that nature
is an idea opens the door to a nihilistic relativism in which any idea of nature goes. If we
invent nature and cannot access a nature uncontaminated by our ideas, then we cannot
choose between them; if everything is relative to our ideas, then we lose the stable ground
from which to argue for the defence of the natural world (Cronon 1995a). Environmental
crisis becomes merely a social construct (as in, either, an idea dreamt up and residing in our
heads or simply false). Thus it is argued that constructivism potentially leads to political
quietism and refuses a central strand of nature conservation: the possibility of advancing
positive ethical standards in relation to the environment (Proctor 1998a, 1998b).
There are several possible responses to these criticisms. The first is to adopt a
constructivist stance and defend it. It is possible to suggest, like Bumingham and Cooper
(1999), that the criticism of 'social constructivism' is actually aimed only at strong
constructivism (which verges on a form of idealism) and that the majority of constructivist
work actually practices a much milder form: the criticism thus misses the mark. As Eden
puts it, 'if we analyse how we understand or relate to natural things such as trees, animals or
floods.. .this does not mean that those things do not exist or matter. It does mean that we can
only ever know them through (imperfect and changing) cultural and social ways...Exploding
the rubric of 'nature' thus allows us to examine its power to move us to use, value or protect
it but does not negate the noncultural' (Eden 2001: 82-83). It can also be suggested that a
constructivist approach does not remove the possibility of engaging in political debate or
making political interventions. While such interventions will not justify themselves by
reference to objectivist claims to know an incontestable reality, but will rather, accept the
situated and partial nature of the claims, political interventions can be made all the same. The
criticism of political quietism is, as Burningham and Cooper (1999) make plain, based upon
a model of theory and practice within which 'objectivism' is an indispensable element.
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The second response to realist criticisms of constructivist arguments is to attempt to
avoid the entrenchment of the debate as one between realists and relativists/constructivists
arguing about the nature of reality and our ability to know it, by seeking a philosophical
position that accepts the insights of constructivism whilst not losing touch with reality. Soper
(1995, 1996), for example, sought accommodation between the 'nature endorsing' and the
'nature sceptical' camps by accepting some degree of constructivism and of realism. Hayles
(1995), following Haraway (1991), advocated a program of 'constrained constructivism' that
acknowledged the construction of knowledge by re-visioning the notion of distanced
objectivity as embodied 'interactivity' and 'positionality' (situatedness). She claimed it to be
a position that could satisfy both realists, because they would still have access to the real,
and constructivists, because knowledge is still social. Similarly, Sismondo (1993, 1996)
argued for a 'heterogeneous constructivism' as a means of avoiding the excesses of the poles
of realism and relativism (although Hacking (1999) questions the degree to which
accommodation can be reached). Each attempt at finding a resolution recognises that despite
the common characterisations and fears of realists, a constructivist approach does not
necessarily lead to nihilistic relativism and despite the portrayals by constructivists, realism
does not necessarily entail seeing knowledge as unproblematically connected to nature. Each
epistemological position has some merit.
A third, related, response to constructivism and criticisms of it has sought to avoid the
dualisms that are embedded in the realist-relativist arguments by adopting a more empirical
approach. More specifically, it is argued that social constructivism emphasises
representation and thus society, and that realism emphasises a direct, unproblematic contact
with nature. Both approaches therefore reproduce a nature-society dualism by emphasising
one side of it. Exponents of Actor Network Theory (Callon 1986; Latour and Woolgar 1986;
Latour 1987, 1988, 1993, 1999a; Law 1991, 1994) have thus sought to extend the
constructivist understanding of the 'interests' - discourses and personal commitments -
influencing scientific knowledge by asking how that knowledge entails the mobilisation of a
variety of heterogeneous materials, both human and nonhuman. As such, the actor-network
perspective sought to question certain assumptions that underlie constructivist
understandings of science and, in particular, to repudiate a priori distinctions between the
social and the natural or technological. What is needed, according to Latour (1999c) is 'one
more turn after the social turn'. ANT, and associated projects like that of Haraway with her
concept of the cyborg (Haraway 1997), attempts to work across the distinction between
human and nonhuman by trying to understand how these things interact before they are
categorised as human or nonhuman, subject or object, nature or culture. Although criticised
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(Bloor 1999) and reworked (Hetherington and Law 2000; Law and Hassard 1999), this
approach has been found useful by many in geography to study the interconnection of the
human and non-human worlds (Whatmore 1997, 1999, 2002; Whatmore and Thorne 1997;
Thrift 1996; Holloway 1998; Woods 1997; Murdoch 1997a, 1997b, 1998, Demeritt 1996;
Wolch and Emel 1998).
My response to the apparent difficulties raised for environmentalism by
constructivism is not, however, to engage in what Macnaghten and Urry (1998: 2) have
characterised as the 'rather dull debate' between realism and constructivism. Nor do I wish
to adopt the approach of ANT and its obscure terminology or attempt to fashion a position
between realism and constructivism by turning to critical realism (Gandy 1996). Instead I
align myself with a constructivist stance - whilst recognising that this stance itself refers to
different sorts of constructivism (Demeritt 1998) - despite the criticisms that are made of it.
By adopting Foucault's methods with regard to nature conservation, I want to put the
epistemological debates to one side and adopt an approach that allows me to ask why nature
conservation is being reframed as biodiversity conservation and why some approaches
become the basis for action while others lose ground. I want to ask how contemporary nature
conservation has come to be as it is. I therefore adopt a broadly constructivist position in a
pragmatic move that allows me to change the conventional conversations about the
conservation of nature. Like Golinski (1998), I adopt a constructivist position as a
methodological orientation because it allows me to reflect in new ways on how conservation
problems are defined, articulated and acted upon. It is a useful strategy for denaturalising the
practices that become normalised and taken-for-granted.
I suggest that this broadly 'constructivist' approach is useful because it emphasises
that nature is not nearly as natural as it seems and that concern for nature flows more from
human value than from nature itself. This is important because so often conservation retreats
behind the facade of objectivity with its implicit unproblematic connection to nature. It does
so because, from the position of the classic view of science as neutral and objective, if it
recognises that values have 'contaminated' its claims to know, the political and moral
authority it seeks is compromised. Retreating behind the facade, however, only serves to
inhibit a critical understanding of what we mean by nature. Indeed, it is arguably this lack of
reflection on the sometimes-contradictory assumptions at the centre of conservation that lies
at the core of many environmental conflicts. Accepting that we make nature and our
knowledge of it encourages critical reflection of the sorts of nature we make, the
assumptions that sit at the heart of conservation and the processes by which conservation
works. Far from weakening conservation such reflection has the aim of deepening and
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enriching our understanding of conservation itself and the problems it engages with. Far
from threatening the 'objective' credentials of conservation it would help develop what
Harding (1986) has called 'strong objectivity'. That is, by recognising the societal and
disciplinary cultures within which we are positioned and which shape our knowledge claims
we can become more objective.
For those at the sharp end of conservation who are trying to protect species from
extinction or habitats from degradation or loss, it may appear frivolous to talk about social
construction. As Irwin puts it, 'it may be intellectually stimulating and entertaining to
unravel the epistemological problems of knowing the environment...but it leaves us without
any tools...when dealing with environmental problems...Can we afford such analysis when
the problems are so pressing' (Irwin 2001: 169)? Whilst I write myself into philosophical
corners, real day-to-day practical action is being carried out at conservation sites across
Scotland. The people I interviewed carry on trying to manage to the best of their ability.
Arguably, what they need is knowledge that will help them achieve their goals: new
ecological research and management advice. Abstract analysis of their work does not seem
to help at all. I suggest in what follows, however, that addressing these issues is crucial and
important. The purpose of the constructivist approach adopted here is thus not to claim that
the nonhuman world is somehow unreal and that it only exists in our heads. Nor is it to
suggest that only those developments in conservation that I dislike are socially constructed
(one incorrect interpretation of social construction, which retains the classic view of science,
recognises the construction of nature or landscape 'myths' but takes those myths to be false
because they have been corrupted by social influences - see Budiansky 1995). Nor is it to
advance an anti-science argument as if it is simply the same as any other claim to know: I do
believe that there are good reasons to believe scientists. Rather, it is to put a Foucauldian
approach to work in order to situate conservation within the cultural discourses that enframe
it and discursive practices that give it shape. The presupposition is that far from undermining
conservation, critical reflection on its discursive basis and thus on what is actually being
conserved and how we have arrived at the present approach to conserving and understanding




Constructing Knowledge of Nature Conservation
Writing about research
Chapter two framed this research as an exploration of the changing relations between
ecological knowledge, ideas of nature and institutional practice. It suggested that examining
these relationships allows reflection upon why we conserve nature in the ways that we do
and pointed to the discursive negotiation involved in the institutional establishment of the
biodiversity process as one example of a context within which the conservation of nature
was debated. In this chapter, I reflect on how I went about researching the changing practices
of nature conservation.
Chapter two contained a relatively straightforward narrative. I suggested that there
are discursive changes in nature conservation that need to be explained; that there are
theoretical developments that should be taken into account when attempting an explanation;
and that there are certain conceptual resources to call upon to tell the story. Under the
'classic' research design - where one starts with a problem, designs a project to examine that
problem, collects the data and then analyses it - the next logical step is to apply a method to
reveal the discursive change. The purpose of this chapter would therefore be to recount why
a particular method was chosen and how data were collected before the following chapters
present analysis and results. To portray my research in this way, however, would be to
subscribe to an ideal that, from a constructivist and hermeneutic perspective, is problematic.
It is problematic because it is derived from discourses developed for quantitative and
positivist methodologies (although the two do not necessarily equate, see Kwan 2002) which
imply that data is 'out there' to be collected, brought back and subjected to analysis.
Research is portrayed as proceeding in a sequence of relatively neat stages and the authority
of the research resides in the degree to which it conforms to the ideal. Constructivist scholars
note, however, that the knowledge claims of others are 'messy' accomplishments.
Constructivist sociologists of science, for example, have suggested that the creation of
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scientific knowledge is a messy, power-laden activity and that science does not conform in
any simple way to the ideal of scientific method (cf. Kuhn 1962; Latour and Woolgar 1986;
Latour 1987; Merchant 1981; Haraway 1989, 1991; Harding 1991). The crucial issue, then,
and the reason that the ideal of research is problematic, is reflexivity. It would be
contradictory to adopt a constructivist stance and emphasise the situated and messy nature of
the knowledge claims of others but then implicitly suggest that one's own claims adhere to
an ideal and directly refer to some external reality irrespective of one's own situation. In
what follows, then, I seek to be reflexive about my own research practice.
Reflexivity is advocated, especially by feminist theorists who have most thoroughly
engaged with the concept, as a strategy for situating one's own knowledge claims and
avoiding the false neutrality and universality of much academic knowledge (c.f. McDowell
1992; Nast 1994; Wolf 1996; Madge et. al. 1997). Since power and knowledge are
understood from a constructivist and post-structuralist position to be interwoven, researchers
are encouraged to acknowledge the power relations embedded in their research and their
'position' in relation to others. They are encouraged to render visible their own acts of
construction, their relations with research participants and their politics. The goal is to follow
Haraway (1991) and emphasise that their knowledge is partial, situated and messy.
But once the researcher has acknowledged the 'situated messiness' of their own
research, they are presented with a problem. How do they convey that messiness? If research
is understood to be less a series of stages where the researcher goes into 'the field' to collect
data before bringing it back to analyse it, and more an iterative process of data construction
(Davidson 2001), how does one write about that messy process without 'sanitising' it? If
'data collection and analysis should not be disentangled, as analysis prompts new questions,
possibly new theoretical concepts, and commonly challenges interim interpretations and
explanations' (Hoggart et. al. 2002: 238), how does one state clearly why certain methods
and forms of analysis were adopted? In short, how does the researcher write about their
research, emphasising its messiness whilst also claiming authority to speak?
The most common way that researchers have sought to highlight the messiness of
their work has been through an emphasis on the constructive relations between themselves
and their research participants. Emphasising these relationships is one way of illustrating
how the research is constructed in inter-personal power-laden engagement and that the
participants have an influence on the work rather than being reduced to objects of it. The
researcher commonly tries to take account of their own position and that of their participants
and weave these positions into their narrative. By doing so the researcher seeks to stress that
their work is the result of very specific sorts of personal situated practice and that it is not a
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view from nowhere. Further, because academic writing has long been recognised as one of
the ways that researcher power is manifest and perpetuated (Clifford and Marcus 1986),
attempts have been made at developing writing strategies that disrupt that power (Richardson
1998). Thus some researchers have sought to experiment with writing in different 'voices' so
that their singular, authoritative, academic voice is disrupted. Others have experimented with
'auto/biographical' writing which emphasises how the researcher's personal history, race,
gender, age or nationality impinges on the research process and how the researcher
constructs their own identity as they engage in the research and construct the stories of others
(c.f. Okely and Callaway 1992; Stanley 1992; Lai 1996; Birch 1998).
This sort of reflexivity provides one way by which I can address the problem of
representing the messiness of my own research. In writing about the methodological process,
for example, I could write about my position on the issue of intervention in nature reserves
and detail how my initial desire to see some reserves left alone softened as I engaged with
practicing conservationists and understood the complexity of the issues and the position in
which they find themselves. I could, alternatively, detail my shifting use of social
constructivism as both a means of challenging conservation and as a means of explicating
the socially situated way that certain sorts of understandings of the natural world and forms
of management were arrived at (on the distinction between 'social construction-as-
refutation' and 'social construction-as-philosophical critique' see Hacking (1999) and
Demeritt (2002)).
There are, however, two problems with detailing position in this way. The first has
been highlighted by Rose (1997). She argued that when researchers attempt to detail their
position they implicitly assume that their relationships to others, and indeed that they
themselves, are transparent and can be 'seen' by the reflective researcher. Such 'transparent
reflexivity' therefore potentially falls into the 'God-trick' of attempting to see everything
whilst being detached from it (Rose 1997; Haraway 1991). Such detailing of positionality
contradicts the presumptions of a constructivist position because it assumes a position
outside of politics and a direct unproblematic view of research relationships.
The second problem with many accounts of positionality is that whilst they are
reflexive about power and research relations, they often tend to be unreflexive about the
research process in a different way. That is, while many researchers profess a belief in the
processual nature of research, when it comes to writing about their own work, there is
commonly an order imposed - apparent in methodological descriptions based around the
ideal of research design, data collection and analysis - that, I suspect, was not apparent in the
doing. Despite the insights provided by the sociology of science that natural scientists do not
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adhere to scientific method, it is common for social scientists to implicitly suggest that their
work adheres to the ideal of rigorous research. Even in some of the most reflexive work that
seeks to understand research as a journey of self-discovery for the researcher, the study is
split into stages of theoretical preparation, fieldwork, analysis and writing (Nairn 2002;
Birch 1998).
This contradiction of being very reflexive in some ways but less so in others is
perhaps due to the ambiguous position in which constructivist and feminist researchers find
themselves. On the one hand, they want to challenge dominant knowledge making practices:
as Madge et. al. (1997: 86) proclaim, 'feminist geography, like feminist theory, is involved
in challenging academic orthodoxies about how research is undertaken'. But on the other
hand, if they are to be taken seriously by the very people they wish to engage, they have to
emphasise the importance of the work they want to challenge and subscribe to the accepted
academic practices through which arguments are made. In order to be heard, they have to
demonstrate their academic credentials by illustrating their adherence to norms of research
practice, norms that they also wish to question. Nevertheless, it is with this latter problem of
being reflexive about the research process and power relations but writing about it in
unreflexive ways, that I wish to engage.
Despite the risks of making myself appear like an inadequate researcher because of a
lack of adherence to the research ideal, I suggest that not being reflexive about how one
writes the research process, and simply subscribing to the ideal of research, would itself be
bad research practice. I found that if I translated the messiness of my research into a rigid
model of how research is supposed to proceed, I would misrepresent my research. I am
uncomfortable with such a misrepresentation because if ethical issues pervade research and
are not just restricted to issues of confidentiality and trust, then how researchers present their
work in written form is just as importantly a question of ethics. Finding a way of
representing my research that does not misrepresent it is thus a question of honesty. Contrary
to Bernard, who suggests that 'it would be a monumental waste of precious space in books
and journals to describe the real research process for every project that is reported' (2000:
66, original emphasis), I would argue that for a constructivist project it is precisely the 'real'
process that is important.
My response to the problem of representing my research is not, then, to attempt to
define my positionality and illustrate the way it has influenced the research; it is to construct
a narrative akin to a 'thick description' of my own research process (cf. Geertz 1973). By
referring to the letters, fieldnotes, interview notes, work produced along the way, bi-annual
reports to my funding body and discussion documents produced for supervisors, I construct a
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narrative of my research. As will become clear, I attempt to understand, and tell the story of,
the construction of contemporary positions in nature conservation, through the traces of
change in documents and conversations with practitioners. In the next section, I do the same
with the traces of my own research. In order to avoid excessive post-hoc rationalisation
where I tell a story that renders smooth a sometimes erratic and disjointed process involving
dead ends and significant changes in approach, it is more appropriate to tell the story of my
research through the materials that I generated at the time. Instead of presenting my work as
a polished piece that keeps the reader on the outside, this approach is intended to open up the
process of its making. And instead of presenting myself as an onlooker viewing my research
from a distance, in using these materials I seek to emphasise my role. In this way, I follow
Haraway (1991) by seeking to emphasise my own knowledge construction as situated and
partial, whilst also seeking to avoid the imposition of rigid methodological stages that were
not apparent at the time.
In presenting this sort of narrative, answers to the methodological questions of what
I did, when and why are woven into the text. This is to allow the reader a greater sense of the
process, to open my research out so that others can assess its veracity and to suggest that
method was on-going and itself worthy of scrutiny, not alone a means to an end. But more
than this, I have found that emphasising the processual nature of research actually challenges
the presuppositions of common methodological questions. One such question that the
researcher is normally required to answer is why the methods suit the research questions. But
if I am honest about the process, I only came to be able to frame decent research questions
through the process of writing and continually 'juggling' my material with the literature. I
only arrived at the questions at the end of the process of doing the research. As such, I did
not choose the methods because they were best suited to answering the questions; rather, I
started with a philosophical orientation that suggested certain methods (Guba and Lincoln
1994). Consequently, the methods were not instrumentally related to answering my research
questions but were part of the process of arriving at the questions. Indeed, the sorts of data
that I generated by adopting certain methods shaped the questions I asked. Representing my
methods post-hoc as well suited to my research questions would erase the process of
question construction in order to construct myself as the rational actor purposefully carrying
out research in the positivist model. Emphasising the process of research and taking the
constructivist position seriously therefore raises questions about the common
conceptualisation of methodology itself.
The narrative that follows should not be understood as implying direct reference to
my own practice or as suggesting that it can reveal how method really happens. Rather, it
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should be seen as one means of constructing a version of my research process. Thus, the
narrative does not attempt to 'get it all'. I cannot capture the influence of every conversation
or text on my research; I simply select extracts from research notes and letters in order to
document a chronology in an attempt to render my research practice 'visible'. This greater
visibility is intended to disrupt the relatively straightforward narrative of the previous
chapter. My understanding of the discursive change that needs to be explained, of the
theoretical developments that should be taken into account and the conceptual resources that
I want to call upon, is revealed as a messy accomplishment.
Some may say - especially those in nature conservation - that such an approach is
over-reflexive, even self-indulgent. Dwelling on the process of research prompts questions of
whether, in the face of pressing issues in nature conservation, such self-reflection helps. I
want to suggest that it does and that it is important, especially given the lack of reflection on
the presuppositions and forms of knowledge that underpin conservation. If new thinking is
required in nature conservation, then reflection on the ways that knowledge is produced is
crucial. Making sets of claims without thinking about their theoretical and methodological
underpinnings would be to reproduce the same unreflective approach.
The story of this research
Getting established
When I reflect on my research and try to identify an origin I find only a tangle of interwoven
roots that render problematic any straightforward attempt to situate it in personal experience,
theoretical outlook or apparently obvious research question. As such, I want to resist the
search for an origin and jump into my research on 12 March 2001, the day I wrote to the
Director of the RSPB in Scotland seeking permission to look at the work of his organisation.
Dear Mr Housden,
...I am interested in conservation from a social science perspective and, in
particular, in the ways that understandings of nature, environment and particular
landscapes, such as the Highlands, are shaped within the field of conservation. I
am writing to inform you of my interest in the RSPB and to seek your consent to
the Society being the forum for my work.
...I would, specifically, like to use some of the publications produced by the
RSPB as a means of exploring conservation issues and I would like to spend
extended periods on RSPB reserves as a volunteer.1
1 The letters, preliminary work and reports for supervisors from which I cite in this chapter, are
available from the author on request.
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This letter marked something of a crucial moment in my research. It represented both a
culmination and a beginning. It was a culmination in three senses: it marked the end of a
series of false starts where I had contacted other organisations such as the John Muir Trust
and various environmental partnerships; it marked the translation of my questions about why
certain approaches were undertaken in nature conservation into a constructivist project; and
it indicated that I had arrived at an interest in undertaking an ethnographic project involving
textual analysis and participant observation.
With regard to the last of these, I was aware that in the complex interplay between
ontology, epistemology and methodology, a constructivist engagement with meaning lends
itself to qualitative methods (Guba and Lincoln 1994). I was also aware that a constructivist
approach, itself bound up in the linguistic turn in the social sciences, pays attention to how
'nature' is brought into existence through language. Methodologically it seemed
straightforward: in order to address how conservationists represent - construct - nature, I
could examine spoken and written language by undertaking a series of interviews and by
examining texts; I could analyse the discourse of nature conservationists.
At the same time, I was aware of the arguments of those who criticised the
constructivist emphasis on representation (Whatmore 1999, 2002; Thrift 1999). This
emphasis, it is argued, is problematic because representations become conceptualised as
'floating above' the social world. The emphasis upon abstract conceptualisations tends to be
mapped onto social groups as if that group would adhere wholly to the position irrespective
of context. More fundamentally, the emphasis on representation is thought to reproduce a
dualism between representation and reality, which, in turn, is mapped onto other dualisms of
'nature'/'society' and 'realism'/'relativism'. One response to this apparent abstraction of
representation from everyday practice has been to attempt to develop a non-representational
theory (Thrift 1999). A more empirical approach has sought to focus either on the
significance of embedded social practices (Macnaghten and Urry 1998), or the role of the
body (Macnaghten and Urry 2001). With the focus of attention on embodied social practice,
a great deal of this work is associated with the ethnographic tradition (especially in science
studies: Latour and Woolgar 1986; Law 1994). Thus another option for researching nature
conservation, which takes account of the embeddedness of representations within social
practice, is to approach conservation ethnographically and more specifically to undertake
some participant observation. But, aware of the potential benefits of methodological
triangulation (Burgess 1984) and of the potential pitfalls of choosing to devote more
attention of either representation or practice, I decided that a useful approach was to
undertake both documentary and ethnographic methods at the same time. My approach to the
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RSPB was thus prompted by my knowledge that they produced mountains of textual material
that could be used in textual analysis and my knowledge of their residential volunteering
scheme that offered the possibility of conducting participant observation.
The letter to Stuart Housden was also a beginning. It was the beginning of an
exploration of a specific institutional context and of the start of a process of convincing the
RSPB of the probity of my research. There was, on initial contact with the RSPB, a fair
degree of suspicion about my work, my motives and a concern that I would take up valuable
staff time (I was later to find out that this suspicion was in part due to the exploits of Ian
Mitchell (1999) who, starting with a pre-conceived pro-local community/anti interfering
agency agenda, travelled around conservation sites only to write in disparaging terms about
conservation bodies - especially the RSPB). Consequently, before gaining permission I was
asked to give a presentation to the staff at the regional office in Inverness.
In this presentation I explained my interest in texts and the methods of discourse
analysis and participant observation, setting out my desire to work as a volunteer with nature
reserve staff. I suggested that I would allow myself a year for fieldwork, ideally spending
three months on three different reserves and allowing time for revisits. The outcome of the
meeting was, however, more cautious. Whilst 'the RSPB [was] happy to participate in [my]
research', and was thus firmly established as an organisational research context (with the
Regional Manager for the North of Scotland becoming my contact and 'gatekeeper'), it was
thought best that I visit sites for short periods before reporting back and finalising my plans
(a strategy that allowed the site managers to evaluate me as well as allowing greater
familiarity with the issues before finalising my plans). As such, I organised three weeks
volunteering with one week on a different nature reserve and I visited other sites to meet
staff and talk through the issues. I was also given access to the documents in the library of
the RSPB's Inverness office (which contained published and unpublished reports relevant to
particular issues, species, habitats and sites). As I framed it in a report to my supervisors,
I spent a week as a residential volunteer at Vane Farm, Abernethy and Insh
Marshes and visited staff at Forsinard and on Orkney to 1) establish working
contacts in various sites; 2) identify possible sites for long-term volunteering; 3)
identify possible routes to follow in terms of research strategy; and 4) to begin to
identify initial interesting themes (Report to supervisors Sept 2001).
Rethinking
After the long process of getting permission from managers, organising volunteering and
actually doing it, I wrote on 4 September 2001 to my contact at the RSPB to let him know
how my research was shaping up and to seek his comment and further permission to
51
continue. In this letter I reflected (in what now appears to be incredible detail, but which
illustrates my wish to be as open as possible about my research) upon what I had been doing
in terms of textual analysis and volunteering and what it meant for where I wanted to go
next.
Dear ...,
...If you remember, when I came to see you initially about my work, I said that I
wanted to address the ways that those in conservation understand nature and the
Highlands. To get to grips with this I have been working simultaneously on
several fronts. I have been familiarising myself with the field through the texts
produced by conservation agencies; volunteering on and visiting a few sites; and
developing my theoretical position...
With regard to texts, I started to go through the texts produced by the RSPB
looking at the ways that the natural world was being portrayed (for example, as
under threat, as in balance or as past harmony) and at the construction of the
problems facing the natural world. This initial analysis was useful because it
raised questions about what I was trying to find out and how I had been
conceptualising my methodological approach. After re-thinking I changed tack
slightly and started to look for themes that ran through different literatures and
across organisations. It was here that I started to realise the importance of the
developing languages and practices of 'biodiversity conservation'. I am
increasingly seeing biodiversity conservation in the UK (with its structure of
audits, species and habitat action plans, local biodiversity action plans, targets,
management plans and species champions) as a broad theme (or what I would
call a discourse - a notion borrowed from the work of the French philosopher,
Michel Foucault) that, working across organisations, structures understandings of
the natural world and works through into conservation practice in terms of
designations, actual site management and in terms of social relations in particular
places (e.g. in community involvement, participation etc.). Thus this initial
period of looking to texts has allowed me to develop a clearer focus. I now see
my work as seeking to address not so much simply the ways that those in
conservation understand nature and the Highlands as the ways that those
understandings are mediated in changing institutional contexts (Letter to RSPB
Sept 2001).
After spending several days exploring the library in the Inverness office to see how much
material relevant to potential volunteering sites was available and to get a sense of the issues,
I recognised the need to select texts to study in detail. Knowing I was likely to go to
Abernethy - one of the largest pinewoods in the country - I chose a document entitled Time
for Pine (RSPB 1993) and attempted to undertake some discourse analysis. In this first
attempt at analysis, I found myself creating electronic documents and filing similar extracts
in a preliminary system of descriptive codes: biodiversity, economy, genetic variation,
native, natural, rarity, science, special sites, partnership and species and habitats. But in a
write-up of this early analysis, I also drew out the underlying repertoires that framed how the
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pinewoods were constructed. Pinewoods were remnants of an original nature, evidence of
lost natural harmony and they were described through the vocabulary of ecology. At the
time, however, this did not seem particularly interesting and appeared to focus on
representation. It was this that 'raised questions about what I was trying to find out and how
I had been conceptualising my methodological approach'.
After re-thinking I widened my scope and addressed other texts on woodlands
looking at the broader issues such as the emphasis on 'native' species and restoration. Rather
than looking for underlying repertoires I looked for common issues, vocabularies and
themes. This allowed me to piece together texts and to realise the importance of
'biodiversity' because when I was faced with documents containing the word 'biodiversity' I
recalled reading the RSPB's second corporate strategy for 1997-2002, which, in a section
entitled 'Birds to biodiversity', claimed that 'to attain our primary bird objectives, we need
to increase our biodiversity work' (RSPB 1997: 8). In swinging away from an analysis of
repertoires, I turned to the post-structuralist notion of discourse as a complex of ways of
speaking and acting coalescing around the concept of biodiversity. My focus shifted from
addressing how conservationists constructed nature to how they constructed nature in a
changing institutional context.
At the same time as I was moving towards this interest in biodiversity, I was
volunteering (at Vane Farm, Insh Marshes and Abernethy). As I framed it to supervisors,
'Working as a residential volunteer [was] extremely useful'. It involved taking part in the
programme of work set out for volunteers which usually revolved around 'habitat
management' and 'Such habitat management [was] the glorified name for the major theme to
emerge from the three sites: the gardening or managerialist approach to nature
conservation'. After spending three weeks killing things in the name of conservation
(willow, pine, ragwort), I began to get a grasp of why some parts of the natural world were
more valued than others. I came away with an appreciation of why certain sites were
managed in the ways they were. Talking about the need for 'scrub bashing' on Insh Marshes
as we were doing it allowed insight into the value placed on marsh and the reasons for that
valuation.
As well as the general value of gaining more detailed understanding, specific
moments were crucial. One such moment took place as we were preparing to undertake a
count of red grouse at Abernethy prior to 12 August. As one of the managers sought to
explain what we were going to do and why, he verged on to much wider issues of the value
of the site more generally and produced a sheet of paper detailing the site's 'biodiversity'
interest. It was a summary of the species that occurred on the site and which were registered
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on lists of endangerment such as the red data books. What struck me immediately was the
framing of this interest in terms of 'biodiversity'. Connections were beginning to form
between my reading of texts and my experience of volunteering.
Yet whilst I found volunteering useful, it was not entirely successful. One site
manager, on discussing my interest in his reserve, simply refused access for long-term
volunteering saying that he did not think that it was the most appropriate site. I felt that, in
part, this was the result of having negotiated access with regional managers before going to
particular sites. Site managers were not aware, or at best only vaguely aware, of my project
when I arrived. This introduced an uncomfortable positioning that rendered problematic my
forays into participant observation. As I explained to my contact at the RSPB:
In terms of volunteering, I had originally intended to get to grips with
understandings of particular places by spending extended periods in those places
utilising an anthropological method called participant observation. The sort of
extended period of fieldwork that I had envisaged would be extremely useful in
work that looked at specific sites, but as my project has developed my interest
has become less explicitly site-based (because I take the workings of biodiversity
planning to be more diffuse, working at the national, regional and local level) and
I find that such extended periods of volunteering will not help me get to grips
with these broader issues. Moreover, whilst working on a few reserves has been
extremely useful in developing my understanding of some of the issues and in
terms of finding the right questions to ask, I do not feel that spending a long time
as a volunteer would be the best use of my time. Not least of the factors that
helped in this decision was my discomfort at the role I found myself in. I was not
quite an insider and not quite an outsider and my role as a researcher was
sometimes lost from view so that I felt like a kind of spy. I would prefer that my
role as researcher were more visible. As such, I would like to change tack from
an ethnographic approach towards one that is slightly more interview-based
(Letter to RSPB Sept 2001).
In addition to the fact that my research was not at all clear to the site managers and that other
staff were unaware of my work, I found the role of the volunteer to be quite prescribed in
reserve management terms. The relatively fixed role of the volunteer - that of an extra pair
of hands - meant that I was volunteer first and researcher second. My role as researcher
became obscured. In the spectrum of positions from overt to covert, the nature of the role of
the volunteer meant that my position moved towards the covert. Even when I had explained
to each individual what I was interested in, it was obvious that no one really knew what I
was up to. People consequently treated me with a vague suspicion such that I felt like a 'spy'
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1983).
I realised, too, that the location of conservation practice was an important issue.
Whilst volunteering appeared to allow access to the 'sharp end' of conservation practice, by
performing the role of volunteer I would be outside pulling up ragwort or measuring the
54
height of grass on a marsh while the site managers would be in a meeting discussing what
they should be doing. I realised that the practice that was of most interest to me was the
rather mundane bureaucratic practice of meeting, discussing, deciding on appropriate action
and writing documents. I thus recognised anew the importance of documents, that
conservation involved more than dirty practical work in the spaces of nature, and that to a
significant extent it involved a great deal of paperwork. Consequently, I began to move
away from participant observation and my plan to spend three months on three different
reserves as a volunteer changed.
I followed up my interest in the meeting as a space of conservation action by sitting-
in on a two-day management planning meeting at Forsinard in Sutherland. What was
obvious in this sort of formal occasion was that most of the discussion was held in a
continuing interpersonal engagement over the years as site managers discuss issues with
SNH staff or their superiors. Sitting-in on these formal meetings could not really get at that
continuing negotiation. I therefore turned towards interviews because by using this method I
could discuss the issues with individuals and ask them about the continuing negotiation, how
decisions were reached, why certain species and habitats were valued in the way they were
and how different valuations were balanced.
After getting started, then, with some textual analysis and some preliminary
participant observation, I had achieved a focus on the concept of biodiversity and had
changed my methodological approach towards interviewing and textual analysis.
Developing an understanding of Biodiversity
As I saw it, pursuing an interest in biodiversity meant a shift in the conceptualisation of my
study and its relation to the RSPB. Moving away from an emphasis on site management, the
starting point for an investigation of the concept of biodiversity was to return to texts and,
particularly, those associated with the establishment of the 'biodiversity process'. This time,
instead of using texts as a resource for an analysis of the construction of nature, I used them
as a way to familiarise myself with the events, arguments and process through which the
concept of biodiversity came to assume its important position. Stepping back from issues of
sites and pinewoods, I turned to the Convention on Biological Diversity, one of the products
of the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, which provided the impulse for the subsequent
developments in the UK. Starting from this document I was able to trace, through a series of
subsequent texts produced for the benefit of Government, the process by which
'biodiversity' conservation became entwined in new institutional structures. I did not sit back
and purposefully choose particular texts because of their apparent importance. Rather, I
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benefited from the inherent intertextuality of documents (Fairclough 1992; Atkinson and
Coffey 1997) with texts referring to other texts and thus suggesting further lines of inquiry.
In this way, I used the documents to trace the development of the biodiversity process
through time. The UK's initial response to the Convention (Anon. 1994) was followed by the
Steering Group Report and an initial attempt at producing action plans (UK Biodiversity
Steering Group 1995a, 1995b). This in turn was followed by further publications from the
Biodiversity Group and another 'tranche' of plans (UK Biodiversity Group 2000). Through
these documents and their explanation and justification of the approach that was being
developed, I was able to examine how the '59 steps' to protect biodiversity established in the
UK's Biodiversity Action Plan (Anon. 1994) were gradually translated into a focus on
species and habitats; the extensive development of a new approach of action planning; the
process by which certain species were chosen; the ways that habitats were classified; the
changing institutional arrangements as the UK Biodiversity Steering Group was replaced by
the UK Biodiversity Group, with the subsequent establishment of the Scottish Biodiversity
Group (later the Scottish Biodiversity Forum); and the role of particular actors such as the
RSPB and associated organisations in an NGO coalition called 'Biodiversity Challenge'.
This was a means of getting to know the field prior to conducting interviews. Yet if a
discourse is understood as a connected complex of representations and practices, then using
the documents that were bound up in the emerging practices of biodiversity action planning
was also a way of exploring the discourse. As such, my reading of these documents was not
shaped by a search for underlying constructions of nature. Rather - in the way I paid
attention to the construction of 'biodiversity', the forms of justification for the shape of the
biodiversity process, the setting out of criteria that would give shape to the process by
suggesting certain species and habitats for inclusion, and the changes in these justifications
and criteria - I was exploring the developing practices of an emerging institutional arena. I
was gaining insight not only into how those in conservation were conceptualising and
working with the concept of biodiversity, I was also learning who these documents were
written by, who they were written for and what sorts of institutional relationships were
embedded in the process. Interviews would follow and constitute a further exploration.
After engaging in the complexities of a Foucauldian reading of the classification of
habitats and losing sight of biodiversity as discourse for a while, I moved on to a series of
semi-structured or long interviews (see McCracken 1988). In the light of my volunteering
experience (where a common distinction was made between policy and practice) and
because I had followed the documents from the most general through to attempts at
implementation, my interest had turned, as I framed it in letters to potential interviewees,
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towards 'addressing the ways that biodiversity has been translated from emergent concept
into conservation practice'. With this relationship between policy and practice in mind I
developed an interview strategy based around the species and habitat action plans. As I
explained to my supervisors,
I have crafted three discrete sets of interview schedule:
• One for the people on the sites that I visited in the summer. Each interview is
tailored to the specifics of the site but is connected in the themes that they
address.
• One for the people who are in charge of, or are at least the contact points for,
species or habitat action plans. The species and habitats I have chosen are
connected to the sites. For e.g. I would like to see the person in charge of the
pinewood HAP which relates to Abernethy and so on (although I could
potentially see many people here because of the many action plan lead
contacts that would be relevant to each site, I have been selective).
• One for those operating in the less site-based situatedness of the policy arena
(Report for Supervisors Nov 2001).
My prior experience from volunteering on sites thus informed the choices I made about
interviewing. Because I had spent a week at Abernethy and already attempted some analysis
of texts on pinewoods, I intended to focus on the native pinewood habitat action plan and the
action plans of pinewood species such as capercaillie. In turn, because I had been to
Forsinard to speak with staff and to sit in on a management planning meeting, I intended to
look at blanket bog. My time at Insh Marshes suggested that I follow up fens. Identifying
interviewees either from experience on reserves or from the texts embedded in the
biodiversity process, my intention was to speak with the people in particular sites who were
managing for species and habitats, the people co-ordinating action plans and the people who
were involved in developing the whole idea of action planning. I was seeking to look at the
practices that connected different elements of nature conservation and to examine whether
nature was constructed in different ways in different contexts. In this way, I hoped to get at
the complexity of the way that this new approach to conservation was being accommodated
within nature conservation (for a list of interviewees, see Appendix II). At the same time,
however, I chose to ignore parts of the biodiversity process. Due to the fact that I had been
volunteering on sites and had insight into the sorts of management that were being
undertaken for species and habitats, my attention was focused on the species and habitat
action plans. But as one of my interviewees pointed out, the production of plans were only
two of the 59 steps to conserve and enhance biodiversity. I was thus ignoring the local
biodiversity action plans, environmental education, environmental partnerships and the
developing emphasis on urban biodiversity.
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Looking at the pile of interview schedules and the notes made on the way to the
interview, it is now easy to see that each interview was tailored to my preconception of the
interviewee and their area of expertise (and with each interview influenced by prior
interviews). I asked site managers about the specifics of that site and how biodiversity issues
affected what they did. I asked people involved in the policy arena about the development of
the concept and the resultant institutional structures and explored some of the difficulties that
the process raised. I thus wanted several things out of my interviews: to clarify my
understanding of the biodiversity process and the role of different actors; to examine how
this broad policy actually worked in practice and how it was negotiated locally; and to find
out what people thought about it. Talking about biodiversity and the way that it was being
incorporated in extant conservation practice ended up being a means to talk about how
conservation worked and about the human place in nature and how the natural world was
classified and bound up in human valuation.
In the process, however, these interviews were more than simply a means of
extracting the information I wanted in terms of clarifying my understanding and examining
the way that those involved constructed biodiversity. They also challenged my pre-conceived
interview structure and my understanding of conservation. In the actual practice of
conducting semi-structured interviews my intentions of focusing on particular species and
habitats and my conceptualisation of where people fitted in the process were confounded.
One interviewee that I had identified because of their involvement in the development of
policy, for example, strongly self-identified more as a scientist than a policymaker and our
discussions consequently took a different direction. Another was a site manager and, in my
conceptualisation, the person 'on the ground'. But he was also the person in charge of co¬
ordinating action planning (a situation derived from the fact that the species concerned only
occurred in very few places, most of which were on his patch). Whilst I had thought the
manager of Insh Marshes would have a great deal to say about fens and floodplain grazing
marsh, he was actually most interested in the aspen woodland and the associated specialist
species of moth and fly that occurred on and off the reserve. These were productive
discoveries that served to deepen my understanding of the field.
As I transcribed my eleven interviews I highlighted segments of text that struck me
as interesting. In 'post-interview thoughts' for supervisors, I began to pull out themes on the
'central position of science', 'arbitrariness and pragmatism', 'applying accountancy to
conservation', 'charismatic species', 'naturalness', 'playing god' and 'conflicts between
habitat management' (for an extract of a transcribed interview, see Appendix III). But in a
much more comprehensive report to supervisors identifying 'post interview themes', I began
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to focus upon the importance of the word 'biodiversity'; the move towards an objective-led
approach and how this was justified; the biodiversity process as a spatial move allowing
greater co-ordination of conservation action; the importance of different audiences and the
role of biodiversity in changing the relationships between social groups; the place of science
in conservation; the way that the process was negotiated in specific locations; and the
importance of naturalness and how it is balanced with human intervention.
These themes presented me with many possible routes forward. I could, as I
commented at the time, address the tension between the national biodiversity process and the
local biodiversity action plans or follow up the development of classification systems. Yet as
I began to realise after conducting my interviews, my interest lay in the way that biodiversity
worked in daily practice (or not). As I put it in my 'Post interview thoughts':
The interviews with people at the policy level were much less satisfying.
Towards the end I had begun to wish I didn't have to go and ask them all these
questions because as I went on, so the general questions, which were the only
ones I could ask at this level, seemed less and less interesting (although this is not
to say that there is no useful material in them). It was with the interviews that
were focused on a site or species/ habitat, and with people who dealt with
problematic decisions about how to go on in particular situations that much more
interesting issues arose (this leads later to questions about how the abstract
process of biodiversity policy and the sites are connected) (Post Interview
Thoughts - report for supervisors Feb 2002).
While I had originally conceptualised an interest in biodiversity as involving a move away
from looking at sites in detail, following the process through the associated documents and
talking with people was leading me back to the small scale and the complexity of the situated
instance of conservation practice. Nevertheless, it took further thinking by me and prompting
by my supervisors before I began to achieve a finer focus. After deliberating about how to
move forward, I decided to focus on one species and habitat:
The move to focus on particular species and habitats seems to me to be a good
one. I have been doing that anyway up until now because the sites I have been
working with deal with certain species and I have spoken with people in my
interviews about them. But extending the focus on species seems to allow a
greater clarity and I can use the material I have already developed in relation to
specific examples. For example, looking at the capercaillie might involve looking
at the action plan and the species steering group, the ways information has been
circulated and how research and management in a site such as Abernethy has fed
into and out of this.
I also want to address the habitat because it is here that similar networks are
developed around a different object and these then come into conflict with or
have to be negotiated with the species plans/networks. This would then allow me
to connect to the broader negotiation of species and habitats and to classification
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... I will start with the capercaillie and pinewood and see what I can make from
that.. .(Letter to supervisors April 2002).
Focusing on capercaillie and pinewoods
My choice of the pinewoods and capercaillie was partly shaped by the fact that I already had
material from Abernethy and interviews with pinewood and capercaillie specialists and site
managers. It was also because these were already prominent species and habitats and so had
large amounts of associated documentary material. The point of focusing on capercaillie and
pinewoods was to achieve greater detail and to be able to examine how they were
reconstructed (if at all) as they were bound up in the biodiversity process. But a key question
centred on how I was going to focus on capercaillie and pinewoods. At the time I thought
that I would:
be continuing my three-method approach, just in finer detail. I will have to track
down the research papers, conference proceedings, management advice produced
on the species and habitats. I will have to speak with individuals involved in the
research and translation to management and the balancing acts that need to be
made, both at Abemethy and in the wider arena such as the species working
group; and I will have to work out with the RSPB about the possibility of doing
more ethnography (Letter to supervisors April 2002).
Focusing would involve another round of textual analysis and interviews and, in returning to
situated practice, I again became interested in participant observation and the conservation
site. It was at this point (May 2002), that I returned to the RSPB and to the managers at
Inverness to update them on how my project was going and to ask again about the possibility
of volunteering at Abernethy because of the connection with pinewoods and capercaillie.
Abemethy was attractive because I knew from volunteering and my interviews about the
changes in management that were taking place - there being a move towards a more
interventionist management policy - and saw an opportunity to examine how questions of
management in one site were negotiated in the context of the broader development of the
biodiversity process. As I put it in my presentation to the Inverness managers:
The point of focusing on a site like this and its management would be to ask how,
in certain situations, these general understandings of naturalness, ancientness and
nativeness are worked out when hard decisions of management have to be made.
How are balances found between the imperatives of different sorts of
management? This is to try and get at a level of detail that will allow me to
answer my initial questions: how do those involved in nature conservation
understand nature and what are the processes and practices involved?
(Presentation given May 2002).
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In the months it took to arrange more volunteering, I embarked on an analysis of how the
capercaillie and pinewoods had been textually constructed. For capercaillie I turned to its
species action plan, ecological papers on its habitat requirements and booklets on appropriate
management. For pinewoods, I turned to texts on woodlands and Highland vegetation, to
papers and reports in journals and conference collections and to recent material produced by
organisations like the RSPB. I examined the construction of the notion of a declining
resource through maps and images, the concepts of 'ancient', 'semi-natural' and 'native'
woodland, the contemporary emphasis on regeneration rather than planting, and perhaps
most importantly, the stances of those advocating different levels of intervention in 'natural'
systems. I again followed intertextual lines of inquiry into the issue of deer fences (into
which capercaillie fly) and deer management in pinewoods.
With a background established by my reading of these documents, I crafted more
interview schedules, this time for interviews with individuals engaged in research and
management issues effecting pinewoods and capercaillie (see Appendix II). In this set of
four interviews, I discussed the history of sites and the changing ideas of management; the
role of science in conservation; how the management requirements of different species and
habitats are balanced; and the impact of the biodiversity process.
Eventually, after giving another presentation to the site managers of Abemethy -
where I had sought to go back 'occupying something like the role of the volunteer, for an
extended period of perhaps two to three months, in which time I could consult the
management plans and talk through the issues whilst hopefully contributing, if only through
an extra pair of hands' - I was permitted to examine Abernethy in detail, albeit in a
circumscribed way:
Dear Andrew,
Following on from the presentation you gave to our staff meeting last week, I am
contacting you to say that you are welcome to come to Abernethy to carry out
your research. We would like you to limit your research here to a 2 week period
although the weeks do not have to be consecutive ... If you wish to book in as a
volunteer please deal direct with the Lodge (Sandy, Beds) as volunteer requests
are processed centrally ... Staff are happy to spend up to half a day with you to
discuss AB management and we recommend you set aside 2 days to go through
papers in our Inverness office (email received July 2002).
I had been granted access. The role of the volunteer, however, had again been separated from
the role of researcher: I could spend two weeks being a researcher but volunteer if I wanted
to. I returned to interviews and documents and decided not to volunteer due to a concern that
I would face the same problems as before. Consequently, there followed two weeks of sifting
through and copying reports, letters, memos, discussion documents, management plans,
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annual reports and minutes, all punctuated by five more interviews with site managers and
researchers in which I sought to discuss the changes in management and why more
interventionist forms of action were being considered and how such management was the
centre of continuing debate.
Reflecting on the research process
What this narrative makes clear is that my research did not take place as a series of stages: I
did not, in any straightforward way, design a project before engaging in the field and then
collect the data before analysing it. It was then and is now difficult to distinguish where my
data collection finished and analysis began or where analysis finished and writing began.
The initial generation of data and early analysis prompted a focus on biodiversity and a
dependence upon the methods of interviewing and textual analysis, which, in turn, prompted
more data generation and analysis. In this way, there are themes - such as pinewoods - that
run throughout the process of my research, with the gradual exploration of the theme
involving an iterative process of collection and analysis. The research was, therefore, a
convoluted, evolving, although not sequential, process. Getting to grips with how those in
conservation work with certain ideas, juggle competing commitments and decide on certain
forms of action, involved, in a similar way to an ethnographic approach, a more halting
process of gradually 'getting to know the field' than is often represented in conservation
research. It was a process of negotiation. The direction taken and the final shape that my
research assumes is the result of negotiation between several gatekeepers, between my
understanding of conservation and new instances of practice that need to be explained, and
between the specifics of individual situations and my perceptions concerning the
appropriateness of different methods to explain those situations.
What is also clear is that my focus on biodiversity and on the situated practice at
Abernethy is itself an achievement. While I had started out with an interest in how nature
was constructed by those in nature conservation, I gradually shifted that interest from simply
being one of how nature is constructed to how nature is constructed in a changing
institutional context. This was in part because I found that nature is never simply constructed
in the abstract: it is always constructed in context, through negotiation about the best ways to
act in specific circumstances. The introduction of the concept of biodiversity into the British
conservation scene opened up a discursive arena within which such debates could re¬
circulate and it offered me an opportunity to examine the negotiation involved in institutional
practice.
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What is not always clear, however, are the specific implications for my research. In
what follows, therefore, I extend this narrative by focusing on the continual process of
gaining access and what it meant in terms of my ethical conduct; the way I actually went
about analysing the discourse of nature conservation; and the adoption of Abernethy as a
case study and how it is connected to biodiversity. In doing so, I continue to attempt to avoid
excessive post-hoc rationalisation of my research by illustrating how my understanding of,
and position with respect to, relevant theoretical and methodological issues changed as I
proceeded.
Negotiating access and uninformed consent
The processual nature of my research and the continual negotiation that it involved is most
evident with regard to gaining access. In the majority of methods texts, access to a research
context is glossed over because they seek to discuss research design or particular methods
(Bernard 2000; Bryman 2001; Robson 2002). The singularity of the researcher's interest and
contact with gatekeepers makes generalisation about gaining access difficult. It is just
something that each researcher must do. Where it is mentioned, it is usually referred to in a
way that implies that it is a one-off event; the first hurdle that occurs early in the research:
once access has been secured the researcher is 'in'.
Where generalisations are made about gaining access, they relate to appropriate
ethical conduct. Within what has been termed the positivist or traditional ethical model
(Denzin 1997; de Laine 2000), the researcher should seek consent to proceed with their
research in an honest way and they should be open about their intentions and methods and
the uses to which the research will be put. The 'gatekeeper' or participant should be fully
informed and have the opportunity to decline the request. Once consent has been granted
(perhaps signalled by signing consent forms) and access achieved, the research can proceed.
In my research, however, it is apparent that neither the idea of access as an initial
hurdle nor the ideal of ethical conduct, held. In my case, gaining access involved a process of
negotiation that did not end early in the research. After ostensibly 'getting in', when I was
told that 'the RSPB [was] happy to participate in [my] research', I went away to look at texts
and to undertake some volunteering, but then wrote to the managers in Inverness explaining
my initial use of texts and my thoughts on volunteering and seeking further permission to
continue. After I had conducted interviews on biodiversity (that had involved people outside
the RSPB), I returned to the managers in Inverness to give a presentation about focusing on
capercaillie and pinewoods and my desire to look at Abernethy. I was negotiating to get yet
further 'in'. Gaining access was not an initial hurdle but a continuing process; a process that
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was, at least in part, related to my awareness of the ethical problems of conducting the
research.
Contrary to the positivist model of ethical conduct and gaining informed consent, I
found that it was impossible to fully inform my gatekeepers about my research at the outset
precisely because, even to me as the researcher, it was still relatively incoherent. Indeed,
explanations I offered changed as I gradually moved towards a focus on biodiversity and
then to capercaillie, pinewoods and Abernethy. If research involves learning what questions
to ask, it is impossible to fully inform one's gatekeepers or participants of what would be
involved or what would happen to their words because of the impossibility of knowing how
the research might develop. It was obvious that my gatekeepers and research participants did
not fully understand what I was doing even after signalling their comprehension by giving
their consent either on a general level or to be interviewed. When I went back to give a
second presentation, for example, it was obvious that the managers' understanding of my
work, derived from my initial talk, was poor. A lack of understanding was obvious when, in
conducting an interview, I was interrupted as another interviewee popped his head round the
door of my current interviewee's office wishing him luck because my questions 'were all too
complicated for him'. Consent was based on trust rather than comprehension. Part of their
lack of comprehension was, of course, related to my inability to convey in clear terms what I
was doing (one only has to look at the letter to my gatekeeper (above p. 52) explaining how I
had been using texts, to see the difficulty I had in translating concepts between discursive
worlds). But even if it is assumed that I could clearly state in advance what my research was
about and what would result, it is still highly questionable whether my gatekeepers and
respondents would have understood, precisely because we occupy different discursive
worlds. I was asking them to think quite differently about the practices that they simply 'do'.
(Although experience provided a useful lesson in resisting the patronising assumption that
one's participants will not understand the researcher's theoretical discourse. While my first
presentation to managers in Inverness had skirted round theoretical issues, when I returned a
second time I decided to explain social constructivism because not doing so would hide a
large part of my interest and intent from my gatekeepers. In spelling these influences out, the
managers stated themselves that they were able to understand much more clearly what I
wanted to do and why).
The lack of informed consent introduced an ethical problem, and the fact that I
believe my gatekeepers and interviewees were well aware that they were giving in formed
consent does not lessen that problem. My response was to try and keep my gatekeepers
informed. I tried to keep them informed of my research as it developed for several reasons:
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because I was aware that what I was doing was quite different to the research they
encountered in their day-to-day work; because I knew that although I had gained access my
gatekeepers did not really know what I doing; because I wanted to be open about what I was
doing; and because I wanted people to understand that what I was doing was important.
Because Ian Mitchell (1999) had used his interviewee's words to make them look
nonsensical and thus serve his political ends, I was, if anything, over-sensitive to issues of
openness - precisely because I worried that access could be withdrawn. Once access had
been granted, I could have easily just have pursued my own ends with only the most cursory
engagement with gatekeepers. I could have addressed the changes at Abemethy without
actually seeking consent to do so. This would have been the easy approach because
continually explaining and justifying became, in honesty, extremely trying. But I did not take
the easier route precisely because I wanted to conduct my research in as ethically a proper
manner as possible. Yet when I looked to the traditional ethical model and the norms of
researcher conduct involving informed consent, it appeared that, on the one hand, my
research had not adhered to ethical standards and was thus suspect, or that on the other, the
easier route of cursory engagement once permission had been granted would have been
adequate.
My belief that I was behaving in an ethically proper manner, even though their
incomprehension suggested that I had failed fully to inform my gatekeepers or interviewees,
and that not continuing to seek permission as the research changed would be to behave
unethically, led me to question the traditional ethical model. I was finding that 'prescribed
moves don't work' (Holliday 2002: 157). In continuing to go back to my gatekeepers I was
finding a way of dealing with the ethical ambiguity of (un)informed consent. I was, I
believed, behaving ethically and responsibly.
This claim, however, would appear to be contradicted by my research practice with
respect to conducting interviews and my relations with interviewees. Writing to potential
interviewees was effectively another negotiation of access and the issue of informed consent
applied equally here. Even though I prefaced each interview with an introduction to my
research, interviewees consented to be interviewed without really understanding what I was
doing or what would happen to their words. After my introduction, for example, one
interviewee sought to clarify my explanation with respect to other work that they knew about
(a collaboration between researchers at the University of Lancaster and the Natural History
Museum) and simply saying that it was generally coming from the same direction was
enough. Again, consent was based on trust. Yet where I had sought an open position for
myself with respect to my gatekeepers, my relationship with interviewees did not involve
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any prolonged participatory engagement. Rather, I arrived, asked them questions, then left
and used their words. Ultimately, my use of the words of practicing conservationists in a
project that can be understood as challenging conservation itself, might be deemed ethically
problematic.
Why is it that whilst I had sought to be as open as possible with my gatekeepers and
thus claimed my ethical credentials, I approached interviews instrumentally? My seemingly
cavalier attitude derives from my assessment of what my interviewees were expecting. Most
interviewees were extremely busy and fitted me in their schedules a long time in advance.
Whilst most were happy to give me some of their time, there was a definite end to our
interaction. Once the interview was over, they could get on with their work. In part, this is
related to the fact that this is my research: I initiated it and sought to explicate issues I was
interested in (I was not seeking to research for conservationists). As such, my interviewees
did not, in their terms, have anything invested in my research. Interviews were granted either
because the people I contacted saw it as part of their job or because they occupied (or had
occupied) prominent positions in conservation and in public life. In this context, attempting
to make my interviews participatory would have required me to impinge on their time even
more whilst they did not clearly see what was in it for them. They were willing to help but
were not necessarily willing to be co-opted into my research more comprehensively. When I
did make attempts to see if the interviewee thought I had covered the pertinent issues to them
I was greeted with bewilderment as they wondered why I, as the researcher, seemed not to
know what I was looking for.
In the end, I was left with the impression that they did not care what happened to
their words so long as I did not use them in a way that would get them into trouble. My
response in this situation, was not to attempt to make it participatory - which I thought
would actually have strained relations because interviewees saw their engagement with me
as a one-off encounter - but to accept the singularity of the event and to anonymise
interviewees' words and to write in ways that prevented individuals being identifiable to all
but those involved. My interest was about how nature was being constructed: quite who said
any particular sentence was less important (where I do name people it is because I refer to
published statements and so where they have put themselves in the public domain willingly).
As I reflected on my research practice and the different ethical stance with respect to
gatekeepers and interviewees, I once again questioned the traditional ethical model since my
interview practice was no less ethical than my approach to my gatekeepers. Ethical 'norms'
do not seem to apply. I was coming to a position where I would want to argue that ethical
prescriptions from a detached position may suggest a basic framework of good practice but
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do not necessarily result in acceptable practice. Detached ethics appear to offer an illusory
ethical probity because my experience suggested that ethical considerations need to be
worked out in context. In doing my research, and in working out the best way to act in
specific instances, I moved towards an acceptance of 'situated ethics' (Vivat 2002). Situated
ethics has a great affinity with a feminist, communitarian ethical model (Denzin 1997; de
Laine 2000), but I stress 'situated ethics' here since my research did not adhere to two of the
presuppositions of the feminist model: namely, that research be collaborative and reciprocal.
From either a situated or a feminist perspective, it is more difficult, but, ultimately, ethically
more sound if decisions are made in context rather than predetermined in advance.
Doing discourse analysis
'Discourse' is a hard word to pin down (Mills 1997). Different people take it to mean
different things. The result is that discourse analysis as a method actually covers a multitude
of approaches. If one looks to the textbooks on the topic, one can identify conversation
analysis and ethnomethodology, sociolinguistics, discursive psychology, critical discourse
analysis, Bakhtinian research and Foucauldian research (Wetherell et. al. 2001). Doing
discourse analysis would appear to be a case of choosing the most appropriate approach and
applying it. As I was to find out, however, the model of applying Potter and Wetherell
(1987) or Fairclough (1992) is a simplification.
To be clear, I began with just this sort of mentality. Having discarded conversation
analysis, sociolinguistics and ethnomethodology because they seemed too fine-grained for a
study that was about to range across all sorts of conservation documents and practices, I was
most interested in Foucauldian 'analysis of discourses' (Hall 1997; Parker 1990; 1992
Macnaghten 1993; Frouws 1998; Carabine 2001; Dryzek 1997) and the interpretative
repertoire approach of Potter and Wetherell (1987; Wetherell and Potter 1988; Marshall and
Wetherell 1989; Tonkiss 1998; Gilbert and Mulkay 1984; Hollway 1984). I was, as noted,
attracted by the Foucauldian notion of discourse because it offered a broad way of
conceptualising societal change and the relations between power/knowledge and practice. In
this context, a 'discourse' is a set of rules that provide a language for talking about, and
acting towards, a particular topic at a particular historical moment (Hall 1997). Foucault, for
example, outlines how madness or sexuality, as socially constructed categories, could only
have emerged when and how they did because of the particular discursive formation at that
time. These constructions were based on organised social (rather than individual)
representations through which people understood, and acted towards, the things - objects,
people, behaviour, representational strategies, events - that constitute their social and
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physical worlds. These 'things' only gained meaning within discourse; discourses produce the
objects of knowledge. That is, people could only be classified as 'mad' or 'sexually deviant',
they could only become the objects of the developing human sciences, within the discursive
formations of madness or sexuality at that time. As such, discourses refer to what is known,
determine what can be talked about and how one should write and act: discourses construct
meaning.
This is a compelling interpretation and potentially offered resources for
understanding conservation practice. Yet as a framework for analysis it is potentially
problematic because the identification of a discourse usually starts from something actually
said but extrapolates out to identify much broader social relations and practices, without
further reference to the text but with implicit reference to broader cultural knowledge. This
approach is therefore criticised because although it calls itself discourse analysis it actually
involves very little analysis of discourse (as language in use) and, consequently, begins to
make claims without empirical substantiation (Widdicombe and Wooffitt 1995).
It was for this reason that I was also interested in the approach of Potter and
Wetherell (1987; Wetherell and Potter 1988). Rather than seeing discourse as a framework
structuring knowledge and practice, they take discourse to be 'all forms of spoken
interaction, formal and informal, and written texts of all kinds' (1987: 7). Rejecting the idea
of language as a neutral transmitter, they see it as a social practice in its own right, and argue
that meaning depends upon the discursive systems within which it is embedded. In their
analysis of discourse, then, they study language use itself. They look at the way people
construct versions of the world through language by attempting to identify what function
different utterances serve and by paying close attention to the way these functions vary in
different contexts. In this attention to function of language use, the approach that Potter and
Wetherell take is closely related to the emphasis placed on rhetoric and argument by Billig
(1987; 1997) and Myerson and Rydin (1996). Rather than attempting to identify broad
societal 'discourses' that frame action and knowledge, they seek to identify 'interpretative
repertoires'. These are the 'broadly discernable clusters of terms, descriptions, common¬
places and figures of speech often clustered around metaphors or vivid images and often
using distinct grammatical constructions and styles' (Potter et. al. 1990: 212).
Both of these approaches to discourse analysis appeared to be useful, yet each had its
potential drawbacks. On the one hand, the Foucauldian approach could be criticised for not
focusing on the text. On the other, the interpretative repertoire approach could be criticised
for not raising its eyes from the text; in seeking understanding of the social world in texts,
the wider non-discursive social practices that are not 'constructed' can get lost from view.
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With these issues in mind I found the approach of Fairclough (1992) attractive. He
attempted to put together a form of analysis that synthesised linguistically-oriented discourse
analysis with the insights of post-structuralism on language and discourse (also see
Wetherell and Potter 1992; Wetherell 1998). The post-structuralist insights on the
relationships between discourse and power and the discursive construction of knowledge are
useful in precisely those areas that linguistically-oriented approaches are weak.
Linguistically-oriented approaches can supplement post-structuralist approaches because the
latter tend to refer to abstract sets of rules, rather than real instances of people doing or
saying or writing things. Fairclough's developed a three-dimensional framework involving
analysis of the text itself, analysis of discursive practice (the discourse processes of
production and interpretation), and analysis of social practice (the discursive 'event' in terms
of its social conditions and effects at various levels). I wanted to apply it.
This is not, however, what I did. In practice, when I was faced with specific texts
this idealised synthesis fell from view and I did different sorts of analysis depending on the
material. When I was faced with a text on pinewoods, for example, I ended up identifying
repertoires through which the pinewoods were constructed. In a section of Time for Pine
(RSPB 1993) that sought to set out the 'importance of pinewoods', I called upon extracts
such as the following to suggest rarity as a repertoire:
Caledonian pinewoods support a specialised range of bird species including a
significant proportion of the populations of several species listed in Red Data
Birds in Britain, including crested tit, Scottish crossbill, capercaillie, osprey and
wryneck ... Pinewoods provide the habitat for a series of unique vegetation types,
and support several specialised and resticted plant species. These plants include
several wintergreens (Pyrola species, Orthilia secunda and Moneses uniflora),
twinflower Linnaea borealis and three orchids (coralroot Corallorhiza trifida,
creeping lady's tresses Goodyera repens and lesser twayblade Listera cordata)
... Many of Britain's rarest species of moths, butterflies, dragonflies and beetles
are found in the native pinewoods of Scotland. Some are confined to single
pinewood stands or forest areas. Four species of fly new to Britain have recently
been found in Abernethy Forest reserve (RSPB 1993: 8).
Perhaps it was because I had not been doing it properly, or perhaps it was because of the
nature of the text, which spoke from an organisational rather than a personal position, but
extracting large chunks of text like this and allotting it to a category did not feel particularly
revealing. I could detail the way that nature was being constructed in various ways but was
not relating it to social relations and negotiation. Thinking that I had tried a detailed analysis
too early I sought to 'step back out' to get an overview so that I could identify themes that
connected documents rather than forms of construction within single documents. But once I
had picked up on biodiversity as a theme, I did not re-start my analysis of repertoires. Rather,
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as I explored the texts produced in the biodiversity process I was using them as pointers to
much broader social practice. Here I was influenced by Foucault's genealogical work
(Foucault 1977, 1978) which 'avoids the search for depth, avoids the search for what 'really
happened' underneath historical events, and locates its analysis instead on the surface, on the
details; it is meticulous and patiently documentary' (Bell in Carabine 2001: 276). This sort of
genealogical work is 'concerned with describing the procedures, practices, apparatuses and
institutions involved in the production of discourses and knowledges, and their power
effects' (Carabine 2001: 276). By tracing the concept through texts and in the ways it was
defined and translated into specific policies, I was not looking for underlying constructions
of nature but at institutional process. The texts were ways into the processes of allotting
species to lists of prioritisation and classifying habitats. I could trace the development of new
classification systems (which from a Foucauldian perspective constructed new objects which
could then be brought within the realm of new configurations of power/knowledge) and the
development of action plans. But in order to understand these processes, and working within
a broader view of discourse as a connected set of representations and practices, I turned to all
sorts of other texts. I examined ornithological atlases, international lists of endangerment,
books on classification and prioritisation, action plan reporting forms, biodiversity websites
and conservation textbooks. I was exploring a broad social discourse through the texts that
had been produced as it took shape.
Things changed again as I turned to interviewing those involved in the biodiversity
process. I moved back to focus on construction and on repertoires. I used the responses to
my questions about management to identify some of the conceptual resources called upon in
arguing for certain forms of action:
we've done so much management of the environment in Britain, we have
nowhere natural at all, everywhere's been managed, been managed to some
degree that you have to start saying hen harrier are in such a bad condition that
we are going to have to keep some areas free of trees, cos natural regeneration of
trees would deny you hen harrier habitat. Now in the grand old days, hundreds
and thousands of years ago trees were naturally burning and moving and re¬
planting re-growing. Heath was forming and dying away and the hen harriers
were moving around but keeping a stable population. Now you've changed so
much of the countryside to a completely alien habitat that you're going to have to
artificially say this is an area where we are going to keep hen harrier and we're
not gonna allow natural regeneration. We're forced into that because so much of
Britain has been managed in the past and we've got our species down into such
small populations (Interviewee A, 20th December 2001).
In such extracts, I saw ideas of fallen naturalness, the unnatural state of the present and belief
in the need for management. I began to sense the way that many in conservation constructed
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the nature of the past and the present, and to understand how these constructions were
embedded in arguments for specific courses of action. But by asking about the detailed
choices of management practice I could take things further. I usually asked how balances
were achieved when action plans for different habitats came into conflict. A common answer
was to suggest a large-scale approach to planning:
In a sensible world you are trying to deliver the conservation of all these species
and habitats, you need a spatial element to it, you don't try and do all the
conservation on one site, you don't try and conserve pinewood and heathland on
the same site. You decide, this is a sensible part of Scotland for expanding
pinewood, over here is a sensible part of Scotland for maintaining and expanding
heath and in that part [gesturing to that which is pinewood] it's acceptable to lose
the heath because it should really have been pinewood... there's room in Britain
for both objectives to be met but you have to plan spatially (Interviewee A, 20th
December 2001).
I took such extracts to suggest a very large-scale form of managerialism where the
conservationist would effectively decide what went where in the countryside and manage
toward that end. I was thus able to get a sense of how managerialism was not something set
in stone but malleable and changing.
When I moved on to focus specifically on capercaillie and pinewoods this dual sort of
analysis, in which I was simultaneously utilising different approaches, continued. In turning
towards the ecological papers on capercaillie habitat preferences, for example, I could trace
the statistical co-construction of the capercaillie and semi-natural pinewood and how this
worked through into proposals for very specific forms of management. The texts associated
with pinewoods allowed continued engagement with the constructions of, and arguments
over, appropriate management. Finally, in turning to a detailed examination of management
at Abernethy, this dual approach continued. Through management plans and reports I could
trace the historical trajectory of changing practice and through the memos, briefing papers,
letters and interviews, I could examine how specific people argued for particular positions on
the sorts of management to be taken up.
Despite my intentions, then, I did not straightforwardly manage to apply Fairclough's
form of analysis. Rather, illustrating the craft dimension to qualitative research, I pieced
together bits of analysis after approaching different sorts of material in different ways.
Whilst I had started with a preconceived idea of what sort of analysis I wanted to pursue, I
learnt in the doing that the analyst has to be guided, to some extent, by the material.
This was, importantly, a dialectical process. As I explored the world of nature
conservation, I was simultaneously learning how to do discourse analysis and developing my
theoretical understanding. It was in my attempts at doing discourse analysis that I gradually
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started to view nature conservation through the theoretical prism of Foucault's genealogical
work. Exploring the field of nature conservation allowed me to develop a greater
understanding of Foucault because as I looked at the developing biodiversity process, I held
it up against the stories that Foucault tells of the human sciences and his conceptualisation of
power/knowledge. As I moved forward, I invested more meaning in, and reached an
enhanced understanding of, both Foucault and nature conservation. Reaching an
interpretation of conservation from a Foucauldian perspective was, therefore, a double
achievement developed through the process of doing the work rather than starting with the
analytical preference and forcing my interpretation of texts and interview material to 'fit'.
This is not to suggest that Foucault's genealogical work is without its limitations.
Where the centre of attention is on practices and strategies it misses the argument and dissent
that people express in their talk. I was coming to recognise in practice Fairclough's reasons
for seeking a synthesis between textually-oriented discourse analysis and poststructuralist
analysis of discourses. But where Fairclough had sought a single form of analysis that could
combine the two, I would argue that approaching a discursive arena with different
approaches amounts to a form of analytical triangulation that is actually productive. The
different sorts of material and analytical approaches generate different sorts of interpretations
that can complement each other. Although I did not synthesise the approaches in a pre¬
defined way, I suggest that I have still achieved a synthesis in the way that I bring the
different sorts of analysis together in the narrative that follows. The story I tell is one of the
negotiation of repertoires in a changing institutional context.
There are debates within discourse analytic studies that would question this
Foucauldian interest. While Foucauldian analysis is one established approach within
discourse studies, others, notably the conversation analysts, question the interpretation that
results. Schegloff, for example, criticised critical discourse analysis (the word 'critical'
signalling the political engagement of this sort of analysis: Fairclough 1995; Chouliaraki and
Fairclough 1999). For Schegloff, this sort of analysis 'allows students, investigators, or
external observers to deploy the terms which preoccupy them in describing, explaining,
critiquing etc. the events and texts to which they turn their attention. There is no guaranteed
place for the endogenous orientations of the participants in those events' (Schegloff 1997:
167). Schegloff accuses critical discourse analysts of potential and actual bias. The discourse
analyst with a political objective is in greater danger of imputing spurious significance to the
text than an analyst that is less politically engaged.
This important challenge suggests that the interpretation I offer could potentially
bear no relation to anything accept my own concerns and theoretical interest. It is related to
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another potential criticism that would suggest that my choice of texts, interviewees and
forms of analysis was so selective that it was easy to present an argument because I could
choose to ignore those aspects of conservation that contradicted my understanding. In this
context, adopting a Foucauldian perspective could be problematic for two reasons. First,
Foucault had the political intent of seeking to denaturalise the present scientifico-legal
complex; my adoption of his tools in respect of nature conservation could be understood -
and rightly so - as an attempt to denaturalise nature conservation, which in turn could be
argued to lead to questionable interpretation. Secondly, and in connection, it could be
claimed that my theoretical influences mean that I only see certain things in discourse and
ignore others.
There are different potential responses to these criticisms. One would be to seek to
claim my objective credentials and to illustrate how my analysis was not influenced by my
political position and that my interpretation would actually mean something to my
respondents. My response, though, is to reject the terms of the challenge, which is grounded
on the implicit adherence to the notion of objectivity. For Schegloff, the researcher's job is to
uncover patterns of significance rather than invent them. For constructivists, the notion of
'uncovering' facts is flawed; one must accept that all knowledge is 'made' socially. It is
precisely because people have political positions that they can reach interpretations;
interpretations do not simply emerge out of the data. As such, my response has been to
accept my political position and my theoretical influences by being open about them so that
the reader can assess the degree to which the material substantiates the claims I make.
From biodiversity to situated 'case study'
This has been a study of narrowing focus. Starting from a general interest in the construction
of nature within nature conservation, I looked at texts and specific forms of practice on
conservation sites. As I focused on biodiversity, my attention moved to the broader
institutional arrangements involved in introducing a new approach into conservation. As I
explored this institutional arena, however, I began to recognise the need to focus back on
situated practice because it was really only in specific instances that I could get to the detail
that would help understand how nature was being negotiated. I focused on the capercaillie
and the pinewoods as examples of how decisions were being made, in order to draw out how
they in particular were being constructed and caught up in the biodiversity process. This in
turn took me to the site that is Abernethy.
It should be clear that arriving at Abernethy as a focused study was not a phase that
simply occurred after looking at the biodiversity process. Due to my initial interest in an
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ethnographic approach, I was interested in Abernethy from the beginning because I could
volunteer there. In choosing to conduct interviews around species and habitats that were
connected with sites I had visited but which were also embedded in the biodiversity process,
I was still retaining an interest in the site. Coming to focus on Abernethy towards the end of
the project involved gradually letting other strands of research go in order to examine on"e
site and set of issues in detail.
This process of refinement is mirrored in the chapters that follow. In chapters four
and five, I look at the development of the biodiversity process. Chapters six and seven
discuss and examine the changing management practice at Abernethy. Yet it raises the
question of what logical connection exists between the two. Why did I focus in this way? Do
I seek to say things about biodiversity through the case study of Abernethy? What status do
claims about Abemethy have in my broader argument?
In focusing on biodiversity and the development of the biodiversity process, I was
using this changing institutional context as a means of exploring how nature was
(re)constructed. I was interested in the way that species and habitats were defined and
valued, the changing mechanisms of valuation and the way that these broad assessments of
importance are dealt with and negotiated on the ground. What was important was not so
much the concept of biodiversity per se, but what the introduction of new ways of
representing nature and new ways of acting in nature conservation meant for how nature was
constructed, and what new constructions of nature subsequently meant for conservation
practice. Looking at the introduction of the biodiversity process was a way of examining this
construction of nature and how it was embedded in changing practice. Through my reading
of texts and interviewing people, I was attempting to examine how species and habitats were
caught up in the process, how they were being represented and what that meant in terms of
how they were conserved. I was able to trace how institutional practices of action planning
were bound up with new forms of prioritisation based on decline rather than rarity and so
how species came to be represented differently. I was able to examine the construction of
habitats as definable entities and how, once defined, they could become part of the process
and have action plans written for them. I was able to explore some of the politics that was
involved in the development of action planning as organisations like the RSPB sought to
introduce more rigorous practices that appeared to give conservation greater legitimacy and
credibility.
At the same time, I found that I could best get at these relationships not through a
pre-determined interview structure, but through discussing specific examples. Where I asked
those involved at the more bureaucratic end of the biodiversity process about how it
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developed and how action was decided upon, I could address issues of classification,
prioritisation and the processes of action planning, but in speaking about these general topics
my interviewees would refer me to the texts setting out criteria and justifications, which I
had already consulted and which prompted my questions in the first place. Similarly, when I
asked about the relationship between policy and research, interviewees would fall back on" a
standard model of science-based policymaking where science became a taken-for-granted
'black box'. When I asked about the way that species were allotted to lists of conservation
concern, for example, one interviewee bolstered the list's credibility as if I was challenging
it, by proclaiming its scientific credentials:
That list, those are priority species and habitats, that is a purely scientific
exercise, they go on to that published document if they fulfil a certain criteria, if
their rate of decline has been X percent, if their population size is X percent, if
they are listed on an international threatened list. Hard facts, they go into that list
(Interviewee F, 23rd January 2002).
Whilst this understanding of policy and science was important to note, it effectively
forestalled any questions of actually how species were allotted to lists; why decline was
important or had become important; why those criteria; who chose them; and how, in
practice, a species was judged to have fulfilled the criteria.
It was only in the interviews with site managers or in those interviews where we
discussed specific species and habitats that a clearer sense of the construction of nature and
the relationship between research and practice could be gained. In this way, I recognised that
the most interesting issues related to how specific species were being discussed and acted for
or how sites were being managed. As my interviewees spoke about the issues that they faced
and how they were working out how best to act, I began to get an insight into the sorts of
balancing acts that were being made. But since I had centred my interviews around several
species and habitats that were related to different sites, I needed to select to realise a greater
level of detail.
Since many of my interviewees had been connected in some way with pinewood or
pinewood species I focused on capercaillie and pinewoods. In the process of conducting
interviews on capercaillie and pinewood issues, I became more aware of changes taking
place in conceptualisations of pinewood management and how best to attempt to prevent the
extinction of the capercaillie. I also became aware of the central position of Abernethy in
these changes and the relatively small world of pinewood research and management. It was
at Abernethy that the importance of fences in high capercaillie mortality was first recognised
and that attempts at finding new ways of managing the forest were being tested. I thus came
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to realise the importance of site-specific management. The historical development of
management at Abernethy traced broader changes in research and management and offered
me the opportunity to examine these relationships and changes. Where management had
been based on a policy of minimal intervention, current experiments were moving towards a
policy of greater intervention and questions arose as to how this sort of trajectory was
negotiated.
For these reasons, the specific case of Abernethy offered a good way of extending
my work on biodiversity. Where I had been examining the biodiversity process as a means of
examining the construction of nature, looking at the negotiation involved in managing
pinewoods allowed a more detailed examination with reference to one example. I could look
at how the forest and the species that occurred within it were constructed and subsequently
managed and how as the construction changed management also changed. In this way, I was
extending my examination of the construction and negotiation of nature, but not of
biodiversity per se. My examination of change at Abernethy is therefore not a case study that
seeks to exemplify the biodiversity process, but simply an extension of an analysis of the
construction of nature and knowledge and the negotiation of competing ideals. The purpose
of focusing on the specific case is not to generalise but to understand the fine detail of one
negotiation.
Summary: constructing an account of nature conservation
For all knowledge claims questions of method are crucial. Making visible the sorts of data
generated, the methods used to generate and analyse that data and the way that the researcher
negotiated any problems allows others to judge the work and decide which knowledge
claims should be trusted. Contrary to the belief that a constructivist position leads to an
'anything goes' relativism, for many constructivists these questions are, if anything, even
more important. If constructivists argue that all knowledge is made rather than simply
revealed, then acknowledging their own processes of knowledge construction is central to
remaining consistent. Rather than hiding behind a cloak of an ideal, I have found that taking
seriously the reflexivity that comes with a constructivist position actually encourages greater
reflection on one's own knowledge-making practices.
In narrating the process of my research I have sought to emphasise that my focus on
biodiversity, my interest in the work of Foucault and the story that I offer in the chapters that
follow, were all achieved in the convoluted process of exploring the culture of nature
conservation. Rather than impose a post-hoc rationalisation that suggests that the research
question was obvious from the beginning or that I always saw the utility of Foucault, I have
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sought to emphasise that it was only in the doing that I began to recognise interesting
questions to ask and the applicability of Foucault's theoretical perspective. The discursive
change in nature conservation that needs to be explained and the conceptual resources that I
want to call upon, set out in the last chapter, are thus revealed as complex constructed
achievements. In this way, the stories in the chapters that follow should be understood as
equally constructed and the result of a process of negotiation as I tried to achieve a focus,
choose appropriate methods and work out how to analyse discourse(s). In the next chapter, I
begin the story by examining the development of the biodiversity process.
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4
Biodiversity Conservation as Discourse
Biodiversity, governmentality and regimes of practice
The RSPB's Insh Marshes nature reserve on the River Spey is a very important site. It is
important as a breeding site for wading birds, as a wintering ground for whooper swans and
hen harriers and it is the largest area of floodplain marsh in the country. Consequently, when
I went to volunteer there in the early stages of my research, I had expected the main issues to
revolve around the marsh and its management. When I arrived, however, I found that while
the marsh was indeed the centre of attention, there was also a great deal of consideration
being given to two invertebrates associated with the aspen woodlands that fringe the marsh.
Extensive work was being undertaken for a hoverfly, Hammerschmidtia ferruginea (which
does not have a common name) and for a moth, the dark bordered beauty.
These species were receiving attention because they had been prioritised within the
'biodiversity process' and had action plans produced for them (UK Biodiversity Group
1999a: 89-90; UK Biodiversity Group 1999a: 171-172). The site manager provided insight
into the sorts of management that were being undertaken when I went back to talk to him
about biodiversity and his management practice:
Andrew: so what sort of work are you actually doing for those species?
Interviewee: yeah for the hoverfly we're very very fortunate that ... In Scotland
we've got a group of guys who've formed themselves into the Malloch society.
... They are the guys that have found out the amazingly specialised niche that
these flies need...So really it's their management recommendations that we're
instigating. And primarily for the hoverfly its providing fresh deadwood. ...If we
find that there is sufficient new dead wood entering the system naturally, that's it.
If it's not there at all another option, which is possibly more controversial, is to
actually fell a live tree, and we've done that. So that is that continual input of
fresh dead wood. Now that is only sustainable if you've got regeneration, so what
we've done through a woodland improvement grant, for biodiversity, with you
know, Hammerschmidtia at the top there [i.e. at the top of the application to help
in securing funding], we've got money from the Forestry Commission to fence
off all our aspen woodland. So we've put up six kilometres of rabbit netting, put
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in twenty-nine rabbit boxes, and we've got an effective way of controlling rabbits
so that we can hopefully get aspen regeneration going. We got twenty odd
thousand pounds for doing it and it's only happened through biodiversity and the
UK BAP [biodiversity action plan] process. ... So when we severed that one tree,
I was there with these two guys from the Malloch Society and I've never seen
anybody happier, you know, that this was the first time in Europe, maybe in the
world, that there has been specific conservation action for a fly (Interview C, 16th
January 2002).
While this was extensive work for a species which very few people had seen and which did
not even have a common name, it did not appear, at first, to represent anything new because
it essentially conformed to the model by which conservation has operated since the Second
World War. Ever since Tansley (1946) argued the case for scientifically informed
management, conservation in the UK has been characterised by an 'enthusiasm for
environmental intervention and manipulation' (Henderson 1992: 397). Sites that were
initially chosen because they represented the best examples of the UK's habitats were
manipulated in order to keep them in good condition (Sheail 1976; 1998). Knowledge of
ecological succession, for example, was translated into the management practice of halting
the encroachment of tree species onto wetlands so as to retain the wetland as a wetland.
Some sites, furthermore, would be managed with certain species in mind. A breeding site of
a particular endangered species, for example, could be managed, with the help of knowledge
of its requirements, to make the site optimal for its breeding success. In a similar way, here,
experts in diptera (from the Malloch Society) had determined the species' requirements and
translated them into management recommendations that involved ensuring sufficient
deadwood. As a result, a tree was killed in order to provide that fresh deadwood and thus the
habitat for the laval stages of the hoverfly. In addition, extensive measures were taken to
ensure the long-term sustainability of the aspen woodlands and thus the long-term provision
of deadwood. In a similar way to a great deal of conservation work - where ecologists
provide a 'technocratic recipe book' (Adams 1997: 278) of management prescriptions - the
habitat was manipulated in order to perpetuate a particular species and set of woodland
processes.
Yet despite the fact that this work for the hoverfly appeared, at first, to conform to the
model of intervention and manipulation, I came to see that it did, in fact, represent something
new. One of the aims of those that originally sought to develop the concept of biodiversity
was to shift the focus of conservation away from a few charismatic species towards the
diversity of life and the broader ecosystem (Takacs 1996). It was thought that a conservation
that was focused on relatively few species was deficient because it could ignore much that
was of value. The intention was to highlight the importance of the more obscure but equally
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important species such as invertebrates. Under the aegis of 'biodiversity conservation'
attention could much more legitimately be paid to what was earlier ignored. Thus when the
concept was translated into British nature conservation it encouraged relatively obscure
species to be included in the interventionist and manipulative model. In this way, the work at
Insh for the hoverfly represents an extension of the intervention and manipulation that has
characterised conservation. It was perhaps the first 'specific conservation action for a fly'
precisely because 'biodiversity' had extended the ambitions of conservation. While
conservation has involved broad manipulation of habitats or specific manipulation for key
species, the manipulation of habitat for a fly takes this sort of intervention to another level.
If the management undertaken for the hoverfly does represent an extension of the
intervention and manipulation involved in conservation, then the concept of biodiversity and
the accompanying bureaucratic process must be understood as playing a crucial role in that
extension. If this is so, then the introduction of the concept of biodiversity represents a
significant development in the UK conservation scene. This is important because, if the
manipulative and interventionist side of nature conservation is essentially part of a rationalist
project and illustrates how conservation is not only a reaction to rationalisation but also part
of it (Adams 1997), then the apparent intensification of manipulation could be understood as
part of the continuing process of rationalisation. That is, the biodiversity process could be
understood as implicated in the intensification of rationalisation within nature conservation
and thus as representing an opportunity to empirically investigate the process of
rationalisation within conservation.
In this chapter, then, I start to examine how rationalisation takes place by exploring
the development of the biodiversity process. More specifically, and for reasons outlined in
chapter two, I explore this development with the help of analytical resources provided by
Foucault (1977; 1978; 1991). Since Foucault inherited from Weber 'a concern with
rationalisation and objectification as the essential trend of our culture and the most important
problem of our time' (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 166), his analyses of the processes by
which specific configurations of power/knowledge emerge provide resources for those, like
myself, that also want to examine rationalisation. In his analysis of the emergence of
biopower and governmentality, for example, he illustrates that these configurations are
contingent on relationships between people, practices that enframe relationships and the
development of certain forms of knowledge. As such, he provides a useful conceptualisation
of social change and grounds it in social practice. Following Foucault, an analysis of the
rationalisation of nature should pay attention to the practices that enframe knowledge
production and social interaction (see Rutherford 1999; Demeritt 2001; Braun 2000;
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Murdoch and Ward 1997). Dean (1999) points to what such an analysis might look like. He
says, an analytics of government
examines the conditions under which regimes of practices come into being, are
maintained and are transformed...An analytics of government attempts to show
that our taken-for-granted ways of doing things and how we think about and
question them are not entirely self-evident or necessary. An analytics of a
particular regime of practices, at a minimum, seeks to identify the emergence of
that regime, examine the multiple sources of the elements that constitute it, and
follow the diverse processes and relations by which these elements are assembled
into relatively stable forms of organisation and institutional practice. It examines
how such a regime gives rise to and depends upon particular forms of knowledge
and.. .considers how this regime has a technical or technological dimension and
analyses the characteristic techniques, instrumentalities and mechanisms through
which such practices operate (Dean 1999: 21).
Following Dean, an analysis of the changing government of nature in nature conservation
could, therefore, examine how a new regime of practices came into being, was assembled
into relatively stable forms of institutional practice and associated with particular forms of
knowledge. This chapter is thus an analysis of the development and entrenchment of the
regime of practice associated with the concept of biodiversity and target-led action planning.
Just as Foucault eschewed a search for deep essential meaning in his analyses of discipline
and the co-emergence of the human sciences, ideas of justice and notions of scientific
objectivity, by concentrating on strategies, tactics and mechanisms embedded in social
relations, I want to examine the emergence of new discursive formations in nature
conservation by paying attention to the strategies and tactics of planning. In distinction to
Takacs (1996), who studied the role of prominent conservation biologists in developing the
concept of biodiversity and emphasised their agency in shaping agendas, I examine the
practices by which the biodiversity process worked. Instead of seeing specific individuals as
the prime movers or the sovereign subjects with the ability to orchestrate events, I suggest
that once the biodiversity process was initiated it developed into a self-supporting strategy
without strategists. While the RSPB and individuals like Graham Wynne (Wynne 1993;
Wynne et. al. 1993; Wynne et. al. 1995), were, indeed, important in initiating the process
and persuading others to adopt a new approach to conservation, the story I tell is not
primarily one of individual or organisational influence. Rather, I seek to explore how the
natural world came to be re-presented as 'biodiversity' and how that representation was
implicated in new sets of knowledge production and organisational practices.
I begin by focusing on species and habitats. I do so because the biodiversity process
itself became centred on species and habitat action planning. More specifically, I focus on
the establishment of a new habitat classification that ultimately played a crucial role in the
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formation of new objects that were then rendered manageable. I examine, too, the re¬
construction of the means by which species were prioritised. As the register of reasons for
prioritisation changed so new 'objects' of conservation concern were constructed and new
sets of knowledge producing practices established. By looking at how species and habitats
are constructed anew I presuppose that focused action for a fly or a moss or a liverwort is not
simply undertaken because of the fact that it was endangered. These species and habitats
have to come to be understood as endangered - they have to be constructed as such - before
action can be undertaken on their behalf. Just as Braun and Wainwright (2001: 52) suggest
that 'the 'forest' in conservation discourse is not something that existed independently from
the maps, tables, techniques, and practices that made it available to forms of economic and
political calculation', so species and habitats only come to be known through the way that
they are represented which is in turn interwoven in certain forms of practice and connected
with certain types of knowledge production.
I subsequently address the administrative structures that were put in place to allow
plans to be produced and actions reported on. In particular, I focus on the writing of action
plans and the establishment of expert groups, before extending this focus by exploring the
way action planning is connected, by similar logic and by direct reference, to site
management planning. I suggest that whilst management plans have been written since at
least the 1950s, the practice of management planning became increasingly important in the
1990s and that these management plans effectively connect with action plans. As action and
management planning become interconnected what emerges is a densely interwoven, self-
supporting system that shapes conservation in an increasingly unitary regime of practice.
I suggest that these practices of classification, prioritisation and writing were bound
up with the desire to make conservation evermore secure in its broader social negotiations. In
the context of a great deal of ambiguity and heterogeneity of conservation action, which
served to undermine the claims of conservationists (because conservation appeared muddled
and ill-conceived), the biodiversity process provided an opportunity to achieve a greater
degree of coherence. On the one hand, attempts were made to increase the 'objectivity' of
conservation claims by finding more solid foundations for identifying special species or
habitats and by creating a relatively transparent process whereby the reasons for selection
were set out in advance. On the other, action planning was envisaged as a mechanism by
which to bring all the different arms of conservation together so that action could become
focused on specific species or habitats; action planning acts as a strategy for co-ordinating
nature conservationists. As such, I suggest that these attempts to achieve a more authoritative
and consistent basis to conservation action were bound up in a continuing politics of the
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position of science within nature conservation. With the development of the biodiversity
process the scientist, who had (arguably) been slightly marginalised, is brought back to the
centre of conservation.
I envisage these practices, concepts such as decline, objects such as habitats and the
changing position of the scientist, as co-emergent. As the biodiversity process developed so
decline became increasingly ensconced as an important concept, habitats became more solid
in their use and the scientist became increasingly established as the linchpin. The
biodiversity process is a continuing achievement and a process that re-affirms, through its
practices, its own importance. What emerges is an increasingly coherent and unified
structure to conservation action.
Classifying habitats
After the UK Government had committed itself to a target-led action planning approach in
its response to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Anon. 1994), it established the UK
Biodiversity Steering Group to develop action plans. Ultimately this steering group produced
116 species and 14 habitat action plans (UK Biodiversity Steering Group 1995a, 1995b). But
in order to be able to produce these plans, it had to establish a system of focusing attention
on those species and habitats in most need. In the case of habitats, this process was not one
of simply choosing which were most under threat because what constituted a habitat was
ambiguous. The concept of the habitat had to be more clearly defined and a new
classification developed. Habitats had to be classified as such before they could be
prioritised and become part of the action planning system.
There are different ways to understand classification. One is to see it as a process of
discovery: classes exist beyond our conceptualisation of them and as our knowledge
develops so our classification comes closer to reality. All the conservationists I spoke with,
however, took a different view. For them, classification is arbitrary. Classes are human
constructs because, in the case of habitats, defining a class involves drawing a line through a
continuum. Where the line is drawn is less determined by nature and more by the choices
made by the classifier. This pragmatic view of classification is close to the position I take
here because, following Dean (1979; but also Nicholson 1989; Bowker and Star 1999;
Waterton 2002; Murdoch and Lowe 2003), I see classification as a process of invention
rather than discovery. But where the arbitrariness of classification led many of the
conservationists to see classification itself as relatively inconsequential (the lines had to be
drawn somewhere), I want to claim that classification matters. It matters because it is both
the product of, and embedded in, considerable political work. Classification has
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consequences (Bowker and Star 1999). More specifically, in this section, I look at the
process of creating a new habitat classification and at how, as they were classified into
discrete units, habitats became the objects of knowledge and calculation around which
biodiversity conservation could work. I suggest that as these categories were more clearly
defined and as they gradually became entrenched as new objects, so they became implicated
in and supported a wider set of practices that subsequently served to re-enforce the
categories themselves.
The concept of the habitat may appear straightforward - especially now that the
biodiversity process is firmly established - there are fens, native pinewoods, lowland heath,
and so on. They are clearly identifiable units that can be mapped and monitored and have
action plans produced for them. This obviousness is, however, an achievement. It is so
because the present dominance of the idea of the habitat as an assemblage of plants and
animals in physiographical context was but one of several possible definitions that rendered
the concept ambiguous. Tansley, for example, took the habitat as the complex of
environmental factors that influence the nature of a plant community:
In the study of vegetation the term habitat is applied to the whole complex of
environmental factors which differentiates units of vegetation, and is not used in
the limited sense of a particular soil or situation. It is obvious that plant
communities are in the first place related to habitat. This is equally true of the
largest units and of the smallest...Fundamentally, the vegetation of the world is
a mosaic of plant communities whose distribution is determined by a
corresponding mosaic of habitats (Tansley 1949: 216).
In this reading, different communities occur in different places that are characterised by
different sets of environmental factors - different habitats. The vegetation community is
related to habitat, not a habitat itself. But by the 1990s, the use of 'habitat' had changed.
Miles et. al. (1997) point out that 'habitat' is commonly used in at least four ways. There are
two forms of restricted usage: the habitat can be the natural place of growth or occurrence of
a species or it can be the environment of any organism. Both definitions imply that there are
as many habitats as there are species or even organisms. There are also two wider forms of
usage: the habitat can be an area of ground, small or large in extent, over which the
environment is essentially uniform, or the habitat can simply be used as a synonym for an
ecosystem or community. In short, the habitat can be a set of environmental characteristics, a
singular place, a homogeneous space or a thing.
The Convention on Biological Diversity seemed to pin things down when it defined
a habitat in the restricted sense to be 'a place or type of site where an organism or population
naturally occurs' (Johnson 1993: 84). But as the concept of biodiversity was translated into
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the UK context the habitat changed again. The UK Action Plan used a wider form stating
that 'In the UK we often use the term habitat to refer to major assemblages of plants and
animals found together, as in woodland or sand dune habitats. More properly, a habitat is the
locality or local area occupied by a species, but in this chapter it is used in its familiar,
broader sense' (Anon. 1994: 31). It was thus the broader meaning of the habitat as a major
assemblage of plants and animals - which has a long tradition in the UK with the late 1930s
seeing proposals for a national network of habitat reserves based on the four major habitats
of upland, fen, woodland and heath (Sheail 1976) - that was adopted within the biodiversity
process.
This eventual dominance of one interpretation of 'habitat' was not, however, simply
determined by tradition. The wider usage was specifically related to the politics of achieving
the aims of conservation. Petren (2001) suggests that when the habitat was defined as a place
of occurrence it became theoretically unpopular and incorporated within the concept of the
niche, but that with the construction of the need to conserve 'biodiversity', the habitat
emerged again as a useful tool for management. The habitat, defined much more broadly as
ecosystem, has the advantage over the niche because the physical nature of habitats means
that they are easier to identify and quantify. Indeed, because a habitat is synonymous with an
area that incorporates natural communities, protecting the habitat/area means protecting the
interconnections that are part of that community and so all the various niches. The
implication here is that this is not a one-way street where biologists develop the notion of the
habitat and it works through into conservation practice. To the contrary: the instrumental
needs of conservation management influenced the scientific concepts that were developed to
fulfil those needs. The reference to broader habitat types in the Action Plan thus fits with an
extant system of area-based conservation.
Once the concept of the habitat had been defined, it was the task of the Steering Group
to identify discrete habitats for which action plans could be written. This would appear, at
first glance, to be unproblematic because existing classification systems could help in this
task. The Steering Group could have turned, for example, to the existing 'Phase 1' habitats
classification, which was developed by the NCC in the 1980s as a means of monitoring
trends in habitat and land use change (NCC 1990). Or because 'habitat' was now
synonymous with 'community', the Group could have turned to existing classifications of
communities such as the National Vegetation Classification (NVC) or the CORINE Biotopes
Classification that underpinned the EU 'Habitats Directive' (Rodwell 1991-1997; Hall et. al.
2001; Commission of the European Communities 1991). But for the purposes of action
planning the categories of the Phase 1 classification were too specific and the survey
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techniques, which involved on-the-ground field inspection, too labour intensive. Similarly,
the NVC and CORLNE classifications dealt with too many discrete communities and
required a significant degree of botanical knowledge to be able to distinguish categories.
Consequently, with the ultimate purpose of action planning in mind, the Steering Group
decided to establish a new 'broad habitat classification' which defined habitats as
'ecologically integrated units at a landscape scale, rather than seeing habitats as simply
distinct types of vegetation' (UK Biodiversity Steering Group 1995b: 71). Recalling the
utilitarian impulse underlying the popularity of the broad habitat concept, the Steering Group
identified these new broad habitat types with reference to two criteria:
In selecting this broad classification, two main criteria were used:
• a workable number of habitat types to ensure the process remained feasible;
and
• simplicity - the definitions should be easily understood, unambiguous and
recognisable by a broad range of people (UK Biodiversity Steering Group
1995a: 22).
As is the case with any classification, the end to which it is put shapes the categories. In this
case the instrumental needs of the process of action planning shaped the categories and the
specific limits of these new conservation objects. The resulting classification divided the
whole land surface of the UK, and the surrounding seas, into 37 broad habitat categories (see
Appendix IV). But because these broad categories were too broad to be managerially useful,
smaller more discrete habitats also had to be identified. Thus the Steering Group had to
devise a way of identifying and prioritising these 'key habitats'. They established a set of
criteria by which to do so. Action plans would be written for:
• habitats for which the UK has international obligations;
• habitats at risk, such as those with a high rate of decline especially over the
last 20 years, or which are rare;
• areas, particularly marine areas, which may be functionally critical
(essential for organisms inhabiting wider ecosystems) such as sea grass beds
(for spawning fish);
• areas important for key species (UK Biodiversity Steering Group 1995a:
22).
It should be acknowledged that these criteria only present the public version of how habitats
were selected. One of my interviewees put a different version when he said that 'the list of
species and habitats that have been granted habitat and species action plan status are there
simply because they've had a good lobby behind them'. Nevertheless, the criteria emphasise
that the classification of key habitats was not a simple exercise of identifying discrete areas
or assemblages: in addition to the ultimate purpose of action planning, the habitats that were
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'identified' were the product of a process of negotiation. Because they did not yet exist as
'key habitats', selection against these criteria was a process of creation and the limits of
these newly-created objects was, in part, related to the sorts of extant objects under different
systems. In the case of those habitats for which the UK has international obligations, for
example (such as the obligation to protect the Caledonian Forest under the European Union's
'Habitats Directive'), the bounds of the conservation object are already set, even if they
technically require translation from one classification to another. Equally, referring to a
habitat as declining implies that it is already defined and that a related field of knowledge
and practice keeps it under surveillance. If we ask how it is possible to speak of a habitat as
declining over the last 20 years when the habitats have only just been classified as habitats,
we can see that the prior means of referring to habitats, such as the Phase 1 classification, is
crucial in giving shape to this new broad habitat classification. In this way, the emergence of
new habitat types involved the negotiation of various extant forms of classification in a new
context. Habitats such as grazing marsh, fens and lowland calcareous grassland, only came
to be clearly identified as such, with the lines drawn in the places they were, because of the
imperative of creating manageable 'objects' for action planning and because of the existing
structures that were in place.
The resulting list of key habitats overarched by broad habitat types can be seen in
Appendix IV. The key habitats are communities or features that are understood to be under
threat or special for some reason. Thus the 'broadleaved and yew' broad habitat contains the
key habitats of upland oakwood, lowland beech, upland mixed ash and wet woodlands. The
key habitats do not constitute the whole of the broad category but just a few selected bits of
it. What began to emerge by 1995, then, was a set of categories that referred to relatively
small, easily recognisable 'objects' for which action plans could potentially be produced in a
way that was managerially achievable.
There was still, however, significant flexibility to these categories. In as much as the
classification had been developed by the Steering Group and had not yet been adopted by
other groups or worked through into material action, there was still room for revision. This
flexibility is evident in the way the UK Biodiversity Group (the successor body to the
Steering Group that was established to oversee the completion of the action plans and
subsequent implementation) set about reviewing the categories of broad and key habitats in
order to reduce some of the ambiguities that existed. The broad classification was ambiguous
because a habitat, for example, could be a biogeographical zone such as the 'machair', but
also a whole island or group of islands as in 'Islands and archipelagos', meaning that one
broad habitat type could occur within another. In the review, some habitats were simply
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'deleted' or 'removed' (phrases which emphasise the textual nature of the process). Some
were added. Others were re-categorized, changing status from being broad habitats to
priority habitats (in the revision the UK Biodiversity Group reworked the classification from
'broad habitats' with 'key habitats' to 'broad habitats' with 'priority habitats': see Appendix
IV, V and VI). Native pine woodland, for example, was changed from being a broad habitat
category to a priority habitat within a new broad habitat of coniferous woodland that
encompassed both planted and semi-natural woods.
In some ways, this was simply a technical bureaucratic exercise because re-
categorizing pinewoods shifted them around on pieces of paper but did not actually have an
effect on the pinewoods themselves. But such reorganization was more than a bureaucratic
exercise because it was envisaged as an important step in moves towards the working
application of the classification. It was a step on the road to these classes actually having an
effect. The subsequent step, which marks the 'solidification' of the classification, was to
comprehensively describe the habitats in order to standardize the categories. It was with this
aim that Jackson (2000) sought to outline each category of the terrestrial and freshwater
realm in order to offer guidance on the interpretation of the classification and, ultimately, the
interpretation of physical phenomena so that they could be allotted to a category:
2.2 Coniferous woodland
This broad habitat type is characterised by vegetation dominated by trees that
are more than 5m high when mature, which form a distinct, although sometimes
open canopy which has a cover of greater than 20%. It includes stands of both
native and non-native coniferous trees species (with the exception of yew Taxus
baccata) where the percentage cover of these trees in the stand exceeds 80% of
the total cover of the trees present. Woodlands that are made up of broadleaved,
yew and conifer trees with less than 80% of the total cover provided by conifer
trees are included in the 'Broadleaved, mixed and yew woodland' broad habitat
type. Recently felled coniferous woodland is included in this broad habitat type
where there is a clear indication that it will return to woodland. Otherwise it is
classified according to the field layer composition.
Scots pine Pinus sylvestris is the only pine tree that is native to the UK, and
forms native woodland only in Scotland. Semi-natural woods of Scots pine are
normally called native pinewoods. The majority of coniferous woodlands in the
UK are plantations of species that are either not native to the UK or to the sites
on which they occur (Jackson 2000: np).
This was an attempt to draw more definitive lines between the boxes of the classification and
to make it more consistent. In the process, what happened is that the habitats, which had until
then been relatively abstract (existing on paper and open to repositioning), became
increasingly 'solid' objects because they were attributed with a certain set of characteristics.
Subsequently, the habitats would become evermore entrenched as conservation objects
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because once clearly defined, they would become the object of calls for more knowledge:
each habitat should be mapped, their extent measured, their condition researched and
particularly fine examples identified. Gradually, then, as knowledge was accumulated, so
each category was re-enforced and began to actually inform the interpretation of real world
phenomena. Consequently, whilst the act of drawing lines across continua was relatively
arbitrary - influenced by the imperative of planning and the prior classification of habitats -
once they were drawn and classes defined so the resultant categories became more real in the
sense that they had effects.
These effects are evident in the way that each habitat becomes a 'thing' that is valued
for a certain set of qualities. Once a fen, for example, is defined as exhibiting specific
qualities, so a norm is established and questions arise as to what should be done if a fen
gradually changes from that norm. Should those habitats that could be considered fens in a
poor condition be improved so that they conform to the norm? If a fen that was a prime
example gradually changes its species composition, should attempts be made to change it
back? It is precisely this sort of norm that underpinned the targets in the fen and pinewood
action plans. Their targets were to:
Identify priority fen sites in critical need of, and initiate, rehabilitation by the
year 2005 (UK Biodiversity Steering Group 1995b: 241).
Maintain remnant native pinewood areas listed on the Caledonian Pinewood
Inventory and restore their natural diversity of composition and structure (UK
Biodiversity Steering Group 1995b: 259).
Once categories were clearly defined and management suggested to rehabilitate or restore
'degraded' habitats so that they conform to the norm, so the lines that were arbitrarily drawn
gradually become more real in that the physical structure of real world habitats is changed.
The lines that were drawn on paper become inscribed on the landscape and the habitats that
are identified become the object of continued investigation and surveillance.
Ultimately, then, as the Steering Group and later the UK Biodiversity Group sought
to take the biodiversity process forward and introduce a new system of planning, new
conservation objects were constructed. The new objects - the habitats - became entrenched
and interwoven in sets of practices of surveillance and provided the basis for the
accumulation of new sorts of knowledge. The more a habitat was studied, the more defined it
became, the more defined it became the more entrenched as a category it ended up.
Eventually the habitats appear obvious and are intimately interconnected with systems of
knowledge production and management that make them appear so.
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Prioritising species
Whilst it was recognised in the UK Action Plan that the concept of a species was and
remained problematic and that finding a working definition had proved difficult (Anon.
1994: 15), the species was nevertheless declared as the basic unit of biological diversity
(Anon. 1994: 26). Due to the orientation to action, what was required was less a discourse on
the status of the species and more a robust means of choosing which species warranted
greatest attention. In addition to creating and 'solidifying' a new set of conservation objects
in the form of habitats, then, the UK Biodiversity Steering Group had to devise mechanisms
that allowed the clear prioritisation of species and justified the production of action plans for
some and not others. It is the argument of this section that the process of prioritisation was
itself implicated in constructing a new 'object' of conservation concern: the declining
population. This new object rests upon and reproduces a new set of practices and, in
addition, represents one way that conservationists sought to achieve a greater degree of
authority.
In their report, which represented the first attempt at creating a structure for the
biodiversity process, the Steering Group sought to identify criteria for selecting the species
of most concern. Drawing heavily on Biodiversity Challenge (Wynne et. al. 1993), it decided
that if a species qualified for one or more of the following categories, they should be
considered a 'key species':
• Threatened endemics and other globally threatened species;
• Species where the UK has more than 25% of the world or appropriate
biogeographical population;
• Species where numbers or range have declined by more than 25% in the last
25 years;
• In some instances where the species is found in fewer that 15 ten km squares
in the UK; and
• Species which are listed in the EU Birds or Habitats Directives, the Bern,
Bonn or CITES Conventions, or under the Wildlife and Countryside Act
1981 and the Nature Conservation and Amenity Lands (Northern Ireland)
Order 1985 (UK Biodiversity Steering Group 1995a: 19).
These criteria and the subsequent lists of species represent a crucial dimension of the
biodiversity process. If part of the rationale behind developing an objective-led approach was
to move towards a conservation that did not appear to act in an ad hoc way, then setting out
criteria in advance was a means of providing a clear justification for why some species were
more special than others. Crucially, within such lists of criteria are implicit aspirations for an
authoritative, impartial and 'objective' basis for conservation action. In their review of the
biodiversity process, Kerr and Bain convey the importance of criteria when they say that the
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'application of clearly defined...criteria makes the process of species selection more
objective' (Kerr and Bain 1997:275). The listing of these criteria constructs the person who
measures a species or a habitat against the criteria as the objective, disinterested arbitrator
simply implementing the scheme: deciding which species are most threatened is a mundane
activity and has nothing to do with individual choice. The very setting of criteria is thus "a
claim to authority; a claim to a more solid basis from which to act and to argue with others.
It is, as one of my interviewees sought to emphasise, a 'scientific exercise': 'That list, those
are priority species and habitats, that is a purely scientific exercise, they go into that
published document if they fulfil certain criteria, if their rate of decline has been X percent,
if their population size is X percent, if they are listed on an international threatened list. Hard
facts, they go into that list'. Yet despite the apparent neutrality of the list, both the setting of
criteria and the criteria themselves have a history, a history that illustrates that there is
nothing self-evident or obvious about either.
If we look closely at these criteria, we can see that they are set out hierarchically.
The threatened endemic is at the top of the list because if it is lost from the UK it is globally
extinct. Next are those species for which our global responsibility is slightly less - if the
species is lost from the UK it would not be extinct as it occurs elsewhere. The third category
is based on the decline of numbers or range of a species and the fourth is rarity. This
hierarchy is significant because until the 1980s rarity was the principal means of
prioritisation but here it has been demoted whilst decline has risen in importance.
The increasing importance of the notion of decline can be traced with reference to
the importance of the RSPB in developing the biodiversity process. Until the 1980s rare
birds like the avocet or the osprey attracted attention and action was undertaken to increase
their numbers. As a concept, however, rarity could be contested because of what it meant at
different spatial scales. For some a species was rare with reference to the UK, whilst for
others, the same species was abundant in Europe and thus not rare. If the country's major
conservation priorities were identified on account of their national rarity, the result could be
the protection of many species that were at the edge of their range and thus abundant
elsewhere: valuable conservation effort could be expended on a species that did not need
help. Ian Mitchell, a vocal campaigner against the 'metropolitan' conservation agencies and
organisations, utilised this ambiguity to ridicule the RSPB for putting so much effort into
conserving the corncrake in Scotland when there were (for Mitchell) significant numbers in
eastern Europe (Mitchell 1999). The RSPB, then, was on potentially difficult ground if it
justified its prioritisation of a species with reference to its rarity.
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The publication of Red Data Birds in Britain (Batten et. al. 1990), which was
produced by the RSPB and the NCC, was a first attempt to create a more authoritative
system of prioritisation. It was an attempt to set out clearly, which species were of most
concern and deserved action on their behalf. The subtitle of the book, however, - action for
rare, threatened and important species - points to the fact that the problems of rarity
remained. Though it is true that these problems will not go away because the concept of
rarity is, in some circumstances, the most applicable (which is why it is found in the criteria
for the biodiversity process), the Red Data list was thought to be deficient because there was
no attempt to prioritise the 117 species included on it. Questions arose as to which species
was most in need. Gibbons et. al. (1996a: 8) ask, for example, whether 'a species admitted
to the list on the basis of a rapid population decline [is] of greater concern than one admitted
simply on account of its rarity in the UK, even though it might be common elsewhere in its
range?' Aware that Red Data Birds had not managed to sufficiently ground conservation
action for birds, the RSPB along with the British Trust for Ornithology sought to rework the
list, its criteria and structure. The subsequent list of Birds of Conservation Concern was
based much more strongly on decline (Gibbons et. al. 1996).
This focus on decline was only possible because it was in the early 1990s that three
sets of 'trends data' gathered from repeated monitoring 'became available' (or was
constructed to be of greater importance). In 1990, for example, the data and trends observed
in the Common Bird Census that had been conducted annually since 1962 was published as
Population Trends in British Breeding Birds (Marchant et. al. 1990). The second
development was the mapping, between 1988 and 1991, of the entire breeding avifauna at a
national level by recording the breeding species within each 10 km square in the British and
Irish national grids. The resultant atlas (Gibbons et. al. 1993) could be compared with one
produced from a similar survey undertaken twenty years before (Sharrock 1976) and trends
identified. The third set of trends information was published in 1994, from data collated by
Birdlife International on the population sizes and trends for breeding species in all European
countries (Tucker and Heath 1994). As such, the ability to talk in terms of decline rested
upon a complex system of surveillance and monitoring.
Importantly, as this trends data 'became available' species that were already
prioritised on the basis of rarity were reconstructed through the language of decline. In Red
Data Birds (Batten et. al. 1990), for example, despite reference to how it was 'markedly
decreasing in numbers' (Batten et. al. 1990: 124), the capercaillie is included as a
'vulnerable breeder' because it was 'confined to rare and vulnerable habitats, with more than
half the population occurring at 10 or fewer sites' (Bibby et. al. 1989: 5). In Birds of
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Conservation Concern, however, it was included as a declining breeder because its breeding
range had contracted by 50% over the last 25 years (Gibbons et. al. 1996). Then the species
action plan refers to how '[njumbers have declined rapidly throughout its range in Northern
Europe over recent decades with the current UK population estimate now standing at 2,200
birds in winter' (UK Biodiversity Steering Group 1995b: 106). This emphasis on decline is
reinforced in the section of the plan that outlines the target:
4.1 This species has declined in recent years. The plan aims to halt the decline,
the causes of which are becoming clearer, and to restore the species to its
former range.
4.2 Halt the decline of the capercaillie in its core range in eastern and central
Scotland by 2000.
4.3 Maintain, and expand where possible, the range and population numbers of
capercaillie in Scotland to 20,000 by 2010 (UK Biodiversity Steering Group
1995b: 106).
As a means of prioritisation, decline was attractive to the RSPB for three reasons. First, it
provided an apparently more compelling basis for action. If some species are naturally rare,
then rarity is no justification for prioritisation at all. But if species were declining it would
suggest that something was wrong. Even though focusing on decline ignores questions of
whether or not a species had unnaturally high numbers at the beginning of the period of
monitoring, or that they might have been at a peak and go through cycles of growth and
decline, or that the very notion of decline implicitly constructs some ideal former period, a
negative trend implies a species in trouble and in need of conservation action. Secondly, it
was possible to determine rates of decline and therefore identify which species were
declining most. While some species might have declined by 10% over the last 25 years,
others might have declined by 50% over the same period. As such, decline offered a means
of yet further prioritising species and targeting resources. Thirdly, decline was attractive
because where reference to rarity verged on the 'subjective' due to its variability at different
spatial scales, a more quantitatively rigorous system of trends data was understood as
achieving a greater degree of objectivity. By translating their arguments for the protection of
species into figures, conservationists transferred the authority for conservation action onto
the data and thus constructed themselves as simply undertaking what was obviously
necessary as indicated by that data. If debates between conservationists and farmers, for
example, had in the past been major clashes, by referring to the data as the authority for
action, conservationists potentially diffused these clashes. Their argument was not simply
their 'subjective' position, but was based on the data; a position which, in turn, allowed
conservationists a range of argumentative positions: they could, for example, claim to be on
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the side of the farmers but have no choice but to act in accordance with what was indicated
by the figures. If someone objected to the actions of conservation agencies for a particular
species, those agencies could defend themselves by arguing that these actions were not
simply based on their preference for that species but on the data that indicated the species
was in difficulty. As such, there could be less argument about priorities based on decline.
Focusing on decline was a way of achieving a stronger, more authoritative position in fights
over nature.
It is possible to see this claim to authority in the way that focusing on decline
introduced another means of representing nature into the conservationist's representational
repertoire. In addition to the evocative photograph of the spectacular but sadly rare and
endangered species, the conservationist could now utilise the graph as a powerful means of
persuasion. The authority of numbers, which is linked with the mundanity of accounting and
the impartiality of the accountant/conservationist (Porter 1995; also see Demeritt 2001;
Enticott 2001), provides compelling evidence of the need for action (figure 4.1).
Numbers of song thrush, spotted flycatcher and tree sparrow
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Figure 4.1 The graphical representation of decline (Source: RSPB 2001a: 6).
Ultimately, then, in ornithological circles it came to be accepted that if a species was rare
but stable, it was less of a worry (although still requiring attention) than a species that might
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be more abundant but declining in numbers very quickly. It was a position that quickly
extended beyond ornithology. In the way that the RSPB was a prominent actor in the
Biodiversity Challenge group, the importance of decline and its associated practices became
embedded in the biodiversity process. Thus by ostensibly applying the criteria above, the
Steering Group identified (from an estimated 90,000 species in the UK) a list of 1250 'key
species', which it termed the 'long list'. In the context of producing action plans for a report
to Government, however, the long list was too long. The Steering Group needed some way
of further prioritising species and from the 1250 strong long list, a 'middle list' of 400
species was identified by using the 'globally threatened' or 'declining in the UK' criteria.
But even this list was too long, so from the 400 species strong middle list, a 'short list' of
116 species was selected and it was for these that action plans were prepared. (Later, in
1997, when the UK Biodiversity Group set about reviewing the Steering Group's work, this
terminology was simplified. The species constituting the long list were collectively renamed
to become 'Species of Conservation Concern'' (SoCC) and the middle and short list species
became 'Priority Species' with the aim being to produce action plans for all priority
species).
Despite the fact that trends information had only been accumulated for birds
because they were the most observed group of species and because there was an army of
amateur birdwatchers willing to help with surveys, and despite the fact that such coverage -
such visibility - was not applicable to all species, decline became an important element of
the process. And as decline and the practice of monitoring for trends gets bound up in the
process, so the question of decline becomes one asked of more species. Indeed decline is the
key concept around which the plan is organised: section two of each plan, which conforms
to a standard structure, specifically outlines the 'current factors causing loss or decline'.
Thus the practice of monitoring for decline becomes more widespread and the importance of
the concept becomes more entrenched. The new 'object' of the declining population
becomes interwoven with a new set of practices and the production of new forms of
knowledge and in the process itself becomes more solid and important. Whilst it would be
possible to say that the focus on decline is quite simply because the capercaillie, for
example, has, in fact, declined in number (which is beyond dispute), accepting such a claim
on its own would miss all the work that has gone in to being able to speak in terms of
decline. It would miss the desire, derived from a recognition of the ambiguities of rarity, to
find a more robust basis for action. The importance of decline is an achievement bound up
in attempts to achieve a more authoritative nature conservation.
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The planning process
Classifying and prioritising habitats and species was only the first step in the establishment
of the biodiversity process. Once they had been classified and prioritised and listed as in
need of special attention, particular species and habitats were brought into the systematic
process of action planning. In this section, I want to highlight this as a process through which
certain species and habitats became further entrenched as objects of conservation calculation,
and as a process through which the position of the scientist in nature conservation is re¬
negotiated. As the biodiversity process developed, the scientist and the different species and
habitats were co-constructed through a set of practices that re-enforced their importance.
While it takes some of its impetus from the species recovery programmes in other
countries, one of the significant drivers for the adoption of the action planning approach in
the UK was a recognition by conservationists that they needed a more rigorous means of
deciding on action. They were aware that in the context of conflicts over the natural world,
the conservation case could be challenged by suggestions that conservationists were
behaving in an ad hoc way, choosing to protect some species or sites and not others without
clear unproblematic justification. As such, they wanted an approach that was logical,
revisable and visible, so that they had firmer grounds for their claims. Instead of being
reactive and having to justify their interest in a species or habitat after it was threatened by a
development, they wanted to become proactive, and be able to set out more clearly what they
were interested in and why. Developing clear mechanisms for classifying and prioritising
habitats and species was the first step in introducing greater clarity. But once specific species
and habitats had been singled out for special attention, the next logical question revolved
around what the objectives were. If a species was endangered and was receiving special
attention, what should be done to make it less endangered and what would count as success?
It was in this context that conservationists turned to strategic planning models from the fields
of business and management. They needed a clear structure of decision making that leant
credibility to their claims. Planning performed this task.
Planning was a means of introducing a greater degree of rigour and coherence to
nature conservation action because it provided a structured way of proceeding (figure 4.2). In
an initial stage of auditing, the circumstances of the species or habitat are analysed. This
analysis gradually feeds into a planning phase within which priorities for action are agreed
upon, responsibilities for action assigned, budgets determined, detailed work programmes set
out and mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the success of the work established. Once
the work has been undertaken, it is evaluated with that evaluation feeding back into an
assessment of the fortunes of the species or habitat under consideration (Sutherland 2000).
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Planning is, thus, a structured approach, but also a flexible one. As the cycle revolves, action
is undertaken and the results monitored, so the analysis can feed into either the continuation
of management or the alteration of it in the light of experience. In this way, the cycle of
planning introduces a disciplined process that allows change because that change can be





Figure 4.2. A diagrammatic representation of the action planning process
The introduction of this structured way of doing nature conservation was, as one of my
interviewees put it, a means of introducing a greater degree of discipline to nature
conservation:
The whole thing about the planning thing, was really 1 think an attempt...to
bring to nature conservation the logical approach that planners in all sectors of
society, of work, whether that means planners with a capital P, as in Town and
Country Planning or those people who produce business plans for business or
you know managers who are managers in accountancy or whatever. The whole
audit, plan, implement, monitor, that kind of four phase process which has
different names in different disciplines that can always be brought down to
those four. Find out what you've got, decide what you want to do with it, do it,
monitor your success and then use that to create the next stage of your review
and it's a revolving cycle. It was an attempt to bring that form of discipline
to...a discipline, in the other meaning of the word (Interview G, 25th January
2002).
In a general sense, conservation action is disciplined by being incorporated in a prescribed
trajectory of social practice. The cycle of auditing, planning, implementing and monitoring
introduces discipline in the sense of introducing order. It is a logical structure that could
underpin decision-making. But the process is also a form of discipline because it holds
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within itself the means of keeping people in the 'revolving cycle' and because the action plan
serves to render the workings of conservation more visible. The plan, as a text published in
governmental documents, becomes a record setting out publicly what should be done. It
therefore introduces a public field of accountability. If the objective is widely known, the
plan works as a prompt for action because in the knowledge of their visibility those involved
are encouraged to undertake work to achieve the prescribed ends. The structure of the
process with built-in deadlines and targets keeps it going. The process of planning contains
within itself mechanisms that motivate action and encourage self-assessment and
surveillance.
A more detailed analysis of how this process disciplines nature conservation practice
- and in the process co-constructs species, habitats and conservation scientists - can be
attained by focusing on one example: the capercaillie (see Appendix VII). Once the
capercaillie had been short-listed for action planning by the Steering Group, on the basis of
its decline, the entry point into the 'revolving cycle' of planning was to conduct an audit of
the current state of knowledge about it:
The first thing that happened with the biodiversity action plans is a group of
people who were interested in a species - capercaillie - be it from RSPB or be it
from across the board, got together, sat down, reviewed what was known about
current status and trends and biology of capercaillie. Reviewed things that
needed to be done, whether they were policy or research or advisory or
whatever. So from those what you get is a series of demands and in research
terms what you get is a series of questions and effectively we don't know
enough about the predators of capercaillie or capercaillie hitting fences, or
things like this and what arises from that is a set of questions. ... So what the
action plans have done is they have co-ordinated the views (Interview N, 25th
June 2002).
In the first instance the informally-established Capercaillie Working Group was transformed
into the Capercaillie BAP group. It was here that representatives from SNH, the Scottish
Landowners Federation, the RSPB, the Institute for Terrestrial Ecology (ITE, later Centre for
Ecology and Hydrology), the Game Conservancy Trust (GCT), the Forestry Commission and
the Royal Zoological Society of Scotland, came together to discuss the problems and
potential remedies. They wanted to know what was happening to the species, and what the
mechanisms were that were causing its decline, so that corrective work could be undertaken
to reverse those mechanisms and halt the decline. As such, they had to review the research
that had been undertaken on the capercaillie and ask what it suggested should be undertaken
in terms of practical management. They also had to ask what it did not tell them and where
there were gaps in their knowledge. Further studies directed at specific questions could then
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be suggested. Thus one of the functions of action planning is revealed: planning acts as a
strategy for bringing people together, co-ordinating activity and reaching agreement.
But if we pay attention to the sorts of issues that were being reviewed and agreed
upon we can see that the emphasis was on ecological knowledge of the species and the sorts
of instrumental prescriptions that could be derived from that knowledge. This is significant
because while conservation has been dominated by ecologists since its early days and is
commonly understood to rest upon 'scientization' (MacDonald 1998), the centrality of
ecological knowledge and of the scientist should not be taken for granted. When I asked one
of my interviewees about the relationship between science and conservation, he suggested
that biodiversity action planning actually marked a change in the relationship because it
brought scientists back to the centre.
Andrew: ...has the relationship of science to conservation changed?
Interviewee: yes
Andrew: in what way?
Interviewee: erm...it has changed a lot with the arrival of things like the
biodiversity action plans because I think they put science more clearly into the
centre ground...I presume you are happy if we keep using capercaillie as the
example...[yep] so I think before action plans, people were involved in
conservation through nature reserves, they were involved in some degree of
conservation through discussions with local landowners, there may have been
issues about shooting capercaillie and things like this. There may have been
scientists or local people saying they were a bit concerned, there seemed to be a
lot of dead capercaillie beside these fences. The ornithologists were coming
back and saying, you know, the survey data weren't good ... there was a
general view that capercaillie numbers were in decline. What the action plans
did effectively was to get these people together and set out these questions, part
of the group was scientist, inside RSPB - I suppose these were the RSPB's own
original species action plans - erm...and I suppose, as one of the scientists in
that group ... if you come away from a meeting like that and feel that the
research questions that are being asked are the wrong ones then you have not
actually done your job in the meeting. And I felt that if I was in the meeting,
certainly in terms of my staff, I used to say to them you know, if you come out
of that meeting and you are not happy with the research questions you have got
something wrong in the meeting because you are the researcher, you are the
person who ought to be able to persuade the others that this is the right way to
frame the right questions. Then in terms of the drawing up of the species action
plan itself, it was either the research scientists or the ecologists, the reserves
based ecologists, who more or less had a veto on the plan, so again if you felt
the facts behind the plan were wrong, or the interpretations were wrong or the
research questions were wrong, you could actually send the plan back and say
do it again please.. .So in that respect the sort of, the ring for the plan was being
held by the scientists and the scientists were smack in the middle of it... And it
has put the scientist very much in control of things like reserve management
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planning from the ecological perspective, production of advisory material, and
interaction with policy and practical staff as to what gets done, how and where.
It's not perfect but I think it is much better than it used to be (Interview N, 25th
June 2002).
There is a broad politics to the position of science in nature conservation and the centrality of
ecological knowledge and the scientist in action planning points to a continuing negotiation
of that position. This re-negotiation is put in context by John Morton Boyd, who, reflecting
on the establishment of Scottish Natural Heritage, referred to the 'fall of science' (Boyd
1999: 217; see also Marren 2002). He claimed as significant the fact that Michael Usher,
SNH's top scientist through the 1990s, was not the 'Chief Scientist' as had been the case for
his predecessors in the NCC, but was the 'Chief Scientific Advisor' and eventually excluded
from SNH's main management team. The scientist was 'demoted' from the deviser of policy
to the adviser on policy. Arguably this demotion had taken place because nature
conservationists themselves had recognised that an inflammatory element of many of the
past conflicts that conservation had been involved in was the imposition of scientific
knowledge into contexts where lay knowledge was valued highly. In disputes over crofting,
for example, many saw nature conservation as a form of state sponsored imperialism, and, as
a result, in the moves to make nature conservation more inclusive with partnerships
including crofters and 'local communities', the scientific elite were slightly marginalised. In
this context, the position of the scientist in the biodiversity action planning process
represents a significant re-negotiation of the position of the scientist in conservation. If the
role of planning was to bring people together to agree on ways forward and to co-ordinate
activity so that action for species or habitats became more efficient and coherent, then the
centrality of the scientist meant that the biodiversity process was a means by which scientists
could accrue power. 'The ring for the plan was being held by the scientists' precisely
because they were able to define the terms of the problem and possible solutions. They
became the actors through which all claims and proposals had to pass.
The scientists' centrality was further enhanced as the scientist-dominated action plan
group moved on from reviewing the research that could be used to provide management
advice and the gaps in their knowledge, to the next phase in the cycle: writing the plan. This
plan (which follows a standard format for all species - see Appendix VII) re-produces the
abstract planning cycle in its structure. There is an audit (implicit in sections 1-3 of the plan)
of the current status, causes of decline and current management, before objectives are set (in
section 4) and specific forms of action put forward (in section 5) and monitoring schemes
suggested (section 5.5). Their centrality was enhanced because, as was stated in the action
plan, the factors affecting the capercaillie were poorly understood in 1995; what was needed
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and included in 'proposed actions' was more knowledge. By utilising their lack of
knowledge to argue for yet further research they ensure their continued importance in
generating that knowledge and in shaping the process. And by writing the need for more
knowledge into the planning cycle they thus perpetuate the process itself. The action plan
becomes the text through which the cycle revolves and because the scientists write the plan
and co-ordinate action so they retain control.
As the group moved into the implementation phase, the benefits of this co-ordinated
and planned approach became obvious. Research on fences has been important in changing
attitudes to the role of fencing in woodlands; research on habitat requirements provided
potential models for plantation management; promotional material was produced to raise
awareness of the birds plight; a birdwatching code of practice was published; and the
capercaillie was added to Schedule 1 of the WCA 1981. The success or otherwise of all this
work, though, could only be judged if the capercaillie was continually monitored. As the last
interviewee went on to say, he was quite certain that
from now on, one of the emphases in conservation is going to be monitoring
and it is going to be monitoring all of those species that have been afforded
special protection under whatever act or directive it is. Britain's signed up to
Rio and the Biodiversity Convention on a five yearly cycle ... can't do it
without monitoring. So all of these things have got to be monitored. As the data
set builds up you will be able to do more sophisticated modelling to actually
influence the way in which you manage those things and hopefully you make
progress on conservation measures for individual species (Interview N, 25th
June 2002).
While monitoring is crucial to be able to report on progress towards the objectives of the
national Biodiversity Action Plan, it is also crucial on an individual species or habitat level
because attempts at beneficial action can be correlated against changes in the population. In
this way action that was beneficial can be recognised and adopted more broadly. For the
capercaillie, monitoring involved national surveys and much more localised site based
counting. Unfortunately, this monitoring suggested that numbers were still declining.
Consequently, further, more urgent, action was required as the cycle started again. New
plans had to be made. New knowledge was required. Could important sites - even those that
were semi-natural, be managed very specifically for capercaillie? Could the field layer in
which they spend their lives be managed so as to be optimal for them? More research was
needed, trials have to be conducted and the results monitored.
As the cycle proceeded, what happened was that the whole set of practices of
classifying, prioritising and planning became increasingly entrenched and the scientists
bolstered their position. This can be further illustrated by reference to a report on the
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progress of action for the capercaillie (figure 4.3), that fed back in to the public field of
accountability and formed part of the national reporting mechanism that allowed the UK
Biodiversity Group to produce the Millennium Biodiversity Report (UK Biodiversity Group
2001; also see Biodiversity Challenge 2001).
Figure 4.3 Extract from reporting form for Capercaillie. Source: (RSPB/ITE 1999: 4).
Field 4: Assessment of status
Please tick the appropriate category to indicate the assessment of status of the species or habitat, for












Brief text description justifying assessment of status: (~ no more than 100 words for each country/region)
The 1998/99 national winter survey has yielded a provisional estimate of 1057 birds. This
represents a decline of 48% on the 1992/94 national survey estimate of 2189 birds. The number
of adult birds encountered during annual brood counts on several important estates has also
declined at a similar rate during this period. Anecdotal evidence of range contractions; further
survey work underway for 1999/2000.
Field 5: Summary statement
Please provide an overview ofplan implementation, including new factors affecting the species or
habitat, which will accelerate or constrain progress towards meeting of the targets. Where a factor
results in new action(s) please cross-reference back to the relevant numbers under Field 3 and Table B.
Numerous agencies and individuals are contributing to the targets of this plan. This work, co¬
ordinated by the BAP Group, will be enhanced by the recent appointment of the Capercaillie
Project Officer.
Very low recruitment, since 1991 at least, has probably been the principal reason for the decline
of the species. (Inclement weather and predation are considered to be two of the main
contributory factors to this low reproductive success.) However, if the mortality caused by
fences was eliminated, the population decline of capercaillie could be stopped. Adequate deer
control programmes are required in many forests to facilitate the removal of fences; this is an
urgent requirement.
We can see, in figure 4.3, that the revolving cycle of planning is a cycle of texts. At its most
basic, the report takes the action plan as referent; monitoring encourages assessment of
progress against the register of targets set out in the plan, which in the way that it is central,
reinforces the importance of the plan. But we can also see the influence of other texts: we see
the entrenchment of the notion of decline in the way that the options the reporter has to
choose from only refer to either 'signs of recovery', 'no change' or 'decline'. Decline is
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written in as if it can be taken for granted that it provides the appropriate form of description.
This in turn suggests the entrenchment of monitoring mechanisms that would allow the
reporter to assess whether it had declined or not. Further, if the act of reporting serves to
entrench certain concepts and practices, it also serves to set up another round of the cycle by
pointing to what needs to be done next. In the example given (Field 5, figure 4.3), the
practical action of fence removal and change in deer management is set out, but further
research on the habitat preferences of the capercaillie was also thought necessary. As the
cycle revolves and more action suggested by the monitoring, the position of the scientist is
further strengthened.
Management planning
Writing plans for how nature reserves are to be managed pre-dates species and habitat action
planning. Much of the early impetus for the writing and implementing of management plans
came from foresters returning to Britain after colonial service (see Brasnett 1953; Grove
1995, 1997). In 1947, for example, Joe Eggeling, later Director of the Nature Conservancy in
Scotland, was instrumental in producing working plans for Ugandan forests (Eggeling 1999).
Thus as the acquisition of reserves within an institutionalised nature conservation got under
way in the UK in the late 1950s, and as many foresters found positions in the new
conservation structures, the practice of compiling management plans became accepted
practice. Indeed, it was accepted to the extent that plans were written from the outset of
reserve acquisition with a plan produced for Beinn Eighe - the first National Nature Reserve
(NNR) - in 1957 (Johnston and Balharry 2001). Subsequently, plans were produced for other
NNRs including one written by Eggeling (1964) for Rum and for Local Nature Reserves
such as that produced for Aberlady Bay by Usher (1967; 1973).
Yet whilst management planning has been an accepted practice since at least the
1950s, and while 'planning' in a much broader sense has been central to governmental
responses to environmental problems for much longer (Adams 1990), I suggest that it was
not until the late 1980s that planning took on a more important role in site management and
in co-ordinating conservation practice. Even though Adams has suggested that
'[m]anagement plans have formed the principle element in the rationalisation of nature
through conservation' (Adams 1997: 284), I want to suggest it was only relatively recently
that they achieved this importance. Referring to the management plans written for Beinn
Eighe, for example, Johnston and Balharry (2001) note that the first plan was a simple
document and that the following plan, written ten years later, lacked rigour and allowed the
conservation work to drift off course for a long period. It was only in 1990 that a new plan
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sought to 're-establish first principles and to firmly base new objectives on a thorough
analysis and a strict rationale' (Johnston and Balharry 2001: 137). Although only one
example, the inadequacy of the then current practice must have been recognised by at least
1976 because it was in that year that renewed interest in planning emerged. The first of a
series of textual interventions that sought to persuade others of the need for a more rigorous
system of management planning appeared in the form of a Conservation Report (Wood and
Heaton 1976) and a Discussion Paper (Conservation Course 1976), both associated with the
Masters in Conservation at University College London (UCL). These documents, revised by
Wood and Warren (1978), set out the now familiar structure of description, evaluation,
objective setting and management prescription. As the Ecology and Conservation Unit at
UCL was developing into a significant centre of conservation thought and was an institution
through which many of the future workers in conservation agencies would pass, these
Discussion Papers and Reports were important texts framing future developments in
conservation more broadly. But perhaps even more important because of their wider
audience was the series of edited collections connected with the Conservation Course. In the
second volume in the series, Conservation in Perspective, Wood (1983) went on to rework
the Discussion Papers in a chapter on management planning and set out why plans were
needed and the approach to management planning developed at UCL.
Drawing upon this work the Nature Conservancy Council produced guidance for its
staff in the preparation of plans for NNRs (NCC 1983) and later produced a condensed and
simplified version (NCC 1988) to speak to a wider audience because 'all sites managed for
nature conservation should have a management plan' (NCC 1988:1). This 'working guide'
was an attempt to broaden the practice of management planning and as such sought to
persuade others of the utility of planning and provide them with an easy to follow structure.
It also provided a flexible model that others could adapt to their purposes. The RSPB did just
that, producing its own management plan guidance notes (RSPB 1999b). Ultimately, this
series of interconnected texts, which sought to influence conservation practice, culminated in
the inclusion of chapters on planning in mainstream textbooks oriented towards the aspiring
or practicing conservationist (Hirons et. al. 1995; Sutherland 2000; Tait et. al. 1988).
Through this inter-textual argument for management planning, acceptable and proper
conservation practice is constructed. Whilst plans have been written for forests and certain
conservation sites for many years, management planning was by the early 1990s a
precondition of management in connection with any conservation project or in connection
with application for funding under schemes such as the Woodland Grant Scheme.
Management plans have become ensconced on the conservation scene to the extent that,
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referring to the management of pinewoods, Cameron says '[i]t is essential that the
regeneration of any given native woodland be determined as part of a logical, planning
approach...in the absence of such a plan, management decisions lack a clear and consistent
direction and purpose, are more likely to be made on a subjective basis and are unlikely to
achieve a satisfactory result for anyone' (Cameron 1995: 155). Pursuing 'logical',
'consistent', even 'objective' management for nature conservation is, at least in part, a
textual enterprise and the management plan becomes central to conservation action.
The key to understanding the rise of the management plan can be found in the
functions that management plans are thought to perform:
To describe the site by collating all available physical and biological
information; to identify the objectives or purpose of managing the site; to
anticipate any conflicts between, and problems achieving, the objectives for the
site and suggest the best means of resolving them; to identify and describe the
management necessary to achieve the objectives; to identify the monitoring
needed to measure the effectiveness of management; to organise manpower and
funding; to act as a guide to new staff, i.e. to guarantee the continuity of
effective management; to link with national species and habitat action plans; to
demonstrate the effectiveness of management; to ensure that site management
objectives and operations reflect the policies of the parent organisation; to
facilitate communication between sites and organisations (Hirons et. al. 1995:
23).
The management plan seemingly achieves a great deal. This list can, however, be divided into
two parts. On the one hand, the plan serves to organise the work of on-site staff, and on the
other, it does this by placing the site in a wider context. The functions lower down the list -
facilitating communication between sites and organisations; ensuring that management is
consistent with the policies of the parent organisations; linking with species and habitat action
plans - give form to those higher up which are focused on site management. In this way
management plans and planning work to achieve coherence across disparate conservation
sites. Management planning should be understood as a strategy for achieving spatial
coherence or control at a distance. Just as with action planning, management planning was an
attempt to bring a form of discipline to nature conservation, but with management planning
this form of discipline was distinctly spatial. As one interviewee put it, nature conservation
did not have a 'formalised planning and managerial input until probably the mid eighties,
before that it was NGOs were really...they were just groups of naturalists, retired vicars and
all the rest of it, who did what they thought was the right thing in their county or their
locality'. Management planning as discipline is quite strikingly spatial because plans become
tools for co-ordinating action across localities. Hirons et. al. point out, for example, that
'[cjonformity with the objectives for nature conservation at a national and international scale
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is important if duplication of effort is to be avoided and efficient use of resources is to be
achieved.. .The management plan also enables organisations to plan effective conservation in
the context of and in relation to other sites' (1995: 24). Another interviewee elaborated:
Over the years management planning has become increasingly important.
Because I think when the RSPB started they had very superficial management
plans and I think it was ten or fifteen years ago they...through the reserves
ecology department actually, they produced the first guidance notes for
management planning. ... It has really formalised and prioritised on-site
management and how we need to do it. Whereas in the past I think you had a
nature reserve and I think the attitude would have been, do as much as you can,
you know, diversify your site as much as possible and all the rest of it. So
people had been planting things or doing habitat manipulations on a small scale,
it was just more like gardening on a reserve just to increase their diversity.
Because I can imagine in the old days wardens were probably competing for
what they could do on a site, how many species they could get. But times have
moved on. In the last ten years and you know priorities came in, action plans
came in, and people were much more focused on, this reserve is in this part of
the country where these habitats and these species are higher priorities, we
should be focusing on these, and that is the way it has gone. ... Management
plans come in very handy because, you know, you have your main aims and
your rationale for being at the site and then your key objectives for your
management of that site and I think it keeps people on the straight and narrow.
It stops them going off on a tangent and doing what they want to do. You know
with the best will in the world, every warden or site manager that you have is
very variable in experience and skills and everything else and inclination, and if
they didn't have a framework like the management plan then sure they will start
going off. This management plan structure really keeps people focused
(Interview T, 29th September 2002).
Where conservation action in the past was oriented towards high diversity even if the site
would not 'naturally' achieve a high diversity, management planning, linked with the
identification of priorities and ideas of what 'should' be present in any particular part of the
country, put an end to ad hoc habitat manipulations, 'gardening' and competitions. The
heterogeneity of conservation action dependent on the site warden, their ideas and inclination
is, through the increasing importance of management planning, reduced. Appropriate
conservation action on any particular site becomes registered against more broadly
recognised standards rather than being the result of wardening whim (thus management
planning also serves the function of removing responsibility for action from one individual).
How does planning achieve that coherence? I want to point to two interconnected
mechanisms that are involved: the plan format and the process of planning.
In as much as the management plan as text and management planning as a discursive
practice of text production are interwoven, the provision of specific plan formats in the texts
which argue for the widespread adoption of planning (e.g. NCC 1988), encourages specific
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forms of practice on the part of those compiling new plans. Despite the fact that those
arguing for the adoption of management planning say that the plan should 'only be as long as
necessary to achieve its purpose' (NCC 1988: 5) and thus suggest a degree of flexibility in
planning, a uniform process that will result in appropriate management is implicit within the
structures put forward. Drawing heavily on the NCC's (1988) format, Hirons et. al. (1995)
set out the RSPB management plan structure as beginning with general information
including location, tenure and designations, followed by a description of the site in terms of
its physical characteristics, the species and habitats and the cultural history. This description
is followed by an evaluation of the site (against the criteria set out in Ratcliffe's (1977)
Nature Conservation Review that sought to identify sites of conservation importance), the
policies to be pursued, and prescriptions that will be carried out. This plan format - of
description, evaluation, policy, prescription - is, through the inter-textual argument for
management planning, now standard. For the NCC
there are considerable advantages in standardising the structure and format of
plans. Standard headings provide a framework for preparing plans and guide the
less experienced in their preparation. The standard format also helps to ensure
that the sites are properly described; their importance is assessed against
recognised standards; clear objectives of management are laid down; relevant
work is prescribed, planned and executed; and the effects of the work are
carefully monitored' (Nature Conservancy Council 1988: 4).
A standard format means that people in different places act in similar ways. Achieving
coherence within nature conservation is, in part, about applying standardised texts. Taking
this further, though, the standardised text is associated with the actual practice of planning in
a relatively straightforward way. Planning is a progression bound up in the writing of the
plan: 'preparing a plan requires relevant information to be assembled and appraised. Once a
full understanding of the site's present conservation status has been gained, the manager can
determine what must be done to maintain or enhance the important features of the site. This
in turn leads to prescriptions for site management to attain these objectives' (Nature
Conservancy Council 1988: 4). Just as the plan format starts with description and moves on
to evaluation, policy and prescription so managers, if they gain a 'full understanding' by
describing comprehensively, will be able to determine what must be done. The plan, with its
progression - of description, evaluation, policy, prescription - incorporates a 'panoptical
dream' (Bowker 2000: 645) of seeing all, knowing all there is to know, before proceeding to
determine how it should be managed. Implicitly, comprehensive knowledge precedes the
politics of decision-making. The format of the plan is thus standardised and linked with the
progression of management planning in a way that 'leads to prescriptions for site
107
management' (NCC 1988: 4). Represented as such, it appears as a universally applicable
process. Even the inexperienced can arrive at appropriate management if only they follow
the format and the process. In an important sense, writing is planning. Figure 4.4 illustrates
the management planning system. The process of arriving at management mirrors the plan
format of description, evaluation, prescription and is, like action planning, cyclical.
Figure 4.4. The planning system and its control (Source NCC 1988: 5; see also Highland
Birchwoods, undated).
Figure t The planningsystem and its control 4




.• •- : '-'v.- , f .' :
_ .
Consideration of trends and
constraints affectingmanagement
% 'J? ^ \^
■
Formulation ofobjectives and v
selection ofmanagement options
Identification ofoutline prescriptions
■ Identification and description ,




i-.& -U-iif: Vo :f,,-"f






Short term control of current annual work plan
J} Medium term control— review of projects and their progress (annual)
||||J Long term control — review in depth (5 or 10 years)
108
The second mechanism by which planning achieves coherence within conservation
is the 'pathfinder' meeting that is commonly arranged as part of the planning process. These
meetings, which 'can be a key stage in the plan production process' (Hirons et. al. 1995: 33)
are moments when, in the case of the RSPB, site managers, ecologists, land agents and
representatives from the statutory conservation agencies and local communities come
together to decide on the main policies for management. In as much as people involved in
the organisation in different ways and at different levels are involved, the importance of the
site team is slightly reduced. Others that are removed from the immediacy of site
management and can position this particular site in the context of work going on elsewhere
will act as a controlling mechanism to help achieve coherence. Particular individuals, then,
become crucial in their travels and their involvement in many sites. One of my interviewees,
who was an ecologist engaged in the process in this way, emphasised his role in situating the
site in a broader context:
[A]s an ecologist we co-ordinate management planning, we erm advise on any
form of ecological management for species or habitats...erm but the
management planning role is quite a key one and I think that is where these co¬
ordinating roles comes in because we give that wider context because our
wardens write the management plans, or our site staff, not just the wardens, and
they basically have written that more in isolation and it is up to us to have an
editorial role to make sure it fits in with the wide policy and objectives of the
organisation or the biodiversity action plan process or whatever (Interview T,
29th September 2002).
Management planning thus achieves coherence through the connections between
standardised texts and standardised forms of action and through the processes of plan
production that connect the distant sites with other sites and with the 'centre'.
The management plan's importance only increases if we recognise that, as the last
quote suggested, management and action plans actually interlock in an increasingly
comprehensive structure of co-ordinated action. Viewed alongside the development of action
planning, we can see that although they refer to different objects they incorporate the same
logic of establishing objectives, setting out prescriptions and monitoring progress, which in
turn requires practices of surveillance. Yet management plans and action plans are more
closely interwoven than sharing the same planning logic. The same interviewee continues:
So, yeah I think management planning is quite good, but the action plan process
sort of came after that. RSPB had its own habitat and species action plans... and
these came about before the UKBAP process developed. You probably know
that the NGOs through the RSPB and others pushed the UK hard into going
down this line a lot more and a lot of the templates for the RSPB BAPs were
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used to feed into the UKBAP process. So that is good, we use those as a key
sort of, our key manuals I suppose to actually feed into the management plans.
So we try to say well if we are conserving corncrakes or whatever, you know
what does the corncrake action plan tell us we need to be doing and are we
focusing on those actions in this management plan for this site. Is this site
appropriate for corncrakes, if it is, then which objectives in the action plan
should we be trying to implement. So they are keyed in together, I think it is
quite a neat process...(Interview T, 29th September 2002. Italics for emphasis).
Action plans potentially feed into management plans and help shape conservation action on
the ground. The species and habitats that have been prioritised in the process of identifying
special cases with reference to their decline, and which have objectives and targets set for
conservation action, shape on-site management, which then feeds into meeting the targets of
the action plan.
Planning as a regime of practice
At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that the introduction of the concept of
biodiversity and the development of the biodiversity process represented an extension of the
managerialism that has characterised conservation and thus an opportunity to examine the
continuing process of rationalisation in nature conservation. As such, I have, with the
concept of governmentality in mind, sought to follow Dean (1999) and examine the regime
of practices involved in the biodiversity process and the diverse processes by which that
regime has achieved relatively stable forms of organisation and institutional practice. In
particular, I have emphasised the importance of the practices of classifying, prioritising and
planning and I suggest that as these practices became interconnected so they developed into
a larger regime of practice that introduced a greater degree of coherence to nature
conservation.
The development of this regime with relatively stable forms of institutional practice
and coherence was a gradual process. In the first instance, habitats were classified and
species prioritised and incorporated within a system of planning. As they were, so they
became further entrenched as objects of conservation calculation. Habitats became more
'real' as they were more precisely defined, as steering groups were established, action
undertaken and reports written and as the classification became implicated in new practices
of keeping countryside change under surveillance (such as in the Countryside Survey 2000:
Haines-Young et. al. 2000). Similarly, as a marker of conservation concern, 'decline'
became increasingly important as the practices of surveillance that were required to talk in
terms of decline were incorporated within action planning and applied to all species. In this
way, classification and prioritisation became interwoven with action planning and the
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evermore-important practice of monitoring. In the process, conservation action became
increasingly co-ordinated as it too was channelled through the action plan. Ultimately, in the
way that actions proposed for individual species and habitats had to be carried out in specific
locations, action plans came to be linked with management plans. The result was more
coherent conservation action because site management planning was already reducing the
heterogeneity of conservation practice by introducing more rigorous planning co-ordinated
from a centre. As action and management plans connected so that organised practice became
part of a co-ordinated and 'scientifically' managed process of selecting priorities and
deciding on action on a national scale. Conservation became more coherent because the
actions of the well-meaning but sometimes misguided manager or naturalist came to be more
coherently directed as part of an increasingly unitary regime of practice.
This story could be understood as an illustration of the development of what
Rutherford (1999) termed 'ecological governmentality'. Ecological knowledge is interwoven
with the institutionalisation of the concept of biodiversity and the associated practices
through which nature can be governed. Indeed it is interwoven in the practices of planning
through which nature conservationists are rendered docile and themselves governed.
Ecological knowledge, for example, underpinned the development of the new habitat
classification that created new objects which could then be managed and brought within the
cycles of action and management planning. Understanding the development of the
biodiversity process as ecological governmentality, though, raises important questions of
how we should understand the process of rationalisation.
To a significant degree, the analysis I have presented here supports the position on
rationalisation and conservation taken by Adams (1997). Since rationalisation involves the
development of science and technology as a means to understand and manipulate nature, his
argument is that conservation is part of the process of rationalisation because ecological
science provides the knowledge that underpins the technocratic recipe book for controlling
the natural world. In line with this, the importance of ecology in governing nature is evident
in the practices of classifying, prioritising and planning above. But where my analysis of
conservation through the lens of governmentality adds to that provided by Adams is in the
understanding of science itself. As I interpret Adams' suggestion that nature conservation
offers 'critical insight into the ways in which scientific ideas about nature relate to social
action' (Adams 1997: 278), his emphasis is on how science informs the social practice of
nature conservation. But such a view potentially ignores the way that scientific knowledge is
not simply produced in an abstract realm only then to inform social action: it is itself a social
practice embedded in wider social practice. By following Foucault and examining the
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practices through which the biodiversity process developed, this understanding of science in
conservation is extended. The way that science is embedded in the social practice of nature
conservation can be seen in the development of the notion of decline and of new habitat
categories. As new means of prioritisation were developed for birds in the context of
attempts to find more solid foundations for identifying priorities, so new forms of knowledge
(connected with new practices) were also developed. This is most evident as the concept of
the declining population was incorporated in the action planning process. As decline became
a more common means of registering conservation concern and an important part of the
action planning cycle because it was written into all the plans, so there developed a
requirement for more knowledge of trends. As such, the sorts of ecological knowledge that
were developed were grounded in the messy world of conservation practice, rather than
being developed prior to influencing conservation. Similarly, the development of a new
habitat classification was not simply derived from ecological knowledge but also from the
requirement of developing action planning as a manageable practice. In this way, we can see
that ecological knowledge is thoroughly interwoven in the development of the regime of
practice: it does not sit outside shaping that regime but is co-emergent with new conservation
objects and practices.
Once this is recognised, it is possible to see the analyses of the development of the
concept of biodiversity that emphasise the agency of particularly important actors such as
scientists, as somewhat wanting (Takacs 1996). While scientists were important, especially
given the desire to make conservation more rigorous and 'objective', it was not the case that
they simply wielded power and had the ability to shape and force through the development
of the biodiversity process. Scientists could not be the sovereign power positioned outside
the social fray orchestrating events, because they were thoroughly embedded in those events.
In this way, the scientist is not simply a pre-formed identity that influences others; because
they are engaged in social negotiation they also take shape in social practice. Their power
was not simply held: it was produced as the regime of practices took shape.
Nature conservation is not, then, simply part of the process of rationalisation because
it is underpinned by ecological science - not least because the position of science in nature
conservation cannot be taken for granted. Conservation's position as part of the process of
rationalisation is continually being achieved and re-negotiated through the tactics and
strategies - the 'micro-physics of power' - that enframe new ways of conceiving nature and
new ways of acting for its conservation. In the case of the biodiversity process, these tactics
and strategies have served to develop a self-perpetuating system with science at the centre
but which remains open for continued negotiation.
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This account adds a more recent chapter to the story of nature conservation. Nature
conservation saw its mainstream institutionalisation in the years following the Second World
War and the stories of its emergence at this time emphasise how that institutionalisation was
interwoven with the desire on the part of ecologists to find a home for themselves and to
secure wider recognition within biology and the natural sciences. These stories provide the
grounds for a continuing tendency to conceptualise conservation as a one-way process of
scientific knowledge feeding conservation practice. But in looking at the more recent
development of the biodiversity process, what we see is less a detached arena of science
informing nature conservation and more a complex field of social negotiation and power
relations within which science is embedded.
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5
Biodiversity Conservation in Discourse
Questioning the regime of practice
The last chapter illustrated that the establishment of the biodiversity process involved the
development of tactics and strategies that enframed new ways of understanding the natural
world and of acting for its conservation. Approaching conservation in this way - and taking
constructivist arguments into account - provides alternative stories of conservation's
'making' and development. In particular, such an approach allows us to see that 'nature' is
not simply the object over which politics happens: it is re-constructed as 'biodiversity' as it
is classified, mapped, prioritised, researched, planned for and monitored. This approach
allows us to see scientific knowledge, and the scientist, as embedded in the messy political
world of discursive change rather than situated outside it.
In this chapter, I extend the analysis to examine how conservationists talk about
biodiversity. I do so in order to acknowledge and engage with criticisms that are levelled at
Foucault's work. Fairclough sums these up when he says that 'in the totality of [Foucault's]
work and in the major analyses, the dominant impression is one of people being helplessly
subjected to immovable systems of power' (Fairclough 1992: 57). Whilst Foucault insists
that power entails resistance, he gives the impression that resistance is generally contained
by power (McNay 1992). Whilst I would argue that the story of the development of action
planning illustrates that power is generated in the process, it would be possible to suggest
that because the focus is on classifications, prioritisation and planning, one gets the
impression that the people involved were simply caught up in developments without agency
to resist and that the structures of the process determine their actions. There is, apparently,
no room for negotiation or disagreement. If the biodiversity process represents an
intensification of rationalisation, or even the 'governmentalisation of nature conservation',
then it could be argued that the sort of description I offered in the last chapter implied that
this process took place smoothly and that conservation is unproblematically rationalistic and
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governmental. Indeed, it could be argued that in referring to a 'regime ofpractice' what I end
up with is, like Weber's (1968) view of the development of formal rationality, a pessimistic
vision of people dependent on a disciplinary hierarchy and bureaucracy.
In part, the impression of 'immovable systems of power' results from the fact that
Foucault's conceptualisation of 'discourse' as a complex of knowledge and practice in
relations of power means that he does not pay close attention to specific examples of
discourse as language in use (Fairclough 1992; Lemke 1995). In a similar way, in the last
chapter, I used the words of interviewees to tell the story, but I did not look in detail at their
ways of speaking, the language they used and the ways that they constructed biodiversity in
their talk. As such, in this chapter, I extend my analysis of rationalisation in nature
conservation by examining how different people speak about the development of the concept
of biodiversity. That is, I want to extend my analysis of governmentalisation by
acknowledging the importance of language that has been highlighted by the so-called
'cultural turn'. It is in language that we construct meaning and represent the world and it is
therefore through language that 'biodiversity' comes to have meaning. It is through paying
attention to how conservationists talk about and represent 'biodiversity' that we can further
understand how it is being constructed and, importantly, fought over. In this chapter, then, I
want to extend the Foucauldian reading of biodiversity as discourse by drawing upon
discourse analytic research that examines the construction of worlds in writing and talk and
the emplacement of these constructions in a continuing politics of representation. I want to
examine the negotiation of biodiversity in and through discourse as language in use because,
as Escobar (1996) reminds us from a poststructuralist perspective, 'there cannot be a
materialist analysis that is not, at the same time, a discursive analysis'. In doing so, I want to
look behind biodiversity as an immovable system of power and an apparent intensification of
the process of rationalisation, to illustrate how this rationalising tendency is contested.
Moving from discourse as a complex of knowledge and practice in relations of
power to discourse as language in use, is not, however, to set these two usages of'discourse'
in opposition. If a discourse is 'a system of possibility for knowledge' and 'makes possible a
field of knowledge' (Philp 1990: 69), it provides the context for meaning making and thus
enframes the way that different objects, people, behaviour and events get represented.
Taking an example from Foucault's work, people could only be talked about as mad or
sexually deviant, they could only become the objects of the developing human sciences,
within the discursive formation of madness or sexuality at that time. Madness and perversion
only gained meaning within the discourse. As such, discourses produce the objects of
knowledge, determine what can be talked about and supply the interpretative resources for
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speakers: 'discourses enable stories to be told' (Dryzek 1997: 15). The way conservationists
speak about nature and their work is thus embedded in the construction of the broad
discursive formation of nature conservation within which there is a restricted range of ways
of talking about or constructing nature that make sense.
My analysis of language in use in the making of discourse extends the Foucauldian
reading of the last chapter by not only examining some of the ways that biodiversity as broad
social discourse enframes particular ways of speaking and acting, but also how it is resisted.
Paying attention to the ways that biodiversity, the practices of action planning and
appropriate forms of management are talked about is one way of examining the politics
involved in the establishment of the biodiversity process. It is here that we can see some of
the negotiation and the process by which certain discursive formulations achieve hegemony,
are fought over and gradually changed.
In order to illustrate these claims, this chapter uses material generated in my
interviews with people involved in the biodiversity process to look more closely at how they
talk about the structure the process has taken and appropriate forms of management. In
particular, I focus on the debate over the appropriate level of conservation action and the
degree to which conservationists should intervene in 'natural' systems. I concentrate on this
particular debate because when carrying out my interviews, I recognised that the further I got
in questioning my interviewees about the biodiversity process, the closer I got to some
fundamental issues of nature conservation practice and the more divided my interviewees
became on the issue of the degree to which they should intervene. It was here that I could
most obviously see contestation and disagreement about the direction the biodiversity
process had taken.
This disagreement centred on an apparent 'dilemma' (Billig et. al. 1988) - prompted
by the way that the biodiversity process evolved around species and habitat action plans -
about whether conservation should be undertaken at the species or habitat level. The
importance of this dilemma was brought home to me when one of my interviewees told a
story of'a huge debate in an action-planning meeting for eagles'1:
one very lucid scientist said 'well what you've got to decide, in terms of how
many eagles you want is whether you want to be men of the trees or eagle
farmers'. And what he was caricaturing is whether or not you took the Fraser
Darling approach that the Highlands are devastated and what we actually want
to get back to is a richer more fertile, much more wooded...sort of how
1 This must be an RSPB action planning meeting because the speaker refers to golden eagles which do
not have an action plan in the UK biodiversity process. The RSPB initiated the action planning system
and has its own parallel set of plans to guide its work. Nevertheless, the significance of the quote still
holds for the UK process.
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Scotland was - in which you would have fewer eagles per square mile. Or, on
the other extreme, whether you want to maintain your devastated West
Highlands full of dead sheep, because they are over-stocked, but which support
lots of eagles. ... Are you wanting a natural, in inverted commas, environment?
Or do you want, or are you coming up with a sort of recipe book of we want a
Scotland that includes X of these and Y of these and Z of these and we are
going to have XYZ of those in those areas, whatever nature thinks, we are going
to have them (Interview G, 25th January 2002).
Here my interviewee suggests a social arena in which two mutually exclusive subject
positions and ways of constructing nature come into conflict. The 'men of the trees' seek a
more natural environment and are concerned with broad scale management. The 'eagle
farmers' are, on the other hand, oriented towards the species and willing to undertake quite
specific work to achieve their ends.
In seeking to understand this apparent conflict and the dilemma that lies behind it, I
could, at this point, follow many ofmy interviewees who referred to, and allotted themselves
to, different 'schools of thought', or, in an appropriately militaristic metaphor, 'camps'. I
could identify which interviewees adhered to a species or habitat approach and thus identify
different groups and begin to build up a picture of their characteristics, their arguments and
common ways of constructing nature. Alternatively, I could call, like others (Peterken 1996),
upon common typologies of technocentrics and ecocentrics (O'Riordan 1976; Pepper 1984)
or imperialists and arcadians (Worster 1977), and align those that are happier with a species
approach (the eagle farmers) with the technocentric/imperialist position and those that are
happier with the habitat approach (the men of the trees) with the ecocentric/arcadian
position.
In analysis of this and other evidence on how discourse is worked with, however, I
turn to the concepts of discourse theory (Billig 1987, 1997; Billig et. al. 1988; Burman and
Parker 1993; Edwards and Potter 1992; Parker 1990, 1992; Potter and Wetherell 1987;
Wetherell and Potter 1988, 1992). More specifically, my analysis draws upon those strands
of discourse analysis that pay attention to broad social patterns of meaning making through
the concepts of 'interpretative repertoires' (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984; Potter and Wetherell
1987; Wetherell and Potter 1988; Edley and Wetherell 1999) and argument or rhetoric
(Billig 1987, 1997; Billig et. al. 1988; Myerson and Rydin 1996). From the perspective of
this approach, some repertoires - or 'broadly discernible clusters of terms, descriptions,
common-places and figures of speech often clustered around metaphors or vivid images and
often using distinct grammatical constructions and styles' (Potter et. al. 1990: 212) - become
relatively stable both at an individual and cultural level. As Edley and Wetherell (1999:182)
put it 'society provides us with a set of ready-made resources with which to think and talk
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about the world'. As such, in the way that they must call upon extant resources, speakers 'are
part of, and are continuing, the ideological history of the discursive themes which they are
using' (Billig 1997: 49). Identifying repertoires is therefore a way of identifying broadly
available social resources for making meaning which are interwoven in particular forms of
practice and relationships between social actors. At the same time, however, this approach
focuses on how speakers construct different accounts, or versions, of the world in their talk
and sees these versions as achievements accomplished within specific rhetorical contexts.
Because speakers draw upon interpretative resources in different situations they rework those
resources; they actively create their own versions of the world by utilising resources in new
rhetorical and micropolitical contexts. People are, therefore, both the products and the
producers of discourse.
From this perspective, then, any attempt to understand conservation through a simple
turn to extant classifications or typologies would be problematic because individuals do not
simply operationalise a discourse associated with an a priori position. Individuals'
conceptions of how best to conserve nature do not come neatly packaged; they do not have
some kind of internally consistent set of attitudes that allow them to assume positions on any
given topic and they do not adhere to a position irrespective of the rhetorical situation (on
this point and its use as a criticism of attitude or questionnaire surveys see Macnaghten and
Urry 1998). As such, people do not simply adhere to 'camps' as if they can only see virtue in
their maxim of conservation practice. Rather, they access the same culturally available
resources and can see the virtue of different approaches but end up advocating different
positions by calling upon those resources in different ways in different contexts. In short,
rather than understanding individuals as speaking from predefined positions as if the act of
speaking in an interview is an enunciation of that position, the discourse analytic work that I
am calling upon sees these positions as continually re-negotiated achievements. Individuals
work out a position - they speak to a position - in discourse.
In order to begin to understand how these positions are achieved and how people
argue over conservation practice, what follows draws upon interview material that delineates
the species-habitat dilemma and examines the strategies that were employed to manage that
dilemma. To be clear, I do not want to come to a position on which approach is right and
which is wrong. Rather, I want to illustrate the contingency of these different positions and
the fact that both, appropriate in most situations, provide flexible resources that can be used
and re-negotiated in debates over appropriate action. My point is to illuminate how different
approaches are argued over. I suggest that individual speakers should be seen as
sophisticated rhetoricians who achieve their positions on the appropriate approach to
118
conservation by skilfully using language to negotiate alternatives. They pull together
argumentative and interpretative resources to creatively argue a case in any given context.
Detailing strategies in this way, however, can give the impression of repertoires and
discursive resources that are put to use by individuals as they take up positions in an abstract
realm of continuing clashes. While I do see continuing argument as central to the reshaping
of nature conservation, in the final section I focus on one example of management practice
where these discursive resources are called upon and have to be balanced against each other
as the site managers try to find and justify suitable forms of management. In particular, I
focus on the management of Insh Marshes - one of the largest areas of fen in the UK (which
is a priority habitat within the biodiversity process). Through this example I illustrate that
these discursive resources and strategies are interwoven in conservation practice and that
they do not simply come into conflict but are accommodated in specific circumstances where
forms ofmanagement for particular species or habitats have to be balanced.
The species-habitat dilemma
In each interview that I conducted with individuals involved in the biodiversity process I
moved through some questions on the development of the process itself, my interviewee's
role and the procedure by which species and habitats were selected. I then explored some of
the ambiguities of the process as I was interested in how 'habitats' had been defined and how
the lines were drawn around them; why some species were more important than others; and
crucially, how the potential conflicts between species and habitat action would be dealt with
(such as when action for one species contradicts another or when action for a species
contradicts that for a habitat). With issues of procedure, I got responses that simply re¬
iterated the texts produced in the biodiversity process. But with questions about the more
ambiguous topics, my interviewees' responses varied considerably. This variability is
evident not simply between interviewees but also within individuals' responses. In
answering a question about why the ecosystemic definition had been adopted, given the
different definitions of what a habitat is, the following interviewee emphasised pragmatism:
Andrew: I wondered if you knew how that particular definition was adopted
because in the [Biodiversity] Convention they take a smaller definition, but
we've worked with a much bigger definition and I wondered whether you know
whether that was more useful or whether it was simply because that helped in
different ways?
Interviewee: the broader definition was developed er because it helped
encompass a whole range of species issues. With 400 species you've got a lot of
work to do if you are looking at individual species and habitat action plans,
often a group a species all have the same threats and issues affecting them and
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so its quite sensible to have broad habitat groups that overarch erm... Where the
issues affecting a range of species or a habitat are common it allows you to
develop a broad habitat type. ... So that was used in a way to sort of help lump
or separate issues out. What were the issues affecting them, who was your
audience that you were aiming at.. .(Interview A, 20th December 2001).
This interviewee approvingly framed the adoption of a broad definition of 'habitat' as a
utilitarian response of grouping together species with similar threats and issues. It is sensible
to have an overarching category because if that habitat can be dealt with, so the common
threats and issues affecting individual species can be dealt with at once. It reduces the
amount of work to be done. Yet in my next question I referred to an English Nature
document entitled Biodiversity: Making the Links (Simonson and Thomas 1999) that was
produced to address a problem that had developed as a consequence of having separate
species and habitat action plans: species and habitat conservation were not connecting up. In
this text, the broad habitats are broken down into 'micro-habitats', which suggested to me at
least, that the concept of the 'habitat' was being reworked. My interviewee responded by
recounting a clash of approaches and appeared to criticise the habitat approach:
Andrew: ...I just keep reading these documents and er in here [indicating
Making the Links] the big definition shifts to the micro-habitat which then shifts
back to the small definition and I wondered why that suddenly became useful?
Interviewee: Um there was an attempt to say if we do lots of action aimed at
this habitat we can sweep up on all the species that belong to that habitat and
there was a conflict between two schools of thought. There was a school of
thought that says look to reduce time and effort lets just have a group of people
looking at the habitat, get the habitat right and all the species do their thing -
hunky-dory. Saves you having to do all this species work. There is another
school, which the RSPB is very strongly in favour of, that says no we've
learned our lesson in the past, if you go down the pure habitat route you
discover that we don't know enough about the past damage to the habitat, we
don't understand the subtleties of habitat management well enough, we are still
very nai've in our understanding of habitat management. You could believe the
habitat is in a healthy condition but in fact find that you have been destroying
the species. So examples are er national nature reserves. There were lots of
examples in England where a fen or a woodland was managed - as long as the
trees were still standing there it was OK. It wasn't and discovering that there
were subtle management changes that meant that all the butterflies that
belonged to that wood died off and that's what the site was really important for
erm...What you have to do is keep your eye on the species as well as the
habitat, so that you are checking that your habitat management is right and you
have got to devise ways of managing that habitat that doesn't allow the species
to collapse. So...those who try to lump were sort of defeated by those that said
no we've got to keep our eye on the ball with species, you've got to keep
splitting the habitats down to their sub-components because otherwise you'll
have too general a picture and think you are doing well when actually in the
detail the habitat is suffering. And it all comes down to the simple fact that we
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are still learning about habitat management, what's the right way for a habitat to
be managed? (Interview A, 20th December 2001).
Whilst he had initially suggested that habitats were a way of over-arching species action and
potentially reducing the amount of species work, here he appears to be more strongly aware
of the dangers of lumping species together and attempting to undertake generic action that
will benefit them all. He comes down on the side of those that want to manage for individual
species. He does not simply describe two positions. He adopts a stance on these schools and
talks about them in ways that suggest that one is better than the other. In doing so, he
illustrates that different ways of talking about an object are not simply spontaneous and
independent: they are rhetorical and 'develop together as opposing positions in an unfolding,
historical, argumentative exchange' (Edley 2001: 204). His description of the school that
challenges the habitat approach, of which his organisation is strongly in favour, verges away
from simply recounting a position held by others - he actually picks the argument up and
makes the case from this 'side'. While he appears to offer a 'solution' to the dilemma by
saying 'what you have to do is keep your eye on the species as well as the habitat', he ends
by suggesting that we still do not know enough to be able to manage habitats and so,
implicitly, he suggests that species work is required. As such, he oscillates between
positions. Where in the previous extract he advocated the habitat approach as a useful
strategy, here he also seems to argue that the species approach is useful and needed. This
oscillation, as Edley (2001) suggests, is a tell-tale sign of the presence of an ideological
dilemma. My interviewee can see that both the species and habitat approaches contain an
element of truth and he appears to argue different cases at different times.
Another interviewee illustrated the species-habitat dilemma in a different way. When
I asked a similar question (as asked of the previous interviewee) about why the notion of the
habitat had taken on a broad definition, this interviewee corrected my generalisation and then
specifically aligned himselfwith the broader approach to conservation.
Andrew: One thing that jumps out from things like this is the way that the
habitat concept has taken on a particular slant. And so I am thinking of the way
that the habitat could be the place of occurrence of the species or it could be the
sort of ecosystem. This [pointing to the UK Biodiversity Steering Group report
1995a] takes on the ecosystemic view, in that we write habitat action plans and
the native pinewood becomes a habitat on its own. And I just wondered why we
have come to that ecosystemic understanding in that process and whether it's
useful?
Interviewee: I don't know, because I think it's mixed. I mean if you look at the
habitat action plans, some of them do take that route but some of them are very
specific, some of them are very, very specific habitats. So there's a mix of
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things...In an ideal world I think the broad ecosystem approach is the soundest
approach that we can adopt and I think in an ideal world we wouldn't even have
species action plans because they would be incorporated within a broad
ecosystem approach. And you know if you are talking to me as an academic
then I would say the ecosystem approach or an approach that looks at an
integrated...you know integrated approach for species and their
component...what ever you mean by habitats within those ecosystems, is the
most sensible approach because by definition it is an integrated approach, and it
recognises the fact that species populations are interdependent. And in some
instances there are some hard choices to be made in terms of the way habitats
and ecosystems are managed. You know it is not necessarily the case that we
can always manage appropriately for every single species ...er pulls us in
different directions erm so overall that is the most sensible approach and there
are many people and there are people within SNH, er this is not off the record.
There are people within SNH who are less happy with the species action plan
approach because, you know, they feel, with some justification I would say, that
it focuses your attention on one particular species, to the.. .perhaps slightly
ignoring the needs of the wider community and for many of these people
biodiversity is much more than the selected list of species that we choose to
focus our attention on.... Erm, there are counter arguments to that and in the
political process politicians find it much easier to deal and focus on something
very specific, its much easier to focus on say something like 'save the
capercaillie' rather than say lets 'save native pinewoods' really. One is sexy and
one is not sexy. ... Many of us in conservation, you know, are taught really, you
know, on the one hand our academic credentials, our academic training, favour
taking a much more integrated approach but on the other hand most of us are
astute enough to realise that the only way things often get done is by focusing
very narrowly in terms of either single species or single very very important
habitats (Interview B, 15th January 2002).
This interviewee is doing several things. He initially argues that an ecosystem approach
(which I take to be analogous to a habitat approach) is most sound because it is an
'integrated approach'. This claim only makes sense in the context of his simultaneous claim
that 'species populations are interdependent'. The natural world is thus constructed as an
interconnected complex whole, the integrity of which is compromised if broken down to its
constituent parts. He then substantiates this position by referring to the way that the
alternative of attempting to manage for every species would lead to problems because the
requirements of different species pull the conservationist in different directions. In the
process he illustrates again the rhetorical nature of assuming a position by arguing for one
approach whilst simultaneously criticising the other. He argues against the 'species action
plan approach' (whilst distancing himself from this position by referring to the way others in
SNH are less happy with this approach), by suggesting that it has the drawback of being too
focused. Finally, he acknowledges the counter arguments and indicates that whilst he might
believe the broader ecosystem approach to be the most sound there are other pragmatic
considerations. This interviewee does not, therefore, illustrate the species-habitat dilemma by
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oscillating between positions, but by explicitly taking up an argumentative position. By
signalling his awareness of the different arguments about a difficult issue he points to the
importance of the dilemma around which the arguments are made.
Both interviewees, then, indicate an awareness of the dilemma: should they
undertake targeted action for specific species and risk disrupting an integrated system or
should they undertake general management and risk missing the subtle changes that could
endanger those parts of the system that are valued most? Work for the habitat is a means of
reducing the amount of work that had to be done for individual species and is, arguably, a
sound approach because it treats the ecosystem as a complex integrated whole. If one
attempts to reduce that complexity by focusing on individual species, what appears like a
means of reducing complexity actually turns out to increase it because more knowledge
about all the requirements of individual species and their connections with other parts of the
system ends up demanding a difficult balancing act. Work for species, on the other hand,
enables focused action to be undertaken to achieve specific ends for endangered species. It
is, moreover, practically more achievable and it is for precisely this reason that it is likely to
get funding and actually be undertaken. Small, practical gains in the name of conservation
can be highly useful in convincing others of conservation's cause: breaking down the
complexity of the habitat to its constituent parts at least allows some of those parts to
become more manageable and those small gains to be made.
As we can see by the way that these interviewees do not simply argue a case and
ignore the truth of the alternative, this dilemma does not represent a choice as if they simply
have to decide between the species or habitat approach: in any situation both approaches will
be appropriate to some extent. It is precisely because a final decision about the advantages of
one approach over the other is not achievable, that it is a dilemma. Consequently, as these
interviewees - and conservationists more generally - draw upon discursive and rhetorical
resources to negotiate this dilemma, they become the locus of continuing struggle between
approaches. They become the battleground upon and through which the war between cultural
ideals of appropriate conservation practice is played out (the notion of people as
'battlegrounds' is adapted from Edley and Wetherell (1999)). The dominant understanding
of what appropriate conservation action is depends on how they position themselves
ideologically and how they argue the case. In the next section, I examine how these struggles
are played out by looking at two strategies that are employed to negotiate the dilemma.
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Strategies for managing the species-habitat dilemma
Strategy 1 - Claiming the need for intervention
The first strategy can be illustrated by returning to the interviewee who recounted a clash
between schools of thought and the way that those who preferred the species approach
defeated those more interested in the habitat approach. He himself came out in favour of
species action. In the way that his answer to my question about habitats suggested a conflict
between species and habitat action, I was reminded of conflicts between species and habitats
that have arisen in the biodiversity process and, consequently, I asked how a balance could
be achieved. My interviewee directed the conversation towards the issue of competing
habitat action plans saying that the conflicts between habitats (such as when pinewood and
heathland action plans both have targets for expansion of habitat area, but in practice
expanding one could mean encroaching on the other) were easily solvable. 'You don't try
and do all the conservation on one site', he said, 'you don't try and conserve pinewood and
heathland on the same site. You decide, this is a sensible part of Scotland for conserving
pinewood, over here is a sensible part of Scotland for maintaining and expanding the heath
... you have to plan spatially'. Conflicts are easily resolved if the conservationist decides
what goes where and organises their management and planning around that decision.
Addressing this point, I referred to my experience of volunteering at Abernethy and
suggested that there were difficult balances to be found, in order to leave my interviewee
free to suggest ways of finding a balance. This time the interviewee shifted the conversation
from being about the relative merits of the species or habitat approach to the need for
managementper se:
Andrew: I did a bit of volunteering at Abernethy, and that was my question, the
main management objective at Abernethy is the expansion of the pinewood and
yet it does go into the heath. And then the species that are associated with that
which would make, like the black grouse for example which wants both, you've
got hideous balancing acts to try and work out here.
Interviewee: you have to decide sometimes, is this a site where we want lots of
this species or is this a site where we want lots of that species. And you have to
set, and its something on SSSI management that we have been calling for for
years. You can't just say this is a heathland SSSI and therefore it should just be
managed as a heathland. It may be a heathland, but it may be a SSSI where you
want short heath to support a certain range of species, or it maybe a heathland
where you want long heath to support another range of species and you have to
set your objectives - what do you want your SSSI to deliver? Because we've
done so much management of the environment in Britain, we have nowhere
natural at all, everywhere's been managed, been managed to some degree that
you have to start saying hen harrier are in such a bad condition that we are
going to have to keep some areas free of trees, cos natural regeneration of trees
would deny you hen harrier habitat. Now in the grand old days, hundreds and
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thousands of years ago trees were naturally burning and moving and re-planting
re-growing. Heath was forming and dying away and the hen harriers were
moving around but keeping a stable population. Now you've changed so much
of the countryside in to a completely alien habitat that you're going to have to
artificially say this is an area where we are going to keep hen harrier and we're
not going to allow natural regeneration. We're forced into that because so much
of Britain has been managed in the past and we've got our species down into
such small populations. Fens, you artificially hold a fen and stop it becoming a
scrub woodland. Again in the past fens were being created all over the place.
We haven't got the room for fens to be created because its agricultural land, so
you are holding habitats in a moment in time (Interview A, 20th December
2001).
Consistent with the idea that conflicts are resolvable if conservationists plan spatially, here
my interviewee negotiates the conflicts between habitats and habitats and between species
and habitats by suggesting that the conflicts are not really conflicts because 'we' simply have
to choose that we want. Yet after summing this position up with respect to SSSIs by asking
'what do you want your SSSI to deliver?', he changed his line of argument completely by
saying 'Because we've done so much management of the environment in Britain, we have
nowhere natural at all'. In making such a dramatic shift of register, this interviewee indicates
that he was aware that others might object and accuse him of being a managerialist
technocrat disregarding any notion of what would occur naturally. Or that they might say
that the high levels of manipulation required could lead to an artificial landscape solely
managed for the ends of the conservationist according to the latest priority. By shifting the
line of argument he sought to forestall the claims of those who would challenge his position
by suggesting that the intensive management advocated is artificial. He shifts the
conversation in order to provide justification for his position and, significantly, turns to the
notion of naturalness. By saying that there is nowhere that is natural, he puts into play the
common construction of nature and culture as distinctly separate - 'nature is what man has
not made' (Williams 1976: 219) - and implicitly suggests that land that has been managed or
influenced by people has fallen from its pristine naturalness. Once influenced it is no longer
natural. Since the history of human influence is so long and the country so small, that
influence is everywhere evident and there is, therefore, nowhere natural in the UK. In this
way, this interviewee is, in true dialogical fashion, implicitly saying that everywhere is to
some degree 'artificial'. This undermines the assumption of naturalness that supports the
criticism of artificiality. In effectively saying that everywhere is artificial he provides a
context within which an artificial form ofmanagement appears less bad.
He takes this further by emphasising the contrast between the natural past and the
unnatural present and argues that it is because of the fact of the unnatural present that we
need to manage. Contrasting the natural processes of the pristine 'grand old days' with the
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'alien habitat' of the present, my interviewee suggests that the countryside is managed to
such a degree that natural processes do not operate. He suggests that if we do not decide to
halt natural regeneration of scrub on heathland and thus allow hen harrier habitat to diminish,
or if we do not hold fens at an early successional stage thereby allowing them to become
scrub and eventually woodland, then those species and habitats will be lost. His argument is
that the very artificiality of the present necessitates 'artificial' forms ofmanagement.
The strategy by which this interviewee manages the dilemma, then, is by calling
upon discursive resources from associated dilemmas - of artificiality and naturalness and
interventionist and non-interventionist forms of conservation - to argue that the more
interventionist species approach is not necessarily negative, and, does not necessarily
produce a landscape that could be construed as artificial and unnatural (precisely because of
the artificiality of the British countryside). As such, he argues his way into a position - in
this case a position supportive of the apparently more interventionist forms of management
associated with species conservation.
Strategy 2 - Seeking natural character
An alternative strategy for dealing with the species-habitat dilemma is employed by my
interviewee who was sceptical of the utility of the species approach and who thought that the
ecosystem or habitat approach was the most sound. In the following extract we can see that
while he espoused an acceptance that there is nowhere that is natural in the UK, he did not
follow the logic that because nowhere is natural we inevitably have to manage:
Andrew: OK my last one is along similar lines ... with this process you get
actions that are prescribed for different species and habitats. Take pinewood for
example, there might be actions, we'd be managing that pinewood for particular
species which we value for various reasons, we'll be taking the fences down for
capercaillie, or chopping limbs off trees to provide deadwood for particular
invertebrates and so on. My question is, do we begin to manage that habitat in
minuscule detail to the extent that it comes into conflict with the values that we
give it in terms of its naturalness...
Interviewee: ...there are no natural ecosystems out there; we have been
buggering around with just about everything to some extent for the, you know,
ever since the Neolithic period. And a lot of people say, a lot of people hold
their hands up and say these aren't natural ecosystems and therefore we can
make the choice of what we want to do with them in a way that we want to.
There is some support, I have some sympathy with that argument, but I think
the tenor of your question, yes I think we can over-manage. Erm and I think we
can, sometimes we do things at the expense of just, just letting things get on.
Most woodlands, if they are left alone will develop perfectly satisfactorily
(Interview B, 15th January 2002).
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At first glance, this interviewee's claim that 'there are no natural systems out there' appears
similar to the claims of those that might seek to go on to claim the need for management. But
even though he recognises that there is nowhere natural he is not necessarily willing to
therefore hold his hands up and make the choice of what he wants sites to deliver. He still
thinks we can over-manage. In this context, then, the claim that there is nowhere natural acts
like a 'disclaimer' (Hewitt and Stokes 1975). Just as a speaker espousing anti-black
sentiments might preface their remarks with 'I'm not racist, but...' (see Billig et. al 1988;
Potter and Wetherell 1987; Wetherell and Potter 1992), so this speaker uses an initial
statement about the lack of natural ecosystems to prevent what follows appearing to adhere
to the idea that there are natural untouched systems in the UK. Not adhering to the logic that
there is nowhere natural, therefore everywhere is artificial to some extent and needs to be
managed for its own protection, could appear to suggest that the speaker adheres to the
opposite position and believes that there are natural systems. From the perspective of those
that separate out nature and culture and see nature as corrupted by human influence such a
belief would appear na'ive. So by prefacing their remarks with a disclaimer that there is
nowhere natural when they go on to say that we do not necessarily have to manage as much
as we do, they avoid appearing naive.
By saying that there is nowhere natural and then also suggesting that we can over
manage, his use of the available discursive resources is slightly different to those that claim
the need of intervention. He does not say people have influenced everything therefore further
influence does not matter so much. He calls upon a different notion of naturalness; a notion
that is made clearer by another interviewee who responded to a question about the
importance of the notion of naturalness by offering the disclaimer before going on to speak
of naturalness in terms of a set of characteristics:
Andrew: I notice a couple of times you've raised the notion of naturalness and
artificiality. How important is the notion of naturalness?
Interviewee: yeah I think it's actually quite important. There's virtually nothing
natural in the UK. It has all been to some extent managed for something or
other in Scotland, the largest land area for sheep grazing and the sea around for
trawling ... everything has been very much modified. I guess that one of the
things that I have enjoyed doing in my life is going to other parts of the world
which haven't had anything like that intensity of management. We've got 55
million people on a pretty small island erm and just looking at what similar
ecosystems would be like and saying that's what I wish we had. Like Loch
Maree islands is a good example of that... so that I think that the way that these
species would occur without a huge amount of human intervention is probably
what I am looking at (Interview K, 7th February 2002).
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After the disclaimer, which ends with 'everything has been very much modified', the
interviewee takes a different tack. While the construction of nature and culture as separate
still holds and underpins this interviewee's search for ecosystems that are more natural
because they have had less intensive human intervention, what matters is what those
ecosystems would be like. Earlier in the interview the speaker emphasised that habitats afe
not uniform entities and that they encompass much natural variation. Referring to
pinewoods, he suggested that a natural pinewood is not simply thick with pine trees; there
are also boggy areas and heathland. He said, 'if you look at Scandinavia where things have
been much less damaged than here in Scotland, as you come to a boggy area, the pine trees
get smaller, they then thin out and you just get one or two out on the bog and that's it and
you've got this kind of mosaic structure'. While he said it was very difficult to find that
structure in Scottish pinewoods there was one place where he could see, as in Scandinavia,
this complete structure 'of the pine forest as it ought to be': the Loch Maree islands.
'They've got natural pine on them that's never really been managed and it's absolutely
brilliant. And as you go out on the edge of the islands where you get the loch you get bonsai
pines that are about this high and probably a couple of hundred years old...as well as the
boggy areas and you've got this whole diversity of what we'd want'.
What matters is less the fact that present ecosystems have been influenced by people
and more the characteristics that those natural systems 'ought' to have. The register of
naturalness is thus changed slightly. Where the strategy of claiming the need for intervention
rests upon a sharp either/or distinction between the natural and the artificial, this strategy is
based on a sliding scale where relatively less artificial management would lead to a relatively
more natural system. This is a strategy of accepting that nowhere is untouched but, at the
same time, arguing that if people were to interfere less a greater degree of natural character
would develop. Thus where the prior interviewee who was seeking to defend the species
approach drew upon wider resources to bolster his position and argue that intensive
management was not necessarily harmful, this interviewee calls upon similar wider resources
but to argue that less intensive management can have beneficial results. Less intensive
management could lead to sites or habitats taking on a more natural character. What is
sought is not so much a 'natural' (in the untouched sense) site or habitat, but a site or habitat
with a certain set of attributes that would be present in a habitat that was natural in the
untouched sense. Those attributes are implicitly bound up in an inversely proportional
relationship with human influence (the more human influence the less natural character).
Thus the speaker can argue for less interventionist species management and more broad scale
Tighter touch' management.
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Both these strategies illustrate the rhetorical basis to nature conservation discourse.
Interviewees assumed positions on the species-habitat dilemma by constructing arguments
for one form of action and against another and by calling upon wider discursive resources.
They translated their arguments about the relative merits of the species and habitat
approaches into different but associated dilemmas to do with artificiality and naturalness and
interventionist and non-interventionist forms of conservation. In the process, they illustrated
that the boundaries between dilemmas are porous and that speakers slip between concepts
easily - one reason conservation discourse is so convoluted and confused.
Recognising this rhetorical side of conservation offers a useful corrective to the
immovable systems of power of the last chapter because we can see that different people
employ different strategies and are not simply subsumed under the developing biodiversity
process. We can glimpse a world of power, and therefore, a politics of representation, where
different people construct nature and conservation in different ways and fight to see their
position achieve dominance.
This analysis is, however, slightly problematic for two reasons. First, the impression
is given that these two strategies are mutually exclusive, when in fact the distance between
them is not that great. An individual that argued for species action on the grounds of the
relative artificiality of the UK's landscape and the need for continued intervention, might for
example, also conceptualise that intervention as needing to conform to some sort of natural
character. These discursive strategies should be conceptualised as flexible resources.
Secondly, recognising that the species-habitat dilemma is argued over, that the arguments
take place in historical context as speakers call upon discursive resources in creative ways,
does not shed light on how one approach wins more adherents than the other or how
conservation takes one route rather than another in any given situation. By focusing on
argument and repertoires and by utilising interviews where the discussion was relatively
abstract, I have implicitly suggested that repertoires clash together above the social fray.
What is missing, therefore, is a situated analysis that highlights how these resources are put
to use in specific instances of conservation practice. In the next section, one interview with a
site manager illustrates how these repertoires are called upon and balanced in given
situations.
Managing the dilemma in practice
Insh Marshes is a wetland of international importance covering around 1000 hectares of the
floodplain of the River Spey between Kingussie and Kincraig and has been managed as a
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nature reserve by the RSPB since 1973 (RSPB 2000). It is 'the largest continuous area of
base-poor fen in the UK' (UK Biodiversity Steering Group Report 1995b: 241), and, as such,
constitutes an important element of the national extent of both the 'fens' and 'coastal and
floodplain grazing marsh' habitats, for which there are action plans. As one of the sites that I
was familiar with from volunteering at the beginning of my research, I had contacts and
insight into the issues, so once I had decided to focus on the development of the biodiversity
process I returned to interview the site manager. This manager was dealing with several
species and habitats included in the biodiversity process. Here I focus on the management of
the marsh because it is relevant to the question of how discursive strategies are worked out in
practice and because the interwoven dilemmas - of species conservation/habitat
conservation, artificiality/naturalness and intervention/non-intervention - are evident.
The site management plan states that the reserve is important because it is a 'natural
floodplain'; it is 'the most important floodplain mire in Britain primarily due to its unspoilt
character'. Consequently, 'maintaining the natural features of the site is of prime
importance' (RSPB 2000: 36). At the same time, it is important because of its population of
breeding waders: 'about a thousand pairs ofwaders nest on the floodplain between Kingussie
and Kincraig making it one of the most important sites in Britain' (RSPB 2000: 36). The site
is simultaneously valued in different ways, and the sorts of management that could be
undertaken to safeguard or enhance the different features that are valued can come into
conflict. Do the site managers, for example, manage for the wetland in general and attempt
to 'maintain the natural features of the site' or do they manage more specifically to
encourage the populations of breeding waders?
The potential conflict between managing for breeding waders or naturalness was
clear when I asked the site manager which habitat action plan applied to Insh. In asking this
question, I was interested in how lines were being drawn between habitats. The manager
answered, however, by referring to the way that the production of plans led to conflicts:
Andrew: in the UK process ... there's habitat action plans for fens, yeah. And
then there's a habitat action plan for floodplain and grazing marsh, which one
applies to Insh?
Interviewee: probably both, but definitely we are a fen and we are definitely a
floodplain, so I think we just collect these [laughs]. But again I mean you would
come in to, that's where you come into problems. I'm not saying that because
we've got that there about lapwing [pointing to the biodiversity documents I
had brought with me] that we're going to do that throughout the whole of the
reserve. Sometimes there's some conflicts, but it's compromises. You know our
scrub, if we are there solely for lapwing, you shouldn't see a willow bush on the
site, but we are not going down that line. I could tweak my management in
other parts of the reserve where we are not going to retain scrub and get more
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lapwing. You know if we went down there with a plough and some fertiliser
and really improved the structure of the sward ... we could improve our density
of breeding lapwing. If we went down and you know did more predator control
possibly, again, we could improve our lapwing, but to me the prime objective
is, you know, is the naturalness of the site, so that's what we're, that's our
prime aim. ... we are not there for lapwing and nothing else; we've not got
blinkers on (Interview C, 16th January 2002).
The manager indicates that action planning has to be negotiated in specific circumstances.
Site managers do not go out and do everything a plan suggests; they have to find a balance
between the competing species and habitats viewed as important. As he said later in the
interview: 'it's a juggling act. I feel I'm a bit like God juggling those things erm and that
these balls are all the different species and habitats. Some are a bit heavier and have higher
priority than others but I've tried to keep them all up in the air'. In this case, intensive
management for one species is put forward as a possibility but rejected as inappropriate.
Species work is constructed, in a similar way to the interviewees in the last section, as
intensive and interventionist, involving a lot of management by people and based on an
objective that is solely defined by the desire of the conservationist as opposed to what might
be there 'naturally'. In this way, species work is inappropriate because it is set in opposition
to the prime objective of protecting the naturalness of the site. This construction was
continued when he contrasted other wetland sites with Insh:
if you went to Ouse Washes or Nene Washes, you know, theirs is so much more
artificial. Er most of the land is improved, all the water level is controlled, all
the ditches are managed in a very, you know, very strict programme. Erm...
you know, we could do that at Insh, we don't because we feel the landscape
value is far far more important and we've got this mosaic of habitats that we
don't fully understand. Whereas when you've got an improved bit of ground,
say at Nene washes, your priority species are perhaps black tailed godwit or
lapwing. You know that you need a sward like this and you need the water table
to be this far underneath through their breeding season and you know when that
is, so lets go all the hell out to produce that. There's no botanical interest there.
There's probably no invert interest. That's why we're here: we're a godwit-
lapwing farm. It's not that simple here [i.e. at Insh] (Interview C, 16th January
2002).
Whether or not the management of Ouse or Nene Washes is in fact this intensive is not at
issue. The crucial point is that this interviewee frames his understanding of his own site in
terms of a contrast between specific intervention for species and broader management for the
habitat and between naturalness and artificiality. In a way that is reminiscent of the prior
reference to 'eagle farming', a site that is intensively managed for a few species is described
as a 'godwit-lapwing farm'. It is an artificial landscape geared towards the production of a
particular 'crop'. In the case of the nature reserve the crop is an endangered species. It might
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be able to deliver the desired outcome in terms of boosting species numbers, but it would
(according to this interviewee) have very little wider conservation interest. Intensive
management again becomes the antithesis of naturalness. As such, this site manager calls
upon the same sorts of discursive resources as the above interviewees. But instead of
claiming that nowhere is natural and thus everywhere is to some extent artificial and
therefore needs to be managed, this site is constructed as being relatively natural and
therefore in need ofprotection from forms ofmanagement that are too artificial.
If we look more closely, we can see that when the manager refers to the naturalness
of the site he does not mean that the site is untouched: he refers to the site's characteristics.
The fact that the site has been managed has been made evident by the consequences of the
early management of the reserve. In the early years, a non-interventionist approach was
favoured because it was thought that 'grazing by sheep and cattle would damage the near-
natural features of the marsh' (RSPB 2000: 56). Working with the assumption that the site
had been relatively untouched and was 'near-natural', it was left alone, but what happened as
a consequence is precisely what Godwin and Tansley (1923; also see Duffey 1971) had
suggested would happen to wetland sites if they were left in their 'natural state': the marsh
gradually became more and more overgrown with scrub. Learning the lesson of this early
management, 'it is now generally accepted that the marshes have traditionally been free of
tree cover due to the presence of grazing animals' (RSPB 2000: 56), which means that fens
like Insh are still fens precisely because they have been managed and are not untouched.
They are 'artificially' kept as a fen (as opposed to being allowed to develop 'naturally' into a
scrub woodland). The naturalness that the manager refers to is the natural variation and
mosaic of ecological communities and the unrestricted flooding regime. The character of the
site approximates a natural fen (in the untouched sense) where it would have been grazed by
wild animals.
The balancing act that the site manager attempts to perform is thus a case of finding
ways to manage that perpetuate the natural character but which do not become too artificial.
There is a need for management to keep the marsh as a marsh, but it has to be a sort of
management that complements the understanding of naturalness. As such, the manager has
to find forms ofmanagement that negotiate this dilemma, which is ultimately a dilemma of
meaning.
Once it was recognised that a non-interventionist policy would eventually lead to the
loss of fen - and so also very little breeding and wintering habitat for birds - it was
recognised that the marsh needed to be reclaimed from the encroaching scrub. Scrub needed
to be felled and the continuing process of encroachment also needed to be hindered.
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Management shifted towards a more interventionist three-pronged approach of scrub
removal, the introduction of grazing animals to hold back scrub development and 'topping'
or mowing. Each of these forms of management has to negotiate the dilemmas of species
conservation/habitat conservation, artificiality/naturalness and intervention/non-intervention
and is argued for in different ways.
Scrub removal would appear to be problematic in the context of the importance of
the site's naturalness because it involves quite intensive forms of management. But 'scrub
bashing' is pursued because of the way that different arguments are balanced. One argument
that can be made in criticism of scrub removal is that it involves the conservationist choosing
which bits to chop down and which bits to retain. In answering a question about how the
choices of which areas of willow scrub to cut were made, the site manager acknowledged as
much by saying that when he was out on the marsh with a chainsaw he was aware that he
was 'playing god' and that he was in some ways 'gardening' (a term that recalls the notion of
interventionist conservation as farming). But qualms about the degree of human intervention
and the artificiality of the resultant landscape can be challenged by the argument that the
marshes are not somehow natural, but the result of hundreds of years of human activity. If
the site is already artificial then further management will not harm it. Indeed, it can be
argued that the expansion of scrub that is now thought to be a problem, occurred as a result
of the early non-interventionist management. That expansion can, therefore, be portrayed as
the result of a false understanding of what is natural. As such, leaving the marsh untouched
would be irresponsible because it would perpetuate an unnatural situation. Further
management is required, so the argument goes, to undo the damage of past management.
Scrub removal (interventionist management) can paradoxically, therefore, be understood to
be restoring the marsh to a more natural condition, whilst, at the same time, safeguarding
breeding and wintering habitats for birds. The argument for scrub bashing wins out because
it shifts the concept of naturalness away from untouched nature towards naturalness as a set
of ecological attributes. Human intervention does not necessarily result in artificiality and
contradict naturalness if naturalness is conceptualised in terms of what a more natural fen
would be like; that is, in terms of its natural character. The fen has lost its natural character
because of the way it has been managed in the past and human intervention is required to re-
achieve it.
But if it is acceptable to undertake scrub bashing as a means of managing the fen,
why is grazing also undertaken? Why does the site manager not keep undertaking scrub
management so as to retain the site in the desired state? The answer is that grazing
constitutes a compromise between ideological positions and competing forms of
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management. If the conservationist were to continue to undertake intensive forms of scrub
management they might be accused of verging towards the creation of an artificial site
similar to Ouse Washes. Such management would involve repeatedly restricting willow
scrub development and might be undertaken by mowing or more specific cutting of
individual trees. Grazing provides an alternative because sheep and cattle will eat deciduous
tree leaves when feeding and thus effectively control the development of scrub. But grazing
is not only attractive because it represents a labour saving form of management. It is also
attractive because it means that the management being undertaken does not develop into
species farming. When I asked the site manager whether grazing was undertaken for the
breeding waders or for the habitat more generally, he indicated that while it was a way of
ensuring the right sorts of conditions for breeding birds, it was also important because it was
a more sympathetic management tool:
Andrew: Is the whole point of that [grazing management] for the habitat or for
the breeding waders?
Interviewee: yeah initially its breeding waders, but I think more and more its
being seen that grazing is much more, it has less of an impact, it's a much more
sympathetic erm management tool, much more natural tool (Interview C, 16th
January 2002).
Sheep or cattle become natural management tools. Grazing becomes valued for its
naturalness. It is, for example, much less artificial than the conservationist mowing the same
area, even if the end result is similar. As the manager went on to say, grazing is a natural
process:
As far as the grazing is concerned, again that is as natural as possible because
what we try not to do, is to say right, you know, fifty cattle graze here next
month, fifty here. We open out this open ranching policy, so the cattle decide
where to go and you know there must [emphasis] have been some grazing
animals down there, you know, a few thousand years ago and that's how they
would have behaved. So our open...under grazing of the site with the cattle
deciding and the sheep deciding is, you know, is as near natural as possible
(Interview C, 16th January 2002).
As such, an open ranching policy is constructed as replicating the natural processes in a
period prior to major human influence and even the low intensity grazing associated with
agricultural development in the area. In being allowed to roam, moreover, the animals select
some areas over others and thus introduce a spatial variation to the habitat that might not be
re-creatable by mowing; grazing is a means of ensuring natural character. Grazing therefore
allows the conservationist to find a balance between species and habitat management and
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between management that is very intensive and leaving it to nature. By grazing animals on
the marsh, the conservationist can prevent scrub encroachment in a way that is not too
artificial, potentially create the right conditions for breeding waders and still retain an
element of control on the numbers of animals and the period of grazing. Grazing is a form of
management that is also a form of compromise in the negotiation ofmeaning.
Finally, at the same time, mowing is also carried out in some areas of the reserve
because, so the argument goes, it is needed to gradually improve the sward to make it more
attractive to potential graziers:
The topping is different erm ... we would argue that the site the site was over¬
grazed or under-grazed for many many years, you know probably tens of years,
so some of the bits we've been topping below the village were very very tall
coarse rank Deschampsia. You know, sheep and cattle aren't going to go in
there, so our topping, until we can get the management right, is required
(Interview C, 16th January 2002).
In this case, even though grazing is the preferred form of management, the more direct
management of mowing is still undertaken because it is justified by suggesting that, as the
sward changes (as a result of mowing), so the area will become more attractive to grazing
animals with the result that less direct human intervention will be needed. It is one step on
the road to further grazing and more natural management.
Ultimately, then, when we look at a specific example of conservation practice, we
can see that similar repertoires to those used by my interviewees in the last section - of
naturalness and artificiality and intervention - are called upon, and an accommodation
between them is found. Repertoires are not simply abstract entities above the social fray:
they are used in working out how to act. The manager of Insh Marshes, for example,
mobilises repertoires to make arguments with respect to different sorts of management that
are being undertaken at the same time. Once non-intervention was recognised to be
producing changes that were viewed negatively, scrub bashing, as a highly interventionist
form of management, is undertaken because of the need to undo past mistakes. Scrub
bashing can be justified by calling upon the idea that the present state of the marsh is not
natural and needs our intervention. But this sort of intervention is not fully accepted, or is at
least counter-balanced, as the manager is also concerned with natural character. A
compromise is reached by finding a more sympathetic form of management that can
accommodate concerns over naturalness. Grazing, understood to be a more natural form of
management because it was not so precisely controlled, provided that compromise.
Management could be undertaken in ways that did not contradict the reasons for valuing the
site. Since Insh is valued for both the species that breed there and its natural qualities,
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grazing allowed management to be directed at both creating conditions for breeding birds,
and, at the same time, managing the habitat in ways that preserved the site's natural
character. Species management could be undertaken but in a less intensively controlled way,
and in a way that that allowed a balance to be found with habitat management. In this way,
repertoires of naturalness and intervention are not only put to use in arguments, they are
bound up in particular forms of practice. Appropriate forms of management are arrived at
through the negotiation ofmeaning.
Towards an analytical synthesis
The main aim of focusing on language in use here has been to emphasise that conservation is
not just about the tactics and strategies involved in developing a more coherent nature
conservation as set out in the last chapter; it is, at the same time, also negotiated in language
and the struggle over meaning. The approach that nature conservation takes, the shape it
assumes, the degree to which it intervenes and is managerial, is worked out, at least in part,
in discourse. The biodiversity process should not be seen as an immovable system of power
within which people are subjugated. People are 'active, selecting and adapting thoughts,
mutating and creating them, in the continued struggle for argumentative victory against rival
thinkers' (Billig cited in Hajer 1995: 54). People are active in shaping the biodiversity
process in the way they argue over it, not simply subject to the workings of the strategies and
tactics by which the process works. More specifically, individuals take up positions on the
biodiversity process through employing discursive strategies in a rhetorical world of
continuing argument. And in the way that they 'are part of, and are continuing, the
ideological history of the discursive themes which they are using' (Billig 1997: 49), the
biodiversity process was debated and argued over through much broader and longer-running
debates at the heart of conservation practice. Debates about species and habitat action
planning were not centred on internal issues to the biodiversity process, but on issues of the
human place in nature and the appropriate degree of intervention.
This focus on language has also been useful for other reasons. It extends those
analyses that have examined the conflicts between competing cultures of nature, such as
between nature conservation and estates (Toogood 1995), crofters (MacDonald 1998) or
developers (Harrison and Burgess 1994). Such analyses tend to ascribe a broad discourse to
each group and thereby refer to nature conservation as a relatively uniform whole. By paying
close attention to language use within conservation itself, we can see that there is an internal
cultural politics within which meanings are constructed and negotiated in specific situations
and in relations of dominance and subordination, but which gets lost in generalisations about
'nature conservation'. As Marren says 'conservation in practice is to a large extent to do with
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quarrelling' (2002: 28). As I found, arguments appear to be central to how conservation
works. Interviewees would frequently talk about conservation by positioning themselves
with respect to an argument, recount an argument between different sides on a particular
issue or actually engage in argument by criticising certain forms of action and praising
others.
The focus on language is also useful because it highlights that whilst the common
dichotomous portrayals of environmentalism and conservation (such as when conservation is
represented as split between ecocentrics and technocentrics or arcadians and imperialists) do
resonate within conservation, people cannot be classified by adherence to a camp or side of
the debate. Rather, as was illustrated by the variability of their talk, my interviewees took
complex positions and creatively used discursive resources to continually reconstruct forms
of action and re-position themselves on any particular issue. As Holland and Rawles (1993:
15) note, it is a mistake to suppose 'that values are always things that we reason from...the
fact is we often do not know what we think, what our values are; and we may be engaging in
debate precisely in order to discover what we think...As often as not, values are what we
reason towards - things that we work out or discover through a process of critical
discussion'. People do not speakfrom 'camps', they creatively utilise the rhetorical resources
of historical positions in novel ways in new situations and in the process arrive at their
positions. In this way, it is possible to see that the ecocentric/arcadian and
technocentric/imperialist positions are continually being renegotiated in discourse.
Similarly, if these positions are aligned with the idea that conservation is both part
of, and a reaction to, processes of rationalisation (Adams 1997), then we can see that just as
these two discursive positions are negotiated in discourse so the place of conservation with
respect to rationalisation is negotiated. Whilst conservation in the UK is characterised by an
interventionist form of managerialism (Henderson 1992) and appears to be focused on
governing and rationalising nature, what lies behind this generalisation is a field of
negotiation and argument within which the rationalising aspect of conservation does not go
unchallenged. Rather, its status as part of rationalisation - characterised by the
governmentalisation of conservation itself - is the result of political struggles over
representation and meaning that continue to be fought behind the scenes, through which this
characteristic is attained and reproduced.
Finally the focus on language has been useful in highlighting the fact that while
abstract positions and repertoires provided resources for talk, it was only in specific
instances of conservation practice that these abstract positions had to be accommodated. The
example of Insh Marshes emphasises that if we want to understand conservation, then we
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have to examine specific examples in detail. Conservation can be extremely 'situated'
because it is only in specific situations that particular species and habitats, which are valued
in different ways and which have different requirements, have to be balanced. By focusing
on detailed instances of conservation practice we can more clearly see that while the species-
habitat dilemma may appear quite inconsequential because both approaches are needed, the
different approaches are connected with different forms of action, valued in different ways
and balanced in practice. It is with reference to specific examples that we can see how the
construction ofmeaning is bound up in particular forms of conservation action.
Yet while this focus on language in conservation is useful, what I have ended up
with is two separate studies: one, in the last chapter, of institutional practices and one, in this
chapter, of language and the negotiation of meaning. Whilst this illustrates that different
forms of discourse analysis can usefully complement each other, it also separates out two
sets of practices that are, in reality, interwoven. The sorts of action undertaken in nature
conservation are only undertaken because of the way that they are bound up with the
continuing construction of nature and the re-negotiation of ways that we invest it with
meaning. Action for a species only makes sense in the context of the way that knowledge of
that species is constructed and the way that it is valued. Moreover, different sorts of action
may seem appropriate at different times because of the way that knowledge and our
valuation of species change. Consequently, in order to understand why some forms of
conservation are acceptable and others not and why acceptability changes over time, I need a
form of analysis that weaves a concern with strategies and tactics and institutional practice
together with a concern for language in use and meaning. As such, in the next chapter, I
focus on the changing management of pinewoods at the RSPB's Abernethy Forest Reserve
and seek to examine how changing management practice was and is bound up with




Managing Abernethy: Minimal Intervention
Towards an analysis of discursive change
In examining the institutional development of the biodiversity process and the way that it
was argued over in discourse, I came to recognise, as the case of Insh in the last chapter
suggested, that focusing of specific examples was analytically fruitful. If I wanted to
examine the detail of why conservation did what it did and how certain constructions of
nature underpinned ideas of appropriate conservation practice, I needed to focus. Since I had
already spent time as a volunteer on a pinewood reserve (Abernethy) and spoken with
several people involved in planning biodiversity action for pinewoods or pinewood species, I
chose to focus by concentrating on the native pinewoods and the capercaillie. My intention
was to explore, in detail, the ways that the species and habitat were constructed and
incorporated in the biodiversity process.
As I went on to examine the construction of capercaillie and pinewoods in a second
set of interviews (Appendix II), however, two things became apparent. The first was that the
focus on a species and habitat - which I had initially thought was very focused - was too
broad. I still needed to get to an even more detailed level of analysis. The second was that
specific sites were crucial and that since particular constructions of the capercaillie and
pinewoods underpinned what was taken to be appropriate management, those constructions
became inscribed in the history of the sites where management was undertaken. One avenue
that potentially offered a route by which I could examine the construction of nature and the
changing practice of conservation was, then, to address the changing management of a
pinewood site. It was for this reason that I returned to Abernethy. While I recognised that
this sort of examination would take me away from a focus on the biodiversity process per se,
the example of Abernethy was interesting because it allowed an analysis of a specific
example of changing management over the same period as the institutionalisation of the
concept of biodiversity. In this, and the following chapter, then, I move on to examine the
management of pinewoods at Abernethy between 1988 and 2001.
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There are, and have been for a long time, ambiguities about what a pinewood is and
what the most appropriate form of management should be. At the first major conference to
address the ecology and management of the pinewoods (Bunce and Jeffers 1977), for
example, two strikingly different views were put forward. On the one hand, Forster and
Morris (1977: 116-117) suggested that:
The native pinewoods in the Cairngorms area are among the largest areas of
semi-natural forest in Britain...There is good historical evidence from some of
the forests in the Cairngorms area that they stand on sites that have been
continuously occupied by forest cover since the end of the last glaciation.. .In
some respects, therefore, these forests approximate more closely than any other
in Britain to the climax condition. Despite man's undoubtedly heavy influence,
they still may be regarded as relatively less disturbed than any other extensive
area of forest in the UK.. .For nature conservation purposes, the objective should
be to encourage the forest to develop with a minimum of interference.
Gimingham (1977: 3-4), on the other hand, argued that:
We should not be too fearful of human intervention, or management to the end
of maintaining or expanding the native pinewoods. Already, as I have argued,
they have departed in a number of significant ways from their former ecosystem
organisation. It may be that they can struggle on in approximately their present
form for a long time, unaided. But there may be no special virtue in that, when
we have the chance of returning, at least in part, to an ecosystem which might
function properly.
Such an ecosystem would show a greater variety of frees, and my hope would
be that we could actively encourage the greater participation of birch...The
forest would also show a greater variety and patchiness in the dwarf shrub and
ground flora. This variety would not be easy to recreate where it has been lost,
but it is worth considering the use, under careful control, of some localised
prescribed burning.
These quotes represent two positions with respect to the degree of appropriate intervention.
Each position involves different ways of representing, valuing and conserving the
pinewoods. Forster and Morris construct a narrative of the forest as near natural. While they
recognise the influence of people, they play this down saying that the forests have managed
to retain their natural character. Consequently, to protect that naturalness we should abstract
ourselves as much as possible from the equation. For Gimingham, the pinewoods are
constructed through a narrative of past intervention. The forests are not near natural; they are
devastated remnants. People have modified them by reducing the forest area, changing the
proportion of major free species and changing the tree density and age structure. They
therefore depart from the idealised notion of what constitutes a climax community and are
not untouched; they are human artefacts and should continue to be managed.
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There is a degree of caricature in my portrayal of these two positions - Forster and
Morris, for example, are closer to Gimingham in accepting the need for intervention in the
form of deer control and consider simulating forest fires by burning small areas of heather
moorland adjacent to forest stands. What is important, though, is that pinewoods are one
more example through which we can explore the politics involved in one construction of
nature and appropriate conservation practice gaining a dominant position over another. But
rather than examine this politics as an abstract clash of representations, it is possible to
address how these forms of representation are interwoven in conservation practice by turning
to Abernethy, where these different positions have been played out. This is to turn an
analysis of competing constructions of nature into a historical, or genealogical, study.
There has been an RSPB presence at Abemethy since 1959 when a seasonal centre
was opened with the co-operation of the then owners close to the famous Loch Garten osprey
site. It was in 1975 that the first 615 ha of woodland around the site were bought, and since
then, as it came up for sale, more land has been acquired (figure 6.1). A crucial moment was
the acquisition of the Forest Lodge Estate in 1988, which together with North Abernethy in
1990, joined the Upper Glen A'an Reserve in the Cairngorms with the Loch Garten Reserve
in Strathspey to form the contiguous Abernethy Forest Reserve covering close to 15, 000 ha
(nearly 50 square miles).
• Nethybridge
Key to reserve acquisitions:
1. Loch Garten 1975;
2. Garten Wood 1983;
3. Upper Gien A'an 1985;
4. Tore Hill 1986;
5. Forest Lodge 1988;
6. North Abemethy 1990.
Figure 6.1. Map of the RSPB Abernethy Forest Reserve. More recent acquisitions include
woods at Mondhuie and Craigmore near Nethy Bridge. Source: Taylor (1995: 146).
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With the acquisition of the Forest Lodge estate, the RSPB acquired the largest fragment of
pinewood in Scotland and although other pinewoods such as Coille na Glas Leitir at Beinn
Eighe had been managed towards conservation ends, managers were faced with the old
question: 'what was the best way to conserve pinewoods'? The early answer to this question
is set out in the 1991 management plan for the Forest Lodge section of the reserve, which
said that the management policy was:
4.3 To conserve and extend the native pinewood ecosystems for their nationally
important assemblages of breeding birds, especially Scottish crossbill, crested tit
and capercaillie; for their nationally important plant communities including a
number of rare species; and for their important invertebrate populations.
4.4 To reduce grazing pressures on the pinewood by ... lowering the deer
population to levels where conditions will be suitable for natural regeneration
within the next 5 to 10 years...
4.5 To leave the native pinewood, including native broadleaf species, as well as
the regenerating forest, sylviculturally unmanaged
4.6 To leave the pine plantations unmanaged except for the removal of exotic
species and for management experiments or projects which have clear
conservation objectives (RSPB 1991: 36).
In 1991 minimal intervention was the goal. With the exception of culling deer to achieve
woodland expansion and some management in plantations, the pinewoods, especially the
'native pinewood', would be left alone to regenerate 'naturally'. By the 2001 management
plan, however, there was a slight, but nevertheless important, change in orientation. For
whilst it essentially reproduces the broad policy ofwoodland expansion, there are significant
alterations. The woodland objective was stated thus:
4.2 To conserve and extend the internationally important pinewood ecosystem
through the development of a self-sustaining native forest of natural character
over the potential woodland area, including existing plantations, particularly to
benefit capercaillie, crossbill and crested tit and intrinsic biodiversity interest.
To maintain as a minimum, a steady and viable population ofwoodland grouse
(capercaillie and black grouse) and to increase their population if possible to a
level to allow emigration of birds to neighbouring forests. Ideally this will be
achieved by minimum intervention (deer control and putting out fires) in
existing semi-natural woodland; by the retention and creation of deadwood; by
the removal of all non-native tree species - excluding those of cultural
significance to local people, and by investigating potential tree establishment
techniques (RSPB 2001: 66).
There are significant additions and subtle changes to policy. Where the 1991 objective was
to conserve and extend the forest for its important species, here the objective is still oriented
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to a few species but also for the 'intrinsic biodiversity interest': the concept of biodiversity
has crept in. This objective is also supplemented by the additional goal, which was not
present in the 1991 plan, of developing a self-sustaining forest of 'natural character'. In the
ten years between plans, there had evidently been a development of thinking on management
and what they are trying to achieve. But perhaps most significant because of the potential
conflicts it introduces is the inclusion of an aspiration to maintain populations of woodland
grouse. In the context of a declining population of capercaillie in particular, this introduces a
tension since, whilst the policy suggests that maintaining the population will ideally be
achieved through a policy of minimum intervention, it is difficult to see how a declining
population can be maintained by doing very little. The same plan notes only a few sentences
later that there is a policy:
4.7 To research the requirements of key biodiversity particularly capercaillie
and Scottish crossbill, and where necessary and practicable, to maintain viable
populations by management intervention. The research results may modify the
degree of intervention and timescale required to achieve the objectives in 4.2
(RSPB 2001: 67).
Whilst the main thrust of the 2001 management plan is the same as the 1991 plan - and
indeed the 1995 plan - there is a shift from minimal towards greater intervention. Although,
technically, the management practices have not changed and become more interventionist -
because research is being undertaken in order to decide whether or not this route should be
followed - the trend is towards greater intervention. As such, changes have taken and are
taking place at Abernethy that offer an opportunity to examine how and why, over the period
from 1988 to 2001, this discursive change took place. By addressing the move towards
greater intervention I can examine the changing representation of pinewoods and the way
that these representations are interwoven with changing practices. In this chapter, I sketch
out the approach to management in the early years of RSPB ownership (1988-1995) and thus
provide a basis for the next chapter, which examines how the management changed and
ultimately how the concept of biodiversity and the practices of action planning began to
impinge on management.
Abernethy, naturalness and minimal intervention
Native pinewoods have iconic status in representations of Highland nature. The majestic
Scots pine is contrasted with the monoculture of introduced conifers in plantations and
claimed as the native and natural forest cover. At the same time, the lone pine on the misty
mountain recalls the scale of the degradation of these once vast forests at the hands of
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people. Such contrasting representations of the pinewoods as natural and degraded have a
long history (see Ritchie 1920), but I will begin with the representation of pinewoods in
Steven and Carlisle's (1959) classic text, The Native Pinewoods of Scotland. In this, an
ambiguity that underpins these contrasting representations of pinewoods is established when
pinewoods are constructed as both natural and unnatural. On the one hand, pinewoods are
held to be special because they are links with past naturalness, they are remnants of the
original pinewoods that covered Scotland before the impact of people. Steven and Carlisle
say that '[e]ven to walk through the larger of them gives one a better idea ofwhat a primeval
forest was like than can be got from any other woodland scene in Britain. The trees range in
age up to 300 years in some instances, and there are thus not very many generations between
their earliest predecessors about 9000 years ago and those growing today; to stand in them is
to feel the past' (Steven and Carlisle 1959: v). On the other hand, in their general discussion
of the pinewoods and assessment of each individual pinewood, they detail the way that these
remnants have been, and are being, altered by the actions of people. They refer to how
'[m]ost of the native pinewoods have been at orte time or another part of a sporting estate in
which the deer were encouraged and protected for shooting, and this has often given rise to
abnormally high populations within the woodlands' (Steven and Carlisle 1959: 79). Further,
'there has been relatively little natural regeneration during the past century, most of the pine
being over 100 years old. During this period the woodlands, with few exceptions, have been
open to intensive grazing by red deer and sheep' (Steven and Carlisle 1959: 83). The
pinewoods, whilst being remnants of natural woodland, are thus subject to excessive levels
of grazing, which prevent their regeneration and compromise their naturalness. Whilst
derived from a natural origin, the pinewoods are also the result of'unnatural' influences such
as the high numbers of deer or forestry practices.
This sort of dual construction of the pinewoods as natural and unnatural is often
represented visually through reference to a map produced by O'Sullivan (1977) and
subsequently reproduced in documents like the RSPB's Time for Pine (1993). This map
(Figure 6.2.), itself another source of discursive resources for representing pinewoods,
suggests an original extent of the pinewood and contrasts it with the present extent of the
woodlands. Commonly accompanied by the claim that only 1% of the original pinewoods
are left, the visual contrast of a suggested former distribution with the present extent re-
enforces the idea that they are remnants of the original and so links with past naturalness.
Yet, at the same time, in the extent of their decline they are unnatural because the coherence
of such a contiguous area is lost.
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Figure 6.2. Suggested former distribution of Scots pine dominated pine-birch forests in the
Scottish Highlands. Based on original map of reconstructed post-glacial forest types by
McVean and Ratcliffe (1962). Hatched areas represent former extent; dark areas represent
present extent. Source: O'Sullivan (1977: 61).
This ambiguous representation of pinewoods is evident in descriptions of Abernethy made at
the time of the acquisition of the Forest Lodge estate in 1988. Proclaiming the significance
of the purchase to the conservation world, Ian Prestt, then Director General of the RSPB,
signalled the importance of Abemethy by saying that it was 'our only natural conifer forest'
(1988: 3, original emphasis). Similarly, Edwards (1988: 33), reporting the acquisition of this
'sylvan sanctuary' said that 'Abemethy Forest is one of the truly wild places left in Britain'.
Abemethy was special and valued in nature conservation for its relative naturalness. Indeed,
it was this naturalness that was the prime concern of an influential report by the Masters
Course of the Ecology and Conservation Unit at University College London which made
suggestions for management: 'The first priority, for aesthetic, scientific and practical
reasons, should be the maintenance of the naturalness of the forest' (Conservation Course
1988: VI; also see Heard 1988).
Yet at the same time as Abemethy is natural, it is also the degraded remnant of a past
pure original. Again Ian Prestt (1988: 3) captures this ambiguity: 'At Abemethy the RSPB
has secured the future of the largest remaining fragment of the ancient Forest of Caledon
which once adorned the glen sides of the Scottish Highlands. In the last 500 years 99 per
cent of the once-great forest has been destroyed - and with it has gone much of its special
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wildlife'. The pinewoods at Abernethy are natural to the extent that they have a connection
with the original, but unnatural to the extent that they have been reduced to such a small
fragment. This story of decline and the ambiguity of the concept of naturalness can be seen
in the following extract from the 1991 management plan:
For thousands of years the montane section of the reserve has slowly evolved to
create one of the most natural, least modified landscapes in Britain...On the
extensive moorland areas between the lower forest and the montane habitat, the
natural succession to forest and sub-alpine scrub has been lost or prevented, due
to over-grazing and excessive burning. This process has been especially acute
during the past 150 years, when high numbers of sheep and red deer have been
maintained on the hills.
Below the tree line, there has also been substantial forest decline due to
past land use practice. Within the forest many of the woods have been highly
modified by thinning of stands, clear felling of timber and the bulldozing of
tracks and extraction routes.
Despite this past exploitation, the main forest areas remain intact and
retain considerable natural qualities. Due to inaccessibility, several locations
have no recorded management and rank among the most natural woodlands in
our land (RSPB 1991: 25).
The ambiguity of the concept of naturalness is evident because while some areas rank as the
most natural in our land and many have retained considerable natural qualities, the natural
succession has been lost, the forest area has declined and the forest structure has been
modified by thinning and clear-felling. Thus not long after the Conservation Course say that
the priority should be the maintenance of the naturalness of the forest, they say that 'it is
well known that Abemethy forest is far from natural, having been burnt and cut over for
centuries' (Conservation Course 1988: 1). The Conservation Course continues, '[t]he most
distinctive feature of Abemethy Forest is its potential for naturalness' (Conservation Course
1988:57, my emphasis). The acquisition of Abemethy was thought to give 'the RSPB its best
chance ever of returning an area to a near-natural condition' (Conservation Course 1988: 1).
As such, John Hunt, then the Scottish Reserves Manager of the RSPB, relished the prospect
of increasing the site's naturalness, saying, 'to me, as a conservationist, it is very exciting if,
instead of just protecting a tiny fragment of rich habitat and doing nothing with it, we can
take a sizeable area and return it to something natural. That's real conservation — not
preservation, but conservation' (in Edwards 1988: 35; see also Hunt 1992). Similarly, an
early report on a vegetation survey that related to management issues suggested that
'[mjanagement should be geared to restoring as great a degree of naturalness as is possible,
by retaining the existing natural features, whilst removing the past influences of man as far
as possible' (Tickner 1989: 110).
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It is this ambiguous construction of the pinewoods that underpins the early
management. It was argued by many - including the Nature Conservancy Council, which
had contributed £500,000 to help the RSPB purchase the Forest Lodge estate, and the
Conservation Course led by Andrew Warren - that '[t]he preservation and enhancement of
the natural character should dictate the strategy for management. It follows that a minimum-
intervention policy should be the guideline for planning the management of the reserve'
(Conservation Course 1988: 57). This position was arrived at because, if we conceive of a
spectrum of naturalness and artificiality, the pinewoods, constructed as remnants of
naturalness, were positioned nearer the natural end of the spectrum with the negative
influences of human impact pulling them towards artificiality, although not to the extent that
they are irrevocably damaged (figure 6.3). 'It followed' that a minimum intervention policy
should be pursued because this spectrum of naturalness was mapped onto a 'management
gradient' (figure 6.4). Working directly from a nature-culture duality that constmcts human
influence as bad, the closer one is to the natural end of the gradient, the less intervention
there should be. Conversely, the more intervention one pursues, the less natural the result.
Abernethy, positioned towards the natural end, maps onto less interventionist management.
The management adopted was minimal intervention and not no/i-intervention precisely
because the pinewoods were not pristine and had been influenced by people; that is, because




Figure 6.3. Positioning Abernethy on a scale of naturalness.
Management Gradient
More Naturalness More Intervention
Total non¬ Culling deer Culling deer, Culling deer Culling deer, Culling deer,
intervention only Tuley tubes and some preparing preparing
around some ground ground and ground and
broad leaves preparation sowing seed planting
for seed saplings
Figure 6.4. Naturalness/Management Gradient. Source: Conservation Course (1988: 22).
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Yet whilst a broad policy of minimal intervention was agreed upon as the most
appropriate way of achieving the objective of woodland expansion, it was still an open
question as to what form of intervention would best achieve that objective. Specific forms of
management had to be decided upon. Even though minimal intervention appeared to
accommodate the ambiguity of the natural/unnatural pinewoods, the ambiguity remained
because constructions of the forest as both natural and unnatural ran through to approaches
to management. Claims about the naturalness of the forest supported suggestions that the
first priority should be the maintenance and protection of naturalness, and claims that the
forest was far from natural supported suggestions that the naturalness should be enhanced.
Thus in the way that the construction of the pinewoods as both natural and unnatural is
connected with the notion ofprotecting and enhancing those pinewoods, there is a potential
tension between forms ofmanagement. How is it possible to protect naturalness and enhance
it? One implies abstracting human influence and the other implies applying human agency to
achieve a specific end. Those deciding on specific forms of management therefore faced a
dilemma, or at least a difficult balancing act: what sorts ofmanagement could be undertaken
which would enable those aspects or parts of the site that had been damaged, to be restored,
without compromising the site's naturalness? How were the dual imperatives of protecting
and enhancing the pinewoods to be balanced?
The answers that the managers at the time found to these questions are captured
succinctly by one of my interviewees who, reflecting on management at Abemethy, said
that:
Interviewee: ...the ethos in the late 80s, early 90s...was, not hands off, we were
doing a lot of deer stalking et cetera, but the ethos was doing broad-brush
management; when you get the principles right, other things take care of
themselves...
Andrew: can you clarify, your broad brush is...
Interviewee: Our broad brush management aims for the site are...erm aiming to
expand the forest area, up to the potential natural treeline. To do that entirely or
primarily through the reduction of grazing, which mainly means deer on this
site. That the semi-natural woodland, the core of the old forest, will be
sylvaculturally unmanaged, or near as damn it, you might do the odd thing but
in terms of using timber, you know that's not going to happen. And that we
have, getting towards the end of it, but we've managed and re-structured our
less natural plantations erm to push them towards more semi-natural types of
woodland. So big broad brush management aims (Interview H, 30th January
2002).
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It is clear that in leaving the semi-natural forest alone, achieving woodland expansion by
reducing the grazing pressure and physically altering the less natural plantations so that they
more closely approximated natural woodland, the site managers found several ways of
managing the dilemma about the appropriate degree of intervention. In the following
sections, I examine these strategies in more detail in order to examine the concept of
minimal intervention and show why some forms of action were considered acceptable and
how they were positioned to negotiate the tightrope of naturalness/non-intervention and
artificiality/intervention. Why were some areas left and others not? Why was a drastic
reduction in the deer population acceptable as minimal intervention?
Minimal intervention in context: co-constructing pinewoods and plantations
In the context of a large site covering a wide spectrum of possible positions on a scale of
naturalness, one way of negotiating the ambiguity of naturalness and the question of whether
or not to intervene was to discriminate between the more and the less natural parts of the site.
It was this approach that was adopted when the managers at Abernethy stated (in the
summary of the management plan) that 'All ancient semi-natural woodland will be left
unmanaged and only plantation areas will undergo restorative and habitat enhancement
management' (RSPB 1991: np). One way of negotiating the ambiguities of 'minimal
intervention', then, was to employ classifications that cut across the continua of the spectrum
of naturalness to allot different areas of Abernethy into different categories. The woodland
classification that is employed here identifies which areas of woodland are 'ancient' and
'semi-natural' and which are not.
Constructing ancient semi-natural pinewoods
Tsouvalis-Gerber (1998; also see Watkins 1988) argues that for the first half of the twentieth
century the focus on the efficient scientific management of forests with a view to their
productive capacity, meant that woodland history was under-studied. The importance of an
historical perspective, however, was brought back to the fore with the publication of Steven
and Carlisle's The Native Pinewoods ofScotland (1959). Although Ritchie (1920) and Fraser
Darling (1947) provided historical narratives of forest decline, Steven and Carlisle (1959)
marked a watershed in the way they brought together sources of evidence (pollen analysis,
written and map records) to provide a new basis for management. Following this publication,
the importance of ecological history gradually grew, with a similar approach being taken to
the New Forest (Tubbs 1968) and the woods of East Anglia (Rackham 1976; 1980).
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Tsouvalis-Gerber (1998) suggests that this re-framing of woodlands historically
allowed the formation of a new sort of woodland: 'ancient woodland'. Until the early 1980s,
woodlands were predominantly referred to as 'primary' or 'secondary'. Primary woods were
those that had never been cleared of trees and were consequently seen as remnants of the
original 'wildwood'. Secondary woods were those that had grown up on sites which had
been cleared of woodland at some time in the past. It was, however, the gradual realisation
that the distinction between the two was hard to substantiate (many old woods which had
been considered primary because of their natural qualities were found to be secondary) that
led Rackham (1980) to suggest the terms 'ancient' and 'recent'. Whilst the notion of primary
woodland is a useful hypothetical concept, it is easier to show that a wood is ancient than it
is to conclusively prove that a woodland is primary (Peterken 1993). Consequently, for
practical purposes of classification, 'ancient' was more useful because it was more easily
applicable. The term was subsequently disseminated through its central place in prominent
texts (Peterken 1981; 1993) and gradually replaced 'primary' and 'secondary' as a means of
identifying conservation value. In the process, this new form of woodland became an object
of knowledge with programmes for recording the position and extent of these valuable
'ancient' woodlands undertaken (Walker and Kirby 1989; Callander 1986). Ultimately,
ancient woods have come to be defined as 'those occupying sites which have been wooded
continuously for several hundred years at least since the time when the first reliable maps
were made. .. .In Scotland ancient woods are those which were present before 1750 when the
first national survey was made by General Roy' (Forestry Commission 1994: 33). In this
way, retrospective mapping brings a new conservation object in to existence.
Adopting the term 'ancient', however, changed what was valued about woodlands.
'Primary' and 'secondary' had the advantage of discriminating between those woods that
had, it was thought, been continuously wooded and those that had not. A primary wood, if it
had survived the effects of human agency, was a link with past naturalness. Ancient woods,
on the other hand, could include both primary and secondary woods because what was
important was that they had been on the site since 1600 (or 1750 in Scotland).
Discriminating between origins was not possible because what had become important was
simply the length of time woodland was thought to have been wooded. It is possible that a
wood planted prior to 1750 in Scotland would be valued in the same way as a wood that was
a remnant of some sort of original forest cover. As such, whilst ancientness is in many cases
a useful indicator of conservation value (because the longer a site has been wooded the
higher its diversity and conservation interest), in other cases, ancientness is insufficient as a
means of discriminating between woodlands because it is not concerned with origins. It is
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thus common, today, to couple the concept of 'ancient' woodland with the concept of 'semi-
natural' woodland.
The notion of a semi-natural woodland was introduced by Tansley in 1939. For
Tansley semi-natural vegetation was that vegetation that existed between the two extremes
of nature: 'virgin', 'untouched' forests and wheat crops or plantations of exotic conifers. For
Tansley, much extant vegetation was positioned between those two categorical extremes.
Consequently, what he took to be semi-natural included permanent grass, rough grazing and
so on. He suggested that there were two categories of semi-natural vegetation; 'one began as
entirely natural and has been modified by man's activities, as in an exploited natural forest
which is allowed to regenerate by itself ... the second consists of communities deliberately
initiated by man for his own purposes, but consisting of native plants, and often behaving
very much as they would if they had come into existence spontaneously' (Tansley 1949:
195). From this, Tansley concluded that 'between one half and two thirds of England, and
something like three quarters of Wales, Scotland and Ireland are occupied by natural and
semi-natural vegetation' (Tansley 1949: 195).
While this broad definition of semi-naturalness was useful to Tansley (it allowed
him to challenge Clements' climax theory by illustrating that it was not applicable to the
UK), its meaning has changed. Peterken (1993: 42) recognises that under Tansley's original
definition 'all woodland is semi-natural.. .for no completely natural woodland survives in
Britain and even the most intensively managed plantation of exotic species contains some
wildlife'. For Peterken 'a distinction has to be made between relatively natural and relatively
artificial woodland: it would be pointless to describe both the native pinewood at Beinn
Eighe and a nearby sitka spruce plantation as 'semi-natural'. Therefore the term semi-natural
is reserved for those woods or features of woods which have a relatively high degree of
naturalness' (Peterken 1993: 42). Semi-naturalness has thus been re-articulated from its
reference to the broad ambiguity between the poles of the natural and artificial to its being
applicable to those communities that are near-natural. In the Forestry Commission Practice
Guides, semi-natural woods come to be those that 'are composed predominantly of native
trees and shrub species which have not been planted' (Forestry Commission 1994a: 34).
Semi-naturalness has thus come to refer to those stands which are of natural (non-human)
origin but which have been influenced or altered by people in the past.
As with the concept of'ancient' woodlands, however, semi-naturalness is not, alone,
sufficient to discriminate between woods of differing conservation value. Technically, this
definition of semi-naturalness means that very young trees that are naturally spreading on to
moorland would be classed as semi-natural in the same way as a wood deemed to be a
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remnant of the original 'wildwood' (i.e. because the growth had not been planted). Taking
things to an extreme, willow scrub spreading onto a fen (which is seen as damaging to the
fen communities because successional change will mean that the area will not be fen for
long) is equally semi-natural. But whilst 'ancient' and 'semi-natural' might be insufficient
descriptors on their own, when they are joined together they provide axes of valuation with
respect to which individual woods can be positioned. The Forestry Commission Practice
Guides (1994) offer a diagrammatic representation of this coupled classification (figure 6.5).

















Figure 6.5. A diagrammatic representation of the connections between woodland age and
naturalness. Source: Forestry Commission (1994: 34).
The Practice Guide says that although '"Ancient" and "Semi-natural" have sometimes been
used as synonyms, this is quite wrong. Ancientness refers to the site as woodland, whereas
naturalness refers to what is growing on that site' (Forestry Commission 1994: 35). The two
gradients are associated but not equivalent. The axes represent continuous variables against
which individual woods can be plotted. In general, the older a woodland (in terms of the
length of time it has been a wood, rather than the age of the trees) and the more natural it is,
the greater the value that is put on it. Yet across this continuum, lines are drawn which
quarter the diagram to distinguish different sorts of woodland. In Scotland, ancient woods
are those that fall in the left two-thirds of the diagram, whilst semi-natural woods are those
which fall in the top half (note the distinction on the left between planted and semi-natural
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woods). Thus the top left sector, where ancient and semi-natural woods coincide, represents
a new category that can be used to classify woodlands and structure action. It is a relatively
broad category that can contain many types of woodland - the New Forest, for example, is
more natural and older than the Dorset Hazel - but nevertheless, lines are drawn which
separate types of woodland and create a new object: ancient semi-natural woodland.
Applying the classification in practice
It is possible to understand the early management at Abemethy with reference to figure 6.5.
There were, in the early 1990s, three broad types of woodland at Abernethy: the ancient
semi-natural woodland, native pine plantations and exotic plantations. If plotted on the
diagram, the ancient semi-natural woodland would be near the top left, the native plantations
would be in the upper left of the bottom right quarter and the exotic plantations would be
near the bottom right. IfAbernethy were taken as a whole, then these constituent parts would
mean that the forest would fall somewhere near the centre. Since, in general terms, the old
and the natural were more highly valued, the aim for management was to attempt to move
the forest, as a whole, towards the top left of the diagram. Management thus had to
discriminate between the constituent parts because the ancient semi-natural woodland was
already there: plantations were not. As such, the ancient semi-natural woodland would be left
unmanaged, the pine plantations would be managed and the exotic plantations would be
felled. If the forest is taken as a whole, the exotic plantations, which are situated in the
bottom right, were depressing the average: felling them would mean that the naturalness of
the whole increased.
Once exotic species have been felled, the managers are left with ancient semi-natural
woodland and native plantations. The distinction that is made by management to leave the
former unmanaged and to restore the latter is connected to the distinction on the left-hand
side of the diagram: woods are semi-natural if they have not been planted, that is, if they are
not of human origin. Just as the management gradient mapped on to the naturalness gradient
meant that naturalness translated into little intervention, if the woods are of natural origin
then they are left unmanaged. If of human origin they can undergo restorative management.
At a general level, then, the line that cuts across the middle of the diagram separating
cultural and natural origins of woodland is translated on to the ground in the form of the
boundary between managed and unmanaged areas. The idea that the ancient semi-natural is
closer to the left hand corner implies that it is closer to the natural state, and, as such, human
intervention would potentially move the forest away from that ideal. On the other hand,
plantations, as woodlands made by people, exhibit the characteristics of their planting and
management. Further management will not damage them in the sense of damaging pristine
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nature; management could be undertaken with the intention of restoring and enhancing their
natural qualities (attempting, that is, to make them more natural).
This general distinction (between ancient semi-natural/unmanaged and plantation/
managed) is, however, problematic in practice. It is problematic because, as Taylor (1995)
makes clear, areas of semi-natural pine woodland were under-planted with exotic species and
different areas of plantation could have very different characteristics, including different age
structures and different degrees of canopy closure. The question of where to intervene or not
becomes more complicated. It is, perhaps, symbolic that the line bisecting cultural and
natural origin and consequently managed and unmanaged woodland is dashed, because the
distinction between the ancient semi-natural woodland and the native plantation is not hard
and fast. The line separating semi-natural and planted on the diagram translates into a much
more negotiated distinction between unmanaged and managed on the ground. This blurred
boundary is evident in the 1991 management plan because whilst it stated that 'All ancient
semi-natural woodland will be left unmanaged and only plantation areas will undergo
restorative and habitat enhancement management' (RSPB 1991: np), it also states that some
areas of plantation would be left unmanaged too. Some of the older plantations were to be
'left unmanaged to undergo a process of self-thinning/natural selection which [would] ensure
continuity of deadwood' (RSPB 1991: 41). Indeed the plan states that over extensive areas of
Rynettin plantation, a mixture of planted and regenerated woodland had developed and that
these had a 'natural feel' (RSPB 1991: 41). Thus whilst both the diagram and those at
Abernethy draw a distinction between semi-natural and planted, there was, at the same time,
ambiguity that allowed room for local negotiation of the boundary.
The objective of restoring plantations and making them more natural is, therefore,
directed at the younger plantations. It was expected that if intervention could take place early
enough, the form of the mature stand could be changed by shifting the starting position of
subsequent development. The intention was that once restoration work had shifted the
starting point of succession, then they would 'fall into a non-intervention category and will
go on to complete a cycle of maturity, death and decay' (RSPB 1991: 39). The long-term
intention was that gradually the level of management would reduce as the effects of human
influence were gradually made less evident.
But if young pine plantations were relatively unnatural and their naturalness could
be enhanced by more interventionist management, the crucial issue that remained was how
they should be managed and towards what specific end. If the plantations were to be
managed to push them nearer the top of the diagram - towards a more natural form - what,
then, is that form and what is a natural pinewood like? In speaking with those involved in
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this early restoration work, it quickly became apparent that it was the ancient semi-natural
areas that became the ideal or referent of naturalness:
Andrew: at the same time as the sort of non-intervention thing there is the
thinning of plantations
Interviewee: removal of, oh, there is both
Andrew: yeah, how was it decided to thin plantations then? There was a
different logic going on there I think.
Interviewee: yeah we might do it differently now, I think we would do it
differently now. ... What we were looking at is that we knew that these, because
we did own some small patches of natural, semi-natural forest down in the low
forest...there is a big chunk down by Mallachie...just over the esker. All these
bits have an element of this remnant in it. We knew that that was where a lot of
things were actually living, so what we started off doing was that we had all this
plantation, and that is mainly what we had, was plantation rather than semi-
natural and we thought we could mimic the semi-natural forest, and the very
heavy thinning that took place in some of these plantations was to allow some
trees to develop big crowns (Interview R, 15th August 2002).
The bits of forest that were considered 'natural, semi-natural' were identifiable. Through
anecdote and survey, it was considered that many of the typically pinewood species
preferred the semi-natural areas rather than the pine plantations. The objective of the early
restoration was thus the mimicking of the semi-natural forest. It was considered that as the
plantations grew to maturity they would attain a tall straight form similar to mature
plantations elsewhere (because they are planted at a high density and subject to high degrees
of competition for light) and that as the canopy closed so the ground flora would be shaded
out. Re-structuring thus aimed to create 'an open woodland structure', 'prevent extensive
understorey suppression', 'create a structure mosaic by creating a glade system' and
'encourage merger of natural with unnatural by landscaping hard plantation edges' (RSPB
1991: 38-39). To prevent the plantations developing into mature stands of tall straight trees
that would limit light penetration and the ground flora, the plantations would be thinned in
order to allow the trees more space to develop large crowns. As such, at least one of the
identifiers of naturalness was the structure of the trees themselves and the stand more
generally. Identifying appropriate management of plantations thus involved constructing the
semi-natural forests as approximating naturalness, identifying the important structural
qualities and establishing how those qualities could best be managed for.
Naturalness therefore became identifiable through the way the forest looked and a
plantation would be more natural if it looked the same as the semi-natural stand. In this
respect, identifying the less natural parts of the forest was a case of being able to see where
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the trees had been planted in straight lines (planting was normally undertaken in straight
lines and there was a presupposition that straight lines were not natural). The restorative
management was consequently a case of making the forest look less regular by either felling
the trees in straight lines if they were young and had been planted under mature trees or
thinning heavily so that the linear arrangement was less obvious.
In this way, the managers managed to find a means of protecting and enhancing the
naturalness of the forest. The ancient semi-natural woods would be left, as would some of
the more natural plantations, the younger plantations that could have their developmental
trajectory changed would be restructured and the exotic plantations would be felled. It was a
spatial strategy for dealing with the ambiguity of the concept of naturalness. The naturalness
of the ancient semi-natural areas would be protected by abstracting human influence, but in a
different area - in the planted woods - management could be undertaken and the naturalness
enhanced because that management was oriented towards increasing the natural character of
the forest. Two different concepts of naturalness were employed with respect to different
parts of Abernethy.
Minimal intervention in context: co-constructing pinewoods, deer and fences
An important policy developed in relation to the narrative of forest decline was to encourage
the expansion of the woodland through natural regeneration. Whilst the semi-natural areas
would be left unmanaged, it was hoped that they would expand up to the natural tree line and
that the altitudinal gradation from pine forest through birch woods to sub-alpine scrub might
develop. But whilst there was abundant regeneration, the full development of the
regenerating trees was prevented by a high grazing pressure, predominantly from red deer
(Conservation Course 1988; RSPB 1991). In order to achieve the objective of woodland
expansion, therefore, the issue of how to deal with that high grazing pressure had to be
addressed. In the context of a policy of minimal intervention, the policy that was adopted
was to cull the deer and so reduce the grazing pressure. Thus whilst one way of dealing with
the ambiguity of naturalness was to separate the natural and artificial and to allow
intervention in the artificial, with regard to the problem of deer, the effects of intervention
would be felt even in the semi-natural areas - those areas deemed to be close to natural and
thus in need of protection from human intervention. Intervention by culling is therefore
constructed in different ways.
But in order to understand why culling was adopted, it is important to understand
how it was bound up in the broader political issue of deer management. In the 1970s and
1980s, woodland conservation had been achieved in the presence of large deer numbers with
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the aid of fences. From the mid 1980s, the use of fences was being re-thought and the
adoption of a culling policy at Abernethy was part of these debates.
Re-negotiating deermanagement
The failure ofmany woodlands, and particularly native pinewoods, to regenerate because of
the presence of deer has long been a concern (Ritchie 1920; Gordon 1925; Fraser Darling
1947; Steven and Carlisle 1959; Bunce and Jeffers 1977; Callander and MacKenzie 1991;
Aldhous 1995). The deer population is estimated to have risen from approximately 150,000
in the 1960s to 300,000 today (Callander and MacKenzie 1991; Smith 1993). For the
conservationist, identifying the cause of this increase has not been difficult: it is traditional
estate management (SNH 1994). Estates managed for sport are primarily managed for the
maintenance of large stag numbers. The emphasis in shooting for sport is on the stag as the
trophy and it is this preoccupation that lies at the root of the problem (Clutton-Brock and
Albon 1989; 1992). Hinds (female red deer) are very rarely shot for sport, but high hind
numbers are encouraged in the belief that more hinds attract, and then produce, more stags.
Estates have therefore been culling hinds below the rate of recruitment (meaning that
reproduction exceeds losses due to culling and the population increases), in order to
encourage high hind numbers and thus more stags.
It is against this context that before the 1980s if a conservationist wanted to try and
protect a piece of woodland, it was commonly accepted that they had one option: build a
fence around it. Fences were seen as the right tool for the job because there was a belief that
it would be too difficult to control deer without them (Jonhston and Balharry 2001). On the
one hand, it was thought that deer fertility was density dependent and that if the herd were
culled heavily the deer would compensate with higher productivity. On the other, it was
thought that even if deer could be controlled effectively in one area, the lower density in that
controlled area would create space for immigration from outside. Fences would, therefore, be
needed to keep them out (or, for estate's, fences would be needed to keep them in). As such,
fences were a useful technology because they allowed different landowners to pursue
different objectives in close proximity: estates could retain high deer numbers,
conservationists could achieve regeneration. They were solutions to environmental problems
and marked the boundaries between social actors in material and symbolic ways. They
allowed the maintenance of the social status quo because while fences divided areas of land,
different groups could represent and manage the land in different ways.
Because, however, there was no logical relation between the problem of over¬
grazing and the fence, there remained an openness to other sorts of solutions. For some
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within nature conservation, the deer fence was precisely the wrong tool for the job. Referring
to his experiences at Mar Lodge in 1974, Dick Balharry highlights how fences were not
necessarily desirable in conservation terms. He said that when he arrived there he asked,
'why was it a nature reserve?'
It was a nature reserve because of the magnificent native woodland, and yet
there were no young trees. It was like a city of 90 year-old people, with no
youngsters. Why? Because the whole of the reserve was being managed as a
sporting estate, which was the situation for much of it until quite recently. Of
course it is possible to run sporting estates and grow trees. You can build fences,
you can put up growth tubes, you can plant trees. But where the land use
objective is nature conservation, fences can cause more problems than they
solve (Balharry 1998: 35).
Similarly, when I asked an interviewee (who saw the Highlands as degraded because there
were too many deer) about his attitude to fences, he reflected upon his experience of
pinewood management and said:
well what happened was that erm...when I arrived there, there was one fence up
... and I had lots of concerns about it and while I was there we built another
fence...and when those trees arrived at so big [indicating height - approx lm] I
didn't like this because erm.. .it was not reflecting what I would see as a natural
woodland - deer were not in it. And I thought, you know, this is nonsense, we
really need deer as part and parcel, they've been there, they've been an
ingredient in what we see as a pine forest today...what we need to do is
understand the role that red deer play in the making of those woods. And I
would argue that you are not making a natural woodland if you put a fence up
and deny deer access to it, that's not, that's gardening. So the only way that you
can do that is having deer present in numbers that will allow that thing to grow,
to expand, to be sustainable (Interview L, 6th June 2002).
Whilst fences allowed regeneration to be achieved they were not, for this interviewee, the
answer. For him, the central concern was the naturalness of the woodland being created.
Building fences to exclude deer misses the point. It does not tackle the issue that there are
simply too many deer and it results in two equally unnatural conditions on either side of the
fence. Putting up fences is 'gardening'. By his use of this term we get the sense that for this
interviewee fences are indicative of a more interventionist approach to woodland, of which
he disapproves. For him a natural woodland can only be achieved by taking a less
interventionist approach: by culling the deer to levels that allow regeneration whilst keeping
them as part of the system, and not interfering in other ways. Fences are the wrong tool for
the job because the end result will always be a human artefact. The same interviewee
suggested that 'if you are going to get regeneration and you put a fence up, then its not
natural regeneration at all, its a very, you know it's going to finish up that shape or that
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shape'. Arguments about fences are, therefore, also arguments about the degree of
intervention and naturalness. Whilst the debate about deer management is commonly
understood to be a debate between nature conservation and estates with conservation
challenging the estate's version of the red deer and their management (Toogood 1995), it
was also a debate that took place within nature conservation itself.
In order to make the argument to remove fences, those who were against them
needed to support their assertions by reconstructing the red deer. Where red deer were
understood to be a pest and impossible to control, conservationists wanting to argue against
fences had to reframe them as more amenable to management and as an integral part of the
system. There were various resources available to them in this regard. The research of
Clutton-Brock and others (Clutton-Brock et. al. 1982; Clutton-Brock and Albon 1989; 1992),
for example, that had been taking place on Rum since 1972, offered different narratives of
deer biology than those offered by the traditional view of the estates. Clutton-Brock and
Albon showed that high female density and low food availability depressed the growth and
survival of males more than females. They also showed that as hind density increased so the
weight of antlers decreased, as did the size and weight of the stags themselves. The
implications were clear: high hind densities meant poor stag quality. The work on Rum
suggested that estates managing deer for sport by encouraging high hind numbers were
actually undermining their own interests. The best way to achieve quality sport was not by
encouraging huge numbers of deer, but by suppressing their numbers. The Rum research
provided an alternative construction of red deer that conservationists could utilise to argue
for reductions in the deer population. It also suggested that deer, and especially hinds, were
to a large extent hefted to particular areas. The idea that a heavy deer cull in one area would
simply create space for deer from outwith that area to move in and fill the gap was
challenged. This again allowed conservationists to argue that reductions in the population
might be possible.
At the same time, parallel arguments were made which suggested that deer were an
essential element in the ecosystem. It was argued that within many areas from which deer
have been excluded, the structure of the vegetation had changed to become tall and rank and
less diverse. It was further argued that the regeneration evident within exclosures was from
already established trees that flourished once relieved of browsing pressure; new seedlings
were not becoming established because a dense moss layer that develops due to a lack of
disturbance, hindered establishment (Staines 1995; Staines et. al. 1995). In this way, the
influence of deer at levels that were not too damaging was constructed as beneficial: it is a
question of finding the appropriate level.
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A crucial moment in this continuing debate about fences and deer management came
in 1986 when the NCC bought Creag Meagaidh and set out to achieve natural regeneration
without fences (Ramsay 1997). Although it was not the first such attempt - it being tried out
in a much less high profile way at Inshriach between 1974 - 1980 (Balharry 1998) - it was at
Creag Meagaidh that the NCC very publicly decided to cull deer as opposed to putting up
fences. Thus Creag Meagaidh represents a negotiation of different approaches in
conservation and plays an important role in the rise of the notion of minimal intervention.
Whereas it used to be that a conservation manager would only have one option - the fence -
now, with changing ideas of naturalness and the reconstruction of the red deer as too
numerous but manageable, the fence was increasingly understood as the wrong tool for the
job. The rifle took its place. It was in this context, then, that the early management of
Abernethy was debated.
Culling and fences at Abernethy
When the RSPB bought the Forest Lodge estate in 1988 and was pitched into this political
arena there was a certain amount of pressure from the NCC to attempt to achieve
regeneration without fences. The policy adopted followed this approach. It was to 'reduce
grazing pressures on the pinewood by ... lowering the deer population to levels where
conditions will be suitable for natural regeneration within the next 5 to 10 years...' (RSPB
1991: 36; Beaumont et. al. 1995; Taylor 1995). This policy, coming as it did in the early
1990s, was on the leading edge of changes in deer management and thus caught up in a
broad reconstruction of the red deer, estate and conservation practice and appropriate
technologies of management. Questions about appropriate management at Abemethy can,
therefore, be understood as embedded in the negotiation of approaches to the level of
intervention in conservation management and in arguments for changes in deer management.
Yet in the context of a policy of minimal intervention, adopting a policy of heavy deer
culling is something that still needs to be explained. As an interviewee framed it, 'it is pretty
interventionist reducing deer densities by two thirds'. Why, if preferring culling to fencing is
to prefer one form of intervention over another, is culling preferable?
First, as has been noted, fences represent an unnatural interventionist approach.
Fencing is unnatural not only because it does not actually tackle the problem and perpetuates
two unnatural conditions on either side of a fence and results in woodlands shaped by the
fences, but because it is visibly unnatural. As one of the managers involved at the time makes
clear, if an objective is enhancing the naturalness of the site, then one way of enhancing that
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naturalness is to remove the evidence of human involvement. Referring to the initial attempts
to reduce the grazing pressure he said:
we felt that we were now beginning to reduce the deer population and if we
were wanting to enhance the naturalness of the site, we felt that deer fences
were not natural, far from natural, they were man-made artefacts. Within four
years we took, from 1988 to 1993 or so, we took away most of our deer fences
(Interview Q, 13th August 2002).
My interviewee says 'most' because it is not the case that Abernethy is now fence-free: some
have had to be retained along the marches with neighbouring estates and surrounding
vegetation monitoring plots. Despite this pragmatic retention of fences for the sake of
accommodating neighbours wishes, the desire to remove them is clear. The fences were
obviously 'man-made' and compromised the naturalness of the forest. They should,
therefore, be removed if the aim is to enhance naturalness. Removing fences is, therefore, a
case of removing the visible evidence of intervention. As an alternative, culling, which
normally takes place in the quieter parts of the reserve and is carried out either early or late
in the day, is a much less visible form of intervention. In relation to human influence, culling
is the least bad option because it tackles the problem whilst leaving little evidence of human
involvement.
Secondly, the Conservation Course suggested other reasons for preferring culling to
fences when they said 'Of all the alternative ways of enhancing successful regeneration -
fencing, burning, screefmg and culling - we recommend culling. We justify this as part of a
management strategy that stresses naturalness, by referring to the observation that, in the
natural forest, deer would have to be regulated by wolves' (Conservation Course 1988: 57).
In such thinking, deer numbers are unnaturally high, not only because of past management
practice, but because of the lack of natural predators. The deer population is allowed to grow
to numbers that are detrimental to the deer themselves, so the argument goes, because of the
unnatural lack of predation. In a natural situation, the weak deer would be selected out by
predators with the result that the population as a whole would be healthier. As such, culling
is a necessary element ofmanagement. In becoming the surrogate wolf, the manager moves
the system back towards a more natural arrangement. The important question is finding the
level at which deer can be present whilst allowing natural regeneration of trees. The question
of balance is, consequently, implicit in early culling policy.
Culling as a form of intervention that effects even the semi-natural areas of the forest
is acceptable because it is arguably less interventionist than fencing, but most importantly,
because it restores the balance and removes the grazing pressure that is stopping even the
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semi-natural areas form regenerating naturally. Where the semi-natural areas' naturalness
was going to be protected by leaving them unmanaged whilst work was carried out in the
plantations, culling means that intervention will be undertaken in those areas. The 1991
management plan deals with this by making a subtle distinction when it says that one of the
main policies is to 'leave the native pinewood, including native broadleaf species, as well as
the regenerating forest, sylviculturally unmanaged' (RSPB 1991: 36, my emphasis). Saying
that the native pinewoods (which is, here, synonymous with ancient and semi-natural) would
be sylviculturally unmanaged is to suggest that the woods would not be utilised for their
timber and would not be physically altered by direct intervention. This leaves open the
possibility of the indirect intervention that culling deer represents. Culling is an acceptable
form of intervention because it seeks to create a more natural situation rather than simply
putting up fences. In the context of potential conflicts between protecting extant naturalness
by abstracting human influence and enhancing damaged nature through human influence, the
semi-natural areas are shifted from being understood as already near natural to being seen as
themselves subject to the damaging influence of too many deer. Culling deer enhances the
naturalness of the semi-natural areas and, as such, this form of intervention is acceptable
because we are taking the place of a 'lost' element in the system (the wolf) rather than
simply introducing a new one. One of the ironies of early management, then, is that if there
is a balance which deer are currently upsetting, it is also a question of manipulation by the
active manager to attempt to find that balance. Achieving naturalness - which was one of the
reasons for taking down fences - still requires the active involvement of people. Naturalness,
which should be understood in this case as natural character, depends on humanity.
Culling thus became the preferred means of managing the forest to achieve
regeneration and woodland expansion. But questions about the naturalness of the forest and
fencing were usurped when, in June 1989, a warden at Abernethy walked along a deer fence
at the forest's edge and found five black grouse carcasses. Subsequent monitoring of deer
fences for bird strikes, and work by capercaillie researchers elsewhere, found that deer
fences were a considerable hazard to woodland grouse (Catt et. al. 1994; Moss and Picozzi
1994). Recognising that these human artefacts were potentially killing large numbers of
already declining populations of birds provided straightforward justification for arguing
against fences. Instead of having to argue that fences created unnatural habitats, fences could
simply be shown to have a detrimental impact on certain species. In retrospect, one of my
interviewees who had been against fences said that:
what helped me no end was the caper [capercaillie] argument, Bob Moss and
Adam Watson. There is no question that this whole business of the caper...I
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never like to admit it because I'm not very keen on that argument, that you use a
single species like the caper ...There is a strong argument that these fences kill
lots of birds, not just caper but erm. I'm not so keen on arguing for a single
species, but it helped...if that was going to help the argument then fine
(Interview L, 6th June 2002).
The construction of fences as 'a bad thing' was thus bolstered. Today culling has become
established as the primary means of management. Another interviewee framed this change
thus:
Certainly ten years ago...the widely held view among land managers and land
practitioners was that if you want forest regeneration you did it with deer fences.
And now deer fences are an ugly word and deer fences are no longer seen as
being an acceptable way of dealing with the problem. ...It's interesting to see
how quickly what was...a perfectly acceptable policy has been turned round. It
is now...you know the government has been subsidising landowners to put up
deer fences for many years and the Forestry Commission with WGS grants have
paid for fences and now we spend seven hundred thousand pounds paying the
very same landowners to take the bloody things down... (Interview B, 15th
January 2002).
Balancing species and habitat management
As reference to the capercaillie makes clear, considerations of naturalness and appropriate
forms of management were complicated by concerns for particular species. Single species
management could potentially contradict concerns with naturalness because it might require
intensive intervention. The early management at Abernethy was, however, able to
accommodate both species and habitat considerations without compromising the concerns
about the naturalness of the site. Not only did the problems caused by fences for the
capercaillie dovetail with a desire to remove fences, but research on the structure of
capercaillie habitat re-enforced the importance of semi-natural woodland and provided
resources for those wishing to restructure plantations (Picozzi et. al. 1992; Moss and Picozzi
1994).
I highlight this research here not because the management at Abernethy was initially
directed by it - although it did subsequently feed into and support that management and was
used to describe Abernethy by Summers et. al. (1995) - but because it points toward both a
specific idea of what constitutes a semi-natural pinewood and highlights the fact that
constructing the pinewoods and plantations is linked with the construction of the capercaillie
as a particular sort of species. Semi-natural pinewoods, plantations and capercaillie were co-
constructed.
The capercaillie is a localised breeding bird largely restricted to the pinewoods and
was one of the major reasons why the RSPB bought the Forest Lodge estate. It had become
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extinct in Scotland in the second half of the eighteenth century, but was successfully re¬
introduced in 1837 (Sharrock 1976), reaching a peak in numbers in the 1920s and 1930s, but
subsequently declined. Despite an expansion of numbers in the 1960s and 1970s, the future
looked bleak. It was in this context that Picozzi et. al. (1992) and Moss and Picozzi (1994)
sought to address the question of how best to manage a forest for capercaillie. The preferred
foods and the problems created by wet breeding seasons were already understood (Moss
1986), but less was known about the role of 'old' 'natural' forest. Some maintained that
capercaillie preferred mature forests while others suggested that it was not the fact of
maturity, but the set of characteristics - in terms of structure and key food elements - that a
mature forest exhibited, that was important. This suggestion raised the possibility of young
forests being managed for capercaillie. Could forests that were not, at present, thought to be
suitable for capercaillie, be managed in a way that would make them more attractive to the
species and thus provide more habitat and potentially halt the decline? Picozzi et. al. (1992)
sought to establish whether, in fact, it was the structural qualities that were important by
developing a method ofmeasuring forest structure and assessing these qualities in relation to
the behaviour and numbers of capercaillie.
Focusing on the forests around lek sites (where male birds gather and display in the
breeding season and so where numbers can be counted), Picozzi et. al. (1992) divided the
forest into age-classes (pre-thicket, thicket, pole, high canopy forest, semi-natural forest - the
last, not technically an age-class, is a category used by Picozzi et. al.) and measured fourteen
structural components. By performing principal component analysis on their data they were
able to plot their different sites on a graph illustrating, by the way that they were clustered,
that each class of forest around the lek sites had broadly similar structural properties (figure
6.6).
This graph allows Picozzi et. al. (1992: 756) to say that 'A high PRIN1 score
represented well-spaced trees with thick trunks and branches, which tended to be clumped,
and had an open canopy and a good field layer of dwarf shrubs. This occurred in native pine
forest with spreading, old 'granny' trees ['granny pine' refers to the old, gnarled, broad-
crown trees that are commonly found in the relatively open remnant pinewoods],..The
PRIN2 score increased as trees became taller, high values corresponding to much canopy
closure above 5m and no ground vegetation. A big PRIN2 score described tall closely






























Figure 6.6. A plot of principle component scores for 64 plots in four forests assigned to 'age
class', with a grid of 28 numbered boxes overlain. Source: Moss and Picozzi (1994: 19).
Once the PRIN1 and PRIN2 scores of the various classes of forest around a lek site
had been averaged and weighted according to the areas of each class, the forest as a whole
around a lek site could be given two structural scores, which Picozzi et. al. refer to as
GRANNY and PLANTATION scores. The GRANNY score is derived from PRIN1 and the
PLANTATION score is derived from PRIN2. Because 'a high PRIN1 score.. .occurred in
native pine forest with spreading, old 'granny' trees', the GRANNY score 'was essentially a
measure of how closely a forest resembled a typical, semi-natural old forest' (Picozzi et. al.
1992: 758). These scores were then plotted against the density of cock capercaillie at the lek
sites and after excluding two outliers the correlation between bird density and GRANNY
score was significant and positive (increasing GRANNY score is associated with increasing
bird density) and the correlation between density and PLANTATION score was weakly
negative. The positive correlation between GRANNY score and capercaillie density meant
that the more a forest resembled a semi-natural forest the more capercaillie would be
expected. Consequently, Moss and Picozzi (1994: 8) argued that 'In general, the findings
suggest that forest management for capercaillie should aim to produce a forest structure with
features resembling those of a semi-natural pinewood'. Forests that already had a semi-
natural structure could be left alone because capercaillie were thought to prefer them, but
forests that did not, could potentially be managed to shift them towards the structure of the
semi-natural. That is, towards an open character with scattered, spreading trees with thick
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sweeping branches, rounded crowns and a good field layer of dwarf shrubs (because
blaeberry is recognised as a key food plant).
Ultimately, then, the objective of thinning young plantations is twofold. On the one
hand, managers negotiated the ambiguity of minimal intervention and the competing
imperatives of protecting and enhancing the naturalness of the site by separating the semi-
natural forest from the plantations and leaving the former unmanaged whilst restoring the
latter. Intervening in plantations was aimed at enhancing their natural character. On the other
hand, it was thought that since capercaillie preferred the semi-natural forest, if the
plantations could be thinned so as to take on the character of a more open forest as they
matured so more capercaillie habitat would be produced. As such, the concern with
naturalness coincides with a concern for the capercaillie. In fact, the work on capercaillie re-
enforces the distinction between the natural and unnatural by helping construct the semi-
natural as the most suitable for capercaillie and plantations as less suitable. More
specifically, the work on capercaillie and forest structure actually constructs an image of
what constitutes a semi-natural structure.
By superimposing a grid of boxes on figure 6.6, a set of ideal types is effectively
produced. Although these boxes were established to develop a key that could be used by
forest managers to identify the structural qualities of their forests, it effectively reinforced a
particular image of semi-natural forest structure (figure 6.7).
Figure 6.7. Diagrammatic representations of (A) semi-natural stand structure; (B) forests with
high PRIN2 scores; and (C) a key for the interpretation of A and B. Source: Moss and
Picozzi (1994: 19).
Taking box three (figure 6.7 A), the box which contains the most semi-natural plots,
the forest averages ,16m in height, the trees are well spaced being approximately 5m apart,
they have broad crowns and the ground flora is dominated by heather but with blaeberry
present. (Note that this image of semi-natural pinewoods ignores the fact that under recent
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definitions semi-natural woodland could also refer to young, dense natural regeneration that
appears to be very much like a plantation). By contrast, box twenty (figure 6.7 B) represents
a stand with trees much closer together, with great amounts of dead material in the lower
canopy and virtually no ground flora because of a lack of light. Thus managers are provided
with an image of what they should be aiming at and thus a kind of manual for what practical
action they should carry out.
The early management of Abernethy
This chapter has explored the early approach to management at Abernethy. Operating from a
concern with the naturalness of the site, the management centred on a strategy of minimal
intervention which involved leaving the ancient semi-natural forest sylviculturally
unmanaged; enhancing the naturalness of the less natural bits of the forest by restoring
plantations and in the process also undertaking work to benefit the capercaillie; encouraging
regeneration by culling deer; and felling the plantations of exotic conifers. Crucially, what is
revealed by asking 'why minimal intervention?' and 'why those specific forms of
intervention?' is a complex field of negotiation. Concerns with naturalness were balanced
against intervention. Concerns for species were balanced against the habitat and naturalness.
What happened is that specific strategies were employed and justified by using different
discursive resources with respect to different issues. The policy of thinning plantations, for
example, was an appropriate form ofminimal intervention - even if it involved quite drastic
thinning - because a spatial strategy of separating areas by degree of naturalness allowed
plantations to be constructed as less natural and amenable to enhancement. Separating
natural from unnatural areas and intervening in the less natural ones was a strategy for
achieving the dual aim of protecting and enhancing the pinewoods and was achieved by
putting different concepts of naturalness to work in different contexts. Where the naturalness
of the already highly natural areas was protected by abstracting human agency, the natural
character of the plantations could be enhanced by human agency. At the same time, a policy
of culling was adopted, even in the near natural areas that were to be left alone, because of
the construction of red deer and appropriate management. Culling was the best option - in
contrast to fencing - precisely because the forest's naturalness would be least harmed by the
indirect effects of culling, and because a case could be made that culling replicated natural
processes and so was not necessarily analogous to direct manipulative intervention. In this
way, intervention can be appropriate in one context but inappropriate in another depending
on how the issue is constructed and how competing considerations are balanced.
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The management strategies set out in the 1991 and 1995 management plans, then,
mark the achievement of minimal intervention. Minimal intervention does not come pre¬
packaged, but is worked out in situated practice. Viewed with the concept of rationalisation
in mind, minimal intervention can be understood as a compromise where the ambiguity of
the position of conservation with respect to rationalisation is reached. On the one hand, it is
an attempt to protect nature from the rationalising and controlling tendencies of human
impact. On the other, some of those controlling tendencies are evident in the sorts of
intervention that are undertaken. It is a resolution of the ambiguity of conservation being
both part of and reaction to rationalisation, and it is reached in a very specific way because
of the particular circumstances of this one site.
This achievement, however, was not final. As the fortunes of different species and
habitats changed and as policies began to have what were seen as negative effects, the ideas
that under-pinned early management were challenged. In chapter seven, I examine why and
how minimum intervention was questioned; how pinewoods and pinewood species were re¬
constructed in attempts to achieve new forms of management; and thus how conservation's






The mid 1990s were a period of relative stability at Abernethy. After the policies ofminimal
intervention were established, their implementation was necessary. As such, the 1995
management plan (RSPB 1995), the first plan produced for the whole Abernethy Forest
Reserve, reproduced the policy of 1991. For those managing the site, it was too soon to
assess whether the adopted policies were producing the desired results. It was not too soon,
however, for others to express their doubts about the appropriateness of the management
being undertaken.
Roy Dennis (1995), who was for many years the RSPB's Highland Officer and
involved in the purchase of several parts of Abernethy (but who is no longer directly
involved with the RSPB), voiced his thoughts on pinewood management in ECOS. Drawing
upon his experience of forests around the world, Dennis, who is a widely respected and
influential figure in Scottish conservation circles, contrasted the forest fragments in Scotland
with the larger, richer and implicitly more natural forests of Poland or Sweden and made
suggestions concerning how Scottish forests should be restored to become ecologically
sustainable. While the proposal to connect the fragments of forest in the Spey and Mar
catchments into more contiguous units was welcome, Dennis was concerned that the forests
should be managed in ways that encouraged their long-term sustainability. He was 'alarmed
that there is too much gardening and over-manipulation in reserves' and goes on to suggest
that 'In the end they [i.e. nature reserves] should manage themselves and we should hold the
tiller more lightly' (Dennis 1995: 19). Living, as he does, on the edge of the reserve at
Abernethy, these comments were no doubt aimed at the RSPB's management of the forest
and specifically the policy of thinning plantations to produce open, spreading pine trees
similar to the semi-natural woodland. This policy was, for Dennis, misguided because
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today's open parkland structure of the semi-natural woodland is itself unnatural: 'the leggy
growth of heather in the forest is unnatural, the choking of forest ponds by aquatic vegetation
is unnatural and the tall straggly stems of willow are unnatural' (Dennis 1995: 19). The
policy ofminimum intervention was problematic because, on the one hand, the heavy deer
cull, which reduced the grazing pressure, allowed the heather and field layer to grow up in a
way that would not occur in a natural forest. On the other hand, thinning plantations to
produce what was understood to be a more natural situation when the policy was decided
upon, now appeared to be reproducing another unnatural situation because allowing more
space between trees and thus allowing more light means that long 'leggy' heather will
develop here too and create a relatively uniform field layer across the reserve.
Working from the idea of the semi-natural areas as remnants of naturalness subject
to overgrazing - and from the idea that natural systems were relatively stable (cf. Adams
2003a) - it was presumed that if the deer were culled the forests would flourish and that
naturalness would be protected/enhanced. But in reducing the grazing pressure, what Dennis
saw, was a forest developing characteristics that could inhibit forest processes such as
regeneration and that are bad for species such as black grouse and capercaillie. Dennis was,
in effect, challenging the minimal intervention management at Abernethy. He was
suggesting that the policy being pursued would not actually achieve its own objectives of
protecting naturalness and ensuring the conservation of pinewood species, because the
increasingly long field layer was unnatural and detrimental to many highly valued species.
Although these thoughts were made public in 1995, it was not until 1997 that these
issues came to be central to discussions at Abernethy itself, when further prompting from
Dennis effectively began the management planning process scheduled for the winter of
1998/99. There followed a prolonged debate over the appropriateness of the management
thus far and the long-term vision and how to achieve it. The result was the 2001 management
plan and the apparent shift towards greater levels of intervention. In this chapter, I examine
the processes by which that shift occurred.
Re-assessing management
Once criticisms of minimum intervention had been raised, managers were forced to ask
whether or not their management policy was actually achieving the desired objectives. To
answer this, the managers turned to the gradually accumulating data on regeneration and
deer numbers, available as a result of the monitoring undertaken since the culling policy was
put in place. On reflection, one ofmy interviewees thought that 1997 was a crucial moment
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in appraising prior management and in appreciating that managing pinewoods was more
complicated than just reducing deer numbers, he said:
What we are now learning, really, from about...in terms of date, '97 was quite
important because that was...we established the baseline monitoring of tree
regeneration in 1988 no 89 time. Looked at it again in '92, looked at it in
'97...It was quite obvious that a lot happened in the first few years but we are
pretty certain that now, the rate of recruitment of new regeneration, which is a
primary aim of the site, has slowed down. Deer are still in quite low numbers,
probably even gone down a bit further. But we are not actually getting, rather
simplistic, you know, the delivery of new trees. So that was one of the first
things that alerted to us that there may be a bit more to managing...pinewoods
than reducing deer (Interview H, 30th January 2002).
At a presentation in 2002 explaining the changing approaches to management, this
realisation was represented in a series of graphs. We must recognise that discussions over the
questioning of minimal intervention were taking place in 1997, which means that the data
evident in these graphs was less certain. Even so, trends were emerging. The first trend was
encouraging and supported the policy of culling deer because as the deer were reduced in
numbers so the height of seedlings was allowed to increase (figure 7.1). There was evidence
that a reduction in deer numbers was having a real effect on allowing tree growth.
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Figure 7.1. Change in red deer numbers vs median height of pine seedlings at Abernethy
(Source: Amphlett 2002).
A second trend was, however, less encouraging. The reduction in deer numbers was
accompanied by a reduction in the establishment of new seedlings (figure 7.2). The
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assumption implicit in the policy ofminimum intervention - that if the grazing pressure was
reduced the woodland would be given chance to expand - was apparently misplaced because
as the numbers were reduced, the rate of the expansion of the pinewood by regeneration was
slowing down. Other factors must be working to inhibit seedling establishment.
Change in red deer numbers vs apparent recruitment
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Figure 7.2. Change in red deer numbers vs apparent recruitment of Scots pine seedlings at
Abernethy (Source: Amphlett 2002).
A third trend only added to concerns about regeneration. At the same time as deer numbers
were being reduced with the resultant effects on vegetation, the black grouse, which did well
at Abernethy in the early 1990s, gradually declined (figure 7.3).
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Figure 7.3. Change in red deer numbers and blackcock at leks (Source: Amphlett 2002).
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This initial appraisal of management thus appeared to confirm the worries of Roy Dennis
and to suggest that the policy ofminimal intervention might not actually be the best way of
achieving their objectives. To the site managers these data suggested the heavy deer cull was
having disadvantageous effects that had to be connected with changes in the field layer:
the general view was that if you prevented the deer from browsing the forest and
browsing the regeneration then you would get into the cycle where natural
regeneration occurred and everything would be fine. Low levels of mammal
intervention and the forest regeneration would occur. I think people have been
finding that if you exclose the deer, and Glen Tanar is probably a better example
than Abernethy, you get to the point where the dwarf shrub layer gets so long it
prevents natural regeneration itself (Interview N, 25th June 2002).
Equally, it was thought that a relatively long and uniform field layer was bad for woodland
grouse. Research on capercaillie suggested that areas of long heather were important because
they provided cover to nest in, but at the same time, it was known that capercaillie exhibit
particularly bad productivity in years with a lot of rain in June, when the chicks are young.
One interpretation of declining woodland grouse was that the combination of wet weather
and increasingly long vegetation was a detrimental one. Moreover, it was thought that since
the main food source for capercaillie and black grouse chicks is invertebrates that live
predominantly in the dwarf shrub canopy, as the heather and blaeberry grows, so the main
food source grows out of reach of the young chicks.
It appeared to the managers, therefore, that the policy of minimum intervention was
potentially acting against their broad objectives of woodland expansion and 'conserving the
native pinewood ecosystems for their nationally important habitats and assemblages of flora
and fauna' (RSPB 1995). The policy of minimal intervention represented a negotiated
achievement where constructions of the pinewoods as relatively natural and subject to
overgrazing were connected with certain forms of practice, but as the practice of minimal
intervention had unexpected effects so the idea of pinewoods was questioned. Consequently,
the changes that were taking place at Abernethy prompted a renegotiation of ideas and
policies. The changes prompted new questions. Should minimal intervention continue to be
pursued? Should another sort of management be pursued? Should there be more
intervention? Should work be undertaken specifically to encourage regeneration or woodland
grouse? Thus the original question that was asked when the Forest Lodge section of the site
was acquired in 1988 - what is best way to conserve the pinewoods? - was asked again, but,
crucially, in a different context.
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Re-negotiating the nature of pinewoods
In the early days, the naturalness of the site was one of the prime concerns. Minimal
intervention as a broad policy and complex set of practices was put in place to protect and
enhance that naturalness. That is, the policy was based upon the idea of the forests being
relatively natural but subject to damage from too many deer. It was thought that if the deer
were removed, the forests would be returned to a more natural condition. But as a relatively
uniform field layer developed and had apparently detrimental results, so that uniform growth
was understood as 'unnatural'. Consequently, if the result of the policy was 'unnatural', the
idea of the forest upon which the policy was based must have been wrong. This in turn
meant that the idea that the semi-natural areas were closest to natural and that their qualities
could provide the model for thinning plantations and enhancing naturalness, was also
potentially flawed. Accordingly, in order to be able to decide on a new direction for
management, the managers had to re-ask an old question: what is natural? They needed to
have a relatively clear idea of what it was they were aiming at. As such, the question - what
is a natural pinewood? - ran through the management planning process that took place
between 1997 and 2000.
This management planning process took place through a series of meetings
involving managers, ecologists and specialist researchers. At these meetings, managers
attempted to keep their discussions as factually based as possible and avoid the simple
expression of personal opinion by pre-circulating briefing documents, academic papers and
internal reports in order that they would provide a focus for discussion. Examination of these
texts, and reference to interviewee's comments, allows an understanding of the discursive
resources called upon in reconstructing the natural pinewood and thus management.
The 'New' Ecology
When Dennis (1995, also see Dennis 1998) challenged the management of pinewoods and of
Abemethy, he did so by suggesting that the policy ofminimal intervention in the early 1990s
was inappropriate because it was based on a false idea of the forest. In making this claim he
called upon developing ideas in ecology. Through what Botkin (1990) calls the 'new
ecology' and what Worster (1990) refers to as the 'ecology of chaos', ecology as a discipline
was undergoing significant change. Until the 1970s, ecology had been dominated by the
'equilibrium paradigm' (Steward et. al. 1992; Mcintosh 1985). Clements' ideas of
succession, for example, although termed 'dynamic ecology', implied that natural systems
tended towards order (Worster 1993). Similarly, as E.P. Odum sought to boost ecology's
scientific credentials by transforming it into an experimental science based around the
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concept of 'systems', the idea of equilibrium was retained. Ecosystems were seen as
exhibiting stability and it was thought that if a system was disturbed it would, as a self-
regulating system, return to its position of stability. Understood in this way, ecosystems were
relatively predictable and could be manipulated by the ecologist or manager. But since the
1970s, the ideas of equilibrium, stability and the 'balance of nature' have been challenged.
The new ecology has emphasised the non-linearity of ecological processes and the role of
disturbance in ecological systems (Pickett and White 1985; Pahl-Wostl 1995; Zimmerer
1994, 2000). Stability, it is now argued, is rare; ecosystems are in a continual state of
upheaval.
It was with reference to these ideas that Dennis argued that instead of simply setting
out to protect naturalness as if it already existed and attempting to check any negative
influences on that naturalness 'we should recognise that natural events, such as fires,
droughts, storms, floods and changes in the numbers of individual species create the mosaic
of ecotones within these places. Death, destruction and renewal are part of nature and we
should not strive for equilibrium' (Dennis 1995: 19). The policy of minimal intervention at
Abernethy was, for Dennis, misguided because it was assumed that the forest would tend
towards stability. It was assumed that all that was wrong was that there were too many deer
(on the importance of the notion of equilibrium and stability in conservation management see
Adams 2003a). Once the numbers had been reduced, intervention should be minimal to
protect that stability. But, for Dennis, protecting the forest from fire or from high levels of
grazing in uniform ways meant that the forest would take on a relatively uniform structure.
Such uniformity was unnatural because the forest would not, under the new ecology, tend
toward stability. Rather, forests are in a continual state of upheaval. For Dennis the
disturbance caused by fire, storms and large mammals (Dennis 1998) is natural, indeed it is
crucial because disturbance processes are fundamental in perpetuating the forest. Fire may
burn the forest and the field layer but it creates a seedbed and provides a pulse of nutrients
suitable for regeneration and whilst grazing can keep the vegetation in check, hooves churn
the soil and dung provides nutrients. So in protecting the forest from upheaval, management
was stopping the forest achieve its 'natural' condition.
This rationale was also shared by some of the staff at Abernethy. Calling upon the
same developments in ecology - and, I suspect, simply constructing the opposite ofminimal
intervention - a key point of discussion in management planning meetings was the need for
disturbance. In an internal report that reviewed the literature on the role of fire in forest
systems, for example, the author, an advocate of the role of fire management, adopts an
explicitly argumentative tone:
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Fire cannot be ignored in long-term planning as the management of forest
ecosystems must take into account disturbance processes as these are an integral
part of the ecosystem. The continuation and preservation of natural forests is
clearly not being accomplished through the policy of total fire exclusion
because fire is part of the natural ecosystem (Proctor 1998: 2).
While fire has long been regarded as an essential element of pine forests (Carlisle 1977;
Gimingham 1977), Proctor takes his inspiration from developments in the US. There, fire
was suppressed under a policy of minimal intervention because it was constructed as an
agent of damage. This policy was reversed, however, after the wildfires in Yellowstone in
1988, which were understood to be caused by the suppression of fire and the resultant build¬
up of fuel. If fire suppression had resulted in an unnatural build up of fuel, it followed that
the normal occurrence of fire acted as a natural means of fuel removal. As such, fire was
reconstructed and understood as part of the forest system. Here, Proctor explicitly seeks to
reposition fire as an integral part of the natural forest and does so by connecting the lessons
from the US with the idea of the importance of disturbance derived from the new ecology.
He continued:
Climax communities were once considered to be the most stable in terms of
structure, species diversity, fertility and in nutrient production, retention and
recycling. Any large-scale disturbance was seen as a 'backward step' as it
stopped the forest reaching the climax stage or returned it to the first
successional stage. The reverse is now seen to be true. Climax communities are
not stable because fire and windthrow initiate successional changes in the
community... climax forests are probably rare as any fires in this type of habitat
are generally stand replacing (Proctor 1998: 11).
Ecological theories are themselves claims to define the nature of natural woodland and
Proctor utilises the 'new ecology' to challenge ideas of stability bound up with notions of
climax communities, which are themselves arguably bound up with policies of minimal
intervention. Thus debates in academic ecology are called upon and used as argumentative
resources by those in Abemethy that wish to argue for different management. In the process,
the idea of the natural forest that had underpinned minimal intervention is contested.
This emphasis on disturbance was reinforced by a study of how the current
management was effecting invertebrates (Edwards 1999). With reference to the areas of
grassland within the forest, the report says that:
The loss of continuity of flowers through agricultural intensification as a major
reason for the loss of many insect species has long been well recognised. A
similar effect due to over and under grazing of unimproved grasslands has been
concerning entomologists for a number of years. 'Leaving it to nature' where
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there is no established balance of grazing animals, predators and disturbance
agents and, equally, the uniform reintroduction of grazing management have
been responsible for the loss of many insect populations on reserve areas
(Edwards 1999: 16).
In effect, Edwards is saying that too little grazing can be just as harmful as too much and that
the policy of minimal intervention potentially reduced the diverse habitats that a diverse
range of species need. What is needed is a diversity of management with disturbance and
upheaval. As an interviewee interpreted the report, Edwards
didn't say, oh yeah everything is rosy. He said well yeah, you've got your big
objectives, but within that, you know, this species, actually they don't like this
lack of grazing, actually they rather like grazing, they like disturbance. These
areas where, you've still got lots of deer, they may be eating all the trees but
they are maintaining the short grassland that these species like, they are
maintaining more open flowery areas for nectar, pollen sources. So it adds
complexity. And I suppose one of the watchwords of colleagues in the last few
years is 'it's getting more complicated' and of course it is (Interview H, 30th
January 2002).
The implication was that minimal intervention had created an unnatural situation. A more
natural situation would be where some areas were disturbed, some not, and as some areas of
bare ground were colonised by regenerating pine, others would be created elsewhere and so
on. Reconstructed with the help of the new ecology, natural woodlands contain change and
fluctuation, not uniformity.
Environmental History
A second set of discursive resources called upon to re-establish what a natural pinewood
would look like were historical. When the RSPB took on the Forest Lodge estate in 1988 the
history of the forest was well known (Steven and Carlisle 1959; O'Sullivan 1973; Munro
1988; Grant 1994). Indeed this history, which was derived from documentary and pollen
evidence, was referred to in management plans and other documents (RSPB 1991;
Conservation Course 1988). But in the first management plan, whilst this past was
recognised, it was played down. The semi-natural forest was understood to have remained
relatively intact and retained considerable natural qualities despite past exploitation. It was
this emphasis on their relative naturalness that led to the policy of leaving these areas
silviculturally unmanaged and to their position as the model of a natural pinewood.
This policy and the downplaying of history did not, however, go uncontested. There
were some that did not agree with elements of the policy of minimal intervention and in
contesting the appropriateness of the policy, they used the forest's history as an
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argumentative resource. They brought the history to the foreground. A sense of how the
forest's history was mobilised is apparent in conversations recorded in my fieldnotes. As I
worked with a member of staff, attaching black barrier netting to a fence around a vegetation
monitoring plot, we spoke about his job and how he loved his work but how he hated doing
the work he thought was pointless:
He hated the work restructuring plantations in such as way as to produce a
structure similar to the broad crown semi-natural woodland we were standing in.
For him this broad crown stuff is not natural at all because over a hundred years
ago people came in and took out all the straight stuff and left all the knotty,
gnarly looking stuff which was not worth as much. So the broad canopy is an
artefact of past intervention and restructuring plantations to fit this broad crown
idea is gardening; it moves plantations as a human artefact towards a different
structure, which is equally the result of human action. The forest as it is, he said,
is completely unnatural in the sense that the trees are too sparse. If you go to
Poland or Russia the pine forests are much more dense...
This member of staff was of the view that this was a nature reserve and that we should
simply cull the deer and leave the rest to develop as it will. So even with a minimal
intervention policy for the semi-natural areas, intervention in plantations was too much
intervention. Whilst he criticises the set of practices involved in the broad policy of minimal
intervention, he is actually in favour of the broad policy; it is just the specifics that he
dislikes. Here he refers to past intervention in order to claim the present structure of even the
bits of the forest that were taken to be special, as not 'natural' in the pristine sense. They take
on a form that has been assumed to be natural precisely because of the past intervention. He
does so to undermine the rationale behind restructuring plantations that he would prefer were
just left to self-thin.
Similar sorts of argumentative strategies were employed in interviews with others
that were uneasy at the policy as it was being carried out. In the following quote my
interviewee questions the perception of the old semi-natural areas as the appropriate form for
the forest. Comparing the widely spaced trees of the upper forest with the trees that
regenerated naturally around Forest Lodge (the old estate house, now the office, where the
interview was conducted) he noted:
Some of the Reserve staffs perception of what the reserve should look like will
determine their management.. .but is that the right interpretation. And that is
what we were saying last week about looking at the historical side, taking all the
historical evidence and then from there combining it with what you see as
natural regeneration and saying well, how come natural regeneration doesn't
look like the stuff that we have got now...
Andrew: what do you mean by the stuffwe have got now?
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Interviewee: er well these kind of big broad Granny pines ... those big trees is
what I class as the stuff they have got now and looking at the historical evidence
... those big trees are the result of what humans did 200, 300 years ago. The
natural regen doesn't look like that, they are tall, straight, quite a small canopy,
erm more branches have dropped off naturally, so the form is not the same. That
is not to say that you won't get Granny type pines, these big broad canopy pines
in a natural forest, you will get them, but probably rarer (Interview S, 15th
August 2002).
By bringing the history of the forest to the foreground a different idea of the natural forest
begins to emerge. Since the past management of taking trees for ships' masts has resulted in
the spaced character of the forest, a forest that has not had such selective human
management would be naturally more dense. Equally, the actual form of the trees is an
artefact of management. On the one hand, as the straight trees were removed so only the
gnarled, less valuable ones, were left. On the other hand, as space was created, young trees
had a chance to develop in a way that allowed the retention of lower limbs and the
development of broad crowns. A more natural forest, therefore, would be more dense and
made up of relatively straight, tall trees.
This alternative interpretation of the naturalness of the current semi-natural areas was
captured when I asked another interviewee about how a manager knew what a forest should
be like (because management has to aim at something). I framed my question in terms of the
debates about whether broadly spaced trees are natural, he said:
Andrew: ...some of the remnants that are there are very spaced broad crown
trees, and there's a debate about whether or not it should actually be quite dense
Interviewee: umhum, more natural in fact. Because the broad crown grannies
are an artefact of previous man and they are really prevalent in Scottish semi-
natural woods are they not, because they are an artefact of previous
management. If you go to, you know, pristine boreal forest, you get very few of
these, only in the odd clearing you get the odd granny, generally the trees are
quite dense. More like plantations in many ways I'm told (Interview D, 17th
January 2002).
Peterken (1993) offers an interpretation of this changing importance of history. He suggests
that as recently as the 1980s woodland conservationists and foresters 'still considered that
most ancient woods were relatively unmodified remnants of the original 'wildwood',
preserved as oases of stability in a changing landscape' (1993: 314). But goes on to suggest
that the recognition of human impact on woodland composition means that 'a simplistic view
of ancient woodlands is...being replaced by a long history of complex interaction and co-
evolution of woodland and local human communities' (1993: 315). This sort of simplistic
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reading of accumulating knowledge and changing practice is, however, contradicted by the
recognition that the history of the pinewoods was well known in 1988. Whilst it might be
true to say that the forest was viewed as a 'relatively unmodified remnant of the original
'wildwood', preserved as an oasis of stability in a changing landscape', it would be wrong to
say that increasing historical knowledge simply leads to changing ideas because those
managing the site were already aware of the long history of human involvement. The forest's
history was mobilised in a political context, for particular ends.
This mobilisation of history by people who did not really agree with the policy as it
was practiced was important when it came to the management planning process within which
the policy was being re-examined. As both the general policy, and the construction of the
pinewoods upon which the policy rested, were being questioned, the history of the forest was
brought back to the foreground. The original management plan had acknowledged the site's
history in terms of numbers of deer and timber extraction but had retained the notion that the
semi-natural areas retained natural qualities and that they represented a continuous link with
past naturalness. But by 1999, a report entitled ' The History and Ecology of Abernethy
Forest, Strathspey' (Summers 1999) retold the history of Abernethy with reference to maps
reproduced from O'Sullivan (1973) and concluded that 'much of Abernethy Forest has been
cut during the last 250 years so the idea that there had been continuous tree cover since the
last glaciation can be dismissed' (Summers 1999: 10). The history of the forest is brought
back to the fore and the semi-natural areas are reconstructed.
Quite how this worked to reconstruct the natural pinewood can be seen in other
documents. One such document, circulated prior to meetings in 1997, discussed the 'Future
Structure of Abernethy Forest' (Anon. 1997). In it, the objective of management was re¬
stated in terms developed by Peterken (1996: 13), as the development of an 'original-natural'
forest. (One year later this objective had changed to the development of a 'present-natural'
(Peterken 1996: 13) forest because it was thought that recreating an original-natural forest
was probably impossible because of changes in climate.) Defined as 'the state which existed
before people became a significant ecological factor', 'original naturalness' was constructed
by detailing past intervention and what effect that intervention had in altering the
characteristics of the woodland. In this way, natural woodland was constructed as exhibiting
the opposite characteristics to those that were anthropogenically derived. If people had
removed trees and created a stand structure that is characterised by widely spaced trees, a
more natural forest would be more dense. Since certain owners in the past disliked birch and
had it removed, it is likely that there was a greater proportion of birch. And since people had
kept deer numbers high and deer prefer to eat broadleaves before conifers, it is likely that a
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more natural pinewood would contain more broadleaf trees. It was, therefore, presumed that
if the effects of intervention could be reversed, the forest would move towards a more
natural condition. In thus reconstructing the present forest as relatively unnatural - as one of
my interviewee's remarked 'it is not near natural, untouched, you know, these woods have
been in a way devastated by heavy felling' - a new picture emerged of what a natural
woodland should look like. There would be species which are now extinct from Scotland that
would have been 'important members of the natural pine forest in that they influence the
structure of the forest (moose), rivers and riverside vegetation (beaver) and impact on large
herbivores (wolf)' (Anon. 1998). There would be a higher density of pines and there would
be a higher proportion of broadleaf species. There would be large amounts of deadwood, a
diversity of forest cover with some areas not forested at all and there would be natural
processes associated with the effects of fire, wind, snow, drought and disease.
The Natural Analogue
A third discursive resource called upon in the questioning of minimal intervention and in
attempts to re-define the nature of a natural pinewood, comes from studies and experience of
natural forests elsewhere. One ofmy interviewees made this clear in speaking about creating
a woodland of natural character. These more natural forests are in Scandinavia or further
east:
we wanted to try and develop a woodland of natural character. You know,
what's natural? A glib question, it's a very important question but its an easy
one to ask but um. That's quite crucial and I had a bit of time ... to put together
our thoughts and what we knew about the situation abroad and what we'd read
... you know, characterising the sort of attributes and the processes in a more
natural boreal forest which is our sort of analogy for Abemethy. So looking to
Scandinavia and then further East. So we have a picture of - not going back,
you know not putting the clock back or anything like that but erm, time marches
on - the sort of features that we would like to see more of at Abernethy and
those we would argue we would like to see less of, the sorts of processes that
support that, which often revolve around disturbance, so things like fire are very
much in people's minds (Interview H, 30th January 2002).
The more natural forests of other places thus become models for Abernethy. Nearly every
interviewee made reference to the forests of other countries not being exploited as much as
the forests in Scotland and that they were, thus, closer to their 'natural' condition. This is
environmental history as the geographical present. Looking to forests in other countries is to
look back in time within Scotland. Other countries are less advanced in their exploitation,
yet, as time progresses those natural forests seem to recede into the east. In speaking about
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the possibility of simply letting natural processes, such as fire, free reign, an interviewee
said:
We basically say that the native pinewood is simply too small to manage in that
way. It was OK when it stretched halfway from here to Aberdeen.. .As it does in
some parts, not many parts of Scandinavia now, but once you get into Russia
and things (Interview H, 30th January 2002).
To get a better idea of what a natural woodland is like one had to go east to places where
there are tracts of forest big enough to have retained large mammals and their natural
processes. It was with this purpose in mind that in 1998 a party of RSPB staff, along with
some from the Forestry Commission, visited Norway to 'obtain information about the
structure and conservation of near-natural pine forests' (Campbell et. al. 1999: 3). Similarly,
in 2002 a field visit was organised to Bialowieza, Poland. When I asked how important such
visits were to the work at Abernethy, one interviewee suggested that they helped raise the
eyes from the immediacy of day-to-day management:
What I took from Poland in particular in terms of a specific issue was the
importance of deadwood because the ratio, I mean we are quite well off for
deadwood in Abernethy but the ratio of deadwood to live wood over in the
Polish forests is far higher than here and it creates so many niches in terms of
birds, there are several woodpecker species there and you see them all over the
place, ...and there is so much biodiversity associated with that, that that was a
real eye-opener for me. And you almost wanted to come back and kill the
whole forest [laughs] because it just created so much life. It was great, a real
real eye-opener (Interview P, 8th August 2002).
The attributes of this more natural forest were contrasted with Abernethy in order to provide
goals for management. But more than this, as the managers were also working with ideas of
disturbance emphasised in the new ecology, so these more natural forests exhibited all the
processes that they might expect:
you could see all the processes going on. You could see acorns lying on the
ground, you could see young oaks coming through, you could see oaks that
were 500 years, 10 percent dead and you could see woodpeckers all over them
so I suppose that is what we are aiming for. ..and it helps if you have got big
mammals running about, they make a huge difference to the forest (Interview P,
8th August 2002).
Negotiating new directions
The discussion that the questioning of minimum intervention fostered, concerning what
constituted a natural woodland, resulted in a new image of the natural pinewood, or at least
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the ascendancy of one image over another. Interwoven with this new image was a set of
attributes and processes which would be expected to be present. Consequently, this new
image opened up for debate questions of whether or not management should work towards
restoring those attributes and processes. Should broadleaf species be encouraged? Should
fires be left to burn? Should plantations be left to self-thin because a natural pine forest
would have a higher density anyway? Should a few of the big old trees be killed to increase
the amount of deadwood? How can lost processes of disturbance be replicated? Should the
deer culling programme develop in a much more complicated way?
These questions returned the managers to issues of naturalness and intervention. Even
if the new idea of a natural pinewood suggested new forms ofmanagement involving fire or
grazing, should they be undertaken? Could human manipulation make the forest more
natural? Or should a policy of minimal intervention be continued? There were, on these
issues, different positions that reveal the extent to which finding a way forward was a
process of negotiation. For some, even though they recognised that minimal intervention had
negative effects (at least in the short term) and that the forest had a long history of human
influence, minimal intervention was still the way forward:
Andrew: Last week you said, well we talked about several things, one was like
the only natural thing you had seen in the forest was when the Nethy changed
course - I went and had a look and it was impressive, and other things like
sometimes you sit back and say 'Nooo, just let it go'... and I just wondered
where you stood on naturalness and intervention in the forest. How far should
we be intervening?
Interviewee: I would probably put myself in the non-intervention camp. So
maybe not pure sort of non-intervention as such, probably minimalist. So we
obviously, we are keeping tracks open, so I would say if a tree falls across a
track you would maybe cut the centre out of the tree, take that centre up and
throw it to the side. So you are not taking anything off the site but with the
tracks are still usable or for health and safety reasons you might have to cut
something down, but other than that I would say very very little human
intervention (Interview S, 15th August 2002).
This interviewee went on to contextualise this self-positioning in a non-interventionist camp
by indicating that for him, naturalness, in the sense of a lack of human involvement, rather
than whether the forest conforms to our ideas of what a natural woodland 'should' be like,
was crucial:
Andrew: so if the forest is the result of human impact, why leave it alone all of a
sudden?
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Interviewee: I.. .yeah.. .erm ...well the way I think about it is that the trees that
we have got now, rather than trying to correct the mistakes which would then
leave gaps that may not have occurred there naturally, that we should just say
well OK what we have now is the result of three hundred years worth of human
impact, but rather than say well we are going to continue that, by managing and
cutting out some of the trees that we don't think look the right shape, then we
should stop all management, let these trees get to their old age and eventually
die and then what will be replacing them will be these newer type trees, the
plantation type trees that folk consider aren't natural [but which are considered
to be more natural under the new image of a natural pinewood] (Interview S,
15lh August 2002).
Where others might suggest that management could be undertaken to make the forest take on
a more natural character, this interviewee would argue that if the forest is left alone and
given sufficient time, it would take on the more natural form. Even though the forest is the
result of human influence, leaving it alone will allow it to become more natural in both the
sense that it takes on a natural form and in the sense that it exists outwith the control of
people. Moreover, if the forest is left alone, the processes that are now understood to be so
important will be perpetuated. One interviewee - who positioned himself with the non-
/minimal interventionist camp by saying 'I would still overall push that this site should be
left to manage itself as much as possible apart from the deer control' - made precisely this
point. He did so in a way that illustrated the flexibility of argumentative positions and the
way that speakers can utilise new argumentative resources. In this case, the speaker calls
upon the concept of biodiversity and thus illustrates the way that arguments about practice at
Abernethy are situated in a wider context. Minimal intervention is preferable because:
you will get your maximum biodiversity by leaving these trees to become old
naturally and die. Whatever you look at, whether it is beetles, fungi, lichen,
there are quite often more things associated with a dead tree than there are with
a live tree and what we don't want is a forest of dead trees. But if you let nature
take its course, if we go in to thin there we don't know that that tree is not the
next one to die. So if you started thinning what you interfere with is this natural
process a long-term supply of deadwood. You know freshly dead, long-term
dead, collapsed dead, so all this cycle of deadwood, that's where the richness
comes in (Interview R, 15th August 2002).
Interventionist management to make the forest conform to the new idea of the natural
pinewood would, according to this interviewee, risk interfering in processes that are best left
to nature. A richer, more biodiverse forest results from letting nature take its course. The
alternative of trying to manipulate the forest so that it conforms to our idea of a natural forest
raises the spectre of always chasing the ideal: intervention would never stop.
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For others, though, since minimal intervention had negative effects, continuing with
that policy was clearly not an option. Abstracting human influence after a long history of
such influence did not, for many, make sense:
Andrew: I was just reading the paper by Edwards on invertebrates saying that
grasslands needed to be grazed, heather needed to be shorter in certain areas and
longer in others, that verges towards suggesting that you need to have
management in different areas for different things in different ways...is it
verging that way?
Interviewee: I think it is moving, it's not there yet, certainly not in terms of the
semi-natural remnants, but it is moving in that direction, but it might not get
there, but I suspect it will in ten, fifteen years time we might be doing quite a bit
more of that, perhaps soon. In terms of the burning, perhaps sooner. Personally,
I'm a I suppose I would be in the interventionist camp, but I can appreciate
the caution involved in the arguments...
Andrew: why would you put yourself in the interventionist camp?
Interviewee: because I'm not convinced that any part of the United Kingdom,
British Isles is not heavily influenced by man and er.. .ifwe are going to achieve
any particular objective in the future, human intervention will play a part in
achieving that objective. The only, where it might not is perhaps the high tops
of the Cairngorms where we don't do anything and I've never had any reason to
do anything.. .but down in the woodland.. .people think of Abernethy as a place
which has not been managed but the reality is that it has been hugely intensively
managed for four or five hundred years. I don't see why...all the plants and
animals that exist here have evolved through that management, I don't see why
we should stop intervening now...to some extent (Interview P, 8th August
2002).
This interviewee broke off from talking about the trend towards more manipulative
management to position himself in continuing debates about that trend. For him, and others
that position themselves in the interventionist camp, human intervention plays an important
part in achieving the goals of nature conservation. As such, there is less of a problem with
manipulating the forest so as to conform with the new idea of the natural pinewood. Another
interviewee put his argument more forcefully and extended the emphasis away from re¬
creating a natural pinewood to managing for species:
I think on some sites people want to, have still got this idea of you know you
leave it alone and lets see what happens. Or there are other people wanting to
manage it actively. So I think there are still differing opinions in nature
conservation circles about how to do things and in fact what we are trying to do.
I'm definitely in the camp: what we've got is not natural, we should be
managing it and we should for.. .we can't manage it for everything I don't think,
we need to manage it for what we want to manage it for and we shouldn't be
ashamed of saying that. ... I think generally speaking it's a cultural landscape
and if we want to have lots of capercaillie I think we know how to do that,
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notwithstanding weather problems etcetera. We shouldn't be ashamed of saying
we are managing this reserve for these birds and creating a natural forest as a
secondary aim because its almost an impossible thing to do isn't re-creating a
native woodland (Interview D, 17th January 2002).
For these interviewees, minimum intervention, as others advocated it, was not acceptable
because it would mean accepting whatever happened. If the forests were left to become more
natural over time, for example, it might be the case that particular species would be
negatively affected in the short-term. Such an approach was unacceptable because there were
specific stated objectives, such as protecting pinewood species, which should be worked
towards. For some that advocated intervention, people have the ability to intervene in ways
that allow balances to be reached. A pinewood of natural character could be developed,
whilst at the same time protecting species. For others, because they draw a sharp line
between the natural and the cultural and see any human action as corrupting nature and see
human influence everywhere, the concept of naturalness should be ignored. We should
simply decide what we want and set out to achieve it.
The reassessment of the policy of minimal intervention in management planning
meetings through the late 1990s opened up, therefore, a complex arena of negotiation. As the
constitution of a natural pinewood was discussed, questions of objectives were raised, and as
objectives verged into issues of intervention and naturalness so broad argumentative
positions on appropriate management developed. As one interviewee put it, if I sat in on the
next management planning meetings, he thought I would witness:
a real tussle between the broad brush approach - and the broad brush approach
ultimately produces the naturalness, or some components of it - and
the.. .gardening's a little unkind, but the maintenance of individual features or,
which may support some species, or the actual species themselves (Interview H,
30th January 2002).
Complicating the negotiations: the importance of species
There were, however, broader developments that impinged upon these negotiations. It was
not the case that different people simply argued the case for different approaches with the
outcome influenced by the strength of the argument or the power of the speaker. Rather,
these arguments were influenced by such things as the development of the biodiversity
process and objective-led planning. Those that were more inclined towards intervention, for
example, found resources in the development of objective-led approaches to conservation.
For them, minimal intervention was problematic because it meant accepting some of the
negative effects of the policy in the short term. But, as an interviewee noted:
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that slightly relaxed attitude to the waxing and waning in the fortunes of
different species is...is less easy under the whole Biodiversity Action Plan,
species action plan-type world in which we live. And that's probably a good
thing because it can be slightly sloppy, you sort of end up with a ... whatever
you end up with is OK, and that's not the best way of site management
(Interview H, 30th January 2002).
If minimal intervention was a means of developing a more natural pinewood in the
untouched sense, it potentially meant standing by as some species, that had prospered under
a more manipulative regime, faired less well. But in the context of a very focused approach
to conservation, such broad-brush management can appear 'sloppy'. The development of
action planning thus influenced the arguments between the interventionist and minimal
interventionist camps at Abernethy.
This is perhaps most evident with regard to the capercaillie. Reflecting on some of the
subtle changes in emphasis at Abernethy, one of the members of staff suggested that 'all
along, consistently for all the management plans, the primary objective was the expansion of
the woodlands by regeneration.. .there is no debate on that'. But he went on to say that:
In more recent years probably from about 95, 96 you will see that individual
species requirements particularly key birds like capercaillie and black grouse
have a far higher profile. They were perhaps not mentioned in the early plans
except for being mentioned as key species in the forest.. .they weren't getting
specific mention in the policies or specific mention in the prescriptions to meet
their needs. But they are far higher up the profile now because they have
declined. You know since the last national survey there has been a 50% decline
of capercaillie in the last 8 or 10 years you know. So the requirements of these
key species is higher up on our agenda than it was ten years ago (Interview Q,
13th August 2002).
As the capercaillie became incorporated in the biodiversity action planning process - and,
importantly, was understood to have declined - it became more central to questions of
appropriate management. As such, questions of species management began to impinge on
questions of how to manage Abernethy with regard to the concept of naturalness and the
changing idea of the natural pinewood.
More specifically, it was understood from research on the capercaillie that blaeberry
was one of the key plants because of its associated invertebrates and because its foliage,
stems and berries provide important foods for adults and older chicks. Yet as Petty pointed
out:
In open, semi-natural pinewoods there appear to be two problems. In woodlands
with heavy grazing pressure there is often quite a lot of blaeberry, but in
common with the rest of the vegetation it is short and offers little shelter for
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broods, and arthropods are scarce. In contrast, excluding deer by fencing or by
reducing densities through culling results in the vegetation becoming
increasingly long and dominated by heather. In addition to the loss of blaeberry,
young chicks appear to find it difficult to manoeuvre in such tall vegetation
(Petty 2000 n.p).
The situation in Abernethy, with its long 'leggy' heather, resulting from high rates of culling,
was potentially causing problems for the capercaillie. With this sort of situation in mind,
Petty suggests that,
it may be undesirable to just 'let nature take it course', as heather is likely to
become more dominant as the nutrient status of sites decline and stands become
more open. Consideration needs to be given to how the ground vegetation can
be better managed in these stands, including management options that will
increase nutrient cycling and in so doing lead to a revival of blaeberry and
provide better access and foraging for broods (Petty 2000 n.p.).
Minimal intervention was again challenged. If nature is left to take its course, the pinewood
field layer could develop in ways detrimental to the capercaillie. Consequently, another
strand of the debate at Abernethy centred on what could be done for the capercaillie. Since
fences had been removed or marked and predators were being controlled and the species was
still declining, consideration began to be given to the potential ways that brood habitats
could be improved. But all of the options of encouraging blaeberry and a diversity of field
layer habitats - which included controlled burning, tractor mounted swiping and cattle
grazing - were highly manipulative and potentially contradicted any notion of naturalness. In
this way, specific management for one species could be seen as contradicting the broad
objective of managing the pinewood and achieving a woodland of natural character. For
some, direct management for the capercaillie would mean that the broader picture of the
whole suite of pinewood species that constitute the habitat would be ignored and that the
pinewood would become a 'capercaillie farm'. As such, the managers had to negotiate a
dilemma that was indicated my one of the managers:
One of the dilemmas for us is that we have got to continue with our primary
objective but we have got to fit the secondary objectives into that primary
objective, and that has caused a wee bit of concern for some of our colleagues.
Because there is no question that we we're capercaillie farming here, we could
do a lot more for capercaillie but would that be jeopardising the key principles
of biodiversity and forest expansion. That's up for grabs and some people argue
that it does compromise your primary objective, other people argue that it
shouldn't do (Interview Q, 13th August 2002).
With the concept of naturalness in mind, there was clear consensus that there should not be
large-scale intervention to attempt to boost the numbers of capercaillie, but there was still
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discussion about the degree to which work could be undertaken for the capercaillie whilst
not compromising the broader objectives and naturalness.
Achieving a resolution: towards 'natural' management tools
Those that preferred a policy of minimal intervention were fighting a losing battle. A more
clearly objective-led conservation brought with it the imperative of action and intervention
and the plight of the capercaillie suggested the need for some form of immediate
management. Everybody in conservation - even those that would prefer minimal
intervention - would see the world as a poorer place without the capercaillie and say that we
should do all we can to save it. The argument that the site should be left to manage itself,
apart from deer control, was thus seriously undermined. Consequently, as the planning
meetings continued, the discussion centred less on abstract arguments about intervention and
more on what could be done. But whilst it looked like those in favour of intervention had
won out, it is not the case that the concept of naturalness was thrown out and rampant
intervention pursued. The particular forms ofmanagement that were proposed represented a
compromise that attempted to balance intervention with naturalness and management for the
capercaillie with management for regeneration and the pinewood more generally.
As discussions about what to do continued, they were increasingly informed by the
reconstructed idea of what a natural pinewood would be like. In contrast to the idea of the
pinewood that underpinned the initial policy of minimal intervention, managers were now
influenced by the new ecology and recognised the importance of disturbance in forest
systems. Natural forests would experience the effects of fire, storms, disease and grazing
animals. They therefore asked whether these processes could be encouraged at Abernethy.
The answer was no. Concern with natural processes and natural forests had to be negotiated
with reference to the specific situation at Abernethy and the fact that the site was recognised
to be far from the natural ideal. The circulated document entitled 'Attributes of a present-
natural pine forest in Scotland' (Anon. 1998 n.p.), for example, said that '[gjiven the small
size ofAbernethy Forest, it is perhaps unwise to allow fire to engulf a large proportion of the
forest, even though there may be long-term benefits'. It was argued that fires could easily
destroy the majority of the forest that was valued the most. Whilst disturbance was needed
for the perpetuation of the woods, too much disturbance would potentially 'be detrimental to
the site and resource of this habitat in Scotland' (Anon. 1998 n.p.). Thus if a natural fire
started, it would still be put out because of the risk to the forest. The managers were left in a
position of accepting the need for disturbance but not being able to allow it if it occurred
because of the potential harm that it would do to the forest. Similar problems existed with
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grazing. Because there were no natural predators left for deer or sheep, they had to be
controlled.
The apparent impasse between wanting to see disturbance but also wanting to protect
the 'resource', was overcome by developing the notion of 'controlled disturbance'. Since the
principle means of disturbance in forest systems were understood and effectively being
limited under the policy ofminimal intervention, managers began to consider the possibility
of controlling the means of disturbance to achieve specific ends. That is, they began to
consider being able to not only control unwanted disturbance, but also to be in control of
where, when and to what end disturbance occurred.
This line of thinking was influenced by wider developments. In the US, for example,
fire had been understood as an agent of damage but was reconstructed into an essential
element of forest systems and then reconstructed again to be an effective means of
preventing wildfires. Relatively small fires that burn the forest understorey but leave the
forest standing are now employed to remove the fuel that would feed extremely large and
devastating fires. Prescribed burning has become accepted practice. Likewise, moorland in
the UK has been comprehensively managed for grouse by burning areas to provide a mosaic
of feeding and breeding habitats. In these ways, fire is controlled and used as a management
tool to achieve specific results. With these sorts of management in mind the managers at
Abernethy considered the possibility of replicating disturbance by fire, which would occur in
a natural pinewood, in a controlled way. The long, 'leggy' field layer could potentially be
removed, providing a pulse of nutrients and areas for pine regeneration and blaeberry.
Similarly, if one of the agents of disturbance in more natural pine woodlands would be
grazing animals, then broader developments in conservation practice provided impetus for
consideration of the re-introduction of large mammals to graze the forest. Since at least the
use of cattle to halt successional change on Woodwalton Fen in the late 1960s (Duffey
1971), cattle have been used as a management tool to achieve specific ends. Cattle could be
used to prevent the spread of scrub woodland or to achieve a specific sward height before the
breeding season for wading birds, or, as the managers saw it, to check the growth of heather
and to churn up the mossy ground in the pinewood so as to provide niches for pine seedling
establishment. When I asked why cattle were being considered for re-introduction in the
context of a heavy deer cull to reduce grazing, one manager put it in straightforward
pragmatic terms:
well basically deer are rather less manageable ... wild cattle certainly occurred
within woodland and erm the archaeological record is a bit ropy, I don't know
exactly where it used to be ... although it's probably more biased towards
lowlands and broadleaves and richer woodlands, so it may or may not have
190
been at Abernethy, they were probably in some pinewoods. That's a bit of a
dead end sort of argument. So there was quite a debate as to whether it is
actually a good idea to put in, effectively substitutes for extinct mammals
which would have had a different role within the ecosystem and then we don't
actually have a properly functioning ecosystem because we don't have all the
keystone mammals, we don't have some big predators, we don't have wolves,
we don't have wildcat, we don't have wild boar. ... So we've rather put that to
one side because we can't answer it. It's a good one for debating but you can't
really decide erm so what ... so how we really look at it now is as a tool,
management tool, it's a chainsaw, it's cows hooves. So we are approaching it in
a less romantic view as simply a management tool. And one can manage, you
can have twelve animals in five hectares for three weeks or whatever (Interview
H, 30th January 2002).
Putting questions of naturalness to one side, cattle were viewed in instrumental terms. The
cow is, like a chainsaw, a tool. By utilising these tools, the heather could be browsed back
and the soil churned up or small patches burned in ways that did not pose a threat to the
forest.
In this way, managers sought to find and discuss new forms of management based
upon the new idea of the natural pinewood. In the process, disturbance processes were added
to the conservationist's armoury of management practices and the 'new ecology' was
brought within the compass of managerial and manipulative nature conservation. While this
developing field of ecological knowledge emphasised the chaotic nature of natural systems,
and thus posed difficulties for the technocratic manager, by emphasising particular parts of
that field of knowledge and ignoring others, it was translated into a model of conservation
managerialism based on order and predictability. In this way, the new ecology was translated
into an argument for yet more sophisticated and elaborate forms of manipulation. Far from
undermining the technocratic manager, the new, more complex ideas of natural systems were
incorporated within the technocratic discourse: the belief in the ability of the manager to
comprehensively manipulate only deepens (this is what Murphy (1994) and Adams (1997)
refer to as 're-rationalisation'). Thus where Dennis (1995) brought the notion of disturbance
to the foreground in order to argue for the introduction of cattle so that the system could
gradually be left alone, the resultant focus on disturbance was translated into the
interventionist and manipulative nature conservation model. Disturbance came to be
understood as a natural process that could be replicated by the controlled use of new
'management tools' and thus a new means of actively developing a pinewood of 'natural
character'.
This was not, however, an unfettered interventionism. Questions of quite how they
should intervene were still being balanced against issues of naturalness. The sorts of
management that were being considered were not simply instrumental responses to a
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problem. They represented, rather, a balance between trying to find ways of rectifying a
problem (the lack of disturbance and the long uniform field layer) and the desire to
acknowledge the site's naturalness. Whilst it would appear that as those that were happier
with intervention gained ground, the concept of naturalness as natural character became
more important than naturalness as the absence of people - thus allowing intervention to
make the forest more 'natural' - the use of discursive resources is more flexible than that. In
arguments about intervention, the history of the forest was brought to the foreground in order
to emphasise the presence of people and their influence, and thus argue that the abstraction
of human influence did not necessarily make sense and that people could continue to
manage. But this did not mean that the concept of naturalness as the absence of people was
then ignored because the same people that argued for intervention then called upon that
concept of naturalness when they discussed specific forms of intervention. This is most
obvious in the way that fire and grazing were being considered and not more artificial forms
of intervention. Forms of management which distance the results of management from
people were preferred:
I don't have a problem with intervention, provided we always have this in our
mind that you know we intervene using as near natural prescriptions as possible.
For example, we get the cattle in perhaps to do a job as a surrogate for the
reindeer or the elk or whatever would have done that job in the past. Provided
we don't, we manipulate the forest, but we don't do lasting damage. We might
create a seed bed by burning or having cattle in but we probably wouldn't
dream of having a JCB in to create a seed bed because that is certainly not
natural whereas the burning and the cattle are mimicking natural processes
(Interview Q, 13th August 2002).
Whilst people are responsible for the sort of disturbance that could be employed and thus the
end result, the physical change is at least once removed from the actions of people
themselves. In this way, the result is more 'natural'. The manager might be able to control
the general area that cattle are in, but will allow them relative freedom to roam and thus
disturb certain areas more than others depending on their own preferences. Equally the
manager might be able to control the area of a fire but the pattern of heavily burnt and less
burnt areas and long term effect is less under their control. The fire and grazing involved in
controlled disturbance are therefore framed as 'managed natural processes' and Abernethy
comes to be understood as a 'managed natural site'.
The sorts of management being considered thus represented a compromise that was
acceptable to both those that would prefer less intervention and those that were relatively
happy with intervention. Management by fire or controlled grazing was acceptable to those
that were sceptical about the need for human intervention because it was more 'natural'. This
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positioning is obvious in the words of an already quoted interviewee. Whilst he positioned
himself in the 'non-intervention camp', he went on to say that managing with cattle and fire
were still things that he would consider:
I would probably put myself in the non-intervention camp. So maybe not pure
sort of non-intervention as such, probably minimalist. So we obviously, we are
keeping tracks open, so I would say if a tree falls across a track you would
maybe cut the centre out of the tree, take that centre up and throw it to the side.
So you are not taking anything off the site but with the tracks are still usable or
for health and safety reasons you might have to cut something down, but other
than that I would say very very little human intervention. Erm still thinking
about cattle and fire because they are more natural if you know what I mean. I
feel that they are more natural in the sense that they are doing something which
would have occurred in nature, whereas chainsaws.. .well chainsaws don't exist
in nature (Interview S, 15th August 2002).
While classifying himself as a non-interventionist, this speaker was happy with forms of
intervention that were more natural because they represented the restoration of processes that
were missing from the present unnatural pinewood. In this way, we can see that discursive
resources are called upon in flexible ways in different contexts in order to achieve acceptable
outcomes. Those that positioned themselves in the interventionist camp and emphasised the
achievement of natural character and thus could be understood as opposed to the view of
naturalness as the absence of people, actually called upon the discursive resources of the
concept of naturalness as absence of people. Similarly, those that positioned themselves as
non- or minimal interventionists and wanted to see the achievement of natural character
through the abstraction of people, also called upon the notion of achieving natural character
by intervention. Arriving at a route forward is, in this way, a negotiated achievement.
But more than this, the achievement of an interest in controlled disturbance and
'natural management tools' was attractive because it also potentially offered forms of
management that could be employed specifically for the benefit of the capercaillie.
Capercaillie were not doing well for many reasons but it was thought that changes in the
field layer due to the heavy deer cull, were significant. The field layer was becoming
uniformly taller and dominated by heather, but capercaillie were thought to require a mosaic
of habitats and to prefer blaeberry over heather. Since these changes in the field layer were
brought about by the lack of disturbance, the re-introduction of controlled disturbance could
potentially be targeted at achieving the optimal conditions for the struggling capercaillie.
Managers began to wonder whether burning, for example, could be used as a means of
reducing the dominance of heather and increasing nutrient cycling and so encouraging
blaeberry.
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Instead of coming into conflict, species management coincides with habitat
management. The worries of some that managing for the capercaillie would result in the
pinewood turning into an artificial capercaillie factory were potentially allayed because the
sorts of management that could be undertaken could at the same time be understood as
replicating natural process and thus working towards natural character. While such
management is still manipulative and oriented around actively working to achieve natural
character instead of letting it develop without human influence, it is not entirely artificial.
The importance of the coincidence ofmanagement for the capercaillie with that for the
habitat and regeneration can be emphasised with reference to how work for rare dragonflies
was probably not going to be undertaken:
the dragonfly people got quite annoyed with us because we wouldn't.. .down in
Garten wood we recreated the wet woods by blocking up the drains, way ahead
of the European funded ones and we created this large areas of initially open
water because they had drained then. So what we had is open water which isn't
really what the wet woods is about. Usually it is a sphagnum or peat covered
site, but of course the dragonflies on one or two of these sites went through the
roof, red data book DB3 I think [scientific name] there were a hundred on one
pool one day. The dragonfly people come and say well 'it is getting all
sphagnummed over, are you going to go in there and break it all up' and I say
'well I don't think we will be'. And so the population probably has started to go
down again, they are still there, but what we have probably done is we have
optimised it by what we did and you have probably got to come to some level of
agreement (Interview R, 15th August 2002).
Decisions about the level of appropriate intervention are made in the context of complex
interconnected concerns. Intervention for the capercaillie is perhaps appropriate because of
the imperative of decline, but also because of the way that it coincides with work for the
habitat in terms of regeneration and woodland processes. Intervention for a dragonfly on the
other hand raises the prospect of intervening for individual species alone. The level of
intervention is negotiated with reference to specific instances of practice, species and
habitats. Thus achieving appropriate management is continually being worked out in
practice.
Moving towards a change in management
While it appears that much of the discursive work of reconstructing the idea of a natural
pinewood, and thus reconstructing possible management options, has been accomplished, it
is not the case that new forms of management are simply undertaken. Rather, debates about
appropriate action have been channelled into the 'regime of practice' of planning and are (if
we recall the move, detailed in chapter four, towards a more coherent nature conservation as
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action and management planning became connected with the scientist in a position of power)
brought within the ambit of the scientist. Since Abemethy is an important site in terms of its
position in understanding pinewoods and pinewood species and informs management
elsewhere, managers do not feel able to simply change their management even though they
may feel relatively comfortable with their reconstructed ideas of natural pinewoods. There
must be a detailed assessment of the 'resource' and a clear justification for the sorts of
management that are to be undertaken; there must be a clear, structured plan of action; and
that action must be monitored. Changes in management must therefore be based on
authoritative knowledge and set within a clear process. The present policy of minimal
intervention therefore remains in place while a series of trials are conducted in order that a
decision about appropriate practice can be made:
Andrew: can I ask you a bit more about these trials. What is actually
happening? You have got these three trials one for grazing, burning and
cutting...?
Interviewee: we have twenty plots on the edge of the forest and five plots at the
moment within the forest and those five plots within the forest will increase to
twenty five after this year's burning programme. The ones within the forest will
consist of a burnt plot side by side with a swiped plot, side by side with an
untouched control. We are looking at field layer effects within those three plots.
So once the site has been burnt or swiped, what plant community colonises
immediately? And in particular we are looking for an increase in blaeberry.
That is the effect we would like to see, we will see what we do see. ... In
conjunction with that, we are monitoring invertebrate use of the sites, game bird
use of the sites and deer use of the sites. At the edge of the forest, the objective
is to look at enhancing regeneration, so the burning there, post burning we will
also look at the field layer, but we are particularly interested in the seedfall and
germination success on the burnt plots as opposed to the unbumt controls.
Grazing is looking at similar questions in that we have cattle at the edge of the
forest now, which we are going to look at the effect on regeneration. Do they
break up the field layer, do their hoof prints provide niches for seeds to
germinate in and all that sort of stuff? We had cattle in the forest last year.. .and
the cows have been removed and we are looking to see how their trampling
damage influences the field layer in terms of blaeberry.. .just the same way as
with the burnt plots within the forest, invertebrates blaeberry, capercaillie and
black grouse use and what we would ideally like to find is that burning and
grazing increases blaeberry within the forest, increases invertebrate abundance,
...may well increase capercaillie brood size, effectively, and on the edge
increases regeneration (Interview P, 8th August 2002).
As such, the renegotiation of management at Abernethy is still in the auditing phase of the
planning cycle. Research is being conducted to enable the managers to plan their
management and to rigorously justify it in the wider social world where others might look to
Abernethy as an exemplar of how to manage pinewoods. These trials are oriented towards
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testing the management techniques of grazing, burning and cutting to see which produces the
most favourable results in terms of manipulating the field layer for capercaillie and for
regeneration. They are designed to examine which forms of controlled disturbance could be
employed with the most effective results. Thus while fire and grazing might be acceptable to
both those that are happy with intervention and those that are not, and represent a negotiated
achievement of appropriate practice, such a discursive achievement is not enough. For clear,
planned management to be undertaken, the managers need to know which form of
management achieves the best results and what the results will be from a particular form of
management. They are working towards a situation where they will be able to say that in any
given set of atmospheric conditions, a controlled burn will produce a certain set of
predictable results. Or a situation where they know how long they need to keep a given
number of cows in a known area to achieve their desired outcome.
In this way, changes in the management of pinewoods, which have been influenced
by ideas from the new ecology and involved the negotiation of ecocentric and technocentric
positions, have been translated into the dominant governmental discourse of interventionist
management. If, as I suggested in chapter two, we should consider the changing position of
conservation with respect to rationalisation rather than simply use the concept of
rationalisation as a means of explaining conservation practice, then what we see with the
renegotiation of the position of conservation with respect to rationalisation is the emergence
of rationalisation itself. As minimal intervention was questioned due to the changes in the
field layer that came about as a consequence of the policy, so the concept of the pinewood
itself was reworked. Ecological knowledge of forest processes was selectively utilised, as
was the forest's history. A new ideal of what is natural was constructed and then argued
over. Questions of intervention and naturalness were negotiated as different actors argued for
certain forms of action and put different notions of naturalness to use in different contexts.
Idealistic arguments about intervention were, however, somewhat usurped by the imperative
of action introduced by the plight of the declining population of capercaillie and the action
planning process. While discursive compromises were found that allowed concerns with
naturalness and intervention to be balanced - by developing natural management tools - in
the end, the move towards greater levels of intervention was translated into the bureaucratic
regime of planning. If this is interpreted as an instance of conservation becoming more
rationalistic - moving towards greater levels of control - we can see that this process of
rationalisation involves a complex process involving the selective use of ecological
knowledge, rhetorical strategies and arguments over the meaning of 'naturalness', the re-




New Directions for Nature Conservation?
Deconstructing nature conservation
At the start of this thesis, I stated that I was interested in understanding why nature
conservation acts in the ways that it does and that I wanted to investigate the processes and
practices through which appropriate conservation action is achieved and renegotiated.
Influenced by the work of Foucault and by constructivist approaches to nature and to
knowledge, the conclusion that I have reached is that specific forms of action only become
appropriate through complex cultural and political negotiations. What is considered
appropriate practice is the result of the specific configuration and interconnection of ideas of
nature, ecological knowledge and institutional practice. But these ideas, forms of knowledge
and practice do not come together automatically, as if one form of practice is necessarily
connected to an idea of nature. At any particular moment, specific types of action are
justified and understood to be most appropriate because of the way that forms of knowledge
and understandings of nature are mobilised by individuals in continuing cultural and political
struggles over the meaning of nature, the proper means of knowing nature and the most
useful way of acting on its behalf. The broad institutional frameworks that are put in place to
achieve conservation's ends, and the management policies in specific places made with
respect to individual species and habitats, are complex cultural and political achievements.
These can be illustrated by reflecting upon the sorts of analysis I have offered here.
In chapter four, I examined the development of the new ways of doing nature conservation
that were ushered in by the accommodation of the concept of biodiversity and the
establishment of the 'biodiversity process'. In particular, I examined the development of a
new regime of practice associated with action and management planning and suggested that
this regime was bound up in attempts to make conservation action more rigorous and
coherent. By setting out clear reasons why a species or habitat should be conserved and clear
steps to achieve its conservation, the scientists (or strongly science-oriented organisations
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like the RSPB) were attempting to make nature conservation more 'objective' and to reclaim
their central position within the nature conservation scene. In the process, habitats were
classified and species prioritised in novel ways, which meant that new 'objects' - such as
particular types of habitat or the declining population - were constructed. These new objects,
which were brought within the compass of the planner, subsequently became the focus for
the generation of new sorts of ecological knowledge and thus further bolstered the scientist's
position. The development of new forms of practice associated with the biodiversity process
was worked out as conservationists attempted to reshape conservation itself for an outside
audience and particular sorts of conservationist positioned themselves within conservation as
a whole.
In chapter five, I extended this analysis to show how appropriate forms of practice
were negotiated as individuals debated the development of the biodiversity process. Since
that process had centred on species and habitat action plans, some considered that it moved
conservation too far in the direction of intervention, even suggesting that it could lead to
over-management. For them, the biodiversity process did not necessarily represent
appropriate practice. They challenged the process by calling upon alternative constructions
of naturalness and artificiality. Chapter five thus illustrated the politics of argument and the
rhetorical strategies that were utilised in debates over appropriate action. Ultimately, through
the example of Insh Marshes, I emphasised that these debates reached a negotiated
conclusion in the context of specific sites or issues. Different arguments and ideas of nature
and naturalness could be mobilised with respect to different sorts of practice. What this
emphasised was that whilst nature conservation did take shape through arguments between
the 'big names' in conservation and ecology, it also takes its shape through a much more
ingrained set of arguments over the meaning of nature - arguments that take place on a day-
to-day basis between practitioners and in policy-making and with reference to very specific
examples.
In chapters six and seven, I sought to extend this examination of the development
and negotiation of a regime of practice by looking at how a (different) regime of practice
changed. In chapter six, I explored the way that a minimal interventionist regime of practice
was understood to be appropriate in the pinewoods at Abernethy. To understand the policy of
minimal intervention and the specific management practices that it entailed, I suggested that
one needed to address the ways that pinewoods were represented and how different parts of
the forest were constructed. In particular I emphasised the ambiguous construction of
pinewoods as both natural and unnatural. Non-intervention was not an option precisely
because of the way that the pinewoods had been influenced by people: they were no longer
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natural. Yet at the same time, they represented a connection with an original naturalness and
should be protected from further harm. The specific forms ofmanagement that were adopted
under the rubric of 'minimal intervention' were strategies for negotiating this ambiguous
construction of the pinewoods. Some areas were constructed as more natural than others and
thus suggested as areas to be left alone. Others were constructed as less than natural and thus
less susceptible to harm from intervention: they could be altered to move them onto a
trajectory towards achieving a 'natural character'. At the same time, the problem of high
deer numbers, which affected even those areas thought to be more natural than others, was
dealt with by constructing the form of intervention (culling) as indirect and relatively natural
(because of the way it replicated natural processes). By teasing apart the arguments for
minimal intervention as they were put forward in the management plans, reports and letters,
it was possible to appreciate that the policy represented an achievement resting upon a
specific configuration of ideas and knowledge of the natural pinewood. There were ideas of
what a natural pinewood was like, what the preferred habitat of the capercaillie was and what
needed to be done to plantations to make them more natural. Individual forms of
management thus rested upon the way that cultural and scientific constructions of
naturalness were balanced with intervention.
In chapter seven, I went on to look at how this achievement of appropriate
conservation practice was reworked. The practices involved in minimal intervention were
based upon ideas of the pinewoods as relatively natural and subject to overgrazing and it was
thought that once the grazing pressure had been reduced, the pinewoods would recover and
take on a more natural character. But as the policy of minimal intervention began to have
what were understood as negative effects (in terms of allowing the field layer within the
pinewoods to become too long), the policy was questioned. It was thought that the ideas
upon which the policy was based must be flawed (a more natural situation would surely not
be detrimental to breeding birds). The idea of the natural pinewood was consequently
reworked. By calling upon new theoretical developments in ecology and by re-emphasising
the history of the woodlands, a different understanding of the natural pinewoods developed.
The new idea was oriented around a much more complex understanding of pinewoods as in a
continual process of change and upheaval. The translation of that complexity into
suggestions for different forms of management based on controlled disturbance was,
however, mitigated by further debates over the appropriate degree of intervention. In what
could be interpreted as a clash between techno- and ecocentrics, between those that wanted
to restrict, and those that were happy to pursue intervention, different argumentative
strategies and resources were adopted to advocate alternative ways forward. Ultimately, a
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resolution was found by finding compromise policies that allowed each 'side' to interpret the
action that would be undertaken as generally conforming to its point of view. The proposed
use of 'natural management tools' provided those that wanted to manipulate the forest to
achieve better conditions for the capercaillie with tools to achieve their ends, whilst also
providing those that were less happy with intervention a compromise because the means of
intervention were more 'natural'. The change in approach to managing pinewoods that took
place at Abernethy thus allowed an insight into how appropriate conservation practice is
achieved. The configuration of ideas, knowledge and practice was reworked in the context of
arguments over intervention, naturalness and artificiality. In those arguments, new forms of
knowledge were mobilised and extant histories re-emphasised by individuals seeking to see
their version of appropriate management made real. In the process, the very idea of the
pinewood that should be conserved was reworked.
In contrast to the majority of work that engages with the development of nature
conservation, I have sought to emphasise that conservation is a cultural arena and that nature
conservation practice is not only culturally negotiated, but based upon culturally constructed
ideas and knowledge of 'nature'. This thesis is, therefore, a contribution to the literature that
both takes a constructivist approach to nature and the environment seriously and puts it to
use (Hajer 1995; Takacs 1996; Toogood 1996b; Macnaghten and Urry 1998; Braun 2002).
The fact that 'nature' is not an unproblematic, self-evident 'thing' over which politics
happens was most evident in chapters six and seven. As the minimal interventionist policy of
culling deer and allowing the forest to recover from excessive grazing pressure began to
have what were thought to be negative consequences, so the very idea of the 'natural'
pinewood was questioned. New discursive resources were called upon to reconstruct the
natural pinewood in order to rework management options. The pinewoods that were
understood as being relatively stable and simply subject to damage (if the damage was
removed, the woodlands would recover), came to be understood as actually subject to
instability and disturbance. Thus the very idea of a natural pinewood was revised. What was
natural had changed. The natural pinewood was not simply the object over which people
argued; it emerged in the development of attempts to conserve it. 'Nature' is embedded in,
and emerges through, cultural politics. This is not, however, to make the idealist claim that
nature is entirely a cultural artefact because, as we saw with the growth of the field layer at
Abernethy, material changes in reality had consequences in terms of how people understood
pinewoods.
The fact that scientific knowledge is not simply utilised in conservation (as if it is
produced in an asocial realm only to be brought into the social arena of conservation), was
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most evident in chapter four. As the biodiversity process developed and as habitats, for
example, were classified, new ecological objects were created. These new objects took their
shape from the imperatives of the practicalities of planning. Where the lines between classes
were drawn was not determined by the obviousness of differences in reality - as my
interviewees made plain, classifying involved drawing lines across continua - but by the
imperative of having a manageable number of classes. Subsequently, new ecological
knowledge about the extent and characteristics of these objects was developed. Ecological
knowledge was intimately interwoven with the practice of conserving those objects.
Similarly, as conservationists sought a more 'objective' means of prioritising species for
action by developing trends information, new sorts of ecological knowledge were developed.
In this way, we can see that science is not simply related to conservation in a one-way
relationship where it is imported from outwith conservation to inform practice. Indeed, we
can see that such practice is not simply based on the progressive development of scientific
knowledge as if it is moving towards the best way of conserving the natural world based on
the truth about nature. Rather, scientific knowledge is embedded in the messy world of
conservation practice.
The analysis presented in this thesis adds, therefore, to the work of Hajer (1995),
Bocking (1993, 1997), Toogood (1996b) and Takacs (1996) and challenges and extends
those analyses that have examined nature conservation but bracketed off the scientific realm
as if it does not involve social interaction. The social, political and institutional histories of
nature conservation cannot be comprehensively told if there are areas of conservation that
are privileged or understood as off limits to the sociologist or historian. Changes in
conservation that are the result of changing scientific knowledge are not simply the result of
the development of 'better' knowledge because that knowledge is produced by social actors
in a social context, a context that influences the sorts of knowledge that is produced and
embedded in conservation practice.
Understanding nature, science and conservation in this way, allows us to appreciate
the development of conservation differently. Instead of viewing shifts in site management or
changes in broad policy instrumentally, I suggest that a constructivist approach allows us to
see a much more messy and political process. The shifts in management at Abemethy, for
example, could be understood as a straightforward response to the change in the field layer
that resulted from a policy of minimum intervention. The policy was not working, so it was
changed and based upon better ecological knowledge. Such a reading does not pay attention
to the fact that the ability of managers to see one course of action as 'wrong' and another as
'right', involves a great deal of discursive and interpretative work and that the very idea of
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what is being conserved, changes. A constructivist approach that pays attention to the
processes by which ideas of nature are generated and incorporated in conservation practice
thus allows more subtle renderings of the development of nature conservation. I suggest,
therefore, that such an approach extends the conventional histories of the development and
institutionalisation of conservation (Adams 1986, 1993, Evans 1992; Lowe 1983; Sheail
1976, 1981, 1998). While it is true that these studies have emphasised the politics involved
in developing a home for nature conservation and the conflicts over nature that conservation
has been involved in, the approach taken here goes further by recognising more explicitly
that conservation is itself a flexible and contested arena of cultural politics.
Foucault, rationalisation and nature
This emphasis on conservation as a form of cultural politics is important. Not only does it
broaden out the stories that are told about nature conservation, it also adds to an
understanding of the relationships between nature conservation and rationalisation. While
Foucault is not the first theorist that comes to mind when addressing environmental issues —
indeed, he made a great show, whenever presented with a magnificent landscape, of turning
away and saying 'my back is turned to it' (Eribon cited in Darier 1999: 7) - this thesis would
suggest that his work is useful in this respect.
On a general level, the philosophical position that Foucault advanced has had a huge
influence on social science approaches to nature: nature came to be understood, like madness
or sexuality, as produced in discourse. Nevertheless, although Matless (1992) suggested that
Foucault's work might be of use in studying 'the place of nature', it is only relatively
recently that it has been more explicitly engaged with by researchers studying broadly
environmental topics (Hajer 1995; Darier 1999; Demeritt 2001c; Bryant 2002; Braun 2000;
2002). I have sought to contribute to this developing literature in two ways. Firstly by
employing Foucault's ideas about discipline and governmentality to analyse the institutional
arrangements by which nature conservationists are themselves disciplined. Secondly, I have
sought to take Foucault's interpretation of the processes by which people were rendered into
objects by the human sciences and brought within a system of surveillance and control, and
translate it into an interpretation of how we have rendered the natural world into objects and
thus made it amenable to control. I have sought to examine the production of nature,
biodiversity and the natural pinewood in discourse, in the 'micro-physics of power' through
which conservation operates. That is, while Foucault's focus was the rationalisation of the
body and the rationalisation of the population in the emergence of the present scientifico-
legal complex, I have, by utilising the tools that he provided and applying them to the natural
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sciences and the scientifico-managerial discourse of contemporary nature conservation,
examined the rationalisation ofnature.
Following Dean's (1999) 'analytics of governmentality' as an investigation of the
emergence of institutionally-stable regimes of practice, I examined in chapter four the
different elements that constituted the biodiversity process, the dependence of these practices
upon specific sorts of knowledge and the techniques involved. I examined how new 'objects'
in the form of habitats or the declining population were constituted and how those objects
were then drawn into a regime of planning which subsequently required new forms of
knowledge and the establishment of intensive surveillance practices, which, in turn, provided
more knowledge that could be fed into the planning cycle. Nature was classified and
incorporated in a rational bureaucratic structure of plans and organised action. I also
suggested that, through the introduction of the biodiversity process and new practices of
government, nature conservation was, and is, taking on greater coherence and that this
coherence has a distinctly spatial aspect. Coherent conservation action, which connects
conservationists working in all parts of the country, is achieved by deploying devices such as
new habitat classifications and action and management plans. These 'devices' travel and act
at a distance. The activities of distant conservationists become controlled from the centre of
conservation calculation (cf. Latour 1999b; Rose and Miller 1992).
In the process of conducting an analysis that concentrated on the practices through
which the discourse operated, I recognised that this rendering of conservation could be
criticised and extended. Whilst the analysis of the regime of institutional practice inspired by
the work of Foucault was useful - because it threw into relief that regime's inherent politics
- it was not alone sufficient. Focusing on the practices of classification, prioritisation and
planning and the way that they became connected in a regime of practice, potentially either
ignored the role of people or implicitly suggested that they were subsumed within that
regime, powerless to resist or change the course of events. By paying attention, in chapter
five, to how people spoke about biodiversity and by turning to a much more restricted
understanding of discourse as language in use, I suggested that much of the work that has
picked up and worked with the concept of rationalisation or governmentality in relation to
environmental issues could be extended (Demeritt 2001; Enticott 2001). I argued that the
rhetorical construction of nature in talk was important and that understanding these linguistic
processes added to the analysis of the development of institutional practices. This was to
follow Foucault by investigating empirically the workings of contemporary forms of
rationality and then to expand on his approach, and on understandings of the process of
rationalisation, by examining specific examples of language in use. In particular, I looked at
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the way that individuals argued over appropriate practice and the importance of the
construction of there being nowhere natural in the UK. The dominance of the technocratic
approach to conserving nature can be seen - at least in part - to rest upon the use of language
to construct nature as 'other'. The construction of a pristine nature that is the antithesis of
culture, combined with a narrative of a fall from its pristine state, produces a natural world
that is always already interwoven with human action. The resultant fallen nature provides the
basis for calls for further benevolent human action to restore it to a more natural situation;
further human action will not, after all, harm it. The construction and representation of nature
as other but subject to the corrupting influence of humanity allows people to construct
themselves as having responsibility for nature, for protecting it and looking after it. Human
action becomes necessary ifwe are to protect nature and we, therefore, intervene and control
on nature's behalf. Through the example of Insh Marshes, however, I highlighted how the
multiple and competing constructions of nature in language are accommodated in a
negotiated compromise with different arguments being made in support of different
management strategies. Ultimately, in chapters six and seven, I sought to develop an analysis
that, while inspired by Foucault's work, provided a more rounded understanding of how
institutional practices were bound up in cultural negotiations over the meaning of nature and
the most appropriate form of action.
This analysis complements that of Adams' (1997) - and his suggestion that
conservation is not only a reaction to, but also very much part of rationalisation - by
focusing on specific examples. The institutionalisation of the concept of biodiversity and the
establishment of the biodiversity process, for example, took on a form that could be
understood to be firmly embedded in processes of rationalisation. Action plans that included
prescriptions for habitat manipulation were written for species and habitats, bureaucratic
structures were developed to manage the process and new forms of knowledge were
demanded and called upon with monitoring programmes established. These developments
seem to take the technocratic approach to conservation to another level because there appears
to be an extension of the manipulative approach to even the most obscure of species and
habitats. While the objective of developing the biodiversity process was to save, protect and
enhance individual species and habitats, the rationale was (and remains) one of control.
Further, as the analysis of the move towards more complex and finely-tuned forms of
intervention at Abernethy suggested, the rational control of nature is being extended into
even those areas that were previously understood to be precious and in need of protection
from human interference.
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Where this study adds to that of Adams is, I believe, in its emphasis on cultural
politics. Emphasising the construction of nature and knowledge in relations of power adds to
the narrative that essentially argues that since conservation is based upon ecology and
ecology as a science underpins rationalisation, conservation is part of rationalisation. While
changes in ecological theory do work through into conservation practice, the analyses
offered above suggest that this process is always locally negotiated and always complex. In
the context of the identification by other commentators of two broad and flexible 'schools of
thought' (technocentrics and ecocentrics or imperialists and arcadians), this thesis has
pointed to the negotiation involved in one achieving dominance. More specifically, the fine¬
grained analysis of change at Abernethy, for example, allowed insight into the process by
which the technocratic approach to conservation managed to attain ascendancy. The thesis
has illustrated that this is not simply a battle between two a priori positions: these 'sides'
take shape and are themselves reconstituted through the process of negotiation. While
accommodation between those people that wanted to leave pinewoods alone and those that
were happier with more intervention could be understood as one manifestation of a clash
between the arcadians and imperialists, what we see is that the route forward involved the
negotiation of a compromise where limited intervention was acceptable to both 'sides'. In
this way, both arcadians and imperialists achieved new positions in the process of finding
ways forward. Ultimately, the dominance of the rationalistic approach to conservation is
something that is continually being negotiated and fought over. It is continually being re¬
established as a characteristic of conservation in the UK. Rationalisation is entwined in the
developing culture of nature conservation.
Nature conservation, reflexivity and research
This emphasis on cultural politics has profound implications for nature conservation. If there
is no secure place of knowledge from which the truth about nature can be known once and
for all, and if what counts as nature is unavoidably an effect of culture, then conservation can
never be the same, it cannot return to the authority of nature or claim in any simple way to
speak on nature's behalf. One implication of this is that we are forced to recognise just how
important are the questions of power and positionality. We are forced to recognise that
nature is constructed as it is represented and implicated in institutional contexts and that
these constructions are never innocent; they are always political and always oriented towards
a purpose. As those that were happy with intervention at Abernethy, for example, sought to
persuade others that their approach was the most appropriate, they represented the forest in
ways that necessarily rendered other forms of signification less visible. The representation of
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the pinewoods in arguments over action was itself a political act: it involved what Braun
(2002) calls 'cognitive failures' that have political consequences. As such, we have to
recognise that nature only gets refashioned as 'biodiversity', and pinewoods only become
'ancient' and 'semi-natural', as a result of their representation from specific positions.
Nature and knowledge are generated in specific relations of power as some seek to
interpolate others into a specific way of seeing. As such, the stabilisation of nature or the
native pinewood must be recognised as itself an effect of power and the political interplay of
multiple actors with particular interests. Consequently, nature conservationists can no longer
be complacent and assume that how they understand a habitat and management is the result
of the gradual move towards better knowledge of it. How they understand and ultimately
manage a habitat - and indeed how they come to see the need for management in the first
place - is worked out in a field ofpower and social relations.
Recognising the importance of this politics forces us, and I would argue should force
nature conservationists, to ask additional questions in any given context. Why is nature, or a
particular species or habitat, being understood in the way it is? How is it being represented,
by whom and with what interests? In short, recognising the importance of power and politics
encourages a greater degree of critical reflection about conservation's concepts, and its
discursive and knowledge-making practices.
Crucially, this critical reflection must, I suggest, start with the individual
researcher's own concepts and discursive practices. Once one recognises this politics and the
way that all claims to know are embedded in relations of power, one must also acknowledge
that one's own claims are produced from a particular perspective and inevitably involve
emphasising some things and not others. Thus, if one wants to avoid reproducing this
politics, one must explicitly attempt to acknowledge one's own closures or 'cognitive
failures'. One must attempt to render visible one's own acts of construction. It is for this
reason, and because I wanted to bolster my message to nature conservationists by remaining
consistent, that I explicitly sought to trace, in chapter three, the process of this research. By
attempting to honestly portray the development ofmy research and to open it up to scrutiny
so that the reader could understand how I arrived at the questions and analyses that I did, I
sought to emphasise my position and my own knowledge construction as situated and partial.
This illustrated that method is about much more than a means to an end; it is about
more than how one gets the data or analyses it. In the context of a constructivist project,
method is itself worthy of scrutiny. Thus while I devoted most attention to the cultural
politics of nature and the processes through which meanings were made in nature
conservation, I turned my attention in chapter three to my own research as another example
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of how meanings and knowledge are made. Through the narrative that I presented there of
my research, it was possible to glimpse the process through which I developed my
substantive foci, theoretical interests and methodological resources. These foci, interests and
resources should, as the narrative sought to emphasise, be understood as the achievements of
a long process of negotiation. Just as much as the development of appropriate conservation
policy, my own research involved negotiating a social world of politics and power relations.
It involved directly negotiating with organisations like the RSPB and dealing with their
scepticism and protectiveness; negotiating with interviewees and the power relations that
interpersonal contact entailed, especially when my interviewees were long established in the
field; trying methodological approaches and judging their appropriateness; gradually refining
a focus from a general interest in how conservationists constructed nature to how they
constructed biodiversity and established institutional arrangements for it; and it involved
focusing yet further from an interest in biodiversity and how it was argued over to an interest
in particular species and habitats and sites. Furthermore, my research involved working with
Foucault's ideas and recognising their limits and trying other approaches in ways that could
extend my analyses; gradually shutting doors on possible interpretative avenues and thus
imposing order by obscuring other issues; and developing my own rhetorical strategy for
arguing that constructivist approaches to nature are useful. Ultimately, then, reflecting upon
my research practice and its own on-going acts of construction allowed me to support my
analyses of the construction ofmeaning in nature conservation.
In the process of recognising this politics and in seeking to bring my own acts of
construction to the fore, however, I encountered a methodological problem not commonly
addressed in methods texts, namely, how one represents one's own acts of construction. How
does one write about a 'messy' complex process - a process that does not conform to the
normative model of design, collect, analyse - without imposing an order that might not have
been present in the doing of the research? In some ways this question is redundant from the
outset because all acts of representation are acts of imposing order. But if questions of
representation are also questions of ethics, we cannot simply hold up our hands and return to
established ways of representing research. We have to experiment with other ways of
writing; ways that at least attempt to portray the messiness and allow the reader to see how
knowledge is 'really' constructed. Thus the narrative I offered in chapter three, while
inevitably imposing an order or post-hoc rationalisation, was an attempt to contribute to
other work, such as that by Davidson (2001), that has sought explicitly to open up the
processual nature of research.
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Beyond biodiversity and Abernethy: reconstructing nature conservation
In addition to forcing conservationists, and researchers, to reflect on their habits of making
meaning, I suggest that the emphasis on cultural politics opens up new possibilities for
political engagement. In particular, it leaves us in a relatively optimistic position because, in
contrast to Weber's pessimistic view of the iron cage of rationalisation, it is possible to see
that if the technocratic approach to conserving nature is constantly being renegotiated and re-
achieved, it is not set in stone. Whilst it is arguably a characteristic of conservation in the UK
at present, it is not a characteristic that is achieved once and for all. There is always space for
resistance. There is always the possibility that different ways of conserving nature could be
argued for and developed. Thus the insights inspired by Foucault and constructivist
approaches to nature are potentially useful because, as Castree and Braun point out, they
have 'profound implications and embod[y] a liberatory potential, radically opening the field
of debate and action surrounding what kinds of nature we seek' (Castree and Braun 1998: 5).
It is important, therefore, to keep asking, like Mabey (1980) and Adams (2003b), what sort
of nature conservation we want and to keep arguing for change. Here, then, I attempt to put
some of the insights gained from a constructivist position to use by arguing for new
directions in nature conservation.
This question — what sort of nature conservation do we want - is important,
especially, I believe, when we consider current trends. Two examples of these trends will
suffice. First, the direction that conservation is taking was apparent at a symposium held in
September 2002 to review progress and set an agenda for plant conservation in Scotland.
With the Botanical Society for Scotland, Scottish Wildlife Trust, National Trust for Scotland,
Plantlife and the RSPB all represented, this was essentially a review of biodiversity action
planning and an assessment of the gaps that the biodiversity process was highlighting.
Reviewing the themes of the symposium, Crofts (2003) noted that:
increased knowledge and information about the diversity of Scotland's flora ...
has been acquired; findings from scientific research are available...; more
sophisticated approaches to monitoring and surveillance of plants and their
habitats have been developed...; the use of scientific knowledge to tease out the
causal factors of change, especially those factors which have a deleterious effect
on conservation, is essential; more scientific knowledge to improve the success
of habitat restoration and plant reintroduction is needed (Crofts 2003: 226-227).
As the engine of technocratic managerialism trundles on, and as scientific knowledge is
deployed in particular contexts, what is needed is more knowledge, more resources, and
more expertise. Current developments point to an increasing turn to science to provide the
answers. As research is conducted more questions arise and more research is needed. In this
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way, nature conservationists are developing increasingly sophisticated ways of mapping,
modelling and storing knowledge about nature, knowledge that can be used in the evermore-
sophisticated government of nature.
Secondly, since the initial development of biodiversity action planning, the process
has continued. Since habitats were 'selected' and prioritised for action planning, action plan
groups have been developed and have initiated strategies that should work towards achieving
the targets for their respective habitats. But as the different groups have been attempting to
achieve their aims for the part of the environment that they are focused on, however, things
have become more complicated. The goals for different species and habitats can come into
conflict and the management can become increasingly complex. Consequently, it has been
recognised that related species and habitat groups have to communicate and that a broader
view of change and large-scale land management is needed (Simonson and Thomas 1999).
The result is the development of over-arching initiatives that encourage action plan groups to
talk to each other. In other words, the bureaucratic structure develops problems that require
more bureaucracy to fix and so on.
Both these examples, which are directly connected to the analyses presented in this
thesis, suggest that conservation is becoming increasingly entrenched in processes of
rationalisation. But is this the sort of nature conservation we want? The position that I have
reached through conducting this research - consistent with the suggestion made in chapter
five that people work towards their positions in debates rather than arguing from them - is
that it is not. I am concerned that the contemporary culture of nature conservation may not
provide the means by which conservation can fulfil its aims. To return to an issue raised at
the start of this thesis, I am concerned that if conservation continues to develop increasingly
sophisticated ways of controlling nature and continues to worship at the alter of
rationalisation, it will not succeed in its aim of getting a concern for wildlife and an
ecological ethos to pervade society.
While many practices and processes through which meanings are made have been
analysed above, I worry that two key habits of making meanings about nature in nature
conservation may in fact be part of the problem and a hindrance to progress. Supporting the
claims of Adams (1997), the first of these is the continual return to science. Ecology and
scientific knowledge more generally are crucial prisms through which nature is constructed
and reconstructed. The second is the prevalence of the construction of nature as where
people are not; nature is other; nature and culture are distinct. Although the characteristics of
the natural pinewood were culturally negotiated and changed, the idealised pinewood was
still a woodland uninfluenced by people.
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These are not original claims, but the constructivist interest in cultural politics and
relations of power throws into relief several important issues. First, the central place of
science, while useful, is also problematic. As we classify, map and monitor with the aim of
protecting species or habitats, we develop eminently useful knowledge that we can employ
to save and protect species and habitats that we value. It is through the use of such
knowledge that we have managed to achieve favourable outcomes for many species that
might have become extinct without that technical intervention. But at the same time, as this
knowledge is developed, our power to control those species and habitats is extended.
Drawing upon Foucault's claim that knowledge is produced as an effect of power and that
power operates through knowledge, our power to control is immanent in the kinds of
knowledge we seek and produce about nature. It could be claimed, then, that even when we
use our knowledge to achieve a favourable outcome for a species, the deployment of that
knowledge has a wider effect:
Such knowledge, however benignly applied, must inevitably extend our control
over nonhuman others. Thus even though our explanations of biological
functioning may be employed to sustain the remnants of a fading species in
reserves or outright captivity, and thereby provide us with the satisfaction of
having 'saved' one kind of being, the knowledge employed entails the
diminishment of that other. Success, therefore, also means failure - successful
control over the life and death of the other requires the abrogation of its
autonomy (Evernden 1992: 130).
The success of conservation in saving a species through the deployment of technical
expertise and management has consequences. While a species might have been saved,
human control over it will be extended.
Secondly, the key position of science and the desire to achieve a more 'objective'
conservation is also involved in a politics of knowledge. As Minter and Toogood (1994)
pointed out, 'policy and action exclusively based on certain forms of knowledge - which
successive governments and agencies have trusted in relation to environmental protection —
may marginalise and exclude other roots of environmental concern, including cultural ones'
(Minter and Toogood 1994: 1). In short, the reliance on scientific and technical knowledge
potentially marginalises other forms of knowledge. Evernden puts it slightly differently by
saying that the importance of science and objectivity results in a denial of experience and
subjectivity. The natural others can never be known 'as encountered in experience if we
begin with a denial of experience. Indeed, we might say that it is through the dismissal of
direct, 'subjective' experience that we are made vulnerable to the imposition of the social
abstraction called nature and the conventions it entails' (Evernden 1992: 110). Always
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approaching the nonhuman other through science involves distancing oneself from it so that
the ideal of impartiality can be attained. In the process, the culture of objectivity captures
nature and closes alternative windows on experience. Reacting to criticisms that they are
Romantics seeing landscapes through 'rose-tinted spectacles', conservationists have
compensated and sought to emphasise their technocratic, industrial, hard-nosed credentials,
but in the process something else is lost.
Finally, if we listen to construedvist sociologists of science such as Wynne (1992,
1996), the centrality of science has consequences for how conservationists engage others.
While science is crucially important for addressing specific issues, if problems and solutions
are defined in technical and scientific terms alone, conservationists run the risk of losing
public identification with conservation itself. In the context of broader developments in the
relationship between science and society where the proclamations of science are frequently
seen to be contradictory depending on who says what and with what interests (such as the
different arguments marshalled in debates over GM technology), or where policies have been
based on what was portrayed as objective science only later to be proved wanting, the
'public' are increasingly sceptical of claims to impartiality. Time and again the view from
nowhere is shown to be a view from somewhere. As people are continually bombarded with
the latest research results on the health benefits (or lack of them) of particular foods, and as
people witness scientists trying to grapple with the increasingly globalised problems of risk
society, the limitations of science are becoming more obvious. Thus if conservationists
simply claim their scientific credentials or hide behind the faqade of objectivity they will
only widen the gulf between themselves and others. While it at first appears to strengthen
conservation, increasing conservation's apparent objectivity, without giving people more
insight in to the practice of conservation science, potentially weakens it.
My view, then, is that the current approaches to conservation, while achieving
successes in the form of protecting endangered species or habitats, are also themselves part
of the problem. Arguably, while conservation challenges developments that impinge upon
nature and fights for its protection, it also implicitly subscribes to the approach to nature that
underpinned those developments. That is, the exploitation of nature for its resources rests
upon a construction of nature as other, as separate from culture and there to be used, but
while conservation might challenge such exploitation, it too rests upon a similar construction
of nature as other. I agree with Adams who suggested that there was 'a potential conflict in a
conservation based on ideas of nature and practices of engagement with nature that are
driven by the same rationalist project that has generated the damage that conservationists
wish to oppose' (Adams 1997: 287). While it challenges the imposition of industrial
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rationality, conservation also perpetuates it. It is for this reason that conservation only
achieves small successes that are also at the same time failures.
If we really want to succeed, I would argue, along with Evernden, that we must first
acknowledge that the 'environmental crisis' arose as a consequence of conceptual
imprisonment and that the contemporary culture of nature conservation perpetuates that
imprisonment. Evernden suggested that 'if we would save the world, we must set it free'
(Evernden 1992: 130). 'While this might be a frightening prospect for many, because as
members of twenty-first century industrial societies what we fear most is the loss of control',
Evernden asks us to bear in mind that 'every act of control, however well intentioned,
constitutes a continuation and an amplification of the process that has been unfolding since
the Renaissance' (Evernden 1992: 130). Therefore, while I am aware of the difficulty of
generalising in nature conservation (because there will always be counter-examples), I want
to suggest that we need to re-imagine - re-construct - nature so that it is not always pushed
into the distance and the past and separated from culture. We need to re-imagine our
approach to conservation science so that the myth of objectivity is acknowledged as myth.
And we need to create space for other forms of knowledge about nature.
We need to do this because when we see nature as a distant place and say there is
nowhere natural in the UK at all, we further entrench a way of seeing that makes it harder for
us to see the nature all around us as natural: the trees in our gardens, the gull colonies on our
rooftops and the plants that grow in the cracks in the pavement (cf. Cronon 1995b). It makes
it harder to remember and acknowledge the autonomy of the wild others that live in our
midst. A re-imagining of nature could potentially lead to a new way of relating to the world
around us.
We also need to develop a much less idealistic view of objectivity. Conservationists
could profitably accept that the knowledge they produce does actually come from
somewhere; that it is situated. Instead of always seeking to make conservation more
objective in the sense of impartial and neutral, they could set out much more clearly why
they make the claims they do. The knowledge that scientists produce is not undermined if it
is acknowledged to come from a specific position. It is only the currency of the idea of
objectivity that gives this impression. Scientific knowledge has always been produced from a
position: it is just the question of position has been pushed to the background because it was
thought that accepting positionality meant that knowledge was somehow flawed. But even if
it is produced from a specific position there are still very good reasons why we should trust
scientists. They still produce the best knowledge we have. If they accept their positionality
and allow others to see the processes of knowledge production, then others can judge why
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they should be trusted. If conservationists hide behind the faqade of objectivity they cannot.
It is precisely because science is not a single-minded force, because it is pluralistic and riven
with conflicts that it has been able to expand our understanding of the natural world.
Objectivity is not what is continually pointed to - that epitome of impartiality - it is the
plurality of perspectives on the same phenomenon openly debated.
Let me be clear. In suggesting that we need to develop new ways of constructing
nature and ways of relating to nature that do not perpetuate the rationalist project of control, I
am not arguing for a laissez-faire approach to conservation as if we should leave everything
alone. Such an argument would be contradictory because it depends, just as much as present
practice, on the separation of nature and culture. I concur with Mabey who said that
'[njothing seems less appropriate for the protection and maintenance of complex, sensitive
and highly localised natural communities.. .than the ponderous processes of conventional
planning. Yet leaving them to the mercy of an unbridled laissez-faire would be even worse'
(Mabey 1980: 227). Nor am I arguing that the biodiversity process is bad and that
conservation should return to its reactive (rather than proactive) ways. Nor am I arguing that
science should be done away with: we have nowhere else to turn for reliable knowledge. I
am arguing, rather, that how we construct nature matters and that we need new, less dualistic
constructions in order to develop new ways forward. We need to develop a different ethic
towards the nonhuman others with which we share our planet.
In the context of fifty years of institutional, legislative and practical conservation
effort, this suggestion is radical. It effectively questions the last half-century of nature
conservation practice and implicitly suggests that ideas that have guided conservationists
have to be abandoned. Since the idea of nature-unsullied underpins conservation effort,
suggesting that we need to rethink nature so that we do not continue to separate it from
culture effectively argues for the dismantling of the present structures of conservation. What
do we conserve and what do we aim our management at if the ultimate reference of nature
unsullied is removed?
I do not have any easy answers to these questions. I do not pretend here to offer an
alternative. But if the Foucauldian analyses of this thesis are reflected upon, questions of
alternatives and how to completely reconstruct nature should perhaps be seen as too
idealistic. Cultural change, quite simply, does not happen like that. While I might, on a
general level, suggest that we need to re-imagine nature, I am pragmatic enough to recognise
that such re-imagining is Utopian. The lesson that I take from having undertaken this research
is therefore that since the culture of nature conservation works through a 'micro-physics of
power', through small practices in specific contexts, it is in specific contexts that
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rationalisation and the dominant culture of nature conservation has to be resisted. We need to
open up spaces of resistance within current institutional frameworks; we need to find space
for different sorts of engagement with the natural world; we need to recognise that others
know the world in different ways; we need to find space for art and emotion; and we need to
reclaim wonder. It is only, I believe, by resisting the extension of rationalisation and striving
to develop new understandings of nature and new ways of relating to the world around us
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English Nature - The government agency responsible for nature conservation in England.
Established in 1991 when the Nature Conservancy Council was split into separate 'country
agencies'. Equivalent to Scottish Natural Heritage and the Countryside Council for Wales,
but with a slightly different remit, given the different arrangements in England and Scotland.
English nature does not, for example, deal with amenity issues or National Parks, which
were the responsibility of the Countryside Commission and now (since 1999) the
Countryside Agency.
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) - Now called the World
Conservation Union but retaining its original acronym, IUCN is the world forum on
conservation issues, especially endangered species and habitats.
Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC) - The organisation established at the same
time as the three country conservation agencies in 1991-1992 to advise the UK Government
ofUK-wide nature conservation issues.
National Nature Reserve (NNR) - Nature reserve owned or managed under agreement by
English Nature, the Countryside Council for Wales or Scottish Natural Heritage to conserve
wildlife or geological interest. The network of reserves, which was originally established by
the Nature Conservancy and developed by the Nature Conservancy Council, is meant to
ensure that all the important habitats or geological formations are represented. NNRs
therefore represent the finest examples ofBritain's habitats.
Nature Conservancy (NC) - Institutionalised through the National Parks and Access to the
Countryside Act 1949, the Nature Conservancy was the first science-based conservation
body in the world (Marren 2002). In its early years (1950-1965) the Nature Conservancy,
under the Directorship ofMax Nicholson, was responsible for the establishment of a nation¬
wide system of National Nature Reserves and Sites of Special Scientific Interest. In
Government, however, its role was ambiguous and questions were asked about its ability to
be scientific and impartial whilst also advocating that the conservation of nature was itself a
good thing. In 1973 the research and administrative sides of the agency were separated in
what came to be called 'the split' (Sheail 1998). Two new agencies were established: the
Nature Conservancy Council and the Institute for Terrestrial Ecology.
Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) - Established after the splitting-up of the Nature
Conservancy in 1973, the Nature Conservancy Council was responsible for the government
conservation activity between 1973 and 1991. After the split the NCCs emphasis shifted
away from scientific research - which had been one of the key elements in the establishment
of the Nature Conservancy - and towards site safeguard. Since the majority of the land in
National Nature Reserves and Sites of Special Scientific Interest was not owned by the NCC,
this was essentially an administrative task.
Red Data Books - Lists of endangered species. Originally developed at an international
level by IUCN. Red data books have subsequently been developed at the national level.
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) - The RSPB is one of the 'big three'
voluntary conservation organisations in the UK (with the Wildlife Trusts and the National
Trusts). Formed in 1891 and receiving its royal charter in 1904, the organisation gradually
grew and by 2002 had over one million members. It is a powerful force in conservation and
governmental circles (Marren 2002; Samstag 1988; Sheail 1976; Lowe and Goyder 1983).
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Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) - Sites that represent the best examples of wildlife
habitats in the UK. The SSSI is arguably the central pillar of governmental conservation in
the UK. Originally established under the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act
of 1949, they were strengthened and under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. While
designated by the Nature Conservancy Council, SSSIs were predominantly owned by private
landowners and benevolent management was secured by management agreement. SSSIs
fostered great resentment in the 1980s because of the ability of conservation agencies to
determine or inhibit what private landowners could do. The administration of SSSIs was
changed in England by the Countryside and Rights ofWay Act 2000 and is likely to change
in Scotland through the passage of the Nature Conservation Bill in the Scottish Parliament.
Scottish Biodiversity Group (SBG) - The Scottish Biodiversity Group was formed in 1996
so that the objectives of the UK Biodiversity Action Plan could be translated into action in
Scotland. In the context of there being separate conservation agencies in Scotland, England
and Wales, a UK-wide initiative was incongruous and hard to implement. Separate country
groups were established to tailor action planning to their particular context. While the
country groups came together in the UK Biodiversity Group (now the UK Biodiversity
Partnership), the result has been the development of different approaches to action planning.
Scottish Biodiversity Forum (SBF) - The Scottish Biodiversity Forum grew out of the
Scottish Biodiversity Group and was officially established in May 2002. This transformation
was thought necessary so as to open membership out to include Government agencies, local
authorities, voluntary bodies, farmers, fishermen, foresters, business and scientists in an
atmosphere of partnership. The SBF developed the Scottish Biodiversity Strategy between
2002-2004.
Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) - The government agency responsible for nature
conservation in Scotland. Established in 1991 when the Nature Conservancy Council was
split into separate 'country agencies' (with the Nature Conservancy Council for Scotland
forming a transitional arrangement between 1989 and 1991). Formed by merging the Nature
Conservancy Council in Scotland and the Countryside Commission for Scotland, SNH has
responsibility for landscape amenity issues and designations and for more strictly
conservation issues and designations.
UK Biodiversity Steering Group - The group (consisting of representatives from the
different country agencies, conservation NGOs, the JNCC, the Department of Environment,
academia and farming and land-owning communities) that was given the task of developing
a structure for the governmental response to the Convention of Biological Biodiversity as set
out in Biodiversity: The UKAction Plan. The group was sub-divided into smaller groups that
developed thinking on local biodiversity action planning, target setting, dealing with
biodiversity data and public awareness and involvement. The Steering Group published its
report in 1995 setting out example species and habitat action plans.
UK Biodiversity Group - The successor group to the UK Biodiversity Steering Group. In
its early work (1996-1998) the UK Biodiversity Group refined and extended action planning
by producing more action plans and filling the gaps left by the Steering Group. The Group
then focused on establishing reporting mechanisms so that progress against actions could be
monitored and produced the Millennium Biodiversity Report. In the years 2000-2003 the
Group sought to develop the National Biodiversity Network so that information could be
shared via the Internet and it sought ways of co-ordinating action between national groups.
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APPENDIX III: Interview Extract
Note on transcription. I chose a simple transcription procedure. When a speaker pauses I
indicate the pause thus: ... I note laughter and have included the ums and ers. I was not,
however, paying great attention to the time of the pause, overlapping speech or other small
detail because I did not envisage paying that much attention to the minutiae of the
interaction, as would a conversation analyst. Whilst the interviewee's answers appear
incredibly long and suggest editing, no such editing took place. They are long precisely
because my interviewees were extremely articulate.
Andrew: Ok, .. .well my next question is really kind of.. .easy in some respects but speaks to
difficult issues. And that's simply the question of why the capercaille and the black grouse
are important...
Interviewee: Well I think that probably comes out of the UK Biodiversity action plan
process.. .er er the once once you, once Rio reported the UK, I'm sure you know all this, the
UK Government then developed its response to Rio and .. .they made, for reasons you'd, you
know, have to go to the Government, I wasn't around at the time when all these decisions
were made, but they have majored very heavily on the species action plan side and the
habitat action plan side er and Defra and the Department of the Environment as they were,
have been heavily criticised for that by some. And there is some dissatisfaction in some
circles that that that the um government department the Department of Environment at the
time majored so heavily on what was one small aspect. You need to, it would be helpful
sometime if you could have a look at what we call the Scott report, have you got it, It's a
report Michael Scott did for SNH, I'm not quite sure how accessible it is, but erm I'm quite
happy to get you ahold of a copy of that, In which Michael tried, he's our Deputy Board
Chairman, what Michael tried to do was rebalance the effort. Anyway that's an aside, that's
an aside, the way the process worked was that the DOE majored very heavily at the time on
the species and habitat action plan side of the biodiversity convention. As a result of that
there was a decision made in order to develop a list of species which action would be taken
for and the UK biodiversity report highlighted those species, it initially categorised them
according to what I suspect at the time was perceived as the degree of threat um and er those
species which came out top, in the case of birds, er Corncrake, capercaillie, aquatic warbler
and a few others that what we, at the time was called the short list. And then there were a
group of species which were assigned to a thing called the middle list er, where it was still
intended to write action plans for them but they would be done slightly later, in a sort of
phased approach they would be brought on at a later stage. And then there was intended at
the time that there would be a much larger list of species which would be used as a sort of, as
a condensed list of all the species that we deal with, these would be kept a watch on and er
that was essentially the long list. Now how that process worked, how those lists were
developed I'm not quite sure, I wasn't around at the time. But since then the long list has
disappeared, it's been replaced by a thing called the species of conservation concern, the
SoCC list which is much bigger than the long list and then the middle and short list species
have been amalgamated and they are just priority species and a priority species is just a
species that has an action plan, a costed action plan. Now if you look at those species they
conform very well to er the species which appear on the RSPB's red list erm the match is not
absolutely identical but by and large if its on the red list then it is probable that it will have a
biodiversity action plan and certainly the other way round, all the biodiversity action plan
species are currently on the red list, I'm pretty certain, there may be one or two exceptions
but I'm fairly certain and that's how they were all prioritised. Now obviously in a Scottish
context a lot of those species that appeared on the short and the middle list, what ar priority
species, are English, Stone Curlew, things like that, not relevant up here erm and it is
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inevitable that attention should be focused on things like capercaillie, Corncrake. And in
terms of resources and effort, probably more effort's gone into corncrake than just about
anything else, but capercaillie's fast catching up at the moment and black grouse is lagging
quite considerably behind. And that's partly due to the way the process was phased in, you
know with corncrake and capercaillie coming first, the organisational structures developed
first and there is I suppose a sort of bureaucratic organisational time lag in terms of obtaining
and delivering resources. And I'm sure in the long term, probably five years time, if we've
cracked capercaillie erm then you will see a progressive switch of attention and resources to
some of the other species, you know black grouse, common scoter and many of the other
species that have come on relatively recently.
Andrew: Ok eer... I suppose I had a more specific question as well. Your response there was
how they were prioritised within the bureaucratic process, but those species must have been
identified as being in need of the process in the first place, and how were they identified in
that way, how do we decide that species is important?
Interviewee: Well... I think...I suspect, that much of the information on which we base,
certainly for the birds, and this is not true for many of the others species erm, we focused on
two particular things, we focused on straight rarity...but in a sense rarity is not the best way
of looking at species, but for many taxonomic groups that's all we have to go on, erm but
what has exercised the mind of ornithologists for quite a long time, and that's the basis
behind the red lists, and you know the RSPB's red, amber and green categorisation, is trends
within the populations. And ultimately for birds we have much better trend information, for
most other taxonomic groups we are lucky if we've got even distribution information or
population information and the idea of having trend information, but for birds we have very
good trend information. Now I think, in a sense, if you look at the Biodiversity action plans
there is quite a fundamental difference between the ornithological ones and many of the
others because trend information is very important in that process, many of the species that
are in the biodiversity action plan are widespread and yet they are there because they have
very very rapid decreasing trends. Obviously that applies particularly to the skylark and you
know most of the other farmland birds. Even capercaillie. If you look at it, it's distribution is
still fairly widespread and if you compare the distribution of a lot of the bird species with say
a lot of the vascular plants and a lot of the invertebrates what characterises the inclusion of a
lot of those species is the fact that they are pretty restricted in their range, they have very
disjunct distributions with small populations here, that are scattered, fragmented populations
and often the sort of knowledge, state of knowledge that's based on whether or not they were
suitable for inclusion has really relied purely on distributional information erm and and very
little on trend information. We're trying, I mean I think in the vascular plant community,
they are beginning through development of repeat atlases, they are beginning to to this sort
of information and they are beginning to identify those species which are suffering. But I
think that what characterises the birds, and so in a sense its an inevitable, I mean the
biodiversity process wasn't new it didn't re-invent the wheel or anything like that it hijacked
the existing one, if you want to call it hijacked, its not exactly it's a pejorative term. But it
made use of existing processes for categorising birds into threat categories. And you have to
remember that most of these plans at this early stage were written by the RSPB, you know
the RSPB were very heavily involved. So it was inevitable that, what eventually came out of
it was er, this is probably being slightly tendentious but but you know accorded very much
with an RSPB agenda. Which I think everybody accepts, there is nothing sinister about that
really er I'm sure even DoE were perfectly well aware of that er ...and so were the country
agencies at the time, but it was there it was on the shelf so why not use it.
Andrew: yeah, definitely...to be a bit more specific on the capercaillie, how would you erm
identify the requirements that the capercaillie needed in its niche
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Interviewee: how did we identify or how do we identify the requirements
Andrew: both
Interviewee: well, its one of those species that's been very well researched for certainly since
the sort of the I would say the mid '70s or so, you know there has been a long running
research programme undertaken by what was the institute for terrestrial ecology is now the
Centre of Ecology and Hydrology. Erm and so...we had a very good, what I would call an
autecological basis on which to assess requirements erm so I think there has been...it's the
way you develop any species... an action plan for any species, you have to understand it's
ecology and er ...we have probably for capercaillie less than anything else yeah probably
black grouse follows on from that but you know there was a lot of the essential fundamental
research a lot of the fundamental science had been done already or was in the process of
being done and that's not meant that there has not been additional required research on that.
And there is quite a difference there with some of the farmland birds where you looked at it
there was very little autecological research and much of the action that has been taking place
for many of the farmland birds over the last few years has been getting the fundamental
research sorted out erm and you know it would include a wide range of issues from tree
sparrow and com buntings and things like that and there are still research requirements for
some of those species. But we were lucky ...we were fortunate in having a very good
autecological basis for capercaillie it was a very well known species. In a sense that tends
that...in a sense that tends to buy us the process anyway. I mean capercaille was chosen
because it was so well known erm and because there was you know the work that had been
undertaken had identified this very rapid decline, whether its as rapid as the population
figures suggest is open to question, there is some, there's some, theirs is very good reason to
suppose that the figure of 20,000 which is quoted in the the er species action plan was
somewhat fanciful at the time. But has the population declined - yes - no doubt about it, has
it declined fast - yes it has declined fast. There is no doubt about the need, probably yes at
the moment. Does that help at all.?
Andrew: I think so. You made a distinction between did and do. Is it different now?
Interviewee: er I think our, the requirements now are different. They are much more focused,
we tend to focus them much more ...what happened...why CEH or ITE as they were spent
so much time on capercaillie back in the '70s is, I really don't know, you'd have to go back
into the mists of time. And it often focuses on the interests of one particular individual, I
mean CEH has always had this fascination and interest in 'the grouse'. Although
interestingly they sort of partition and red grouse get taken by or used to get taken by
ITE.. .er the pioneering work of Adam Watson, David Jenkins and Bob Moss and people like
that although red grouse has now been taken very heavily on by the Game Conservancy
Trust erm and then Bob Moss developed his interest in Capercaillie and its probably the, you
know, you have to remember that .. .a lot of these processes for a lot of these species, not all
of them, are so uniquely tied to individuals or organisations or groups. With capercaillie you
just cannot get away from the name of Bob Moss...and he has been a driving force in the
process and still continues to be very very important driving force in the process. But in
terms of the research and action that is needed, yes things have changed, it's much more
focused. But its still a requirement erm having said that the time for actually pure
autecological work is over and you know we have to pull our finger out and do the work
now.
Andrew: to do that work, how do you translate that research into identifying a management
strategy that fulfils the requirements that you've identified?
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Interviewee: Its not a particular, I mean that that that isn't rocket science. The research,
much of the research that has been done has focused heavily on you know various aspects of
the life history of Capercaillie. Particularly in terms of the breeding habitat requirements,
erm and once you know that you have a sort ofmanagement menu for a particular species in
terms of what the particular species likes in terms of the proportions of different habitats.
And the question is whether or not those conditions exist in suitable abundance across the
range, now you know, and you identify those factors which er you know are responsible for
deterioration of those features and try and address those and obviously one of those is
grazing and grazing pressure, er that has been identified as an important factor and that has
to be dealt with. That can be dealt with at a number of particular scales. It can be addressed
at the site scale, so you know action can be very localised in terms of you know what RSPB
have done with red deer grazing at Abernethy. But that isn't always necessary sorry that isn't
always appropriate and sometimes some of this work has to be done on a much larger scale
and that could involve the Deer Commission. And I think that's one of the interesting things
about, one of the interesting things about conservation is often we are very successful in
dealing with requirements of species at a very local scale, you know its relatively easy to
manage Abernethy for capercaillie... but many of these species often require to be managed
at a much broader scale and many of the issues which...and that if anything is where the
biodiversity process has not been successful. It hasn't addressed the big policy issues, it
hasn't had the bearing on the CAP you know things like that that we would have liked it to
have done erm and those I think are some of the erm. If you look at the notable successes
within the biodiversity action plan, those species where we have really made progress, they
are often those that are relatively site restricted where you know the action is not particularly
complex, arises out of a good understanding of the auteco you know the ecology of the
species that you can take a very specific piece of action on that particular site or a number of
sites and hey presto your population recovers and you can see that with some of the vascular
plant species aswell really that when we understand the ecology we can do a lot for them
relatively easily and often relatively cheaply erm, the difficulties come with those species
which are much wider you know have a much wider dispersion and where some of the
important policies are operating on a much broader scale and the CAP is a good one, forestry
is another one. I think that's probably an area where we have been much more successful in
terms of turning around certainly forestry, old forestry practices of blanket afforestation with
conifers, you know that policy has changed and the Forestry Commission is not the same
organisation that it was ten years ago so we've been successful in that particular area. Um
...so again I'm not quite sure if that strictly answers your question...The process is not a
particularly complicated one but it does rest on having a good understanding of the science
and erm when you have an understanding of the science erm then there is an issue of
translating that into policy. I think you know if we look at a more specific issue with
capercaillie and if you look at the fence issue which is one that came to the fore probably a
lot later than some of the others you know we only really understood and realised that fences
were having the effect they have.. .probably.. .say well at most ten years ago, but most of the
research was done in the mid nineties really. You know so for a species that has probably
been on the slide since the seventies, we came onto fences relatively recently but you know
in terms of the way that we respond to that, the political response, the policy response has
been relatively rapid once that research has gone through all its, you know the academic side
of thins, you know there was a process of actually getting that advice into government,
getting government to accept that advice, er, and then getting them to do something about it.
And that process has happened and I mean there are many people will say it hasn't happened
fast enough but I think for Government it's probably happened pretty quickly actually.. .You
know, I mean probably five to ten, certainly five even, certainly ten years ago but you could
argue that up to five years ago erm, the wide held view among land management and land
practitioners was that is you want forest regeneration you did it with deer fences and now
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deer fences are an ugly word and deer fences are no longer seen as being an acceptable way
of dealing with the problem and then that leads us into the issue of culling red deer...that's
obviously another issue, but it's interesting to see how quickly what was, I would say
probably you could argue five years ago, how a perfectly acceptable policy has been turned
round and it is now, you know the government has been subsidising landowners to put up
deer fences for many years and the Forestry Commission with WGS grants have paid for
fences and now we spend seven hundred thousand pounds paying the very same landowners
to take the bloody things down. That's quite a rapid turn around in policy I think ... [laughs]
Andrew: Yes... there's lots of examples in nature conservation... as new understandings
have developed, taking for example lodgepole pine as a nursery crop and now they are re-
seeding having to pay to get them cut down.
Interviewee: Governments will always see it as a sort of seamless process but in fact when
you look at it, in hindsight, when you look at it it is such a complete about turn, a complete
volt face it is quite amusing to look back on it really...
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APPENDIX IV
THE 37 BROAD HABITATS, THE 38 KEY HABITATS AND EC HABITATS
DIRECTIVE LISTED HABITATS FOR SPECIAL ATTENTION (Source: UK
Biodiversity Steering Group 1995a: 23-24).
Broad Habitats Key habitats (* =
costed action plan
prepared)
EC Habitats Directive - Annex I
types (+ = priority in the
Directive)
1. Broadleaved and yew Upland oakwood*
Lowland beech
Upland mixed ash woodland
Wet woodlands
Old oak woods with Ilex and Blechnum in the
British Isles
Beech forests with Ilex and Taxus rich in epiphytes
(llici-Fagion)
Asperulo-Fagetum beech forests
Stellario-Carpinetum oak hornbeam forests
Tilio-Acerion ravine forests+
Bog woodland+
Residual alluvial forests (Alnion glutinoso-
incanae)+





3. Native pine woodland Native pine wood* Caledonian forests-
4. Lowland wood pastures Lowland wood pastures and
parklands
5. Boundary features Ancient and/or species - rich
hedgerows*






Lowland hay meadows (Alopecurus pratensis,
Sanguisorba officinalis)
Mountain hay meadows (British types with
Geranium sylvaticum)
9. Acid grassland Lowland dry acid grassland
Purple moor grass and rush
pastures*
Siliceous alpine and boreal grasslands
Molinia meadows on chalk and clay (Eu-Molinion)
10. Calcareous grassland Lowland calcareous grassland Semi-natural dry grasslands and scrubland facies on
calcareous
substrates (Festuco-Brometalia) (important orchid
sites)+
Semi-natural dry grasslands and scrubland facies on
calcareous
substrates (Festuco-Brometalia)
Species-rich Nardus grassland, on siliceous
substrates in mountain
areas (and sub-mountain areas, in continental
Europe)+
Alpine calcareous grasslands
Juniperus communis formations on heaths or
calcareous grasslands
11. Lowland heathland Lowland heathland* Northern Atlantic wet heaths with Erica tetralix
Southern Atlantic wet heaths with Erica ciliaris and
Erica telralix+
Dry heaths (all subtypes)
Dry coastal heaths with Erica vagans and Ulex
maritimus+
12. Grazing marsh Coastal and floodplain grazing
marsh*





Calcareous fens with Cladium mariscus and carex
davalliana+
Petrifying springs with tufa formations
(Cratoneurion)-t-
Alpine pioneer formations of Caricion bioloris
atrofuscae+
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Molinia meadows on chalk and clay (Eu-Molinion)
Transition mires and quaking bogs
Depressions on peat substrates (Rhynchosporion)
14. Lowland raised bog Raised bog Active raised bogs+
Degraded raised bogs (still capable of natural
regeneration)
Depressions on peat substrates (Rhynchosporion)
15. Standing open water Mesotrophic standing waters*
Eutrophic standing waters
Aquifer fed naturally fluctuating
water bodies
Natural eutrophic lakes with Magnopotamion or
Hydrocharition
-type vegetation
Hard oligo-mesotrophic waters with benthic
vegetation of chara
formations
Oligotrophy waters containing very few minerals of
Atlantic sandy
plains with amphibious vegetation: Lobelia,
Litlorella and Isoetes
Oligotrophy waters in medio-European and
perialpine areas with
amphibious vegetation:
Littorella or Isoetes or annual vegetation on exposed
banks
Dystrophic lakes
16. Rivers and streams Chalk rivers* Floating vegetation of Ranunculus of plain and
submountainous rivers
17. Canals
18. Montane (alpine and
subalpine types)
Alpine and subalpine heaths
Sub-Arctic willow scrub
Eutrophic tall herbs
19. Upland heathland Upland heathland Juniperus communis formations on heaths or
calcareous grasslands
Northern Atlantic wet heaths with Erica tetralix
Dry heaths (all types)
20. Blanket bog Blanket bog Blanket bog (active only)+
21. Maritime cliff and slope Maritime cliff and slope Vegetated sea cliffs of the Atlantic and Baltic coasts
22. Shingle above high tide
mark
Coastal vegetated shingle structure Perennial vegetation of stony banks
Annual vegetation of drift lines
23. Boulders and rock above
high tide
24. Coastal: strandline
25. Machair Machair Machair
26. Saltmarsh Coastal: saltmarsh Salicornia and other annuals colonising mud and
sand
Spartina swards (Spartinion)
Atlantic salt meadows (Glauco-Puccinellietalia)
Mediterranean salt meadows (Juncetalia maritimi)
Mediterranean and thermo-Atlantic halophilous
scrubs
(Arthrocnemetalia fructicosae)
27. Sand dune Coastal sand dune (including dune
grass, dune heath, dune scrub and
strandline vegetation)
Embryonic shifting dunes
Shifting dunes along the shoreline with Ammophila
arenaria (white
dunes)
Fixed dunes with herbaceous vegetation (grey
dunes)+
Decalcified fixed dunes with Empetrum nigrum+
Eu-Atlantic decalcified fixed dunes (Calluno-
Uliceae)+
Dunes with Salix arenaria
Humid dune slacks
Dune juniper thickets (Juniperus spp)+
28. Estuaries Estuaries Estuaries
Mudflats and sandflats not covered by sea water at
low tide
29. Saline lagoons Saline lagoons* Lagoons+
30. Islands and archipelagos
31. Inlets and enclosed bays
(including sea lochs, rias
and voes)




Large shallow inlets and bays
32. Open coast Maerl beds Sandbanks which are slightly covered by sea water
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Chalk coasts (littoral and
sublittoral)
all the time
Mudflats and sandflats not covered by sea water at
low tide
Reefs
Submerged or partly submerged sea caves
33. Open sea water column
34. Shelfbreak
35. Offshore seabed
36. Limestone pavements Limestone pavements* Siliceous scree
Eutric scree
Chasmophytic vegetation on rocky slopes -
Calcareous sub-types






Revisions to the Broad Habitat Classification (Source: UK Biodiversity Group
2000: 36-37).
Original broad habitat type Change made Revised broad habitat type
1 Broadleaved and yew Redefined to include mixed woodland 1 Broadleaved, mixed and yew
woodland
2 Planted coniferous woodland Redefined to include native and semi-
natural coniferous woodland
2 Coniferous woodland
3 Native pine woodland Now only recognised as a Priority
habitat type
4 Lowland wood pastures and
parkland
Now only recognised as a Priority
habitat type
5 Boundary features Redefined to include linear features 3 Boundary and linear features
6 Arable Redefined to include horticulture and
woody crops
4 Arable and horticulture
7 Improved grassland Unchanged 5 Improved grassland
8 Unimproved neutral grassland Redefined to include semi-improved
neutral grassland
6 Neutral grassland
10 Calcareous grassland Unchanged 7 Calcareous grassland
9 Acid grassland Unchanged 8 Acid grassland
Added 9 Bracken
11 Lowland heathland Redefined to include upland heathland 10 Dwarf shrub heath
12 Grazing marsh Priority habitat
13 Fens, carr, marsh, swamp and
reedbed
Redefined to remove carr and include
flushes
11 Fen, marsh and swamp
14 Lowland raised bog Redefined to include blanket bogs 12 Bogs
15 Standing open water Redefined to include canals 13 Standing open water and canals
16 Rivers and streams Unchanged 14 Rivers and streams
17 Canals Deleted and incorporated into standing
open water
18 Montane Restricted to only habitats which occur
exclusively in the montane zone
15 Montane habitats
19 Upland heathland Deleted and incorporated into Dwarf
shrub heath
20 Blanket bog Deleted and incorporated into Bogs
36 Limestone pavements Now only recognised as a Priority
habitat type
Added 16 Inland rock
37 Urban Redefined to include all built-up areas 17 Built-up areas and gardens
21 Maritime cliff and slope Priority habitat
23 Boulders and rocks above high
tide
Removed
22 Shingle above high tide mark Priority habitat and renamed coastal
vegetated shingle
24 Coastal strandline Removed
25 Machair Priority habitat
26 Saltmarsh Priority habitat
27 Sand dune Priority habitat
28 Estuaries Removed
29 Saline lagoons Priority habitat
30 Islands and archipelagos Removed
31 Inlets and enclosed bays Removed
32 Open coast Removed
34 Shelf break Removed
33 Open sea water column Removed
35 Offshore seabed Removed
Added 18 Supralittoral rock
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Added 19 Supralittoral sediment
Added 20 Littoral rock
Added 21 Littoral sediment
Added 22 Inshore sublittoral rock
Added 23 Inshore sublittoral sediment
Added 24 Offshore shelf rock
Added 25 Offshore shelf sediment
Added 26 Continental shelf slope
Added 27 Oceanic seas
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APPENDIX VI
Relationship between the revised broad habitats and priority habitat
types (Source: UK Biodiversity Group 2000: 38-39).
No. Broad habitat Priority habitat
1 Broadleaved, mixed and yew woodland Upland oakwood
Lowland beech and yew woodland
Upland mixed ashwoods
Wet woodland
Lowland wood pasture and parkland 1
2 Coniferous woodland Native pine woods
3 Boundary and linear features Ancient and/or species rich hedgerows
4 Arable and horticulture Cereal field margins
5 Improved grassland Coastal and floodplain grazing marsh 1
6 Neutral grassland Lowland meadows
Upland hay meadows
7 Calcareous grassland Lowland calcareous grassland
Upland calcareous grassland
8 Acid Grassland Lowland dry acid grassland
9 Bracken No associated priority habitat
10 Dwarf shrub heath Lowland heathland
Upland heathland
11 Fen, marsh and swamp Purple moor grass and rush pastures
Fens
Reedbeds
12 Bogs Lowland raised bog
Blanket bog
13 Standing open water and canals Mesotrophic lakes
Eutrophic standing waters
Aquifer fed naturally fluctuating water bodies
14 Rivers and streams Chalk rivers
15 Montane habitats No associated priority habitat
16 Inland rock Limestone pavements
17 Built up areas and gardens No associated priority habitat
18 Supra littoral rock Maritime cliff and slopes
19 Supra littoral sediment Coastal sand dunes
Coastal vegetated shingle
Machair
20 Littoral rock Littoral chalk (one plan with sublittoral chalk) 2
Sabellaria alveolata reefs
21 Littoral sediment Coastal saltmarsh
Mudflats
Seagrass beds (Zostera noltii) 2
Sheltered muddy gravels
22 Inshore sublittoral rock Modiolus modiolus beds
Sabellaria spinulosa reefs
Sublittoral chalk (one plan with littoral chalk)
Tidal rapids
23 Inshore sublittoral sediment Maerl beds
Mud habitats in deep water
Saline lagoons
Seagrass beds (Zostera marina)
Serpulid reefs
Sublittoral sands and gravels 2
24 Offshore shelf rock No associated priority habitat
25 Offshore shelf sediment Sublittoral sands and gravels
26 Continental shelf slope Lophelia pertusa reefs
27 Oceanic seas No associated priority habitat
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APPENDIX VII




1.1 The capercaillie is a localised breeding species
which is largely confined to Scottish native pinewoods.
In the UK, it became extinct in the mid-18th century and
was re-introduced in the mid-19th. Numbers have
declined rapidly throughout its range in Northern Europe
over recent decades with the current UK population
estimate now standing at 2,200 birds in winter.
1.2 The capercaillie is listed on Annex 1 of the Birds
Directive and Appendix II of the Bern Convention. It is
also listed on Schedules 2, 3 and 9 of the WCA 1981.
2. CURRENT FACTORS CAUSING LOSS OR
DECLINE
2.1 The factors affecting this species are poorly
understood but may include:
2.1.1 Predation due to a reduction in keepering.
2.1.2 Collisions with deer fences.
2.1.3 Over-shooting and human disturbance.
2.1.4 Over-grazing by deer and sheep reducing the
vigour of ground vegetation.
2.1.5 An increase in adverse weather conditions during
June when chicks are newly hatched.
3. CURRENT ACTION
3.1 Management prescriptions have been implemented
to increase numbers of breeding capercaillie and
suitability of habitat in a number of forests, i.e. natural
pinewoods and areas with better Vaccinium field layers.
3.2 Research into preferred habitat is ongoing,
managed by the inter-agency Capercaillie Working
Group in Scotland.
3.3 Voluntary bans on shooting are in place on many
estates and all FE forests
4. ACTION PLAN OBJECTIVES AND TARGETS
4.1 This species has declined in recent years. The plan
aims to halt the decline, the causes of which are
becoming clearer, and to restore the species to its
former range.
4.2 Halt the decline of the capercaillie in its core range
in eastern and central Scotland by 2000.
4.3 Maintain, and expand where possible, the range and
population numbers of capercaillie in Scotland to 20,000
(the status of the early 1970s) by 2010.
5. PROPOSED ACTIONS WITH LEAD AGENCIES
5.1 Policy and legislation
5.1.1 Seek to protect, manage, create and
enhance native pinewoods for the benefit of
capercaillie. (ACTION: FA, FE, SNH, SOAEFD)
5.2 Site safeguard and management
5.2.1 Encourage sympathetic management of
Scots pine, especially extended rotations in
commercial plantations. (ACTION: FA, FE,
SNH)
5.2.2 Encourage management of non-Scots
pine woodland for capercaillie within, or close
to, existing capercaillie ranges. (ACTION: FA,
FE, SNH)
5.2.3 Consider aerial spraying of insecticide
within, or close to, existing ranges on a case-by-
case basis to avoid undue impact to
capercaillie. (ACTION: FA, FE)
5.2.4 Seek to enhance the continuity of existing
isolated woodland fragments within the current
range of the species. (ACTION: FA, FE, SNH)
5.2.5 Promote reduced grazing by deer and
sheep to encourage regeneration of native
pinewood and blaeberry understorey, and to
allow removal of fences. (ACTION: FA, Red
Deer Commission, SOAEFD)
5.3 Species management and protection
5.3.1 Encourage removal of forest fences where
practicable and, following further research by
the Capercaillie Working Group, improve
visibility of remaining fences. (ACTION: FA, FE,
SNH)
5.3.2 Consider adding capercaillie to Schedule
1 of the WCA 1981 to make disturbance of
nesting birds an offence. (ACTION: DOE,
SOAEFD)
5.3.3 Encourage private estates and FE to
continue the voluntary ban on shooting
capercaillie. (ACTION: SNH)
5.4 Advisory
5.4.1 Provide advice to landowners and
managers of native pinewoods and plantations
on favourable methods of management for
capercaillie, in particular managers of estates
considering re-introduction or re-stocking
programmes. (ACTION: FA, SNH)
5.4.2 Ensure the provision of appropriate advice
on predator control. (ACTION: SNH)
5.5 Future Research and Monitoring
5.5.1 Survey suitable sites to assess the
number and breeding success of capercaillie in
relation to methods of habitat management and
predator control, and their inter-relationship with
other native pinewood species. (ACTION: SNH)
5.5.2 Establish the frequency of collisions of
capercaillie with deer fences and research the
effectiveness of marking fences in reducing
collision risks. (ACTION: FC, SNH)
5.5.3 Encourage a survey of numbers and
distribution, and establish a long-term
population monitoring scheme. (ACTION: SNH)
5.5.4 Pass information gathered during survey
and monitoring of this species to JNCC or BRC
so that it can be incorporated in national
databases. (ACTION: SNH)
5.5.5 Provide information annually to Birdlife
International on the UK status of the species to
contribute to maintenance of an up-to-date
global red list. (ACTION: JNCC)
5.6 Communications and Publicity
5.6.1 Lek sites should remain confidential to
protect the breeding population. (ACTION:
SNH)
5.6.2 Consider publishing a Code of Practice for
birdwatching, to highlight the problems of
human activity in the vicinity of capercaillie and
other sensitive species and advise on
appropriate techniques. (ACTION: SNH, JNCC).
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